THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE.

BAXTER, PRINTER, OXFORD.

THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE,

WITH ENGLISH NOTES.

BY

JOHN S. BREWER, M.A.

QUEEN'S COLLEGE, OXFORD.

Non nisi ex Aristotele ipso discas demum Aristotelem intelligere.

BUHLE.

OXFORD,

HENRY SLATTER, HIGH STREET;

WHITTAKER AND CO., LONGMAN AND CO., SIMPKIN AND MARSHALL, LONDON;

T. STEVENSON, CAMBRIDGE; W. JACKSON, NEW YORK.

MDCCCXXXVI.

PREFACE.

In preparing this edition of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics for the press, I have followed the text of Bekker's smaller edition, published in the year 1831, from which I have seldom ventured to deviate except upon the authority of the MSS. or ancient commentators; and on such occasions I have always retained the rejected reading in the notes. In dividing the books into chapters and subdividing the chapters into paragraphs, as their previous division rested not on the sanction of antiquity, I have allowed myself unreserved liberty, incorporating two or more chapters into one, or breaking up one chapter into several, where by so doing the unity of the subject was better preserved, or the argument rendered more intelligible. But in order to obviate any inconvenience consequent upon such alterations, I have retained in the inner margin the numbering of the chapters as they are marked in Bekker's edition.

The advantage to be derived from thus dividing the chapters into paragraphs, and distinguishing each paragraph with a capital letter, upon the introduction of a new argu-

ment, is too obvious to require specific mention; especially as this edition is intended merely for the use of those who are commencing the study of Aristotle. But as the interpretation of a passage sometimes depends on such a division, it becomes necessary to advertise the reader, that in this respect, I have been guided by a merely arbitrary rule, and by what appeared to be the sense of the author.

It now only remains for me to state the authorities which I have principally followed in compiling the notes and illustrations to the text. However imperfectly the design has been realized, my chief object has been to illustrate Aristotle by himself; a mode of interpretation more necessary for the Ethics than for many of his other writings, inasmuch as the diffusive yet inaccurate Scholia of Eustratius, or the more meagre labors of Michaelis Ephesius or Aspasius, furnish but a poor substitute for the learned commentaries of an Alexander, a Simplicius, or a Johannes Philoponus.

The earliest commentaries upon the Ethics appeared in the shape of a Paraphrase; and to some attempt of this kind in all probability we owe the Magna Moralia and the Eudemean Ethics[a]. Of these, the most valuable is that

[a] This accounts for the reason why such copious extracts and even entire books of the Ethics occur verbally in these

which is generally attributed to Andronicus Rhodius, which was first published by Daniel Heinsius at Leyden in 1607, reprinted at Cambridge in 1679, and finally at Oxford in 1809.

Next to these are the Greek Scholia published by Aldus at Venice in 1536, folio[b], of which a Latin version by Gio. Bern. Feliciano[c] was printed at Paris in 1543, folio,

treatises. For where the subject was not very intricate, or very difficult, such extracts would coincide with the design of the author. These works, however, have often been attributed to Aristotle; but a strong internal evidence may be urged against this supposition; not so much from the style, as on account of their remarkable discrepancy from the Nicomachean Ethics, and his other writings.

[b] Of this collection, the commentaries on the first, second, third, and fourth books are attributed to Eustratius, Bishop of Nice; on the fifth to Michaelis Ephesius, the sixth to Eustratius, the seventh and eighth to Aspasius, the ninth and tenth to Eustratius. But it is not probable that Eustratius is the author of the commentary on the tenth book, because the author of that book calls Heracleitus of Ephesus his fellow-citizen, and because, from the commentary on the third chapter of the first book, it is clear that Eustratius was a warm supporter of Plato against the objections of Aristotle; while on the other hand, from the commentary upon the second and third chapters of the tenth book, we should infer quite the contrary. This collection I have generally quoted by the term "Scholia."

[c] For the use of this book I am indebted to the kindness of my friend, the present Librarian of New College. The publisher of Felician pretends, that another MS. of the Greek original was collated for this book; but in all the difficult and corrupt passages I have observed, that the Translator does not give a faithful version as on other occasions, but merely a paraphrase.

and dedicated to Cardinal Alexander Farnese.

The merit of the writers in this collection is very unequal; for while the commentaries of Alexander of Aphrodisium, Simplicius, and others, upon the physical and metaphysical writings of Aristotle, have preserved to us not only some valuable notices of the state and history of philosophy, but also several fragments of the lost writings of Aristotle, they exhibit a much deeper acquaintance with the Peripatetic system than either Eustratius or Aspasius, who possess none of the other advantages. Besides, the Platonic partialities of Eustratius, his evident anxiety to vindicate his master, and to reconcile at any rate his tenets with those of Aristotle, render him an unsafe guide wherever his prejudices are brought into action. And this liability is more frequent than at first sight would appear when it is considered, that indirect references to Plato occur throughout this treatise; that in most instances no specific mention is made of Plato's name, nor the particular passages or treatises verbally or definitely quoted, against which the whole force of an objection is directed. To this may be added, that several of the most important writings of Plato have been lost, and that consequently, did we but possess them all, instances would be found of this commentator's misrepresentations more numerous than can

easily now be determined. These difficulties, in conjunction with the practice of Aristotle, who seldom quotes his authorities, or the names of the writers whom he is refuting, frequently occasion great obscurity, and must furnish my apology if I have often brought forward in the notes parallel passages from Plato and other writers which appear to bear but little on the text.

Of the almost innumerable Latin Commentators, the most valuable are Albertus Magnus[d] and Thomas Aquinas[e]. But their labors are far more adapted to those who are already conversant with the philosophy of Aristotle, than to those who are only commencing the study.

From the date of these Schoolmen till the commencement of the fifteenth century, nothing was done towards explaining the text of the Ethics or the moral philosophy of Aristotle. Men were content to follow the steps of the scholastic commentators, rather than to consult the original; to comment and compose annotations on the commentaries already existing

[d] See Alberti Magni Ethica, vol. iv. of his Works, published at Lyons (Lugduni), 1651.

[e] I do not mean his professed commentary upon the Ethics, which is little else than a paraphrase, but his Summa Totius Theologiæ; particularly the second and third parts, known by the names of Secunda Summa and Tertia Summa.

without attempting to seek for fresh information from authentic and original sources.

But the revival of learning under the auspices of Pope Nicholas V. breathed fresh vigor and animation into the lifeless and attenuated form of Greek literature, and especially of Greek philosophy. By the indefatigable research of this most illustrious Pontiff, Greek books and manuscripts were procured from all parts of the globe; and the most celebrated scholars of every nation were invited to his court to transcribe and translate them. Poggio, George of Trebizond, Leonardo Bruni of Arezzo, Giannozzo Manetti, Fr. Filelfo, Laur. Valla, Theod. Gaza, and Guarini, formed part of this illustrious circle, who were encouraged by his bounty, and preferred to places of honor and emolument. By their exertions, a flood of light burst forth upon the astonished world, and penetrated through the dusky regions of monastic seclusion. Where the Master of the Sentences, Aquinas and Scotus, had ruled with an undisputed and undivided sway, a new race of literary champions were springing up, prepared to dispute their claims, and to question the supremacy even of Aristotle and of Plato.

Men of the greatest literary eminence were now earnestly engaged in the no very philosophical contest of placing the one or the other of these philosophers on the highest pinnacle of literary renown, to the utter degradation of

his rival. The world rung with the disputes of the Aristotelian and the Platonist; nor can the days of romance produce an instance where greater zeal and devotion were displayed by rival knights and squires in the service of some earthly goddess of their idolatry, than was shown by the rival champions of Aristotle and Plato in vindicating the peerless superiority of their respective masters[f].

This dispute, however, although perhaps trivial in itself, was great and beneficial in its consequences. These literary skirmishes taught men to feel their own powers, opened their eyes to a more perfect appreciation of the ancient philosophy; and they who had been engaged

[f] This controversy commenced in an amusing way, originating with Gemistius Plethon, who had inspired Cosmo di Medici with a predilection for Platonism. This brisk and staunch old scholar had been sent to the Council of Ferrara to take part in the conferences between the two Churches; upon which occasion he combated so warmly for his own, that, contrary to the example of several of his compatriots, he refused to make a single confession. He wrote a treatise in Greek upon the difference between the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, in which he turned into ridicule the opinions of those who thought the two philosophers could be reconciled, and treated with much contempt both Aristotle and his followers. Upon this the Aristotelians took fire, and entered the lists against him; but Plethon died before he could reply. Two of the most earnest and eminent who engaged in this quarrel were Cardinal Bessarion and George of Trebisond. See Ginguené, Hist. Litt. d'Italie, iii. p. 357.

in contending for others, had now learned to venture for themselves. The names of some who were most eagerly engaged in these disputes, are still illustrious in the annals of literature, and Europe still venerates the memory of Bessarione, Don. Acciajuoli, Argiropulo, Erm. Barbaro, Marsiglio Ficino, Giov. Pico dalla Mirandola, Cristoforo Landino, Poliziano, Alexander and his son Franc. Piccolomini, Laur. Donati, Franc. Patrizi, Charpentier, and Bembo.

But it would be superfluous to enter here into a detail of the merits of this controversy, to show what advantages it produced towards the illustration of Aristotle generally, or of the Ethics in particular; nor shall I weary the reader's patience by enumerating the host of modern commentators, who have devoted their time to the illustration of this treatise, particularly after the labors of Buhle, Zell, and Hoffman. I shall therefore only mention those which after some examination appear to me to be the most deserving of notice.

1. The earliest of these is Jo. Argiropulo with his disciple Acciajuoli, to whose deserts the celebrated Victor has paid a merited eulogium[g]. Argiropulo was a native of Byzantium, and upon the capture of that city by the Turks retired to Florence, where he was liberally received by Cosimo di Medici. In this splendid

[g] See p. 357, note to this Edition.

retreat he became tutor to Peter the son, and Lorenzo the grandson, of Cosmo; and numbered among other pupils the celebrated Angelo Poliziano. To avoid the plague which devastated Tuscany during the latter part of his life, he retired to Rome, where he died in 1480. His Latin version of the Ethics was first published in 1488, and republished several times within that century. In 1535 it was reprinted at Venice, with the commentary of his pupil Acciajuoli[h], and again at Paris more accurately in 1555.

2. The next and most important is the commentary of Victorius (Pietro Vettori), born of noble parents at Florence, July 11, 1499. The attentions of this eminent scholar were not confined merely to literary exertions; he took an active part in the political divisions which agitated his country. Upon the tragical death of Alexander of Medici, he intended to settle at Rome, but was diverted from his purpose by the Grand Duke Cosmo di Medici, who appreciated his talents, and recalled him the following year (1538) to Florence. Here he was appointed Professor of the Greek and Latin tongues; and having filled the chair with much reputation and ability, was elected by acclama-

[h] This commentary is attributed by Buhle to Argiropulo incorrectly. See the dedication prefixed to the Paris Edition of this version and commentary, and Acciajuoli's own dedication to Cosmo di Medici.

tion President of the Florentine Academy in 1542. He died at an advanced age at Florence, loaded with civil and literary honours, December 18, 1585, a year after the publication of his Commentary upon the Ethics [i].

3. Johannes Magirus, Doctor of Medicine, and Professor of Natural Philosophy in the Academy of Marpurg; author of an ingenious commentary upon the Ethics, which he was prevented from completing by a premature death. His work was published at Frankfort in 1601, 12mo [k].

4. Hubert Van Giffen, (Giphanius), a celebrated jurist, born in 1534 at Burn, a little village in the ancient duchy of Gueldres. After commencing his studies at Louvain, he removed to Paris, and finally to Orleans in 1566, where he received a Doctor's degree the subsequent year. Having travelled over Italy, he at length fixed himself at Strasbourg, where he taught philosophy and civil law. In consequence of his reputation he was appointed Professor of Civil Law at Ingolstadt; but attracting the notice of Rodolph the Second, was

[i] Petri Victorii Commentarii in X libros Aristotelis de Moribus ad Nicomachum. Positis ante singulas declarationes Græcis verbis auctoris: iisdemque ad verbum Latine expressis. Florentiæ ex officina Junctarum 1584. fol. On the reverse is a portrait of him in his 81st (86th ?) year.

[k] Dr. Joannis Magiri Philosophiæ professoris in Academia Marpurgensi inclyti, Corona virtutum Moralium, &c.

by that Emperor invited to Prague, where he died 26th July, 1604. His commentary upon the Ethics was not printed till after his death in 1608.

Of all the critics now mentioned, Acciajuoli is most valuable for his acuteness, and the knowledge he displays of the other writings of Aristotle. Magirus furnishes a clear and easy interpretation and paraphrase of the argument, aiming at little else than rendering the terse and sometimes involved reasoning of Aristotle familiar and intelligible to the beginner. The commentary of Vettori is more distinguished for its critical scholarship, and its illustrations produced principally from the Latin classics; but in explaining the philosophy of Aristotle, or the systems of others which he is employed in supporting or refuting, this commentator is inferior to any of the others. The most valuable is the commentary of Giphanius, who, to an intimate knowledge of the writings of Aristotle and great natural acuteness, united the study of the other Greek philosophers. In the labors of this excellent scholar the reader will frequently find that satisfaction which elsewhere will be sought in vain. Of the notes of Zell (1820) and Michelet (1833) it is needless to speak; with the former I am no otherwise acquainted than through the extracts of Dr. Cardwell, whose selections from the ancient commentators are extremely useful, and had they

been given in English would have rendered needless an edition like the present. The notes of Michelet in the earlier part of his book generally display considerable ingenuity, but his patience and industry seem to have failed towards the latter part, where his labors become jejune and unimportant.

But though the attention of scholars in our own country, and more particularly abroad, is now being attracted to Aristotle, and the use and advantage of improved editions of his works, little has been done of late years for the elucidation of his philosophy, more particularly the Ethics. That field is still open to one who, to a sound judgment, accurate scholarship, and a familiar acquaintance with the other writings, more particularly the logic, of Aristotle, shall unite a calm and chastised love of philosophical investigations. But if he come to such a task with a mind already prepossessed with other systems, with a desire to torture the philosophy of antiquity to the measure of his own conceptions, he must, as others have done, experience only a miserable failure.

For this edition I have only to observe, that these notes were compiled without any intention of publication: and had I not since the time in which they were originally written been engaged in occupations of an entirely different and opposite nature, I should gladly have re-

modelled the whole. But my only object was to present Aristotle's Ethics in a form less repulsive to beginners; to no higher merits does this book pretend; and if it should not entirely fail of this end, I shall fully have attained the object of my wishes. Should I not succeed even thus far, but be found to have mistaken the meaning of my author in more instances than I myself suspect, or than a difference of opinion may plead my excuse, I must defend myself in the words of a passage, which will ever be applicable to those who are engaged in enquiries after moral as well as physical truth, and which furnishes the best encouragement for the feeble and diffident, the best reproof for the able and overconfident enquirer. *ἡ περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας θεωρία τῇ μὲν χαλεπή, τῇ δὲ ῥᾳδία. σημεῖον δὲ τὸ μήτε ἀξίως μηδένα δύνασθαι τυχεῖν αὐτῆς, μήτε πάντας ἀποτυγχάνειν, ἀλλ' ἕκαστον λέγειν τι περὶ τῆς φύσεως, καὶ καθ' ἕνα μὲν μηδὲν ἢ μικρὸν ἐπιβάλλειν αὐτῇ, ἐκ πάντων δὲ συναθροιζομένων γίνεσθαί τι μέγεθος. —οὐ μόνον δὲ χάριν ἔχειν δίκαιον τούτοις ὧν ἄν τις κοινωνήσαι ταῖς δόξαις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἔτι ἐπιπολαιότερον ἀποφηναμένοις, καὶ γὰρ καὶ οὗτοι συμβάλλονταί τι.* Arist. Metaphys. ii. 1.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION.

Since our knowledge of the *moral* nature of man, as well as of the nature of every other class of beings, must depend upon our previous knowledge of the end of his existence; for those actions and habits only which have reference to this end can be considered as his proper characteristics, and the perfection of his being must be considered as the perfect adaptation of his faculties for energizing upon those objects for which he was produced; therefore before we can proceed to the consideration of the nature and perfection and consequently the Happiness of man, we must first learn what is the object of his being. And first, whether he have any such particular object.

If he has such a particular object, it must be marked by these properties; that every other end must be subordinate to it; that whatever be its nature, whether some result independent and beyond the mere action that produced it, or whether it be an action itself, it must be the chief end of all, including within it all other ends, and consequently superior to them in value and completeness.

But such an end as this is the end of the Political Science, for to that end all the ends of all other energies and sciences are subordinate; we know therefore thus much touching the nature of the end we are investigating, that it is identical with the end of the Political Science; that is to say, εὖ ζῆν and εὖ πράττειν, for such is the end of the Political Science.

But the advantages to be derived to our subsequent inquiries from the result at which we have now arrived, are more apparent than real. For in their notions and interpretation of this perfection or happiness (εὖ ζῆν) all men are at variance,

and every one forms his conceptions of it according to his own particular fancies. Thus one person calls it Pleasure, another Honor, another Wealth, another Virtue, and Plato an [a] *Ideal* Good. But the perfection *of man*, as man, cannot consist in Pleasure, in its vulgar sense, for this is common to brutes. Nor in Honor, as neither in Wealth, for these are not final; we seek Wealth with a view to some other good, and Honor with a view to be thought virtuous, so that Virtue would possess a better claim. But neither is Virtue Happiness, for this perfection is an energy (εὖ ζῆν), Virtue a habit; Misery may coexist with Virtue, but not with Happiness. Neither is it the Ideal Good, because such a notion is contrary to the general practice and sense of mankind; and such a good is rather the unreal creation of a philosopher's brain; and to say the least, has no practical influence with mankind. All these notions respecting this Chief Good of man are therefore deficient in some essentials, nor can all be at once correct; both because Nature has produced men for *one* object, and therefore their Perfection or Happiness must be uniform; and secondly, because Truth is never at variance with itself, nor changes its colours according to the passions and prejudices and habits of men.

Our investigation then has not advanced beyond the first steps of our inquiry.

What then is this εὖ, or εὖ ζῆν, which men interpret so variously? That it is both final or perfect we infer from our introductory remarks; from which it would also seem to follow, that it is a complete and independent Good, not requiring other subordinates to increase its essence or improve it.

But to resume. If, as we have already stated, an instrument or agent can only then be said to be perfect when it is so adapted as perfectly to perform the end and object of

[a] I use this term technically, not according to its usual acceptation. The Greek reader will at once understand the meaning.

its being, to discover the perfection (τὸ εὖ) of any thing, we must first look to the object of its being (τὸ ἔργον): in other words, its characteristic. For as Nature never produces (as man often does) one thing for two uses, it must necessarily follow, that its characteristic, or, to speak logically, its *differentia*, must have reference to its ἔργον; consequently, if we can discover the differentia of man we shall be able to discover his ἔργον, consequently his εὖ ζῆν. That differentia then is reason, or, more correctly, the exercise of reason, or ζῆν κατὰ λόγον, consequently the perfection of man must be, the living perfectly (εὖ or κατ' ἀρετήν) according to reason; and the highest perfection of man, when he lives according to reason in the highest perfection, (κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀρίστην): the Happiness of man, therefore, will be a life, or ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς, for the terms are synonimous, perfectly according to reason; or ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀρίστην, adding to our definition what common sense teaches us, that such a life must be exercised for a length of time; so that the complete definition of Happiness will be ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀρίστην ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ.

If then this definition be correct, as it seems to be in theory, it must also be correct in practice, and in some degree meet the general apprehensions of mankind. Let it then be examined in conjunction with those theories of Happiness which we have already discussed and rejected, and see how it agrees with what is true in them, and avoids what is false and reprehensible.

With their notions then who consider Happiness to be the highest of all goods, this definition is found to agree; for the goods of the soul are the highest of all, and such are the energies of the soul (ἐνέργειαι ψυχῆς). Likewise by defining it to consist in energy, we agree with those who consider it to be εὐζωΐα and εὐπραξία.

Nay, even *all* the qualities which mankind attach to Happiness may be found in this definition. For if we look to Socrates and others who consider virtue to be synonimous

with Happiness; our definition, by describing it as an energy according to Virtue, will meet with their view, for the energies according to Virtue are Virtue. And further, an *energy* according to Virtue avoids the objection, which may be urged against their tenets, that Virtue may be inactive, whereas they only that run receive the crown, they only are happy who energize.

Or whether, on the other hand, with Aristippus and his followers, we consider Happiness to consist in Pleasure, we shall find that Pleasure is essentially included in our definition of Happiness. For they only can be called virtuous actions and energies which spring from perfect habits, and the exercise of such habits is necessarily attended with Pleasure, Pleasure being the criterion of the perfection of the habit. Whereas Pleasure, according to the notion of the generality of mankind, is ever varying and fluctuating, like a wave of the troubled sea, tossed hither and thither according to the caprices of mankind. In short, our definition includes all that is desirable in life; for since the good man is the only unerring standard, and judges that the virtuous energies are the most beautiful, most eligible, most perfect, most pleasant of all actions, the virtuous energies do possess all these qualities, so consequently must the Happiness which is according to those energies.

Yet may it not be questioned whether our definition is in all parts complete? For not to say that we can hardly suppose a person to be happy who is sunk in the very depths of poverty, whose children are vicious, or his own life burthened with personal disease and deformity, can virtuous energies be exercised without external means, and must we not therefore add to our definition, that the happy man must be competently furnished with external goods? The affirmative of this question certainly coincides with the opinions of a great number, who consider good fortune and prosperity as essential to Happiness.

To this we reply, that such a question necessarily involves another; what is the cause of Happiness? If man, (for we omit the consideration of divine agency, as not within the scope of this treatise, as well as from other considerations,) the former question receives an immediate answer: and that man is the cause of his own happiness appears from what has been said already, that Happiness is the end of the Political Science, and it would be absurd to suppose that we should be directed to its acquisition, (as we are by the Political Science), if the attainment of it were not in our own power. But if Fortune be the cause of Happiness, then certainly Good Fortune must bear a much more important part in our definition than it at present possesses. But is it not inconsistent with the whole course of nature, and contrary to analogy, to attribute the noblest good to an uncertain and ignoble cause?

Nevertheless, as the opinion that external prosperity is essential to Happiness, is supported not only by the consent of the many, but seems also countenanced by the adage of Solon; it will be right to consider what was Solon's opinion, and thus more explicitly to determine the question.

According to Solon then, no one can be called happy as long as he lives. By which assertion Solon did *not* mean to say that he might be called happy when he was *dead*, but that during the whole of his life he was so completely within the power of Fortune, that she could at any time render him miserable; from whose thraldom Death only could release him. But granting this position to be true, we are reduced to this alternative; either that no one can be happy at any time, (which is contrary to the general feeling of mankind), or that we are not to call a man happy when he really is so (during life) for fear of some eventual unhappiness, which is absurd. Neither, if Solon objected to calling a man happy while he was alive from fear of such an event, but allowed him to have been happy when dead as being then beyond the power of fortune, has he entirely avoided the difficulty as he imagined.

For death does not appear entirely to remove man from the effects of good or ill fortune. At all events, we often call a dead man happy or miserable in reference to the fate and conduct of his descendants, which seems to imply that they are affected by what happens upon this earth[b].

But indeed this whole view of the Happiness of man seems to be erroneous; for the good and evil of life (τὸ εὖ ἢ κακῶς) does not consist in good or evil fortune; although Happiness cannot exist without a degree of good fortune, if Happiness consist in virtuous energies, and energies cannot be exercised without external means. And this very consideration that Happiness is a virtuous energy, removes it at once from the objections which militate against a theory which would make it depend upon the caprice of fortune. For nothing is more stable, more uniform, than the virtuous energies, none are so much in the power of man, or so independent of the fickleness of fortune. And unless ill fortune befal the happy man (such as we have described him) to so great an extent as to prevent his energizing, ill fortune can scarcely deprive the virtuous, that is, the happy man of his Happiness. And this will be more certain and evident should it hereafter appear, that Happiness is of that chief and highest class of goods which do not, like the moral energies, depend upon external means.

Having thus confirmed his definition, and refuted the objections which might be brought against it, Aristotle now proceeds in his analysis. For to define Happiness to be an energy of the soul according to Virtue, or in perfection (κατ' ἀρετήν), and yet not to explain the terms, virtue and perfection, must leave the whole indistinct; at the least, useless for practical purposes.

If man therefore be a compound animal, the perfection of man will be the perfection of all the parts which compose him; and so also if the soul of man be compounded, whether

[b] Compare Cicero De Senect. c. 23.

in reality (as some have supposed) or merely in formality (ἐν λόγῳ), the virtue of the soul[e], in other words, the virtue of man, will be twofold. In its most extensive division, we may separate the soul into rational and irrational; and consequently its virtues into two, rational and irrational. The reality of this definition seems apparent from this consideration; for (to omit a subdivision of the irrational, the merely vegetative) we certainly imply a division of this kind, when we praise the temperate man; as though he possessed a twofold virtue, one of reason to direct him aright, the other of an irrational part which obeys the dictates of that reason. Virtue then is divisible, according to this difference, into Rational and Irrational; in other words, into Intellectual and Moral.

Moral or Ethical Virtue (ἠθικὴ ἀρετή), as the name indicates, is derived from habit (ἔθος); hence it would seem, that Moral Virtue is not the gift of nature. 1st, Because natural gifts can not, as are all the Moral Virtues, be altered by habit. 2dly, Of those gifts which we have by nature, we have the faculties first, and then exercise them; but in the Moral Virtues, on the contrary, the faculties are acquired by previous exercise. 3dly, The conduct of legislators points us to the same conclusion; for they would never institute rules and laws for the acquirement of those excellencies which nature only can bestow. 4thly, Moral Virtue is both produced and destroyed by the same efficient cause, viz. actions, which is never the case in nature; the same efficient cause in nature never being productive as well as destructive of the same effects. These observations bring us to the following results, that Moral Virtue is not the gift of Nature, but of ourselves; that it is generated, increased, and destroyed by action; good actions being productive of good habits, evil actions of the contrary.

We have then discovered thus much of the nature of Moral

[e] We have no adequate term to express the Greek word ψυχή, life and soul being equally implied in it. And therefore I employ the word soul in this extensive sense.

Virtue, that it is a good habit produced by a repetition of good actions. But yet, as far as regards practice, we have still to learn what are *good* actions.

Leaving then, for the present, the consideration that all such actions must be done according to reason, it may serve for a general observation, that good actions are destroyed by excess and defect. For instance, too much exercise as well as too little, is prejudicial to health, whereas moderate exercise promotes and preserves it. The same remark applies to the habits of temperance, courage, and the like; men becoming temperate by the performance of actions avoiding either extremes, and virtuous generally by the performance of such actions. But not only, as we have already observed, are the Virtues produced by good or moderate actions (ἐν μεσότητι), and destroyed by the excessive and defective, but upon those actions by which a habit has been produced, on the same will it reoperate, the actions and habits reciprocally acting upon each other, the actions producing the habit, the habit assisting in the production of the actions. Thus by a continual abstinence from unlawful and immoderate Pleasures, men acquire a habit of temperance, and that habit, when acquired, gives a greater facility to the practice of that abstinence. This furnishes a solution to the question, how are we to know when we have acquired the habit, and what is the criterion of its perfection? That criterion is to be found in the pleasure or pain resulting from the performance of the actions; for he to whom the performance of a moral action causes pleasure, has acquired the perfect habit, as he who feels pain is without it. Thus Moral Virtue, then, is chiefly occupied with Pleasure and Pain; Moral Virtue being a proper disposition in reference to Pleasure and Pain; all our actions being guided by them, all our motives derived from them. Thus far then we have learnt what is the origin of Moral Virtue, and what are the causes of its destruction, its object-matter, and the effect which it produces upon actions. We may then proceed at once

to its definition; but before doing this, it may be as well to meet an objection, which might be brought against some previous observations.

It has been stated, that Virtue is the result of a repetition of good actions; consequently, virtuous actions, or actions resulting from Virtue (κατ' ἀρετήν), cannot be performed at once; in other words, men by doing virtuous actions become virtuous, gain a habit of virtue, and then only when the habit is gained, perform the virtuous actions, properly so called. Of what character then are those actions to be considered which are done previous to the acquirement of the habits? are they not virtuous? A temperate act done previous to the acquirement of temperance, and with a view to acquire it, is it not an act of temperance? And a bold action, before the habit of bravery, a brave action? Is it not so in the case of another class of habits, the arts? Do not they have all their perfection in themselves? Thus he who can perform on an instrument is a musician, and he who makes a watch is a watchmaker, whether he has acquired the habit or not.

To this we reply, that this objection is not valid; for even in reference to the Arts, he who performs the act of an artist is not at once an artist; something more is required. And even granting it to be true, the cases are not parallel; for in the Arts we look to little else than the excellence of the production; in the Virtues, not to the action but the disposition of the agent. In the case of the Arts, we require knowledge as the chief; in the Virtues, knowledge has but little weight towards constituting the character of a virtuous act.

We proceed then to the definition of Virtue. And first to discover its *genus.*

Since in the moral part of the soul the Affections (τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα) are only three; passions, faculties, and habits; Moral Virtue must be one of these. By passions, I mean those affections of the mind which are attended by pleasure or pain; by faculties (δυνάμεις), the capacities of being affected

by the passions; by habits, certain dispositions according to which we are rightly or wrongly disposed in reference to the passions. Now Virtue is neither a passion nor a faculty, since we are not praised or blamed with reference to the mere possession either of the passions, or of the capacities of being influenced by them, but in being influenced by them in an improper degree; in other words in being wrongly disposed in respect to them; consequently Virtue and Vice are habits. But since Virtue is ever productive of good actions, making not only its possessor good, but his actions, (as the virtue of the eye makes the eye perfect and its act perfect,) Virtue must be a habit of this nature, he who possesses it must be a good man, and his actions will be good likewise. The good man therefore and his actions will be our rule for the discovery of Virtue, as we have frequently observed. What then are his actions? such as we have already stated, as avoid excess, defect, and are in a mean, (*ἐν μεσότητι*).

But the mean is of two kinds, either absolute, (in which case it is equally distant from the extremes, as in surfaces and solids, and never varies,) or relative, in respect to us, in which instance it is continually fluctuating. To this mean, Moral Virtue always directs its aim, the absolute mean being seldom the mean to us. Virtue then is, *ἕξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὡρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν*— a mean in its essence and definition, an extreme in its quality and excellence. Not that *all* actions admit of a mean, some always being extremes, and consequently always culpable, otherwise there would be a mean of excess and a defect of excess, which is absurd. But Virtue being a relative mean, as we have stated, it will frequently happen that it is further removed from one extreme than the other, and this for two reasons; either from the nature of the things themselves, or from our being more inclined to one extreme than the other. Thus illiberality is further removed from the mean than prodigality from the nature of the habits themselves; but in the

case of the man who is inclined to prodigality, prodigality is further removed from the mean than illiberality; and, consequently it is his duty, if he be desirous to arrive at the mean, to go to the opposite extreme, that the influence of his favorite habit may cause him to recoil, as it were, upon the mean. To give more exact rules at present for the attainment of this purpose, is difficult; much must be left to circumstances; but as a general rule we ought to avoid excess and defect, and follow the example of the good man.

But since praise or blame, and consequently Virtue and Vice, are attributed only to voluntary acts, and one species of the voluntary enters into the definition of Virtue, it will be requisite to consider the nature of the voluntary and involuntary. Involuntary acts then appear to be such as are done from compulsion or ignorance. The compulsory is that whose principle is external, the agent or patient contributing nothing to the action (οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν τοιαύτη οὖσα ἐν ᾗ μηδὲν συμβάλλεται ὁ πράττων ἢ ὁ πάσχων). There are however another class of actions, in which, although the principle is external, yet the agent or patient do contribute to the act; as the throwing one's goods overboard in a storm. These actions can be considered neither as voluntary, since absolutely every one would avoid them; nor yet involuntary, as they want part of the character which constitutes an involuntary act. They may, therefore, be considered as of a mixed nature. Their attributes also, as their nature, are mixed and variable; sometimes being praised or blamed like the voluntary, at other times pardoned or pitied like the involuntary acts. But their character as moral acts must depend much upon the actions themselves, and the consequences they involve; being praised or blamed, pardoned or pitied, accordingly as they involve great honor or great disgrace, or not involving either great honor or great disgrace, are done under the influence of overwhelming pain.

Of the involuntary from ignorance, a distinction must be

made; for actions done from ignorance are not always involuntary; some being even voluntary, (as when men are themselves the authors of their own ignorance); some, though not voluntary, yet at the same time not being involuntary; as when after an act has been done from ignorance, no pain and no repentance, but rather pleasure, is felt for the evil which has been done; and lastly (which alone can be properly considered the involuntary acts of ignorance), when men are not themselves the cause of their own ignorance, and feel sorrow when subsequently conscious of the wrong which they have done. Involuntariness of this kind can only take place when men are ignorant of some particulars connected with the fact, for ignorance of the principle can only arise from wilful blindness brought on by a continued repetition of evil acts. Voluntary acts, therefore, are those whose principle is internal, the agent knowing the particulars of the act (τὸ ἑκούσιον δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ εἰδότι τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις).

Having thus then determined the essentials of voluntary and involuntary acts, we are naturally led to the consideration of choice (προαίρεσις), for all προαίρεσις is voluntary, although not all acts that are voluntary are done from deliberate choice. Things done on the sudden are often voluntary, but manifestly not the result of deliberate choice. Further, children and brute animals act voluntarily, but not from deliberate choice. Nor is προαίρεσις the same as desire or anger, for both are common to brutes with man, whereas προαίρεσις is not: both are also opposed to προαίρεσις. Neither is it will (βούλησις), although having a great resemblance to it. For will is often of the impossible, προαίρεσις is not. Will is often of things over which we have no control, not so προαίρεσις. Will is rather of the end, προαίρεσις of means to the end. Nor yet is προαίρεσις the same as opinion. For opinion is equally of things impossible and eternal, as of things in our own power. Opinion is distinguished by truth

and falsehood, προαίρεσις by its virtuousness and viciousness. Neither is it the same with any particular opinion. For our characters are determined by our deliberate choice of good or evil, not by the opinion we form concerning them. Opinion is inert, προαίρεσις is an active principle. Προαίρεσις is praised for being of what it ought, rather than for any correctness in itself; opinion for being true. And not unfrequently they who form the best opinions are the least likely to form and act upon a good προαίρεσις[d].

But although προαίρεσις is none of these, yet, from what has been already stated, and from its name, it should seem that it is attended with reason and deliberation, being a choice after *deliberation* formed between two alternatives; (*ἀλλ' ἆρά γε τὸ προβεβουλευμένον; ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας. ὑποσημαίνειν δ' ἔοικε καὶ τοὔνομα ὡς ὂν πρὸ ἑτέρων αἱρετόν*). Before then we can satisfactorily determine its definition, we must first examine into the nature of *Deliberation.* And this may be more easily discovered by first determining what is its object-matter.

No one then deliberates concerning those things whose existence depends upon nature, necessity, or chance. Nor even upon those things of which man himself is the cause, but over which he has no control. But we deliberate each of us only concerning those things which are in our own power; more especially, of those things whose results are uncertain and contingent; and in all cases where there is greater room for doubt. Thus we deliberate more concerning the inexact than the exact arts and sciences. Consequently, we deliberate upon means, not ends; for fixing upon some end, we then proceed to deliberation, and seek for means to the accomplishment of the end in view. Deliberation, therefore, is a kind of search (ζήτησις) but not identical with it, for search ranges over a much wider object-

[d] Compare Butler's Anal. I. 5.

matter, as mathematical and physical truths. Βούλευσις and προαίρεσις then appear almost to be the same, yet there is this difference between them; βούλευσις is previous in point of time to προαίρεσις, for when βούλευσις is completed, then προαίρεσις begins. As in states, βούλευσις is the deliberative, so προαίρεσις is the executive faculty, acting according to and after the dictates of βούλευσις. Gathering up then the threads of our previous conclusions, it would seem that προαίρεσις is βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν. Having thus determined the nature of those faculties which are employed upon the means, we proceed to some observations upon that which is employed upon ends (βούλησις).

According to the opinion of some philosophers, βούλησις is only of the good; according to the opinion of others, of the apparent good. Both of these opinions have their difficulties. For if βούλησις be only of the good, bad men cannot exercise βούλησις; or, if so, then the object of their will (βούλησις) is not always an object of will (for then it must be a real good), whereas it is generally an evil. If, on the contrary, βούλησις be only of the apparent good, then it will follow, that nature has implanted a faculty within us without any specific object-matter upon which it is to be exercised. Perhaps then the difficulty might be solved by the following consideration; that, absolutely speaking, the real good only can be the object of βούλησις, but in the case of the individual, the apparent good. To the good man, therefore, (since to him the real is always the apparent good), the real good will always be the object of βούλησις; and that only is in truth an object of βούλησις, which is an object of βούλησις to him, he only being capable of forming a correct judgment in morals, and being an unerring standard by whom we are to form our judgments.

If then the end be the object of the will, and the mean the object of προαίρεσις and deliberation, actions which have regard to them must be voluntary; and consequently Virtue

and Vice (being formed by such actions) must be voluntary likewise. For if we have the power of doing an act (and that act constitutes Virtue), we must also have the power of abstaining from doing it (which constitutes Vice), and vice versa; so that if Virtue (as some are willing to concede) be voluntary, Vice must be voluntary likewise. That Vice is as equally voluntary as Virtue, seems apparent from the following considerations. 1st. If man, and man only, be the principle of his own actions, his actions must be voluntary. 2dly. The fact of reward being attached to good and punishment to bad actions, proves them to be voluntary; for we never exhort men to or dissuade them from actions, which are not in their own power. 3dly. In the case of ignorance which is *self-caused*, men are punished; and so also in cases where, from their own carelessness or neglect, they acquire bad habits; nor is it allowed to be a sufficient exculpation, or shelter from punishment, to say that they did not know that their ignorance would be productive of such ill effects, since such ignorance is a proof of Vice. 4thly. Where a man has acquired a confirmed evil habit which he cannot change, and acts in obedience to that habit, without being able to withstand its influence, he is considered a voluntary agent, since he was a voluntary agent through every step that led to this evil habit. And his own wishing to change it after it has been formed, can no more constitute him an involuntary agent, than it can prove that man to be who having thrown a stone voluntarily, repents after it is out of his hand. 5thly. This is also confirmed by the distinction we observe in reference to bodily deformities, blaming and punishing them only in such instances where they are self-inflicted.

But it may be urged, that each one aims at the good which his φαντασία presents to him, and is not master of his phantasy (φαντασία), and consequently is not a voluntary agent.

To this we reply; 1st, That if every man's φαντασία is regulated by his moral habits, (and that it is so, has been already shown), if men are masters of their moral habits, they are also masters of their φαντασία. 2dly, If it be not so, and if no one has the power of fixing upon the end, but as nature presents it to him so must he view and take it, and do every thing in reference to it, if it be the case with the bad man it is also the case with the good man; and if one be not voluntary, then neither is the other; or if the latter (as is conceded) be voluntary, so also is the former. So that whether a man can influence his apprehension of the end or whether he cannot, he is still a voluntary agent. Therefore even if we grant this latter alternative to be true, if the good man is a voluntary agent from putting in practice the means to an end (the apprehension of which end he cannot alter), so also is the bad man in the same way a voluntary agent. Nevertheless, actions are more within our own control than are our habits; for the one are entirely in our power, and each part of them perceptible. But of habits only the commencement, and each progressive step is hidden from us and imperceptible.

(Having thus far analyzed his definition of Virtue, Aristotle now applies it to particular instances, devoting an entire book to Justice, when he comes to treat of that virtue, as being more important than the rest, and a ἕξις ἐν μεσότητι in a different way from the other habits. We forbear to follow him into this detail, as not only unnecessary but also prejudicial to the general outline of the treatise.)

Although then we have proceeded thus far in our explanation of the definition of Virtue and the questions connected with it, yet a very important and vital part of it still remains for discussion.

It has been stated that Virtue is a habit in a mean determined by reason (ἕξις ἐν μεσότητι ὡρισμένη λόγῳ), and not only determined by reason, but determined in such a way as he

who possessed φρόνησις would determine it (ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν). We have therefore to examine what is λόγος, and if there be several kinds of it, what is that λόγος which directs us to this true mean; secondly, what is φρόνησις, and further to determine the true nature of προαίρεσις, which was left undecided in the third Book. Last of all to examine the intellectual virtues, according to the division at the conclusion of the first Book.

We have already seen that there are two divisions of the soul, the one without the other possessing reason (λόγον ἔχον): the nature of this latter then we now proceed to investigate, in order to acquaint ourselves with the nature of that reason (λόγος) of which we are in search.

If, then, all matter upon which the soul can operate be twofold, it would seem from analogy that the nature of the soul is twofold, to correspond to that matter. That one part of the soul does not energize upon both matters, but each upon its own peculiar matter, is also probable. Thus if all matter be necessary and contingent, it is reasonable to expect that there should be two parts of the soul, each respectively operating upon its peculiar matter. The one upon contingent matter, which we may term the deliberative (deliberation being only employed, as we have already shown, upon contingent matter), the other upon necessary matter, which may be termed the scientific.

Our object then is to discover what are the virtues of each part. But the εὖ, or virtue and excellence of every thing, is to be found in reference to its ἔργον (as we have already seen); if therefore we can discover the ἔργον of each part of the soul, we shall discover the virtues of each part.

All the ἔργα of the soul of man (as distinguished from brutes) must be moral action and truth; and the principles of all operations are, αἴσθησις, νοῦς, and ὄρεξις; or putting aside αἴσθησις (as being no cause of *moral* action), νοῦς, and ὄρεξις. Since then all deliberation is for action, the delibe-

rative part of the soul must have πρᾶξις for its ἔργον. But all good moral action flows from a correct προαίρεσις, and all προαίρεσις is, as we have already seen, ὄρεξις directed by νοῦς, directed of course in such a way that νοῦς shall discover and dictate the truth, and ὄρεξις be obedient to its dictates. Truth in practice, then, or practical truth (ἡ ἀλήθεια πρακτική), is the ἔργον of this part of the soul; and its virtues will be those habits which give it an aptitude for the discovery of such truth. But since science has reference merely to abstract truth, abstract truth will be the ἔργον of the scientific part of the soul. And its virtues will be those habits which direct it aright in the search of that truth.

Since then the ἔργα of the soul are, of the Deliberative practical truth, of the Scientific abstract truth, the habits which direct each part in the truth will be five, τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη, φρόνησις, σοφία, νοῦς[e].

1. Of these habits, that which is employed in discovering truth in necessary matter by means of demonstration is science (ἐπιστήμη); or ἕξις τις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ἀποδεικτική, κ. τ. λ. For of whatever things we possess science, we are convinced that those things cannot be otherwise; that is, they are necessary; and likewise that they are demonstrative, that demonstration proceeding from certain principles already laid down and determined.

2. Of those habits, that which is employed upon production, (for this may be considered as a division of contingent matter), that is, producing according to certain true principles (ἕξις τις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική), is art. For art is not only employed in production (περὶ γένεσιν), but in theorizing also respecting production, and therefore requires true reason equally as science.

3. Of these habits, that which is upon the other division of contingent matter, viz. moral action, in directing us

[e] In what way this division is discovered, see the Introduction to Book VI. p. 212.

aright in them by right reason (ἕξις τις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ πρακτική) is φρόνησις. That φρόνησις is such a habit as here described, is plain from considering who they are whom we call φρόνιμοι, and for what reason we apply this term to them; who are they whom we conceive to be good reasoners and counsellors, with reference to some good end of which there is neither art nor science; consequently φρόνησις must be a distinct habit from either art or science. And this is also that habit, of which we have already spoken in our definition of virtue as directing us to the true mean in morals (ὡρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν); and hence, because temperance preserves this right conception, we give it the name σωφροσύνη—ὡς σώζουσα τὴν φρόνησιν,—temperance preserving φρόνησις in its integrity, and enabling it to judge aright, our intellectual being influenced by our moral habits as to moral actions, and he only being competent to exercise φρόνησις in perfection who possesses the moral habits in perfection. Φρόνησις consequently cannot exist without Moral Virtue, as we shall presently see at greater length.

4. It has already been stated that Science must proceed from certain given principles, without a right and true conception of which there can be no science; consequently there must be some habit which has these for its peculiar province (ἕξις τις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν), and such is νοῦς; for no other habit which is employed in the contemplation of truth can have this peculiar province. Not ἐπιστήμη, for the reasons stated; not σοφία, for σοφία is of demonstration as well as the principles of demonstration; not φρόνησις or τέχνη, because they are confined to contingent matter.

5. A fifth habit remains for investigation; a habit employed in discovering the truth not only of first principles, but deductions and demonstrations from first principles (μὴ μόνον τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἰδέναι ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀλη-

θεύειν), and this is σοφία; which is farther apparent from considering what persons we call σοφοί, whom we conceive to be not partially wise and partially ignorant, but wise universally and entirely, σοφοὶ ὅλως. This term originally was applied to those who were most perfect and accurate in their respective arts, and it would therefore appear that σοφία was the most perfect and complete of all the sciences; more excellent even than φρόνησις, since its object-matter is more excellent; the object-matter of the first being in a continual state of change and fluctuation, that of the latter eternal and immutable. The former being attributed, in some degree, even to brutes, the other possessed only by men of the highest intellectual attainments. From these remarks it is evident, that σοφία is a habit essentially distinct from φρόνησις, and from every kind of φρόνησις, if there be more than one according to the general opinion of mankind. And this would be more evident by instituting a parallel between them at greater length: for φρόνησις is employed not only upon universals but also upon particulars; nay, to such a degree, that it would seem that particulars were the more important of its object-matter, and that he who possessed merely a φρόνησις of particulars (if such a thing were possible) would have a better claim to the title of φρόνιμος than he who merely possessed a φρόνησις of universals; as he who is a mere empiric and can heal in particular instances without a knowledge of the general principle, has a better claim to be considered φρόνιμος in this particular subject, than he who is acquainted with the general principle which he cannot apply; particularly since φρόνησις is essentially practical. Not but that to possess φρόνησις in perfection both are necessary, a φρόνησις of the universal, and a φρόνησις of the particular; but the knowledge of the particular is only to be gained by experienee; and thus it is that young men may possess science, but never can possess φρόνησις, and for the same reason we are bound to pay particular respect

to aged and experienced men, since they only can possess this kind of knowledge in perfection.

From these remarks it will be seen in what way σοφία differs from φρόνησις; from the same it may be inferred in what respect it differs from νοῦς. For νοῦς is of extremes both speculative and practical of which there is no demonstration; the first principles both in morals and science.

Having then shown in what way εὐβουλία, σύνεσις, and γνώμη are connected with φρόνησις, Aristotle proceeds to show the utility of φρόνησις and σοφία, and what place they occupy in the Happiness of man. For it might be objected, that σοφία having nothing to do with moral action, must be entirely useless as far as our happiness is concerned; and that even φρόνησις, although it is practical, might easily be dispensed with. To the good man it is certainly of no use; for he will do good and just, and such like actions, from the very fact of his being a good man; and mere knowledge, or φρόνησις, will not make him at all more practical (πρακτικώτερος), especially since the virtues are habits; so that to the good man the possession of φρόνησις will be of no use. Neither will it be of use to men who are not good, but are desirous of becoming such; for why should they not be able to follow the directions of others who have already arrived at that desired point, without possessing φρόνησις, just as to a sick man it is not necessary to learn the art of physic to be healed; it is enough for him to follow the directions of his physician?

To this we reply, 1st, That if it be granted that they are virtues (as we have seen), each of each part of the soul respectively, they are eligible for their own sakes, even were they no otherwise productive of beneficial consequences, as the objector states.

2dly, They *are* useful, useful as constitutive parts, and not as the conditions and causes of Happiness. Happiness is

an energy according to Virtue, and they are parts of Virtue, and consequently of Happiness.

3dly, Happiness is an energy according to Virtue, but it is impossible to energize according to Virtue without φρόνησις. For to every virtuous action a good end, as well as good means, are required. Now, though Moral Virtue fixes upon the good end, φρόνησις is requisite to direct us to the true means to that end. With reference then to the objection that we are not at all more practical of what is good and just by means of φρόνησις, let us examine the subject more deeply.

To perform a just or a virtuous act it is not sufficient (as the objector has supposed) to follow certain orders and directions, but they must be performed from a certain disposition in the agent himself, from a correct principle (προαίρεσις) and right motives. Virtue then makes the προαίρεσις correct, but whatever is done with a view to this principle must be directed by some other faculty. That faculty, then, which fixes upon the competent means to *any* end, is δεινότης, a faculty given us by nature; but if it be improved by experience, and be directed to a virtuous end, if, in other words, it be attended with Moral Virtue, it becomes φρόνησις, consequently he who is φρόνιμος must at the same time be virtuous.

The virtuous man must also be φρόνιμος. For the same relation which δεινότης (a natural faculty) has to φρόνησις, Natural Virtue has to Moral Virtue. For as δεινότης regards not the end, so that it but fix on sufficient means for the attainment of its object, so Natural Virtue, if it has determined the right end, cares not for the means which it uses for its object. But since to constitute a perfectly virtuous action, good means as well as good ends are requisite, and that faculty which fixes upon good means, the end being good, is, as we have shown, φρόνησις, Moral Virtue is not without φρόνησις, nor φρόνησις without Moral Virtue. Consequently φρόνησις is indispensably requisite for the very existence of Moral Virtue and the happiness of man, and not (as the objector supposes) an otiose

faculty removed from all moral action. Indeed, from the great necessity of φρόνησις to Moral Virtue, Socrates went so far as to suppose that Virtue itself was φρόνησις, incorrectly; for though Virtue cannot exist without it, Virtue is rather, as we have seen, a habit according to right reason, which right reason is φρόνησις. Now therefore we may substitute the more definite terms for the more general in our definition of Virtue. Instead of describing Virtue as ἕξις κ. τ. λ. ὡρισμένη λόγῳ, we shall say ὡρισμένη φρονήσει, as we have now discovered what that λόγος is which directs us to the true mean, and which was the inquiry proposed at the commencement of this book.

(Having proceeded thus far in the examination of his definition, having discussed both the Moral and now the Intellectual Virtues, Aristotle proceeds to investigate the nature of certain habits and their kindred dispositions, such as Temperance and Intemperance, and the like. The reasons for which arrangement have been already stated in the Introduction of the Seventh Book, where a brief analysis is given of their contents, to which the reader is referred; that Book, with the Eighth and Ninth, entering too much into detail to be included in a general introduction to the Ethics.)

We proceed then to a question which has been already briefly handled; which both from its own intrinsic importance, and the mistakes which have arisen concerning it, demands the utmost attention. It was stated that they who possessed the Happiness we described in our first Book, would *necessarily* possess the greatest pleasure, the energies according to Virtue, involving in themselves the greatest of all pleasures [f]. In order to show this more clearly, as well as for the reasons just stated, it is necessary to examine the nature of Pleasure, and first the theories which have been promulged concerning it. All these may very well be classed under two heads; the system of Eudoxus, and its opposite, the system of Plato. The

[f] See p. 30.

first considering Pleasure to be the greatest of all goods, the other to be no good at all. Probably in this as in many other instances, the truth will be found to lay between the two.

1. Eudoxus supposed Pleasure to be the greatest good, because all things aimed at it; for that which is a good to *all*, and at which *all* things aim, must be the Good. To this reasoning Plato objected, by saying, that it did not necessarily follow that that was a good at which all things aimed. For the greater part of mankind are guided by their irrational appetites, and can therefore afford no criterion to the philosopher. To this objection of Plato, Aristotle replies: if only they who are swayed by irrational appetites sought after Pleasure, there might be some plausibility in this reasoning, but such is not the fact; for the rational and philosophical as well as the irrational and uneducated seek after Pleasure. And even granting that none but the irrational did seek for it, yet as they are guided in this impulse by a natural instinct, that very fact shows that Pleasure is a good. The assertion that the common consent of mankind can prove nothing, is too absurd to need refutation. They who would annihilate such a testimony, what better can they substitute in its room?

2. Eudoxus asserted, that that which is opposite to the greatest evil is the greatest good; that Pain is the greatest evil, (being universally avoided,) and consequently Pleasure is the greatest good. To this argument Plato objected, that Pleasure is not opposed to Pain in the manner here stated; that there are two kinds of opposition, the one of evil to evil, as extremes to extremes, the other of evil to good, as extremes to the mean; that Pleasure was not opposed to Pain in the latter, but in the former way, as an extreme to an extreme, and that consequently as Pain was an evil, Pleasure was an evil.

Aristotle meets this objection by saying, that if both were extremes, both must be the objects of aversion (φευκτά), all

extremes being of that character; but such is not the case in this instance; for though Pain may be, Pleasure is not, an object of avoidance, and consequently not opposed to Pain as one extreme to another.

3. In support of his doctrine Eudoxus further alleged, that Pleasure is eligible entirely for its own sake, which is the characteristic of the greatest good: no one ever thinking of asking another for what object, or with what view, he feels pleasure; which consequently is a proof that Pleasure is most final, most perfect, (τελειότατον).

4. Last of all he asserted, that the good could only be increased by itself; but *all* good is the more eligible with the addition of Pleasure, therefore Pleasure is the good[g]. Upon this Aristotle remarks, that the conclusion which Eudoxus wishes to infer, does not follow from these premises; any one good added to any other makes the whole more eligible it is true, not because the essence of the one is necessarily increased, but because two goods are better than one; and so Pleasure added to every other good makes the whole more eligible, but does not necessarily increase the essence of the good to which it is added. By a similar objection Plato overturned this conclusion of Eudoxus: for if, said Plato, the addition of one good to another makes that good more eligible, and the compound is more eligible than either of the single goods, Pleasure singly cannot be the chief good, since it becomes more eligible in conjunction with another good, whatever that good may be. So that a compound good is the chief good, according to this argument, whereas the chief good is single, and can never be made more eligible by the addition of any other good.

Having thus stated the arguments of Eudoxus, in support of Pleasure being the chief good, Aristotle passes on to examine the reasons of Plato against Pleasure being a good at all.

g See this explained at greater length in the note, p. 400.

1. All goods, they say, are qualities, but Pleasure is not a quality, and therefore not a good. Aristotle denies the major; the virtuous energies, he says, are not qualities, and yet they are in the class of goods[g].

2. All good is definite, but Pleasure is indefinite (because it admits of more and less), therefore Pleasure is not a good. Aristotle replies, by denying the minor and its proof, and by a distinction. The term Pleasure, he says, is ambiguous, and may mean, either the act of being pleased, or Pleasure in the abstract. If then, from seeing men more or less pleased, Plato infers that Pleasure itself admits of more or less, and is consequently indefinite, he might object in the same way to Virtue being a good, because some men are more or less virtuous, and then by the same argument Virtue must be indefinite. Thereupon must follow one or other of these alternatives; either that the abstract does not necessarily admit of more and less because the concrete does, and then the minor is false; or that whatever admits of more or less is not necessarily indefinite, and then the major is false.

But, secondly, if they mean Pleasure in the abstract (ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς), it is not true universally that Pleasure admits of more and less. And if some pleasures do, yet, as health, they may be perfectly definite although admitting of degrees.

3. Plato said, All good is perfect, but Pleasure is not perfect (because it is a motion and a generation), therefore it is not a good.

Aristotle replies by denying the minor: and first as to the first member of it, that Pleasure is a motion. All motions, he says, must be attended with quickness or slowness, either absolute or relative, but neither of these are compatible with Pleasure itself. It is true a man may pass from a state of Pain or neutrality to Pleasure (ἡσθῆναι) quicker or slower, but

g I am not certain that this argument is intended against the Platonists; I should rather think not.

when in the state of pleasure (ἥδεσθαι,) the terms quickness or slowness or any mood of progression cannot be applied to him. So a man may pass from motion to rest, or from rest to motion, quickly or slowly, but when in a state of rest the terms quickly or slowly are wholly inapplicable to that state.

Secondly, as to Pleasure being a generation. Every thing generated is produced from some fixed and adequate generating cause; men gather not grapes off thorns, nor figs off thistles; and further, from what any thing is generated, into that it is resolved. But can it ever be shown that Pleasure is resolved into any thing similar to that from which it was generated? It is impossible; and these notions, he subjoins, have originated from a very incomplete and partial view of the subject, from considering merely bodily pleasures; and it was conceived, that because there is in them an apparent process or generation from a state of want to a state of fulness, that Pleasure must be a kind of change or progression from one state to another state. But in the purer and more perfect kind of pleasures, nothing of this kind takes place; for as they arise from no previous deficiency, so neither do they have or end in any repletion.

To those who bring forward vicious pleasures as an argument against Pleasure generally, it is sufficient to state, that there are various kinds of pleasure, differing as the sources from which they are derived; differing also in respect to different persons. And so, on the other side, against those who would assert that Pleasure is the Chief Good, it might be said that then a life of pleasure would be of itself the most eligible; yet no one would wish to pass through a mere life of pleasure, such as the life of a child, with the intellect and the amusements of a child, though he should never feel any pain. Consequently Pleasure alone is not the Chief Good, nor singly most eligible. But some pleasures are eligible and some are not, as they differ in species, or in the sources whence they are derived.

Having thus examined those theories of Pleasure which were most popular in his own time, Aristotle now proceeds to his own definition of it.

Pleasure, he says, is not a κίνησις, for time and place constitute specific differences in motions, but not in pleasures. Further, Motion is divisible, and the parts of it differ essentially from the whole, and from each other; and Motion requires time and duration for its perfection; but Pleasure does not. Pleasure is perfect without time, as actual sight, a point, or a unit. Pleasure, then, resembles actual sensation. But since Pleasure attends every act of sensation, the most perfect Pleasure will attend the most perfect act of sensation. That then will be the best act or energy, when the sense or faculty is disposed in the most perfect manner to its most perfect object of sensation; so that the most perfect energy will be the most pleasant, and the most pleasant the most perfect; so that Pleasure, in a sense, perfects the energy. But Pleasure perfects the energy in a different way, either from the habit or the object-matter; as a superadded end, following upon the exercise of the energy, by a simultaneous consequence. But if Pleasure follows upon the exercise of the energies, it may be asked, why do not men constantly energize, since they would, by so doing, constantly experience pleasure? To this it is sufficient to reply, that human nature is not adapted for such energies, the faculty becomes weary, and no longer perfectly adapted for energizing upon its proper object-matter, the energies accordingly become imperfect, and consequently not attended with pleasure. From what has been previously stated, that Pleasure perfects the energies, it will appear that Pleasure is the perfection of life, since life is an energy.

But since Pleasure perfects the energies, and things differing in species are perfected by things differing in species, if the energies differ in species, Pleasure must differ in species. 2dly, Since certain pleasures are proper to certain energies,

and the properties of things essentially different are themselves essentially different, Pleasures are essentially different. 3dly, Since the pleasure resulting from one energy frequently destroys the pleasure resulting from another energy and that other energy itself, consequently Pleasures must be specifically different, since they produce the very opposite effects. 4thly, Since the pleasures differ according to the energies, and the energies differ in virtuousness and viciousness, pleasures must differ in the same way. And like the energies also they must differ in degrees of virtuousness and viciousness. And further they must differ relatively; the pleasure of each man, or of each animal, being that of his peculiar ἔργον, or rather energy. Consequently, the peculiar pleasure of man, as man, must be that of his ἔργον. But is it so in reality? Would it not then follow that all men's pleasures should be alike? But such is not the fact. Are we then to reject this conclusion? Certainly not. For if we apply it to the case of the good man, we shall find that his pleasure is the pleasure which results from the proper energies of man, the energies of a life according to Virtue. He, as we have already said, is to be our criterion for judging of the truth; nor are we to forego it, if we find mankind, who are debased or diseased, pursuing those pleasures which are not the real pleasures of man.

From what has been stated, it is apparent that a life according to Virtue, such as we have described in our first book, is not only the Happiness of man, but necessarily the greatest pleasure, nay rather *the* pleasure of man, as man. Recapitulating then the whole subject, this will be more apparent, and will more clearly show the connection and mutual coherency of the several parts of the argument.

We have stated that Happiness is not a habit, for then it would be compatible with a life of inaction and misery. It is therefore rather an energy; but since the energies are eligible either as means to an end, or for their own sakes, it is evident that Happiness must be of this latter class of energies. But

of this class not only are the virtuous energies, but likewise those of mere amusement. It might therefore be thought that Happiness was a kind of amusement; not only because those energies are self-eligible, but because it is found that those whom the generality of the world call happy, and whom the sophists have brought men to think so, spend their lives in these kind of energies, and promote those to honor who can invent and discover new ways of amusement. We are not however to infer from the conduct of the fortunate and powerful the true nature of Happiness, since they afford us no criterion to those energies of Virtue and Intellect from which good energies, and consequently Happiness, is derived. For, as we have frequently stated, the only guide in these things is the good man. Happiness does not therefore consist in amusement; first, because amusement is not final, for we seek amusement in order to exercise higher and more serious energies, and not the reverse; and further, if a life of happiness were a life of amusement, it would be compatible with a life of a slave, or of a child; that is, with the state of those who have not the free use of their energies, who as far as they are slaves or children, have no independent, and consequently no energies of their own. Happiness then is an energy according to Virtue, that is, according to the best Virtue; in other words, Happiness is the most perfect energy. But the most perfect energy is, as we have stated, that of the most perfect faculty[h]. If then that faculty be *νοῦς*, which seems to be the noblest and most royal of all, whether from being in itself divine, or divine in comparison with our other faculties, its perfect energy will be perfect Happiness. That energy then, as we have seen, is *θεωρία*. That this inference is correct will appear from another view of the subject; for if the energies of this faculty possess to a greater degree than any other energy the qualities which reason tells us ought to be

[h] See page xlvi. See also Introd. to Book VI.

found in Happiness, Happiness and this energy (Happiness being an energy) must be identical. And such it is. For it is the noblest of all our energies, being that of the noblest faculty on the noblest object-matter. It is the most continuous, man having power to continue his theoretical energies longer than he can act or produce. It is the most pleasant, for all exercise of the intellect is pleasant, and, as we have already seen, its energies are more pure and perfect than any other class of energies; but the energy of νοῦς or θεωρία is the most perfect of all the intellectual energies, inasmuch as actual knowledge surpasses an advance to knowledge. This energy is also the most independent, the moral energies being dependent upon external goods, and upon the existence of others for their instruments and object-matter; whereas the energies of the mind require neither. It is likewise most final, having its end entirely in itself, and not seeking any result extraneous to itself. Last of all, if Happiness consist in a life of ease and freedom from trouble and disturbance, such are this class of energies and this only. If therefore this energy possesses all the qualities which we attribute to Happiness, it must be Happiness. But a life with such qualities would be too high for man, as man; such only in its perfection is the life of a god; and only as far as man lives according to the divinity within him, will such a life be within his reach. If then, in comparison with the rest of man, νοῦς is divine, the energies or life according to νοῦς will be divine in comparison with human life. This then is the faculty which man is bound to cultivate and obey, which is to exalt him above himself; these are the energies peculiarly his own, and consequently must possess those pleasures which are the most exquisite, and properly the pleasures of man; since, as we have already stated, the greatest pleasures for each are those to be derived from his own peculiar energies.

Nevertheless as man is a compound being, he will still require the energies of his properly human nature to complete

his Happiness. These, indeed, will be his Happiness, but in a secondary sense; since they possess in a degree very inferior to the intellectual energies the requisites for Happiness; and as being the energies of the inferior part are necessarily of themselves inferior. And further they are less independent, requiring external means; and the nobler and more excellent they are, the greater means will they require. For although, for the mere habit and existence of the principle, external means would not necessarily be required, yet for the exertion of that habit, in other words, for its energies, they are needful. Which is not the case with the intellectual habits and energies. Perfect Happiness then is a theoretical energy; and this inference is confirmed by considering in what the Happiness of the happiest beings consists, namely the Gods. These we can suppose to exercise no other than the intellectual energies: for they cannot exercise the moral, the very existence of such energies presupposing a state of vice and imperfection. If, therefore, the Gods are happy (as we suppose them to be), they must energize, and if so, their energies must be those of θεωρία. Consequently the greatest Happiness consists in θεωρία.

But although it has been stated that external means and external prosperity are requisite for man, for he is not sufficient of himself to employ merely his intellectual energies to the neglect and exclusion of all others, but those of his inferior nature must also be regarded, in order to the perfect exercise of the others, it does not follow that he must necessarily possess great means, and great good fortune. For sufficiency consists not in excess, neither are great means requisite for perfect moral actions; it is possible to be just and generous without possessing seas and mountains, and still more to exercise our other moral habits. And this is a sufficient explanation of the assertion of Solon, which has been already examined in the first Book. But he who exercises the theoretical energies, he who cultivates in the highest degree his intellectual

faculties, as he is the most perfect of men, so is he (in all probability) the most favoured and beloved by the Gods, as most resembling themselves. Him, it is probable, they regard with peculiar interest and benevolence, watching over his welfare as a friend. Such a one then truly possesses the most exquisite Happiness; the most perfect of men, the most dear to the Gods, regarding and regarded by them with somewhat of those feelings which arise from a common and kindred nature. But such blessings belong only to the wise.

INTRODUCTION TO BOOK I.

Human happiness being the object of all our investigation, Aristotle in this treatise proposes to teach men the means by which they may as far as possible arrive at it. For since, according to the opinions of the Peripatetics, the soul of man is but a *tabula rasa*, (ὥσπερ ἐν γραμματείῳ ᾧ μηθὲν ὑπάρχει ἐντελεχείᾳ γεγραμμένον. De Anim. iii. 4. see also De Mem. I.) not possessing innate perfection as Plato thought, but only the powers and capacities of attaining it, Aristotle conceived that it was highly useful and necessary that we should have some knowledge of the ultimate end to which we are to direct all our actions, as archers, by first seeing the mark at which they have to shoot, are more likely to hit it. We ought, therefore, to know *what* is Happiness.

But before this can be done, we must first inquire, whether there *is* such a thing as Happiness, or the chief Good? and, if so, whether it be attainable by man?

Having first shewn, then, that there *is* such a thing as a chief or ultimate Good, Aristotle next proceeds to define it; first, examining into the accuracy of such notions concerning it as were afloat in his time. And having arrived at his definition synthetically, he proposes to analyse and examine its component parts, which occupies the other nine books.

This book, then, divides itself into the following parts. In the 1st Chap. he proves that there *is* such an ultimate Good, and also *what it is*. In the 2d and 3d Chap. he explains its name, and the various opinions of mankind and philosophers concerning it. In the 4th and 5th he propounds his definition of it. In the 6th he examines

the correctness of his definition, by comparing it with the approved opinions of others. In the 7th, the efficient cause of it. This leads him to consider, in the 8th, how far Solon's opinion of that cause was correct; and to examine in the remainder of the book other circumstances and questions connected with his definition.

ARISTOTELIS

ETHICA NICOMACHEA.

LIB. I.

CHAP. I.

That there is a chief and ultimate Good—and that it is the end of the Political Science.

ΠΑΣΑ τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πρᾶξίς τε καὶ προαίρεσις, ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι How to discover the finality of ends.

In this chapter Aristotle examines the question, Whether there is such a thing as Happiness, or an ultimate Good; and if so, whether it is attainable by man? He proves that there is, by the following syllogism.

If the chief Good is most final, (τελειότατον) then it is the end of the Political Science. It is τελειότατον, and therefore it is the end of the Political Science. The major is proved from §. 1 and 3; the minor from §. 1.

By the term πολιτικὴ we are to understand that Science which embraces all others whatsoever which have any reference to man, or in any degree contribute to his happiness. As Aristotle himself says, ὁρῶμεν δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐντιμοτάτας τῶν δυνάμεων ὑπὸ ταύτην οὔσας κ. τ. λ. p. 6

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἰδεῖν δεῖ ὅτι πάσης ἐπιστήμης καὶ δυνάμεώς ἐστί τι τέλος, καὶ τοῦτ' ἀγαθόν· οὐδεμία γὰρ οὔτ' ἐπιστήμη οὔτε δύναμις ἕνεκεν κακοῦ ἐστι. εἰ οὖν πασῶν τῶν δυνάμεων ἀγαθὸν τὸ τέλος, δῆλον ὡς καὶ τῆς βελτίστης βέλτιστον ἂν εἴη. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἥγε πολιτικὴ βελτίστη δύναμις· ὥστε τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς ἂν εἴη ἀγαθόν· ὑπὲρ ἀγαθοῦ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡμῖν λεκτέον. Mag. Moral. p. 3. See the Pol. iii. 7.

1. πᾶσα τέχνη κ. τ. λ.] The arrangement of these words, if we may credit the Greek Scholiast, is not accidental. Τέχνη is placed before μέθοδος and πρᾶξις before προαίρεσις, according to the custom of Aristotle, imitating nature, progressing from the more imperfect genera (ἐν γενέσεσι) to the more perfect; τέχνη being less perfect than μέθοδος, πρᾶξις than προαίρεσις. f. 2. b. But Acciajolus thinks that Aristotle here progresses from the better to the less known, according to his usual custom.

— μέθοδος] μέθοδος δέ ἐστιν ἕξις θεω-

δοκεῖ· διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφήναντο τἀγαθόν, οὗ πάντ' ἐφίεται. διαφορὰ δέ τις φαίνεται τῶν τελῶν· τὰ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι, τὰ δὲ παρ' αὐτὰς ἔργα τινά. ὧν δ' εἰσὶ τέλη τινὰ παρὰ τὰς πράξεις, ἐν τούτοις βελτίω πέφυκε τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τὰ ἔργα. πολλῶν δὲ πράξεων οὐσῶν καὶ τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν πολλὰ γίνεται καὶ τὰ τέλη· ἰατρικῆς μὲν γὰρ ὑγίεια, ναυπηγικῆς δὲ πλοῖον, στρατηγικῆς δὲ νίκη, οἰκονομικῆς δὲ πλοῦτος. ὅσαι δ' εἰσὶ τῶν

ποιητικὴ μετὰ λόγου. Eustratius f. 2. b. See an admirable Dissertation on this subject in the Preface to the Encyclopædia Metropol. by Coleridge.

It is to be observed, that Aristotle has brought forward these four, τέχνη, μέθοδος, πρᾶξις, προαίρεσις, to prove his conclusion. Because there are two principles of all human operations and actions; intellect (νοῦς), and appetite (ὄρεξις). Intellect is divided into two, speculative (ἐπιστημονική) and active (πρακτική); so also appetite is divided into two, deliberative (προαιρετική) and executive. Under active intellect is placed τέχνη, and all the mixed or active sciences: under speculative intellect, all the pure sciences. Under the deliberative or elective appetite is included προαίρεσις: under the executive appetite, action (πρᾶξις, in its extensive signification). Acciaj.

1. καλῶς ἀπεφήναντο τἀγαθόν] ἐπαινεῖ τοὺς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὑπογράψαντας, ὅτι καλῶς ἀπεφήναντο τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι οὗ πάντα ἐφίεται· ὥσπερ ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς τινὸς πρότερον τὴν ὑπογραφὴν πιστωσάμενος. ὅτι δὲ οὐχ ὅρος (definition), τὸ εἰρημένον ἐστὶν ἀλλ' ὑπογραφή (description), δῆλον ἐκ τοῦ ληφθῆναι ἐκ τῶν ὑστέρων. τοῦ γὰρ κοινοῦ ἐφετοῦ πάντα τὰ ἐφιέμενα ὕστερα, ὅτι καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνου πάντα καὶ ἐκεῖνο τοῦ εἶναι τοῖς πᾶσιν αἴτιον. Schol.

— τἀγαθόν] This word is used indiscriminately to signify either the real or apparent Good; and frequently τἀγαθὸν appears to have been used by the philosophers of the time to signify *Good* simply, as well as the *chief Good*. The sense, however, will amount, in this place, to the same. For if we here interpret it by the chief Good, then we must understand the argument thus; art and every thing else aims at some Good, and through that, as a mean, at the chief Good. (καὶ διὰ μέσου ἐκείνου πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἄνεισι.) Eustrath. f. 2.

2. φαίνεται] φαίνεται means certain knowledge, δόξα uncertain knowledge. Plato arranges the different states in this order, science, opinion, ignorance; φαίνεται applies to the first, δόξα to the second, which is continually wavering between the other two. See Repub. p. 478.

3. ἔργα τινά] Some results, remaining after the energies have ceased or been withdrawn. Thus walking, if it be for walking sake, has no end beyond the energy: if it be for health's sake, health is the ἔργον remaining after the energy has ceased.

τοιούτων ὑπὸ μίαν τινὰ δύναμιν, καθάπερ ὑπὸ τὴν ἱππικὴν ἡ χαλινοποιικὴ καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι τῶν ἱππικῶν ὀργάνων εἰσίν· αὕτη δὲ καὶ πᾶσα πολεμικὴ πρᾶξις ὑπὸ τὴν στρατηγικήν· τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον ἄλλαι ὑφ' ἑτέρας· ἐν ἁπάσαις δὲ τὰ τῶν ἀρχιτεκτονικῶν τέλη πάντων ἐστὶν αἱρετώτερα τῶν ὑπ' αὐτά· τούτων γὰρ χάριν κἀκεῖνα διώκεται. διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν τὰς ἐνεργείας αὐτὰς εἶναι τὰ τέλη τῶν πράξεων ἢ παρὰ ταύτας ἄλλο τι, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν λεχθεισῶν ἐπιστημῶν. Εἰ δή τι τέλος ἐστὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ὃ δι' αὑτὸ βουλόμεθα, τἆλλα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο, καὶ μὴ πάντα δι' ἕτερον αἱρούμεθα (πρόεισι γὰρ οὕτω γ' εἰς ἄπειρον, ὥστ' εἶναι κενὴν καὶ ματαίαν τὴν ὄρεξιν), δῆλον ὡς τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη

The chief Good most final.

1. *μίαν—δύναμιν*] Δύναμιν δὲ τὴν τέχνην ὠνόμασε διὰ τὸ ἔνυλον· ἡ γὰρ ὕλη δύναμις, ὡς ἐν τῷ δυνάμει θεωρουμένη. ἥ τε ἁπλῶς καὶ ἡ πῇ δι' ἣν καὶ αἱ τέχναι δυνάμεις, ὡς ἐνδεχόμεναι καὶ τὸ ἐπαμφοτερίζειν ἔχουσαι περί τε ἀπότευξιν καὶ κατόρθωσιν· ἁπλῶς δὲ ὕλην λέγομεν τὴν πᾶσι τοῖς γενομένοις κοινήν· πῇ δὲ τὴν προσεχῆ (peculiar) ἑκάστῳ. Schol. f. 3. b. διαφέρει δὲ ἐπιστήμη δυνάμεως, ὅτι ἡ μὲν γνῶσις ἐστὶν ἐξ ἀναγκαίων προτάσεων τὴν σύστασιν ἔχουσα καὶ καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ ᾗ αὐτὸ καὶ πρώτων καὶ ἀμέσων καὶ αἰτίων τοῦ συμπεράσματος, ἢ ἐκ συμπερασμάτων ἃ ἐκ τοιούτων συνάγεται, ὡς μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαί ποτε ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο συμπέρασμα τοῖς προηγουμένοις ἐπιστημονικῶς ἕπεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τὸ αὐτό. ἡ δὲ ἐκ τῶν ὡς ἐπιτοπολὺ καὶ μὴ ἀεὶ θάτερον μόριον ἀποβαῖνον τῆς ἀντιφάσεως ἔχουσα, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ ἕτερον, δυνάμις λεγομένη διὰ τὸ ἐπαμφοτερίζειν. ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ δεκτικὴ αὐτῶν ὕλη δυνάμις λέγεται, διὰ τὸ ἑκάτερον ἀνὰ μέρος δυνατὴ εἶναι δέχεσθαι, οὕτω καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται τῶν τεχνῶν δυνάμεις λέγονται, ὅτι οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀποβαῖνον θάτερον μόριον ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ' ἔστιν οὗ καὶ τὸ ἕτερον. τοιαῦται δέ εἰσιν ἥτε διαλεκτικὴ καὶ ἡ ῥητορική· ἐφ' ἑκάτερά τε γὰρ καὶ ἄμφω ἐπιχειροῦσι τὰ τῆς ἀντιφάσεως μόρια ἐν τῷ προκειμένῳ προβλήματι. καὶ οὐδὲ πείθουσιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης κατὰ τὸ ἕτερον, ἀλλὰ πείθονταί ποτε καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἀντικείμενον· καὶ αἱ στοχαστικαὶ τῶν τεχνῶν ὡσαύτως· οἷον ἡ κυβερνητικὴ καὶ ἡ ἰατρική· ἐνίοτε γὰρ ἃ πρὸς σωτηρίαν ἐπιτηδεύουσιν οἱ κατ' αὐτὰς ἐνεργοῦντες εἰς κίνδυνον ἀποβαίνουσι. Schol. f. 4. b. In a more extensive sense *δύναμις* appears sometimes to be used, signifying any natural or acquired faculty, or the organ by which it is exercised. For further observations upon this term, see Metaph. VIII. chap. 1. sq. p. 174. (Ed. Tauchn.)

14. *ματαίαν*] If nature has implanted in us a desire of reaching to some final

τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον. (ἆρ' οὖν καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡ γνῶσις αὐτοῦ μεγάλην ἔχει ῥοπήν, καὶ καθάπερ τοξόται σκοπὸν ἔχοντες, μᾶλλον ἂν τυγχάνοιμεν τοῦ δέοντος; εἰ δ' οὕτω, πειρατέον τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν αὐτὸ τί ποτ' ἐστὶ καὶ τίνος τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἢ δυνάμεων.) Δόξειε δ' ἂν τῆς κυριωτάτης καὶ μάλιστα ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς. τοιαύτη δ' ἡ πολιτικὴ φαίνεται. τίνας γὰρ εἶναι χρεὼν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, καὶ ποίας ἑκάστους μανθάνειν καὶ μέχρι τίνος, αὕτη διατάσσει. ὁρῶμεν δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐντιμοτάτας τῶν δυνάμεων ὑπὸ ταύτην οὔσας, οἷον στρατηγικήν, οἰκονομικήν, ῥητορικήν. χρωμένης δὲ ταύτης ταῖς λοιπαῖς πρακτικαῖς τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ἔτι δὲ νομοθετούσης τί δεῖ πράττειν καὶ τίνων ἀπέχεσθαι, τὸ ταύτης τέλος περιέχοι ἂν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥστε τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἑνὶ

The chief Good the end of the chief science; the Political.

end of all our energies, then it is probable that there is such an end; or otherwise we must suppose that nature has employed a superfluous degree of power, has created instruments without any matter or object to employ them on, which is contrary to all those of her proceedings which we are able to trace. (οὐδὲν γάρ, ὥς φαμεν, μάτην ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ. Pol. I. 1. p. 4. Ed. Goettling.) This argument, as the reader will remember, is frequently employed by Butler in his Analogy. Michelet quotes the following passage from the Metaphysics II. 2. p. 37. (Ed. Tauch.) τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα τέλος, τοιοῦτον δὲ ὃ μὴ ἄλλου ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ τἆλλα ἐκείνου. ὥστ' εἰ μὲν ἔσται τοιοῦτον τὸ ἔσχατον, οὐκ ἔσται ἄπειρον. εἰ δὲ μηδὲν τοιοῦτον, οὐκ ἔσται τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα. Ἀλλ' οἱ τὸ ἄπειρον ποιοῦντες λανθάνουσιν ἐξαιροῦντες τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν. καίτοι οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐγχειρήσειεν οὐδὲν πράττειν μὴ μέλλων ἐπὶ πέρας ἥξειν· οὐδ' ἂν εἴη νοῦς ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις· ἕνεκα γάρ τινος ἀεὶ πράττει ὅ γε νοῦν ἔχων· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι πέρας· τὸ γὰρ τέλος πέρας ἐστίν. Compare de part. Animal. I. 1. p. 8. ἡ φύσις ἕνεκά του ποιεῖ πάντα.

7. ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς] ἀρχικωτάτη δὲ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ μᾶλλον ἀρχικὴ τῆς ὑπηρετούσης ἡ γνωρίζουσα τίνος ἕνεκέν ἐστι πρακτέον ἕκαστον. Τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἑκάστου· ὅλως δὲ τὸ ἄριστον ἐν τῇ φύσει πάσῃ. ἐξ ἁπάντων οὖν τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην πίπτει τὸ ζητούμενον ὄνομα (sc. σοφία). δεῖ γὰρ ταύτην τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν καὶ αἰτιῶν εἶναι θεωρητικήν· καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἓν τῶν αἰτίων ἐστίν. Metaph. I. 2. p. 5.

καὶ πόλει, μεῖζόν γε καὶ τελεώτερον τὸ τῆς πόλεως φαίνεται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ σώζειν· ἀγαπητὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἑνὶ μόνῳ, κάλλιον δὲ καὶ θειότερον ἔθνει καὶ πόλεσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος τούτων ἐφίεται, πολιτική τις οὖσα.

Nature of the subject being con-

Λέγοιτο δ' ἂν ἱκανῶς, εἰ κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην διασαφηθείη· τὸ γὰρ ἀκριβὲς οὐχ ὁμοίως

3. ἔθνει καὶ πόλεσιν] Thus then we have arrived at three conclusions. I. That there is some perfect and ultimate end of all human actions. II. That since it is conducive to the perfection of our being, it deserves to be investigated. III. That it is the end of the political science; and consequently the good of man, as man, (τἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν.)

Aristotle now proceeds to explain the nature of the argument, which is to be employed in this treatise,—how it is to be received,—and by whom.

4. πολιτική τις] *A part of the political Science.* Μέρος ἐστὶν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ ἀρχὴ ἡ περὶ τὰ ἤθη πραγματεία τῆς πολιτικῆς· τὸ δ' ὅλον καὶ τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν δικαίως δοκεῖ ἄν μοι ἔχειν ἡ πραγματεία οὐκ ἠθικὴν ἀλλὰ πολιτικήν. Mag. Mor. p. 1. (Ed. Tauchn.)

Declarat Aristoteles, ethicæ et politicæ eundem esse finem; quæret enim utraque summum bonum, quod sine virtute adipisci non possumus. Sed etiam altera sine altera ne existere quidem potest. Politicæ enim opus est virtute singulorum, quæ ipsa in societate tantum hominum efficitur et colitur. Est igitur ethice δύναμις, quæ in politica sola ad ἐνέργειαν perducitur. De fine bonorum et virtute adipiscenda locuturi veteres philosophi jam inde a Pythagora, ut dicit Zellius, "nunquam homines sibi informant solitarios et a commercio rerum publicarum sejunctos." Quod Aristoteles ita explicat loco celeberrimo Politicorum. (I. 2. p. 4. Ed. Goettling.) "Civitatem igitur singulis hominibus esse priorem perspicuum est. Si enim singuli separati non sint satis instructi bonis (αὐτάρκεις) similiter atque aliæ partes ad totum se habebunt. Nam sublato toto non est pes neque manus." Sic nec singuli civitate sublata existere possunt. Quocirca ambæ scientiæ ethice et politica, arctissimo vinculo inter se cohærent, ita ut una sint plane eademque disciplina, sicut in fine Ethicorum Nicomacheorum et initio M. Moralium a philosopho exponitur. Ex quo factum est ut hi libri de Moribus cum opere de Republica unum corpus efficiant. Conjunctionem illam optime in sua civitate expressit Plato, cum Stoici et Epicurei politica neglecta soli ethicæ operam dederint, Aristoteles autem et diversitatem et conjunctionem solus perspexerit. Eustratius: τὴν ταὐτότητα καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν ἔοικε τιθέναι διὰ τούτων ἣν αὐτὴ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἐνδέχεται ἡ εὐδαιμονία ὡς τέλος οὖσα πολιτικῆς ἤγουν ἠθικῆς ἅμα, καὶ πολιτικῆς ἁπλῶς. MICH.

7. ὕλην] ὕλη and ὑποκείμενον generally signify the subject matter or substratum in which a thing inheres, and without which it cannot exist. Thus Aristotle, in his treatise De

tingent, will not admit of scientific reasoning.

ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς λόγοις ἐπιζητητέον, ὥσπερ οὐδ᾿ ἐν τοῖς δημιουργουμένοις. τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια, περὶ ὧν ἡ πολιτικὴ σκοπεῖται, τοσαύτην ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ πλάνην ὥστε δοκεῖν νόμῳ μόνον εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μή. τοιαύτην δέ τινα πλάνην ἔχει καὶ τἀγαθὰ διὰ τὸ πολλοῖς συμβαίνειν βλάβας ἀπ᾿ αὐτῶν· ἤδη γάρ τινες ἀπώλοντο διὰ πλοῦτον, ἕτεροι δὲ δι᾿ ἀνδρείαν. ἀγαπητὸν οὖν περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας παχυλῶς καὶ τύπῳ τἀληθὲς ἐνδείκνυσθαι, καὶ περὶ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας τοιαῦτα καὶ συμπεραίνεσθαι.

And therefore our hearers must be those who can and will duly appreciate such arguments.

Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἀποδέχεσθαι χρεὼν ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων· πεπαιδευμένου γάρ ἐστιν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον τἀκριβὲς ἐπιζητεῖν καθ᾿ ἕκαστον γένος, ἐφ᾿ ὅσον ἡ τοῦ πράγματος φύσις ἐπιδέχεται· παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται μαθηματικοῦ τε πιθανολογοῦντος ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ ῥητορικὸν ἀποδείξεις

Anima, illustrates it by a familiar instance. Ὁ δ᾿ ὀφθαλμὸς ὕλη ὄψεως, ἧς ἀπολιπούσης, οὐκ ἔστιν ὀφθαλμὸς πλὴν ὁμωνύμως. p. 27. (Ed. Tauch.) See also the Categories: ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ λέγω, ὃ ἔν τινι μὴ ὡς μέρος ὑπάρχον ἀδύνατον χωρὶς εἶναι τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐστιν· οἷον ἡ τὶς γραμματικὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μέν ἐστι τῇ ψυχῇ. p. 27. (Ed. Tauch.)

With reference to the passage before us the Scholiast observes; ὕλη ἐφ᾿ ἑκάστης μεθόδου καὶ τέχνης λέγεται τὸ ὑποκείμενον αὐτῆς περὶ ὃ καταγίνεται· ὑποκείμενον δὲ τῇ ἠθικῇ καὶ πολιτικῇ τὰ ἐν βίῳ ἐστὶ πράγματα, καὶ αἱ περὶ ταῦτα τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράξεις τε καὶ ἐνέργειαι. Therefore here ὕλη is the *object* rather than the *subject* matter.

1. ἐν τοῖς δημιουργουμένοις] *In the creative arts.* δημιουργικαὶ δὲ λέγονται τέχναι αἱ ποιητικαί, καὶ δημιουργούμενα τὰ ὑπ᾿ αὐτῶν ἀποτελούμενα ἔργα. Schol. Thus in these arts the same degree of accuracy is not required. The material of the statuary is more unmanageable than that of the painter, and consequently less exactness is required from the one than the other.

10. ἐνδεῖκνυσθαι] ἐνδείκνυσθαι is put in opposition to ἀποδείκνυσθαι according to Eustratius: ἀπόδειξις μὲν γὰρ καθαρῶς καὶ βεβαίως τὸ ζητούμενον παριστᾷ. ἔνδειξις διά τινων ἐκτυπώσεων καὶ μιμήσεων καὶ ἐμφάσεων.

— περὶ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ] "*And speaking generally on contingent matter, from contingent premisses to be allowed to draw contingent conclusions.*"

ἀπαιτεῖν. ἕκαστος δὲ κρίνει καλῶς ἃ γινώσκει, καὶ τούτων ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς κριτής. καθ' ἕκαστον ἄρα ὁ πεπαιδευμένος, ἁπλῶς δ' ὁ περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδευμένος. διὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκεῖος ἀκροατὴς ὁ νέος· ἄπειρος γὰρ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον πράξεων, οἱ λόγοι δ' ἐκ τούτων καὶ περὶ τούτων. ἔτι δὲ τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀκολουθητικὸς ὢν ματαίως ἀκούσεται καὶ ἀνωφελῶς, ἐπειδὴ τὸ τέλος ἐστὶν οὐ γνῶσις ἀλλὰ πρᾶξις. διαφέρει δ' οὐθὲν νέος τὴν ἡλικίαν ἢ τὸ ἦθος νεαρός· οὐ γὰρ παρὰ τὸν χρόνον ἡ ἔλλειψις, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ κατὰ πάθος ζῆν καὶ διώκειν ἕκαστα. τοῖς γὰρ τοιούτοις ἀνόνητος ἡ γνῶσις γίνεται, καθάπερ τοῖς ἀκρατέσιν· τοῖς δὲ κατὰ λόγον τὰς ὀρέξεις ποιουμένοις καὶ πράττουσι πολυωφελὲς ἂν εἴη τὸ περὶ τούτων εἰδέναι. καὶ περὶ μὲν ἀκροατοῦ, καὶ πῶς ἀποδεκτέον, καὶ τί προτιθέμεθα, πεφροιμιάσθω τοσαῦτα.

3. πεπαιδευμένος] Experienced. "Ἄλλη μὲν γνῶσίς ἐστιν ἡ κατὰ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἄλλη ἡ κατὰ τὸ πεπαιδεῦσθαι. ἥτις πολυπειρία οὖσα ἱκανότητα τῷ κεκτημένῳ παρέχεται πρὸς τὸ κρίνειν ὀρθῶς τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας καὶ τὰς τέχνας ἀποτελούμενα τὰς θεωρητίκας καὶ πρακτικὰς καὶ πολιτικάς. Schol. See also de part. Animal. I. 1. p. 1. and the Metaph. IV. c. 4. p. 67. "Ἔστι γὰρ ἀπαιδευσία τὸ μὴ γινώσκειν τίνων δεῖ ζητεῖν ἀπόδειξιν, καὶ τίνων οὐ δεῖ.

5. ὁ νέος] Following his passions, and consequently not exercising his reason, at least not upon the subject of morals as far as they tend to practice: therefore having no experience of them he is incapable of judging of them. The eye of his soul is darkened and must be exercised before it can see and discriminate. (See below, VI. 6 and 7, near the end.)

CHAP. II.

The different notions of Happiness briefly considered.

The argument resumed from p. 7.

ΛΕΓΩΜΕΝ δ' ἀναλαβόντες, ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα 2 γνῶσις καὶ προαίρεσις ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ὀρέγεται, τί ἐστιν οὗ λέγομεν τὴν πολιτικὴν ἐφίεσθαι καὶ τί τὸ πάντων ἀκρότατον τῶν πρακτῶν ἀγαθῶν. ὀνόματι μὲν οὖν σχεδὸν ὑπὸ τῶν πλείστων ὁμολογεῖται· τὴν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ χαρίεντες λέγουσιν, τὸ δ' εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν ταὐτὸν ὑπολαμβάνουσι τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν. περὶ δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, τί ἐστιν, ἀμφισβητοῦσι καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως οἱ πολλοὶ τοῖς σοφοῖς ἀποδιδόασιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐναργῶν τι καὶ φανερῶν, οἷον ἡδονὴν ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ τιμήν, ἄλλοι δ' ἄλλο, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἕτερον· νοσήσας μὲν γὰρ ὑγίειαν, πενόμενος δὲ πλοῦτον· συνειδότες δ' ἑαυτοῖς ἄγνοιαν τοὺς μέγα τι καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτοὺς λέγοντας θαυμάζουσιν. ἔνιοι δ' ᾤοντο παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἄλλο τι καθ' αὑτὸ εἶναι, ὃ καὶ τοῖσδε πᾶσιν αἴτιόν ἐστι τοῦ εἶναι ἀγαθά. ἁπάσας μὲν οὖν ἐξετάζειν τὰς δόξας ματαιότερον ἴσως ἐστίν, ἱκανὸν δὲ τὰς μάλιστα ἐπιπολαζούσας ἢ δοκούσας ἔχειν τινὰ λόγον.

Nominal Definition of Happiness.

The inconsistency of our notions respecting it.

Resuming our subject, we proceed to discover the definition of Happiness. Now all men call it εὖ ζῆν or εὖ πράττειν, but when they come to explain their notion of εὖ, all are at variance; every person interpreting it according to his situation, life, manners, or prejudices. One calls it pleasure, another honour, a third virtue, a fourth money, a fifth abstract good. To all of which there are many objections.

17. ἄλλο τι καθ' αὑτό] The opinion of Plato; which is more fully discussed in the next chapter.

Two methods of investigation; 1. *Terminus a quo:* 2. *Terminus ad quem.*

Μὴ λανθανέτω δ' ἡμᾶς ὅτι διαφέρουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγοι καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς· εὖ γὰρ καὶ Πλάτων ἠπόρει τοῦτο καὶ ἐζήτει, πότερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς ἐστιν ἡ ὁδός, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀθλοθετῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πέρας ἢ ἀνάπαλιν. ἀρκτέον μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων, ταῦτα δὲ διττῶς· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν τὰ δ' ἁπλῶς. ἴσως οὖν ἡμῖν γε ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων. διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἦχθαι καλῶς τὸν περὶ καλῶν καὶ δικαίων καὶ ὅλως τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀκουσόμενον ἱκανῶς. ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι· καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαίνοιτο

2. ἀρχῶν] All ἀρχαὶ and αἴτια are reduced under four heads: sc.

I. *Efficiens;* unde profluit motus: ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως.

II. *Finalis;* cujus gratia cætera fiunt: τὸ οὗ ἕνεκεν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν.

III. *Materialis;* quod est primum subjectum: ἡ ὕλη καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον.

IV. *Formalis;* id quo res habet esse. ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι.—See Metaph. I. 3. p. 7.

3. Πλάτων] See the end of the 6th Book of the Republic.

3. ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἢ ἐπί] "It is the difference, in short, which modern writers commonly mark by the terms *analysis* and *synthesis.* In the former, we take the facts of human nature as we find them, and resolve them into the principles and laws of our nature; in the other, we assume certain general truths as the elements of our reasoning, and deduce the particular rules of conduct from them. We have apposite illustrations of these different methods in the works of Clarke and of Butler." Hampden's M. P. Lectures, p. 241.

7. ταῦτα δὲ διττῶς] Compare Analyt. Post. I. 2. p. 148. (Ed. Tauch.) πρότερα δ' ἐστὶ καὶ γνωριμώτερα διχῶς. οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν πρότερον τῇ φύσει καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς πρότερον· οὐδὲ γνωριμώτερον καὶ ἡμῖν γνωριμώτερον. λέγω δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς μὲν πρότερα καὶ γνωριμώτερα τὰ ἐγγύτερον τῆς αἰσθήσεως· ἁπλῶς δὲ πρότερα καὶ γνωριμώτερα τὰ πορρώτερον. ἔστι δὲ πορρωτάτω τὰ καθόλου μάλιστα· ἐγγυτάτω δὲ τὰ καθέκαστα. See also Ammonius on the Categories, De Substantia: and Phys. Ausc. I. 1. with the learned Commentary of Simplicius, f. 4.

11. τὸ ὅτι] ζητοῦμεν τέτταρα· τὸ ὅτι, τὸ διότι, εἰ ἔστι, τί ἐστιν. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ πότερον τόδε ἢ τόδε ζητῶμεν . . . οἷον, πότερον ἐκλείπει ὁ ἥλιος ἢ οὔ; τὸ ὅτι ζητοῦμεν.—ὅταν δὲ εἰδῶμεν τὸ ὅτι τὸ διότι ζητοῦμεν. οἷον, εἰδότες ὅτι ἐκλείπει . . . τὸ διότι ἐκλείπει . . . ζητοῦμεν. ἔνια δὲ ἄλλον τρόπον ζητοῦμεν. οἷον, εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μή ἐστι . . . θεός. γνόντες δὲ ὅτι ἐστί, τί ἐστι ζητοῦμεν. οἷον, τί οὖν ἐστι θεός; Post. Anal. II. 1. p. 202. Now since, in the system and proceedings of nature, the cause (τὸ διότι) is the ἀρχὴ and γνωριμώτερα to her, for she commences with it; but to man, sometimes the cause (τὸ διότι), as in mathematics, and some-

ἀρκούντως, οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ διότι. ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἢ ἔχει ἢ λάβοι ἂν ἀρχὰς ῥᾳδίως. ᾧ δὲ μηδέτερον ὑπάρχει τούτων, ἀκουσάτω τῶν Ἡσιόδου·

οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσῃ,
ἐσθλὸς δ' αὖ κἀκεῖνος ὃς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται.
ὃς δέ κε μήτ' αὐτὸς νοέῃ μήτ' ἄλλου ἀκούων
ἐν θυμῷ βάλληται, ὁ δ' αὖτ' ἀχρήϊος ἀνήρ.

The subject resumed.

Ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγωμεν ὅθεν παρεξέβημεν. τὸ γὰρ 3
ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οὐκ ἀλόγως ἐοίκασιν ἐκ τῶν βίων ὑπολαμβάνειν οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ φορτικώτατοι τὴν ἡδονήν, διὸ καὶ τὸν βίον ἀγαπῶσι τὸν ἀπολαυστικόν. τρεῖς γάρ εἰσι μάλιστα

times the matters of fact, the effects (τὸ ὅτι), as in morals and politics; and we ought to commence from those things which are better known to us: therefore this, being a moral treatise, is analytical, commencing with the (τὸ ὅτι), with actions and affections from which the habits (αἱ ἀρχαί) of moral conduct spring. These lead on to perfect energies, and thence to happiness, the final end and ἀρχὴ of all things. Aristotle has adopted this method as being the same which we must follow in practice, commencing with actions and proceeding to habits. Since, therefore, we commence from certain things which are supposed to be granted, from things known to us, the reader of this treatise must at least be able to judge of these things, and have a competent knowledge of them. But he only can judge ὁ πεπαιδευμένος περὶ τὰς κατὰ τὸν βίον πράξεις.

1. *οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ διότι*] As being self-evident. Thus if a person has learnt to overcome vicious appetites, he will assent at once, when he is told that temperate habits are produced by temperate acts, and will not wait to inquire why.

2. *ἀρχάς*] That is, *the effects*, in this treatise. Since we commence with effects.

3. *Ἡσιόδου*] See Op. et Di. v. 291—5.

9. *ἡμεῖς δέ*] Error eorum quorum opiniones hoc capite Aristoteles refutat, in eo consistit, quod unum alterumque naturalis hominis appetitum seu finem pro summo habeant bono: error Platonis est contra, summum bonum seu ideam boni prorsus ab istis naturalis hominis finibus sejungere; cum vera sit sententia, quam secutus est Aristoteles, bonum in regendis et ad rationem perducendis appetitibus ponere. MICH.

13. *τρεῖς*] The first and most imperfect, in whom appetite has the chief influence; the second, with whom appetite and reason govern with divided sway; the third, with whom life

οἱ προύχοντες, ὅ τε νῦν εἰρημένος καὶ ὁ πολιτικὸς καὶ τρίτος ὁ θεωρητικός. Οἱ μὲν οὖν πολλοὶ παντελῶς ἀνδραποδώδεις φαίνονται βοσκημάτων βίον προαιρούμενοι, τυγχάνουσι δὲ λόγου διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις ὁμοιοπαθεῖν Σαρδαναπάλῳ. Οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες καὶ πρακτικοὶ τιμήν· τοῦ γὰρ πολιτικοῦ βίου σχεδὸν τοῦτο τέλος. φαίνεται δ' ἐπιπολαιότερον εἶναι τοῦ ζητουμένου· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τιμῶσι μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ ἐν τῷ τιμωμένῳ, τἀγαθὸν δὲ οἰκεῖόν τι καὶ δυσαφαίρετον εἶναι μαντευόμεθα. ἔτι δ' ἐοίκασι τὴν τιμὴν διώκειν, ἵνα πιστεύωσιν ἑαυτοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι· ζητοῦσι γοῦν ὑπὸ τῶν φρονίμων τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ παρ' οἷς γιγνώσκονται, καὶ ἐπ' ἀρετῇ· δῆλον οὖν ὅτι κατά γε τούτους ἡ ἀρετὴ κρείττων. Τάχα δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ἄν τις τέλος τοῦ πολιτικοῦ βίου ταύτην ὑπολάβοι. φαίνεται δὲ ἀτελεστέρα καὶ αὕτη· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ καθεύδειν ἔχοντα τὴν ἀρετήν, ἢ ἀπρακτεῖν διὰ βίου, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις κακοπαθεῖν καὶ ἀτυχεῖν τὰ μέγιστα· τὸν δ' οὕτω ζῶντα οὐδεὶς ἂν εὐδαιμονίσειεν, εἰ μὴ θέσιν διαφυλάττων. Καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἅλις· ἱκανῶς

Not pleasure, and why.

Not honour, and why.

Not virtue, and why.

is free from the storms of passion, and brute appetite has no influence.

11. μαντευόμεθα] Upon the use of this word, see Stallbaum's note on the Charmides of Plato, p. 148. or the Repub. I. p. 349. A.

13. γοῦν] *As a proof of this.* Such is the force of this word universally with Thucydides ; generally with Aristotle: unless the exceptions are corruptions.

17. ἀτελεστέρα καὶ αὕτη] Since virtue is a *habit* only, it is incomplete in itself: and cannot be happiness which is an energy (τὸ πράττειν.)

21. εἰ μὴ θέσιν διαφυλάττων] θέσις δέ ἐστιν ὑπόληψις παράδοξος—σχεδὸν δὲ νῦν πάντα τὰ διαλεκτικὰ θέσεις καλοῦνται. Topics, I. 9. p. 107. (Ed. Tauch.) The Stoics did however, in after times, affirm the sufficiency of Virtue alone for constituting Happiness. See the Second Paradox of Cicero.

γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις εἴρηται περὶ αὐτῶν. τρίτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ θεωρητικός, περὶ οὗ τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν ἐν τοῖς ἑπομένοις ποιησόμεθα.

Not money, and why.

Ὁ δὲ χρηματιστὴς βίαιός τίς ἐστιν, καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος δῆλον ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν· χρήσιμον γὰρ καὶ ἄλλου χάριν. διὸ μᾶλλον τὰ πρότερον λεχθέντα τέλη τις ἂν ὑπολάβοι· δι' αὑτὰ γὰρ ἀγαπᾶται. φαίνεται δ' οὐδ' ἐκεῖνα· καίτοι πολλοὶ λόγοι πρὸς αὐτὰ καταβέβληνται. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀφείσθω.

CHAP. III.

The chief Good of man is not the ideal Good.

Plato's *Idea* of Good examined.

4 ΤΟ δὲ καθόλου βέλτιον ἴσως ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ διαπορῆσαι πῶς λέγεται, καίπερ προσάντους τῆς

1. ἐγκυκλίοις] Of the ἐγκύκλια see Buhle "De libris Aristot. exotericis, &c." p. 133. as published in the first vol. of Arist. Works, Bipont. 1791. His opinion is, that they correspond with the λόγοι ἐξωτερικοί, being delivered to his disciples and hearers in a certain course or routine. Ἐγκύκλια φιλοσοφήματα καλεῖ (Aristoteles) τὰ κατὰ τάξιν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς πολλοῖς προτιθέμενα ἅτινα καὶ ἐξωτερικὰ καλεῖν εἰώθεν. The subjects which they included were, gymnastics, dancing, painting, music (in a strict sense), grammar (in an extended sense), geometry, arithmetic, and sometimes rhetoric. Michelet has a long disquisition on this word in his notes to the Ethics. Berolini, 1835.

CHAP. III.

The principal argument of this chapter may be resolved into the following hypothetical syllogism.

If there be more definitions of Good than one, there are more Goods than one, (i. e. the notion of the *one Ideal Good* being the only Good, is not true.)

There are more definitions of Good than one; therefore,

The doctrine of the *Ideal Good* is not true.

The rest of the Chapter is then taken up with proving the minor, which of course must be the conclusion of every syllogism.

In the first part Aristotle considers the Idea in reference to *all goods*: in the second, in reference merely to *absolute goods*.

11. τὸ δὲ καθόλου] In reference to this theory of Plato, the Logicians divided Genus into *universale post multa*

τοιαύτης ζητήσεως γινομένης διὰ τὸ φίλους ἄνδρας εἰσαγαγεῖν τὰ εἴδη. δόξειε δ' ἂν ἴσως βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ δεῖν ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ γε τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἀναιρεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ φιλοσόφους ὄντας· ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντοιν φίλοιν ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. Οἱ δὲ κομίσαντες τὴν δόξαν ταύτην

First proof of the minor.

and *universale ante multa*. Plato used the terms *Genus* and *Species* promiscuously to express ἰδέα. It is here employed in the latter sense.

5. προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν] More is conveyed in this passage than appears at first sight. For Plato in the commencement of the tenth book of his Republic, when he brings forward his reasons why Homer should not be admitted into his Commonwealth, as all *imitative* poetry is pernicious to the intellect (λώβη ἔοικεν εἶναι πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῆς τῶν ἀκουόντων διανοίας), before he enters into a discussion, which seems to detract from the merits and glory of so great a poet, makes the following apology. Ῥητέον ἦν δ' ἐγώ. καίτοι φιλία γέ τίς με καὶ αἰδὼς ἐκ παιδὸς ἔχουσα περὶ Ὁμήρου ἀποκωλύει λέγειν.—ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ πρό γε τῆς ἀληθείας τιμητέος ἀνήρ, ἀλλ' ὃ λέγω, ῥητέον. To this passage Aristotle seems silently to refer, as if implying, that the same indulgence which Plato claimed for attacking Homer, ought to be allowed to himself when examining the theories of Plato.

6. οἱ δὲ κομίσαντες] All the other Categories are subsequent to Essence (οὐσία). But *good* is predicated in Essence as well as in all the other Categories. Good therefore is predicated in priority and posteriority: and consequently there is no one εἶδος of good more than there is of number. 2dly, since genus is predicated of things differing in species, and species of things differing in number, of which it is equally predicated at all times, it is clear that as far as numbers exist according to priority and posteriority, there can be no species or common noun of number. Furthermore, as numbers as far as they exist in priority and posteriority are relative, their *summum genus* must necessarily be in the category of Relation (πρός τι); but the *Idea* of Plato is the *summum genus* in the Category of *Essence* (οὐσία), being τὸ ὄντως ὄν. See Met. I. 7. p. 27. κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὰς δόξας τὰς περὶ αὐτῶν (the *Ideas*), εἰ ἔστι μεθεκτὰ τὰ εἴδη, τῶν οὐσιῶν ἀναγκαῖον ἰδέας εἶναι μόνον. Consequently there is no *Idea* of numbers.

The following is Trendelenburg's remark upon this obscure passage, which will be considered at greater length in the Appendix. "Ethica N. I. 4. (οἱ δὲ κομίσαντες, &c.) per se obscura et difficilia, collato vero alio loco (Metaph. xiii. 6. M. p. 271.) longe difficiliora, ... accuratius tractanda erunt. Hoc vero potissimum . . . . sibi velle videntur, prius et posterius, quorum alterum alterius est conditio in ideas non esse admissa; unde nec numerorum vulgarium quorum alii ex aliis gignuntur ideoque alii aliis sunt priores vel posteriores, unam quandam ideam factam esse. Quæ si est sententia, singulorum numerorum, in quibus non est prius et posterius, ideas esse posse, non excluditur." Trend. p. 69.

Because Good is posterior and prior.

οὐκ ἐποίουν ἰδέας ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον ἔλεγον, διόπερ οὐδὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἰδέαν κατεσκεύαζον· τὸ δ᾽ ἀγαθὸν λέγεται καὶ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῷ καὶ ἐν τῷ πρός τι, τὸ δὲ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ καὶ ἡ οὐσία πρότερον τῇ φύσει τοῦ πρός τι· παραφυάδι γὰρ τοῦτ᾽ ἔοικε καὶ συμβεβηκότι τοῦ ὄντος, ὥστ᾽ οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινή τις ἐπὶ τούτων ἰδέα.

2d Proof. Different definitions of Good in the different categories.

Ἔτι ἐπεὶ τἀγαθὸν ἰσαχῶς λέγεται τῷ ὄντι (καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τί λέγεται, οἷον ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῷ αἱ ἀρεταί, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποσῷ τὸ μέτριον, καὶ ἐν τῷ πρός τι τὸ χρήσιμον, καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ καιρός, καὶ ἐν τόπῳ δίαιτα, καὶ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα), δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινόν τι καθόλου καὶ ἕν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐλέγετ᾽ ἐν πάσαις ταῖς κατηγορίαις, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν μιᾷ μόνῃ.

3d Proof. Different definitions of Good under the same category.

Ἔτι δ᾽ ἐπεὶ τῶν κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν μία καὶ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἁπάντων ἦν ἂν μία τις ἐπιστήμη· νῦν δ᾽ εἰσὶ πολλαὶ καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ μίαν κατηγορίαν, οἷον καιροῦ ἐν πολέμῳ μὲν στρατηγική, ἐν νόσῳ δ᾽ ἰατρική, καὶ τοῦ μετρίου ἐν τροφῇ μὲν ἰατρική, ἐν πόνοις δὲ γυμναστική.

The *Idea*, and that of which it is

Ἀπορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις τί ποτε καὶ βούλονται λέγειν αὐτοέκαστον, εἴπερ

12. *δίαιτα*] *τόπος ἐν ᾧ εὖ διάγομεν.* Paraph.

15. *μία καὶ ἐπιστήμη*] Plato, following the tenets of Cratylus and Heraclitus, asserted that the objects of sense could never be the objects of science, as being in a continual flux; *ὡς ἁπάντων τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀεὶ ῥεόντων, καὶ ἐπιστήμης περὶ αὐτῶν οὐκ οὔσης.* Arist. Met. I. 6. Compare xiii. 9. p. 288. *ἄνευ μὲν γὰρ τῶν καθόλου οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμην λαβεῖν.*

Real essence he attributed only to the *Ideas*; upon them only can real science be employed. Each science has its peculiar object matter, and consequently each *Idea* has its appropriate science. If therefore there is but one *Idea* of Good, there can only be one science of it. See Timæus, p. 28—9. Parm. 134. Cic. Tusc. I. 24. Acad. I. 8.

21. *αὐτοέκαστον*] Illo *αὐτὸ* nominibus præfixo eorum ideam indicari Aristoteles luculenter docet, Metaph. VII. 16. z. p. 161. qui et Platonis usus in

ἕν τε αὐτοανθρώπῳ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. ᾗ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲν διοίσουσιν· εἰ δ' οὕτως, οὐδ' ᾗ ἀγαθόν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῷ ἀΐδιον εἶναι μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν ἔσται, εἴπερ μηδὲ λευκότερον τὸ πολυχρόνιον τοῦ ἐφημέρου. Πιθανώτερον δ' ἐοίκασιν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ, τιθέντες ἐν τῇ τῶν

the Ideas, are essentially the same.

The opinion of the Pythagoreans

Sophista, Phædone, &c. Aristoteles sicut nostro loco, ita pluribus voce αὐτοέκαστον utitur ut universam ideam denotet. Cf. Mag. Mor. i. 1. Metaph. i. 6. and xiii. 8. M. p. 281. (Brand.) Quam ideæ vocandæ rationem sive Aristoteles invenit, sive accepit (apud Platonem autem legere non memini) hoc subtiliter sane, quod ideis proprium est, comprehenditur. Id enim in ea conjunctum, ut idea, quamquam genus et communis definitio, ad unum tamen et certam formam (ἕκαστον) revocetur, ut generalis notio solummodo in cogitando sita et singularis species ex intuendo nata in unum coalescant, neutra vero restinguatur. Trendelenburg de Ideis, &c. p. 39.

3. οὐδ' ᾗ ἀγαθόν] But granting there is such a thing as an *Ideal Good*, the examination of it cannot be of any service, for if one and the same definition apply to two things, then those two things are not essentially different; consequently the *ideal* differs nothing from the *particular* and *æsthetical* Good. Neither does it make any essential difference, as Plato thought, that the first is eternal, the other not; for duration constitutes no specific difference. For whiteness is not more essentially white, whether it exist one day or a thousand years.

ἡ δέ γε οὐσία οὐδὲ μᾶλλον οὐσία λέγεται οὐδὲ ἧττον· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος μᾶλλον νῦν ἄνθρωπος ἢ πρότερον λέγεται· οὐδέ γε τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν ὅσα εἰσὶν οὐσίαι· ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἐπιδέχοιτο ἡ οὐσία τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον. Arist. Cat. iii. p. 34. (Ed. Tauch.)

7. τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ] The Pythagoreans held, that the elements of numbers (τὰ τῶν ἀριθμῶν στοιχεῖα) were the elements of all things (τῶν ὄντων πάντων). Thus they supposed that such and such a combination (πάθος) of numbers constituted justice; another, the soul and intelligence; another, opportunity; and so on. They thought that number was not only the material and efficient, but also the formal cause of all things. The elements of number they called odd and even; unity, according to them, was formed of both of these, being both odd and even, and number of unity. But others of them thought there were ten principles of all things, which they exemplified in the following column, generally called the συστοιχία of the Pythagoreans.

πέρας, ἄπειρον·
περιττόν, ἄρτιον·
ἕν, πλῆθος·
δεξιόν, ἀριστερόν·
ἄρρεν, θῆλυ·
ἠρεμοῦν, κινούμενον·
εὐθύ, καμπύλον·
φῶς, σκότος·
ἀγαθόν, κακόν·
τετράγωνον, ἑτερόμηκες.

and of Speusippus. ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ τὸ ἕν· οἷς δὴ καὶ Σπεύσιππος ἐπακολουθῆσαι δοκεῖ. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλος

1. Objection. ἔστω λόγος. Τοῖς δὲ λεχθεῖσιν ἀμφισβήτησίς τις ὑποφαίνεται διὰ τὸ μὴ περὶ παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ τοὺς λόγους εἰρῆσθαι, λέγεσθαι δὲ καθ' ἓν εἶδος τὰ καθ' αὑτὰ διωκόμενα καὶ ἀγαπώμενα, τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τούτων ἢ φυλακτικά πως ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων κωλυτικὰ διὰ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι καὶ τρόπον ἄλλον.

Its answer. Δῆλον οὖν ὅτι διττῶς λέγοιτ' ἂν τἀγαθά, καὶ τὰ μὲν καθ' αὑτά, θάτερα δὲ διὰ ταῦτα. χωρίσαντες οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν ὠφελίμων τὰ καθ' αὑτὰ σκεψώμεθα εἰ λέγεται κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν. καθ' αὑτὰ δὲ ποῖα θείη τις ἄν; ἢ ὅσα καὶ μονούμενα διώκεται, οἷον τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἡδοναί τινες καὶ τιμαί; ταῦτα γὰρ εἰ καὶ δι' ἄλλο τι διώκομεν, ὅμως τῶν καθ' αὑτὰ ἀγαθῶν θείη τις ἄν. ἢ οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν

The invention of this table is attributed by some to Alcmæon of Crotona. See Arist. Metaph. i. 5.

1. Σπεύσιππος] Diog. Laertius (v. §. 25.) Aristotelem singularem librum de Speusippo scripsisse affirmat. Doctrina Speusippi, quam hoc loco respicit, exponitur forsan in Metaph. vii. 2. (p. 129. Ed. Tauch.) Σπεύσιππος δὲ καὶ πλείους οὐσίας, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀρξάμενος, καὶ ἀρχὰς ἑκάστης οὐσίας ἄλλην μὲν ἀριθμῶν, ἄλλην δὲ μεγεθῶν, ἔπειτα ψυχῆς· καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἐπεκτείνει τὰς οὐσίας. xii. 7. (p. 250.) ὅσοι δὲ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Σπεύσιππος τὸ ἄριστον καὶ κάλλιστον μὴ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶναι διὰ τὸ καὶ τῶν φυτῶν καὶ τῶν ζώων τὰς ἀρχὰς αἴτια μὲν εἶναι τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ τὸ τέλειον ἐν τοῖς ἐκ τούτων οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἴονται. Bonum Speusippo nempe non tantum unum abstractum neque in initio est ante multa, sed finis. MICH.

3. ἀμφισβήτησις] A disciple of Plato objects to Aristotle's arguments, because Aristotle has made no distinction between what are properly and what improperly called Goods. Aristotle then applies the same reasoning to that class of Goods which the Platonist allows to be properly so called, the self-eligible: and even then, says Aristotle, they will not all come under one and the same definition. For instance, the intellectual faculties, sight and so on: either these must be self-eligible; or nothing else than the Idea is so. That is, there will be an empty species (εἶδος), a species or *nomen universale*, to which no individuals are referable.

πλὴν τῆς ἰδέας; ὥστε μάταιον ἔσται τὸ εἶδος. εἰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τῶν καθ' αὑτά, τὸν τἀγαθοῦ λόγον ἐν ἅπασιν αὐτοῖς τὸν αὐτὸν ἐμφαίνεσθαι δεήσει, καθάπερ ἐν χιόνι καὶ ψιμμυθίῳ τὸν τῆς λευκότητος. τιμῆς δὲ καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἡδονῆς ἕτεροι καὶ διαφέροντες οἱ λόγοι ταύτῃ ᾗ ἀγαθά. οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ ἀγαθὸν κοινόν τι κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν.

2. Objection: and its answer.

Ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγεται; οὐ γὰρ ἔοικε τοῖς γε ἀπὸ τύχης ὁμωνύμοις. ἀλλ' ἆρά γε τῷ ἀφ' ἑνὸς εἶναι, ἢ πρὸς ἓν ἅπαντα συντελεῖν, ἢ μᾶλλον κατ' ἀναλογίαν; ὡς γὰρ ἐν σώματι ὄψις, ἐν ψυχῇ νοῦς, καὶ ἄλλο δὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ. ἀλλ' ἴσως ταῦτα μὲν ἀφετέον τὸ νῦν· ἐξακριβοῦν γὰρ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἄλλης ἂν εἴη φιλοσοφίας οἰκειότερον.

Dismissal of the subject, with some general remarks.

Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἰδέας· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἔστιν ἕν τι τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον ἀγαθὸν ἢ χωριστόν τι αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη πρακτὸν οὐδὲ κτητὸν ἀνθρώπῳ· νῦν δὲ τοιοῦτόν τι ζητεῖται. τάχα δέ τῳ δόξειεν ἂν βέλτιον εἶναι γνωρίζειν αὐτὸ πρὸς

7. ἀλλὰ πῶς] But if there be so many things which we call *Good*, and yet these are all different and cannot be referred to one common species, how is it that we call them all by the same name *Good*? Does not their having one and the same name, shew that there is one common essence running through the whole of them?

Aristotle replies, No; that they are so called perhaps from all contributing to one common end, (Happiness); or perhaps from analogy.

8. τύχης ὁμωνύμοις] This appears to have reference and to throw some light on that very obscure passage in the Met. i. 6. p. 19. where Aristotle, describing Plato's doctrine of Ideas, says: τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων (sc. Universals) ἰδέας προσηγόρευσε, τὰ δ' αἰσθητὰ περὶ τὰ παρὰ ταῦτα καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι πάντα· κατὰ μέθεξιν γὰρ εἶναι τὰ πολλὰ τῶν συνωνύμων (Univocal) ὁμώνυμα τοῖς εἴδεσι. Here μέθεξις evidently denotes the relation of an individual to its species, or a species to its genus, &c. being continually used in this sense. See Porphyry's Isagog. x. 3. xi. 3. passim.

10. ἐν σώματι ὄψις] A favourite expression with Aristotle. Compare Top. p. 117. (Ed. Tauch.) ὡς ὄψις ἐν ὀφθαλμῷ νοῦς ἐν ψυχῇ.

τὰ κτητὰ καὶ πρακτὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οἷον γὰρ παράδειγμα τοῦτ᾽ ἔχοντες μᾶλλον εἰσόμεθα καὶ τὰ ἡμῖν ἀγαθά, κἂν εἰδῶμεν, ἐπιτευξόμεθα αὐτῶν.

At variance with our experience.

Πιθανότητα μὲν οὖν ἔχει τινὰ ὁ λόγος, ἔοικε δὲ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις διαφωνεῖν· πᾶσαι γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφιέμεναι καὶ τὸ ἐνδεὲς ἐπιζητοῦσαι παραλείπουσι τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτοῦ. καίτοι βοήθημα τηλικοῦτον ἅπαντας τοὺς τεχνίτας ἀγνοεῖν καὶ μηδ᾽ ἐπιζητεῖν οὐκ εὔλογον. ἄπορον δὲ καὶ τί ὠφεληθήσεται ὑφάντης ἢ τέκτων πρὸς τὴν αὑτοῦ τέχνην εἰδὼς αὐτὸ τἀγαθόν, ἢ πῶς ἰατρικώτερος ἢ στρατηγικώτερος ἔσται ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν αὐτὴν τεθεαμένος. φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ τὴν ὑγίειαν οὕτως ἐπισκοπεῖν ὁ ἰατρός, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀνθρώπου, μᾶλλον δ᾽ ἴσως τὴν τοῦδε· καθ᾽ ἕκαστον γὰρ ἰατρεύει. καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω.

CHAP. IV.

Of certain qualities and conditions requisite to Happiness.

Resumption of the argument from Chap. I.

ΠΑΛΙΝ δ᾽ ἐπανέλθωμεν ἐπὶ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν, τί ποτ᾽ ἂν εἴη. φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο

1. παράδειγμα] As Plato had asserted in his Republic. See particularly, p. 505. 596, sq. This is more fully confuted in Metaph. xii. 5. p. 269.

10. ὑφάντης ἢ τέκτων] See Plato's Repub. p. 596.

CHAP. IV.

Aristotle now proceeds to his own definition of Happiness: first narrowing the subject, by considering certain conditions and qualities which belong to it; for which he appears to be indebted to the Philibus of Plato. This is his usual way of proceeding; describing first those parts of the definition which are common and better known, and afterwards advancing to what is peculiar and essential. ἔοικε δὲ οὐ μόνον τὸ τί ἐστι γνῶναι χρήσιμον εἶναι πρὸς τὸ θεωρῆσαι τὰς αἰτίας τῶν συμβε-

ἐν ἄλλῃ πράξει καὶ τέχνῃ· ἄλλο γὰρ ἐν ἰατρικῇ καὶ στρατηγικῇ καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς ὁμοίως. τί οὖν ἑκάστης τἀγαθόν; ἢ οὗ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πράττεται; τοῦτο δ' ἐν ἰατρικῇ μὲν ὑγίεια, ἐν στρατηγικῇ δὲ νίκη, ἐν οἰκοδομικῇ δ' οἰκία, ἐν ἄλλῳ δ' ἄλλο, ἐν ἁπάσῃ δὲ πράξει καὶ προαιρέσει τὸ τέλος· τούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα τὰ λοιπὰ πράττουσι πάντες. ὥστ' εἴ τι τῶν πρακτῶν ἁπάντων ἐστὶ τέλος, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν, εἰ δὲ πλείω, ταῦτα. μεταβαίνων δὴ ὁ λόγος εἰς ταὐτὸν ἀφῖκται. τοῦτο δ' ἔτι μᾶλλον διασαφῆσαι πειρατέον. Ἐπεὶ δὲ πλείω φαίνεται τὰ τέλη, τούτων δ' αἱρούμεθά τινα δι' ἕτερα, οἷον πλοῦτον αὐλοὺς καὶ ὅλως τὰ ὄργανα, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἔστι πάντα τέλεια· τὸ δ' ἄριστον τέλειόν τι φαίνεται. ὥστ' εἰ μέν ἐστιν ἕν τι μόνον τέλειον, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ ζητούμενον, εἰ δὲ πλείω, τὸ τελειότατον τούτων. τελειότερον δὲ λέγομεν τὸ καθ' αὑτὸ διωκτὸν τοῦ δι' ἕτερον καὶ τὸ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο αἱρετὸν τῶν καὶ καθ' αὑτὰ καὶ διὰ τοῦθ' αἱρετῶν, καὶ ἁπλῶς δὴ τέλειον τὸ καθ' αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν ἀεὶ καὶ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο. τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ εὐδαιμονία μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ·

That the best Good is τελειότατον, and in what way.

βηκότων ταῖς οὐσίαις, . . ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνάπαλιν τὰ συμβεβηκότα συμβάλλεται μέγα μέρος πρὸς τὸ εἰδῆσαι τὸ τί ἐστιν· ἐπειδὰν γὰρ ἔχωμεν ἀποδιδόναι κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν περὶ τῶν συμβεβηκότων (the phænomena), ἢ πάντων ἢ τῶν πλείστων, τότε καὶ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἕξομέν τι λέγειν ὅτι κάλλιστα. De Anima, i. 1, 11.

10. μεταβαίνων] *By digressing has come to the same point*; viz. That the chief Good is most final (τελειότατον.) The question therefore now is; *What is the most final Good?*

12. ἐπεὶ δὲ πλείω] Ea partitione usus est et Plato, Repub. II. in principio. Et Cicero, Invent. II. in extremo. Eadem partitione primus ni fallor usus est Archytas ut est apud Stobæum, CIII. GIPH.

21. μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο] "Quærimus igitur quid sit extremum, quid ultimum bonorum, quod omnium philosophorum sententia, tale debet esse ut ad id omnia referri oporteat: ipsum autem nusquam." Cicero de Fin. I. 9.

ταύτην γὰρ αἱρούμεθα ἀεὶ δι' αὐτὴν καὶ οὐδέποτε δι' ἄλλο. τιμὴν δὲ καὶ ἡδονὴν καὶ νοῦν καὶ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν αἱρούμεθα μὲν καὶ δι' αὐτά (μηθενὸς γὰρ ἀποβαίνοντος ἑλοίμεθ' ἂν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν), αἱρούμεθα δὲ καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας χάριν, διὰ τούτων ὑπολαμβάνοντες εὐδαιμονήσειν. τὴν δ' εὐδαιμονίαν οὐδεὶς αἱρεῖται τούτων χάριν, οὐδ' ὅλως δι' ἄλλο.

That it is *αὐταρκής*.

Φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς αὐταρκείας τὸ αὐτὸ συμβαίνειν. τὸ γὰρ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν αὔταρκες εἶναι δοκεῖ. τὸ δ' αὔταρκες λέγομεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ τῷ ζῶντι βίον μονώτην, ἀλλὰ καὶ γονεῦσι καὶ τέκνοις καὶ γυναικὶ καὶ ὅλως τοῖς φίλοις καὶ πολίταις, ἐπειδὴ φύσει πολιτικὸς ἄνθρωπος. τούτων δὲ ληπτέος ὅρος τις· ἐπεκτείνοντι γὰρ ἐπὶ τοὺς γονεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἀπογόνους καὶ τῶν φίλων τοὺς φίλους εἰς ἄπειρον πρόεισιν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἰσαῦθις ἐπισκεπτέον, τὸ δ' αὔταρκες τίθεμεν ὃ μονούμενον αἱρετὸν ποιεῖ τὸν βίον καὶ μηδενὸς ἐνδεᾶ· τοιοῦτον δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἰόμεθα εἶναι. ἔτι δὲ πάντων

16. *εἰσαῦθις*] Qui modus quis sit hoc loco non explicat: sed *εἰσαῦθις*, hoc est posterius infra, nempe Lib. II. cap. 8. et Polit. IV. c. 11. ut ego quidem existimo: nam iis in locis bonorum fortunæ mediocritatem quandam non excellentiam viro bono necessariam utilemque esse ostendit. GIPH.

19. *ἔτι δὲ πάντων*] Compare X. 2. *οὐδενὸς γὰρ προστεθέντος αὐτὸ τἀγαθὸν αἱρετώτερον γίνεσθαι. δῆλον δ' ὡς οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν τἀγαθὸν ἂν εἴη, ὃ μετά τινος τῶν καθ' αὑτὸ ἀγαθῶν αἱρετώτερον γίνεται.* This passage is generally so interpreted, as if Aristotle intended to say that Happiness being united with *any* other good is more eligible than without it. But if Happiness is most eligible (*αἱρετωτάτη*), to say the addition of some other good increases that eligibility is to say that a thing can be more eligible than what is most eligible, which seems to be absurd. According to Giphanius, Aristotle distinguishes Goods into two kinds, *συναριθμούμενα* and *μὴ συναριθμούμενα*.—Dicuntur bona quædam esse *συναριθμούμενα* quæ aliis addita eorum quibus adjiciuntur numerum et cumulum augent eaquę excrescere faciunt: ut *prudentiæ* addita *nobilitas* reddit *prudentiæ* bonum cumulatius.—*μὴ συναριθμούμενα* sunt ea quæ aliis adjecta ea

αἱρετωτάτην μὴ συναριθμουμένην, συναριθμουμένην δὲ δῆλον ὡς αἱρετωτέραν μετὰ τοῦ ἐλαχίστου τῶν ἀγαθῶν· ὑπεροχὴ γὰρ ἀγαθῶν γίνεται τὸ προστιθέμενον, ἀγαθῶν δὲ τὸ μεῖζον αἱρετώτερον ἀεί.
5 τέλειον δή τι φαίνεται καὶ αὔταρκες ἡ εὐδαιμονία, τῶν πρακτῶν οὖσα τέλος.

CHAP. V.

The definition of Happiness.

6 ΑΛΛ' ἴσως τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν τὸ ἄριστον λέγειν ὁμολογούμενόν τι φαίνεται, ποθεῖται δ' The definition of Happiness

non augent. v. g. *doctrinæ* addita *perceptio* non auget *doctrinæ* bonum, quia *doctrina* in se continet *perceptionem.*— Et sic Aristoteles hoc verbo usus est hoc loco, et Rhet. II. 37. et Mag. Mor. I. 2. Idem valet *συγκρίνεσθαι* quo verbo usi sunt interpretes hic Eustratius et in Topic. iii. Alexander. Explicata jam verbi ratione, sciendum præterea est plura bona paucioribus esse anteponenda (Arist. Top. iii.) nisi sint ex eo genere quod diximus esse *μὴ συναριθμούμενα*. Nam in his ea regula locum non habet, ut recte eo loco Alexander. V.*g. bona valetudo* et *curatio* et si plura sunt bona, tamen non sunt magis expetenda quam una bona *valetudo*. Sic *beatitudo* et *virtutes* plura sunt bona, non tamen optabiliora quam sola *beatitudo*, propterea quod eas beatitudo omnes in se complectitur. Nunc quæritur, ex quo genere sit *beatitudo*, et ait Aristoteles esse ex iis quæ diximus *μὴ συναριθμούμενα*, hac usus conclusione a repugnantibus:

Si *beatitudo* est *συναριθμουμένη* ergo cum altero vel minimo bono conjuncta erit magis expetenda; i. e. non erit summe expetenda per se;

Falsum est *secundum*, ergo et primum. Quæ Stoicorum fuerit sententia de hac re vid. Cic. De Finibus iii. iv.

The natural and obvious interpretation, however, that Happiness is increased by the addition of other Goods, seems countenanced by the following passages from Cicero: "De *summo* quidem, atque naturali bono sic agunt [sc. Peripatetici]: cetera autem pertinere ad id putant, aut *adaugendum* aut tuendum ut divitias, ut opes, ut gloriam, ut gratiam." Acad. i. 5. "Omnis illa antiqua philosophia sensit in una virtute esse positam beatam vitam: nec tamen beatissimam nisi adjungerentur et corporis et cetera . . . ad virtutis usum idonea." Ib. c. 6.

Chap. V.

All men seem to agree in calling *εὐδαιμονία εὖ ζῆν* or *εὖ πράττειν*; but

investigated and settled.

ἐναργέστερον· τί ἐστιν ἔτι λεχθῆναι. τάχα δὴ γένοιτ' ἂν τοῦτ', εἰ ληφθείη τὸ ἔργον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. ὥσπερ γὰρ αὐλητῇ καὶ ἀγαλματοποιῷ καὶ παντὶ τεχνίτῃ, καὶ ὅλως ὧν ἐστὶν ἔργον τι καὶ πρᾶξις, ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ, οὕτω δόξειεν ἂν καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, εἴπερ ἔστι τι ἔργον αὐτοῦ. πότερον οὖν τέκτονος μὲν καὶ σκυτέως ἐστὶν

when they come to explain their notions of this εὖ all are at variance, interpreting it according to their different situations and habits of life. One man calls it pleasure, another honour, a third virtue, a fourth wealth, others again an abstract Good. But all these opinions are not and cannot at once be true; we have shown how they cannot; we have not therefore advanced further into our inquiry as to the nature of Happiness (the τί τι ἦν) by this digression (μεταβαίνων), and must therefore commence afresh by examining what εὐδαιμονία, that is, what the εὖ of man in reality is.

In what then is the εὖ of every thing to be found? Plainly in the perfect performance of the object of its being (its ἔργον); and consequently to discover what the εὖ of every thing is, we must first discover its ἔργον, and therefore to discover what is the εὖ of man we must discover his ἔργον.

Now as every thing has only one ἔργον (for nature does not act like man, making one instrument for two uses), it is clear that the ἔργον must be that which essentially distinguishes one thing from another, constituting its logical differentia; consequently to discover the ἔργον of man, we must discover his logical differentia.

What then is the differentia of man? Man is distinguished from mere substance by vegetation; from plants by animation; from animals by rationality or the exercise of reason. Consequently the ἔργον of man is an energy according to reason, and his εὖ will be that energy performed perfectly (κατ' ἀρετήν), or rather κατ' ἀρίστην ἀρετήν. If therefore this be εὖ, then εὖ ζῆν (as life is an ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς), will be an energy of the soul according to the best virtue; dropping the word rationality as included under the term ἀρετή. Now the whole of this argument has proceeded on this supposition, that man has an ἔργον, which however we might be induced to grant, from considering that each part of man has a peculiar employment (ἔργον), and therefore the whole, as a whole, has in all probability also.

The Happiness therefore of man is *an energy of the soul according to the best virtue.* But as the reasoning by which Aristotle arrives at this conclusion, starting on a presumption, a strong one it may be said, that man has an ἔργον, is not necessarily conclusive, Aristotle deems it requisite again to caution his readers against expecting pure demonstration on moral subjects.

7. πότερον οὖν] See Plato's Republica, p. 40. (Ed. Tauch.) δοκεῖ τι σοὶ εἶναι ἵππου ἔργον; —Ἔμοιγε.—Ἆρα οὖν τοῦτο ἂν θείης καὶ ἵππου καὶ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν ἔργον, ὃ ἂν ἢ μόνῳ ἐκείνῳ ποιῇ

ἔργα τινὰ καὶ πράξεις, ἀνθρώπου δ' οὐδέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἀργὸν πέφυκεν; ἢ καθάπερ ὀφθαλμοῦ καὶ χειρὸς καὶ ποδὸς καὶ ὅλως ἑκάστου τῶν μορίων φαίνεταί τι ἔργον, οὕτω καὶ ἀνθρώπου παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα θείη τις ἂν ἔργον τι; τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ποτέ; τὸ μὲν γὰρ ζῆν κοινὸν εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς, ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ ἴδιον. ἀφοριστέον ἄρα τὴν θρεπτικὴν καὶ αὐξητικὴν ζωήν. ἑπομένη δὲ αἰσθητική τις ἂν εἴη, φαίνεται δὲ καὶ αὕτη κοινὴ καὶ ἵππῳ καὶ βοῒ καὶ παντὶ ζῴῳ. λείπεται δὴ πρακτική τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος. τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπιπειθὲς λόγῳ, τὸ δ' ὡς ἔχον καὶ διανοούμενον. διττῶς δὲ καὶ ταύτης λεγομένης τὴν κατ' ἐνέργειαν θετέον· κυριώτερον γὰρ αὕτη δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι. εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἔργον ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον ἢ μὴ ἄνευ λόγου, τὸ δ' αὐτό φαμεν ἔργον εἶναι τῷ γένει τοῦδε καὶ τοῦδε σπουδαίου, (ὥσπερ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ σπουδαίου κιθαριστοῦ, καὶ ἁπλῶς δὴ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πάντων), προστιθεμένης τῆς κατ' ἀρετὴν ὑπεροχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἔργον, (κιθαριστοῦ μὲν γὰρ τὸ κιθαρίζειν, σπουδαίου δὲ τὸ εὖ), εἰ δ' οὕτως, ἀνθρώπου δὲ τίθεμεν ἔργον ζωήν τινα, ταύτην δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν καὶ πράξεις μετὰ λόγου, σπουδαίου δ' ἀνδρὸς εὖ ταῦτα καὶ καλῶς, (ἕκαστον δ' εὖ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν ἀποτελεῖται)· εἰ δ'

τις, ἢ ἄριστα; . . . Ἔσθ' ὅτῳ ἂν ἄλλῳ ἴδοις ἢ ὀφθαλμοῖς; Οὐ δῆτα.—Τί δέ; ἀκούσαις ἄλλῳ ἢ ὠσίν;—Οὐδαμῶς.—Οὐκοῦν δικαίως ἂν ταῦτα τούτων φαῖμεν ἔργα εἶναι; . . . Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀρετὴ δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἑκάστῳ, ᾧπερ καὶ ἔργον τι προστέτακται; . . . Ἴθι δή, μετὰ ταῦτα τόδε σκέψαι . . . Ψυχῆς φήσομεν ἔργον εἶναι;—Μάλιστά γ' ἔφη.—Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀρετήν φαμέν τινα ψυχῆς εἶναι;—Φαμέν.

21. σπουδαίου] See note p. 33. Good and ill constitutes not an essential difference in an act.

25. κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετήν] By

οὕτω, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται κατ' ἀρετήν. εἰ δὲ πλείους αἱ ἀρεταί, κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τελειοτάτην. ἔτι δ' ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ. μία γὰρ χελιδὼν ἔαρ οὐ ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ μία ἡμέρα· οὕτω δὲ οὐδὲ μακάριον καὶ εὐδαίμονα μία ἡμέρα οὐδ' ὀλίγος χρόνος.

Some remarks upon the nature of this investigation.

Περιγεγράφθω μὲν οὖν τἀγαθὸν ταύτῃ· δεῖ γὰρ ἴσως ὑποτυπῶσαι πρῶτον, εἶθ' ὕστερον ἀναγράψαι. δόξειε δ' ἂν παντὸς εἶναι 7
προαγαγεῖν καὶ διαρθρῶσαι τὰ καλῶς ἔχοντα τῇ περιγραφῇ, καὶ ὁ χρόνος τῶν τοιούτων εὑρετὴς ἢ συνεργὸς ἀγαθὸς εἶναι. ὅθεν καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν γεγόνασιν αἱ ἐπιδόσεις· παντὸς γὰρ προσθεῖναι τὸ ἐλλεῖπον. μεμνῆσθαι δὲ καὶ τῶν προειρημένων χρή, καὶ τὴν ἀκρίβειαν μὴ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασιν ἐπιζητεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἑκάστοις κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐφ' ὅσον οἰκεῖον τῇ μεθόδῳ. καὶ γὰρ τέκτων καὶ γεωμέτρης διαφερόντως ἐπιζητοῦσι τὴν

reason of its proper excellence; since, as he afterwards shows, actions done by chance or outward force are not good actions. See that subject discussed, ii. 3 and 5.

3. ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ] A similar definition was afterwards adopted by Potamon of Alexandria, the founder of the Eclectic philosophy. τέλος δὲ εἶναι ἐφ' ὃ πάντα ἀναφέρεται, ζωὴν κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν τελείαν, οὐκ ἄνευ τῶν τοῦ σώματος κατὰ φύσιν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐκτός. Diog. Laert. i. §. 21. p. 10. Ed. Tauch.

— βίῳ τελείῳ] τέλειος δ' ἂν εἴη χρόνος ὃν ἄνθρωπος βιοῖ. Mag. Moral. p. 10. But this life would, surely, be perfect, when a man has acquired the perfect habits which produce these energies (ἐνεργείαι ψυχῆς κατ' ἀρετάς), see p. 13, 20; and these ἕξεις will be perfect when pleasure arises from the exertion of them. See ii. 2. If a person then can reach this state of perfect habits, he will be a perfectly happy man; if not, then no further than he can reach it. But Aristotle does not appear to think that this happiness is perfectly attainable by man, at least in this present life. See x. 5. This notion of τέλειος is also confirmed by the definition which Aristotle constantly gives of that term. Thus in his Phys. Ausc. vii. 3. he observes: ἡ μὲν ἀρετὴ τελείωσίς τίς ἐστιν· ὅταν [γὰρ] λάβῃ, τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀρετὴν τότε λέγεται τέλειον ἕκαστον. τότε γάρ ἐστι μάλιστα τὸ κατὰ φύσιν· ὥσπερ κύκλος τέλειος, ὅταν μάλιστα γίνηται κύκλος βέλτιστος.

ὀρθήν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐφ᾿ ὅσον χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ ἔργον, ὁ δὲ τί ἐστιν ἢ ποῖόν τι· θεατὴς γὰρ τἀληθοῦς. τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιητέον, ὅπως μὴ τὰ πάρεργα τῶν ἔργων πλείω γίγνηται. οὐκ ἀπαιτητέον δ᾿ οὐδὲ τὴν αἰτίαν ἐν ἅπασιν ὁμοίως, ἀλλ᾿ ἱκανὸν ἔν τισι τὸ ὅτι δειχθῆναι καλῶς, οἷον καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς· τὸ δ᾿ ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή. τῶν ἀρχῶν δ᾿ αἱ μὲν ἐπαγωγῇ θεωροῦνται, αἱ δ᾿ αἰσθήσει, αἱ δ᾿ ἐθισμῷ τινί, καὶ ἄλλαι δ᾿ ἄλλως. μετιέναι δὲ πειρατέον ἑκάστας ᾗ πεφύκασιν, καὶ σπουδαστέον ὅπως ὁρισθῶσι καλῶς· μεγάλην γὰρ ἔχουσι ῥοπὴν πρὸς τὰ ἑπόμενα. δοκεῖ γὰρ πλεῖον ἢ ἥμισυ παντὸς εἶναι ἡ ἀρχή, καὶ πολλὰ συμφανῆ γίνεσθαι δι᾿ αὐτῆς τῶν ζητουμένων.

7. οἷον καὶ περί] *As in first principles.* εἰ γὰρ ζητήσομεν τῶν ἀρχῶν αἰτίαν, οὐδέποτε ἀρξόμεθα, ἀλλ᾿ ἐπ᾿ ἄπειρον βαδιούμεθα. Paraph.

9. αἱ δ᾿ ἐθισμῷ] ἐθισμῷ δὲ αἱ ἀρχαὶ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ γινώσκονται. καὶ γὰρ ἀδύνατον εἰς γνῶσιν ἐλθεῖν τῶν περὶ ἀρετῆς λόγων, μὴ ἐν ἔθει γενόμενον τῶν σπουδαίων πράξεων. . . . . Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο φαίνεται πλέον ἢ τὸ ἥμισυ τῆς ἀποδείξεως δύνασθαι τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ζητουμένων ἐμφανῆ γίνεσθαι δι᾿ αὐτῆς· ἐν γὰρ τῇ μείζονι προτάσει ἀεὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ παραλαμβάνεται· ἡ δὲ μείζων πρότασις, τὸ πᾶν δύναται τῆς ἀποδείξεως σχεδόν. Καὶ ἴσως εἰ καὶ δι᾿ ἄλλην αἰτίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μείζων καλεῖται. Paraph.

CHAP. VI.

How far this definition of Happiness agrees with the correct opinions of mankind.

Happiness is περὶ ψυχήν.

ΣΚΕΠΤΕΟΝ δὴ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ 9 συμπεράσματος καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων περὶ αὐτῆς· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεῖ πάντα συνᾴδει τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, τῷ δὲ ψευδεῖ ταχὺ διαφωνεῖ τἀληθές. νενεμημένων δὴ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τριχῇ, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἐκτὸς λεγομένων τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν κυριώτατα λέγομεν καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαθά. τὰς δὲ πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς ψυχικὰς περὶ ψυχὴν τίθεμεν. ὥστε καλῶς ἂν λέγοιτο κατά γε ταύτην τὴν δόξαν παλαιὰν οὖσαν καὶ ὁμολογουμένην ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούτων.

It is an ἐνέργεια.

Ὀρθῶς δὲ καὶ ὅτι πράξεις τινὲς λέγονται καὶ ἐνέργειαι τὸ τέλος· οὕτω γὰρ τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν ἀγαθῶν γίνεται, καὶ οὐ τῶν ἐκτός. συνᾴδει δὲ τῷ

Aristotle now proceeds to analyse his definition, which occupies the rest of the Treatise. In the 2d Chap. the opinions of which the consideration is resumed in this chapter were shewn to be more or less incorrect, not wholly destitute of truth. In this chapter Aristotle shews, that whatever was correct in those opinions accords with his definition. τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ παλαιοὶ λεγούσιν, τὰ δὲ ὀλίγοι καὶ ἔνδοξοι ἄνδρες· οὐδετέρους δὲ τούτων εὔλογον διαμαρτάνειν τοῖς ὅλοις ἀλλ' ἕν γέ τι ἢ καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα κατορθοῦν. p. 29, 8.

2. ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος] *The premises from which that definition or conclusion was derived.* οὐ μόνον τὸν ὁρισμὸν αὐτῆς ἐξετάσαντας καὶ τοὺς λόγους τοὺς συμπεράσαντας αὐτόν. Paraph.

3. πάντα τὰ ὑπάρχοντα] *All that is real.* ὁ γὰρ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τὸ ἀληθὲς τοῦτο ἡ ὕπαρξις ἐν τῷ πράγματι ὅταν οὖν τὰ ὑπάρχοντα τῷ πράγματι συνᾴδῃ τοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ λεγομένοις δῆλον ἂν εἴη ὅτι ἀληθὴς ὁ λόγος ἐστίν. Schol.

5. νενεμημένων] A division which originated with the Pythagoreans, and was adopted by the Peripatetics. See Cicero's Acad. i. 5. Tusc. v. 85.

14. οὐ τῶν ἐκτός] If Happiness be a

λόγῳ καὶ τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν τὸν εὐδαίμονα· σχεδὸν γὰρ εὐζωΐα τις εἴρηται καὶ εὐπραξία.

9 Φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐπιζητούμενα περὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἅπανθ' ὑπάρχειν τῷ λεχθέντι. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετή, τοῖς δὲ φρόνησις, ἄλλοις δὲ σοφία τις εἶναι δοκεῖ, τοῖς δὲ ταῦτα ἢ τούτων τι μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς· ἕτεροι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐκτὸς εὐετηρίαν συμπαραλαμβάνουσιν. τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ παλαιοὶ λέγουσιν, τὰ δὲ ὀλίγοι καὶ ἔνδοξοι ἄνδρες· οὐδετέρους δὲ τούτων εὔλογον διαμαρτάνειν τοῖς ὅλοις, ἀλλ' ἕν γέ τι ἢ καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα κατορθοῦν.

All requisites are in this definition of Happiness.

Τοῖς μὲν οὖν λέγουσι τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ ἀρετήν τινα συνῳδός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος· ταύτης γάρ ἐστιν ἡ κατ' αὐτὴν ἐνέργεια. διαφέρει δὲ ἴσως οὐ μικρὸν ἐν κτήσει ἢ χρήσει τὸ ἄριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν καὶ ἐν ἕξει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ. τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἕξιν ἐνδέχεται μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀποτελεῖν ὑπάρχουσαν, οἷον τῷ καθεύδοντι ἢ καὶ ἄλλως πως ἐξηργηκότι,

1. As being virtue, not a mere *habit*, but active virtue.

good of the soul, it must be an energy of the soul, because the soul does not exist unless it energizes. 2. If Happiness be an energy, it must be a good of the soul, for the soul is the only principle of energy or action.

2. εὐζωΐα] The same etymological argument is used by Plato in his Gorgias, p. 507. in the Charmides, p. 172. where for other passages see the notes either of Heindorf or Stallbaum. See also Chap. viii. and note 1.

3. τὰ ἐπιζητούμενα] *The qualities required in happiness.*

4. τοῖς μὲν] These different opinions concerning Happiness are likewise enumerated in the Eudem. Ethics, p. 103. (Ed. Tauch.) The first, that virtue is Happiness, is attributed to Socrates, as also to Zeno and the Cynics. (See Clem. Alex. ii. 199. Ed. Klotz. Plato, Gorgias p. 507, sq. Cic. Ac. i. 10.) The second, that φρόνησις is Happiness, is also attributed to Socrates. (See vi. 10. and the Phædon, p. 69.) The third, that σοφία is Happiness, to Thales and Anaxagoras. (Eud. Eth. p. 100.) The fourth, that it was not without pleasure, to Aristippus and the Cyrenaics; (Diog. Laert. ii. 75.) and subsequently to Callipho. (See Cic. de Fin. ii. 11. Clem. Alex. ii. p. 198.) Of the last opinion was Xenocrates the Chalcedonian, the friend and disciple of Plato. (See Clemens, ib. p. 202. Wynpersse de Xenocrate, p. 178.)

τὴν δ' ἐνέργειαν οὐχ οἷόν τε· πράξει γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ εὖ πράξει. ὥσπερ δ' Ὀλυμπίασιν οὐχ οἱ κάλλιστοι καὶ ἰσχυρότατοι στεφανοῦνται ἀλλ' οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι (τούτων γάρ τινες νικῶσιν), οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ καλῶν κἀγαθῶν οἱ πράττοντες ὀρθῶς ἐπήβολοι γίγνονται.

2. In being *essentially* pleasant.

Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ βίος αὐτῶν καθ' αὑτὸν ἡδύς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἥδεσθαι τῶν ψυχικῶν, ἑκάστῳ δ' ἐστὶν ἡδὺ πρὸς ὃ λέγεται φιλοτοιοῦτος, οἷον ἵππος μὲν τῷ φιλίππῳ, θέαμα δὲ τῷ φιλοθεώρῳ· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὰ δίκαια τῷ φιλοδικαίῳ καὶ ὅλως τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν τῷ φιλαρέτῳ. τοῖς μὲν οὖν πολλοῖς τὰ ἡδέα μάχεται διὰ τὸ μὴ φύσει τοιαῦτ' εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ φιλοκάλοις ἐστὶν ἡδέα τὰ φύσει ἡδέα. τοιαῦτα δ' αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις, ὥστε καὶ τούτοις εἰσὶν ἡδεῖαι καὶ καθ' αὑτάς. οὐδὲν δὴ προσδεῖται τῆς ἡδονῆς ὁ βίος αὐτῶν ὥσπερ περιάπτου τινός, ἀλλ' ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ. πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις γὰρ οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς ὁ μὴ χαίρων ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν· οὔτε γὰρ δίκαιον οὐδεὶς ἂν εἴποι τὸν μὴ χαίροντα τῷ δικαιοπραγεῖν, οὔτ' ἐλευθέριον τὸν μὴ χαίροντα ταῖς ἐλευθερίοις πράξεσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. εἰ δ' οὕτω, καθ' αὑτὰς ἂν εἶεν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις ἡδεῖαι.

3. In containing all excellent qualities.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀγαθαί γε καὶ καλαί, καὶ μάλιστα τούτων ἕκαστον, εἴπερ καλῶς κρίνει

8. ἡδεῖαι] As being an energy or at least inseparably allied to it.

17. περιάπτου] *As an amulet.* περιάπτα enim hæc Græci vocabant quæ a superstitiosis mulieribus infantium collo ad fascinationes amoliendas appendebantur. VICTOR.

26. εἴπερ] *If, as is the fact.* This particle gives a precision and firmness to the word to which it belongs. See some ingenious remarks upon it in Mr. Sewell's Horæ Philol. p. 42.

περὶ αὐτῶν ὁ σπουδαῖος· κρίνει δ' ὡς εἴπομεν. ἄριστον ἄρα καὶ κάλλιστον καὶ ἥδιστον ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ οὐ διώρισται ταῦτα κατὰ τὸ Δηλιακὸν ἐπίγραμμα·

κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιότατον, λῷστον δ' ὑγιαίνειν·
ἥδιστον δὲ πέφυχ' οὗ τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν.

ἅπαντα γὰρ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα ταῖς ἀρίσταις ἐνεργείαις· ταύτας δέ, ἢ μίαν τούτων τὴν ἀρίστην, φαμὲν εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν. Φαίνεται δ' ὅμως καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν προσδεομένη, καθάπερ εἴπομεν· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἢ οὐ ῥᾴδιον τὰ καλὰ πράττειν ἀχορήγητον ὄντα. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ πράττεται, καθάπερ δι' ὀργάνων, διὰ φίλων καὶ πλούτου καὶ πολιτικῆς δυνάμεως· ἐνίων δὲ τητώμενοι ῥυπαίνουσι τὸ μακάριον, οἷον εὐγενείας, εὐτεκνίας, κάλλους· οὐ πάνυ γὰρ εὐδαιμονικὸς ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν παναίσχης ἢ δυσγενὴς ἢ μονώτης καὶ ἄτεκνος, ἔτι δ' ἴσως

Yet it requires external goods.

27. κρίνει—ὁ σπουδαῖος] The good man is the rule and measure of all things: whatever he says is true. He says that energies according to virtues are the noblest, the most pleasant, the most excellent of all things; therefore, this definition of Happiness, as consisting of such energies, has all these qualities.

4. ὑγιαίνειν] Compare the σκόλιον in Athenæus, 694. E. and Plato's Gorg. p. 44. n. Stallb.

8. φαίνεται δ' ὅμως] Certum est Aristotelem et Peripateticos omnes et in primis Theophrastum (quem gravissime reprehendit hoc nomine Cicero de Finibus, v. 5. et Tuscul. v. 30.) multum his bonis tribuisse adeo ut sine iis beatitudinem non consistere posse dicerent. GIPH. But Theophrastus carried out this doctrine to a far greater extent than his master: asserting that with ill fortune, or grief, or bodily pain, Happiness could by no means consist, (conjungi beatam vitam nullo modo posse putavit. Cic. de Fin. v. 26. and Acad. i. 9. with the notes of Goerenz.) But according to Aristotle, Happiness requires external goods, not as part of its essence, but its instruments. Sciences and arts are in themselves perfect: the science of physic is in itself perfect, yet cannot be exercised without external means, as drugs, &c. yet no one would say that these make part of the science *of physic*. See Cic. Acad. I. 6.

ἧττον, εἴ τῳ πάγκακοι παῖδες εἶεν ἢ φίλοι, ἢ ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες τεθνᾶσιν. καθάπερ οὖν εἴπομεν, ἔοικε προσδεῖσθαι καὶ τῆς τοιαυτης εὐημερίας· ὅθεν εἰς ταὐτὸ τάττουσιν ἔνιοι τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἕτεροι δὲ τὴν ἀρετήν.

CHAP. VII.

Whether man is the cause of his own happiness or not.

Of the ἀρχὴ of Happiness.

ΟΘΕΝ καὶ ἀπορεῖται πότερόν ἐστι μαθητὸν ἢ ἐθιστὸν ἢ ἄλλως πως ἀσκητόν, ἢ κατά τινα θείαν μοῖραν ἢ καὶ διὰ τύχην παραγίνεται. εἰ μὲν

23. Ἔνιοι] The Cyrenaics, and subsequently the Epicureans; Ἕτεροι the Cynics, and the Stoics. Mich.

CHAP. VII.

After having discussed the definition of Happiness, and considered it in the Category of οὐσία, Aristotle now proceeds to examine it in reference to the other Categories. In this chapter of its efficient cause ἡ ἀρχὴ ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις. In the next ποτί. In the 8th, πρός τι. In the 9th, ποιόν. In the 10th, ποῦ. All which *accidentia* arise out of the definition, and are of great service in clearing and explaining it.

The question discussed in this chapter arises from the final remarks of the last: for since external goods are needful to Happiness, insomuch that some have considered them as an essential part of it, we must immediately inquire whether it arises from external or internal causes. Aristotle says, granting that *both* may have an influence in producing it, the consideration of the first is no part of a moral or political treatise. That man *is* the cause of his own happiness, is clear from its falling in with the general feeling and practice of mankind as exemplified in the conduct of legislators; and also from the definition which we have formed of it in our Fifth Chapter.

7. θείαν μοῖραν.] He glances at Plato, who in his dialogue of Meno, p. 93, rejecting all other causes, asserted that God only was the cause of virtue, and consequently Happiness. (See, however, Stallbaum's Introduction to the Protagoras and the Laches.) Of course it is not to be imagined that the different and conflicting opinions respecting the origin and nature of virtue put forth by Plato in these dialogues were seriously held by him. What were Plato's real opinions we have yet to learn. For the object of almost all his dialogues, particularly on this subject, was not to build new theories, but to expose the emptiness and folly of such as were already

οὖν καὶ ἄλλο τι ἐστὶ θεῶν δώρημα ἀνθρώποις, εὔλογον καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν θεόσδοτον εἶναι, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὅσῳ βέλτιστον. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ἴσως ἄλλης ἂν εἴη σκέψεως οἰκειότερον, φαίνεται δὲ κἂν εἰ μὴ θεόπεμπτός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ δι' ἀρετὴν καί τινα μάθησιν ἢ ἄσκησιν παραγίνεται, τῶν θειοτάτων εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἆθλον καὶ τέλος ἄριστον εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ θεῖόν τι καὶ μακάριον. εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ πολύκοινον· δυνατὸν γὰρ ὑπάρξαι πᾶσι τοῖς μὴ πεπηρωμένοις πρὸς ἀρετὴν διά τινος μαθήσεως καὶ ἐπιμελείας. Εἰ δ' ἐστὶν οὕτω βέλτιον ἢ διὰ τύχην εὐδαιμονεῖν, εὔλογον ἔχειν οὕτως, εἴπερ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς οἷόν τε

Not chance; and why.

popular. To clear the ground for true philosophy, and a right apprehension of things by the removal of error and prejudice, by showing men how little they knew of those very things of which they fancied they knew most. Thus illustrating the interpretation of the Delphic oracle given by his master Socrates. Who being asked, why Apollo had declared him to be the wisest man of Greece; replied, that whereas others thought they *knew something*, he was convinced he *knew nothing*. See Cicero's Acad. i. 4.

9. πολύκοινον] *And must be common to all:* which it would not be, if the Gods only were the authors of it.

13. εἴπερ—πέφυκεν] *If, as is the fact, things according to nature are, and are so produced, as is the best way possible for them to be.* In reasoning upon morals, Plato and Aristotle were perhaps, the first of all philosophers who considered things not as they *are*, but as they *ought to be;* not as they actually appear to us externally, and upon a superficial view, but as they would appear if their tendencies were allowed unlimited scope. The argument from final causes was perfectly understood and recognized, and was carried out to its fullest extent in the Republic of Plato, particularly in the discussion concerning Justice and Injustice. From this view of the transcendental nature of moral philosophy, from seeing that man's moral energies are in this present life confined and pinioned, and that vice is an imperfect and unnatural state, Aristotle assumed it for an indisputable fact, that whatever is best, is natural, and conversely whatever is natural, is best. On the same ground, he constantly refers *to the good man*, his principles and actions, as the standard and criterion of all moral truth, he alone being in a state of nature, and alone, from the standard within himself, capable of judging of what is right and wrong. (*δεῖ σκοπεῖν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσι μᾶλλον τὸ φύσει, καὶ*

κάλλιστα ἔχειν, οὕτω πέφυκεν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ κατὰ τέχνην καὶ πᾶσαν αἰτίαν, καὶ μάλιστα κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον ἐπιτρέψαι τύχῃ λίαν πλημμελὲς ἂν εἴη.

Proved also from the Definition.

Συμφανὲς δ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τὸ ζητούμενον· εἴρηται γὰρ ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν ποιά τις. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν ἀναγκαῖον, τὰ δὲ συνεργὰ καὶ χρήσιμα πέφυκεν ὀργανικῶς.

And from its being the end of the Political Science.

Ὁμολογούμενα δὲ ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη καὶ τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ· τὸ γὰρ τῆς πολιτικῆς τέλος ἄριστον ἐτίθεμεν, αὕτη δὲ πλείστην ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖται τοῦ ποιούς τινας καὶ ἀγαθοὺς τοὺς πολίτας ποιῆσαι καὶ πρακτικοὺς τῶν καλῶν. εἰκότως οὖν οὔτε βοῦν οὔτε ἵππον οὔτε ἄλλο τῶν ζῴων οὐδὲν εὔδαιμον λέγομεν· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν οἷόν τε κοινωνῆσαι τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας. διὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν αἰτίαν οὐδὲ

μὴ ἐν τοῖς διεφθαρμένοις. διὸ καὶ τὸν βέλτιστα διακείμενον καὶ κατὰ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ ψυχὴν ἄνθρωπον θεωρητέον. Pol. i. 2.) Equally as Plato, he conceived that man when depraved by vice, when his moral tendencies were perverted or prevented from developing themselves, was no more in a state of nature, than a tree whose growth has been stunted, whose leaves are become discoloured from disease, can be considered in its natural condition; nor would it be more unphilosophical to draw inferences from such a specimen as to the nature of trees, than it would be to argue as to the nature of man, his ἔργα or his habit, from what is generally and incorrectly considered to be his natural condition. Phys. Ausc. iii. 3—9. vii. 3. Metaph. i. 3. Cic. Acad. i. 5 and 6. and Butler's ii. Serm. on Human Nature.

4. τύχῃ] Since Happiness is a most excellent effect, it is contrary to analogy to attribute its production to an ignoble cause, to chance. For in all other cases, in nature and art, effects the most perfect are produced in the best way for them to be produced, that is to say, from the best causes, or causes which have the best tendency to produce them. It is probable, therefore, that as Happiness is the most perfect and valuable of all effects, it is produced by such a cause.

9. τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ] *With what was said at the commencement of the treatise.* Namely, that the chief Good, or Happiness, is the end of the Political Science.

παῖς εὐδαίμων ἐστίν· οὔπω γὰρ πρακτικὸς τῶν τοιούτων διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν· οἱ δὲ λεγόμενοι διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα μακαρίζονται. δεῖ γάρ, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, καὶ ἀρετῆς τελείας καὶ βίου τελείου. πολλαὶ γὰρ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται καὶ παντοῖαι τύχαι κατὰ τὸν βίον, καὶ ἐνδέχεται τὸν μάλιστ' εὐθηνοῦντα μεγάλαις συμφοραῖς περιπεσεῖν ἐπὶ γήρως, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἡρωϊκοῖς περὶ Πριάμου μυθεύεται· τὸν δὲ τοιαύταις χρησάμενον τύχαις καὶ τελευτήσαντα ἀθλίως οὐδεὶς εὐδαιμονίζει.

CHAP. VIII.

Whether internal prosperity be an adjunct of, or essential to, Happiness.

11 ΠΟΤΕΡΟΝ οὖν οὐδ' ἄλλον οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων εὐδαιμονιστέον ἕως ἂν ζῇ, κατὰ Σόλωνα The opinion of Solon in favour of

Having observed in the last chapter, that he who dies involved in the greatest misfortunes could not be called happy, Aristotle is led further to enquire, can no one then be happy whilst he lives, since all are subject to die in such calamities? Solon affirmed that no one could. The truth of which opinion must now be examined. For if it be true, that external prosperity is *essential* to Happiness, it ought to have been included in the definition, and it is wrong to consider it as a mere adjunct. And here it is worthy to be observed, the attention paid by the ancient philosophers to the opinions and sayings of the wise, and of the generality of mankind; according to Aristotle's own sentiments, *ὥστε δεῖ προσέχειν τῶν ἐμπείρων καὶ πρεσβυτέρων ἢ φρονίμων ταῖς ἀναποδείκτοις φάσεσι καὶ δόξαις οὐχ ἧττον τῶν ἀποδείξεων· διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχειν ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὄμμα ὁρῶσιν ὀρθῶς*. vi. 9. ult. Hence the very general reference both in Plato and Aristotle to proverbs and the sayings of the poets: and the constant recurrence to nominal definitions as expressing the general sense of mankind, as records of their analysis and observation. See Cic. Acad. i. 8. p. 29, 2. n.

11. *πότερον οὖν*] De hac quæstione multa extant veterum testimonia in utramque partem.—Plato quoque in Epinomide existimat in hac vita neminem præter sapientem esse beatum, post mortem autem alios quoque qui

external prosperity discussed.

δὲ χρεὼν τέλος ὁρᾶν; εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ θετέον οὕτως, ἆρά γε καὶ ἔστιν εὐδαίμων τότε ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ; ἢ τοῦτό γε παντελῶς ἄτοπον, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῖς λέγουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνέργειάν τινα τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν; εἰ δὲ μὴ λέγομεν τὸν τεθνεῶτα εὐδαίμονα, μηδὲ Σόλων τοῦτο βούλεται, ἀλλ' ὅτι τηνικαῦτα ἄν τις ἀσφαλῶς μακαρίσειεν ἄνθρωπον ὡς ἐκτὸς ἤδη τῶν κακῶν ὄντα καὶ τῶν δυστυχημάτων, ἔχει μὲν καὶ τοῦτ' ἀμφισβήτησίν τινα· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναί τι τῷ τεθνεῶτι καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, εἴπερ καὶ τῷ ζῶντι μὴ αἰσθανομένῳ δέ, οἷον τιμαὶ καὶ ἀτιμίαι καὶ τέκνων καὶ ὅλως ἀπογόνων εὐπραξίαι τε καὶ δυστυχίαι. ἀπορίαν δὲ καὶ ταῦτα παρέχει· τῷ γὰρ μακαρίως βεβιωκότι μέχρι γήρως καὶ τελευτήσαντι κατὰ λόγον ἐνδέχεται πολλὰς μεταβολὰς συμβαίνειν περὶ τοὺς ἐκγόνους, καὶ τοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι καὶ τυχεῖν βίου τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν, τοὺς δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας. δῆλον δ' ὅτι καὶ τοῖς ἀποστήμασι πρὸς τοὺς γονεῖς παντοδαπῶς ἔχειν αὐτοὺς ἐνδέχεται. ἄτοπον δὴ γίνοιτ' ἄν, εἰ συμμεταβάλλοι καὶ ὁ τεθνεὼς καὶ γίνοιτο ὁτὲ μὲν εὐδαίμων πάλιν δ' ἄθλιος. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ μηδὲν μηδ' ἐπί τινα χρόνον

vixerant et sapientes maxime. Cum Aristotele faciunt Stoici. (Cic. de Finib. iii. 22.) Et Cicero ipse. (Ib. ii. 27.) GIPH. This question is discussed by Cicero in the passages above quoted.

15. κατὰ λόγον] *In a state of prosperity in accordance with his life.*

19. τοῖς ἀποστήμασι] ἀπόστημα plerumque loci intervallum et spatium significat. Sed hic de tempore nonnulli accipiunt: hoc est, fieri posse longo temporis intervallo, ut liberi a parentibus suis et majoribus degenerent: ut avus fortasse fuerit vir bonus, nepos nequam. Ego cum Eustratio ἀπόστημα idem quod ἀποστάσιν, hoc est degenerationem seu defectionem a parentum moribus, valere existimo. GIPH. See Aristot. Rhet. ii. 15.

συνικνεῖσθαι τὰ τῶν ἐκγόνων τοῖς γονεῦσιν. ἀλλ' ἐπανιτέον ἐπὶ τὸ πρότερον ἀπορηθέν· τάχα γὰρ ἂν θεωρηθείη καὶ τὸ νῦν ἐπιζητούμενον ἐξ ἐκείνου.

Solon's opinion reduced *ad absurdum*.

Εἰ δὴ τὸ τέλος ὁρᾶν δεῖ καὶ τότε μακαρίζειν ἕκαστον οὐχ ὡς ὄντα μακάριον ἀλλ' ὅτι πρότερον ἦν, πῶς οὐκ ἄτοπον, εἰ ὅτ' ἐστὶν εὐδαίμων, μὴ ἀληθεύσεται κατ' αὐτοῦ τὸ ὑπάρχον διὰ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι τοὺς ζῶντας εὐδαιμονίζειν διὰ τὰς μεταβολάς, καὶ διὰ τὸ μόνιμόν τι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὑπειληφέναι καὶ μηδαμῶς εὐμετάβολον, τὰς δὲ τύχας πολλάκις ἀνακυκλεῖσθαι περὶ τοὺς αὐτούς; δῆλον γὰρ ὡς εἰ συνακολουθοίημεν ταῖς τύχαις, τὸν αὐτὸν εὐδαίμονα καὶ πάλιν ἄθλιον ἐροῦμεν πολλάκις, χαμαιλέοντά τινα τὸν εὐδαίμονα ἀποφαίνοντες καὶ σαθρῶς ἱδρυμένον.

External prosperity *no part* of Happiness.

Ἢ τὸ μὲν ταῖς τύχαις ἐπακολουθεῖν οὐδαμῶς ὀρθόν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταύταις τὸ εὖ ἢ κακῶς, ἀλλὰ προσδεῖται τούτων ὁ ἀνθρώπινος βίος, καθάπερ εἴπαμεν, κύριαι δ' εἰσὶν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργειαι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, αἱ δ' ἐναντίαι τοῦ ἐναντίου. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ νῦν διαπορηθέν. περὶ οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως

16. οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταύταις τὸ εὖ ἢ κακῶς] Cicero, following the Stoics, went farther, and asserted the sufficiency of virtue alone to make a man happy, denying the doctrine both of Solon and Aristotle. Thus he argues in his Tusc. Disput. v. 13. "Et si omne beatum est, cui nihil deest, et quod in suo genere expletum atque cumulatum est, idque virtutis est proprium : certe omnes virtutis compotes beati sunt. Et hoc quidem mihi cum Bruto convenit, item cum Aristotele, Xenocrate, Speusippo, Polemone. Sed mihi videntur etiam beatissimi. quid enim deest ad beate vivendum ei qui confidit suis bonis? aut qui diffidit beatus esse qui potest? at diffidat necesse est qui bona dividit tripertito. Qui enim poterit aut corporis firmitate aut fortunæ stabilitate confidere? atqui nisi stabili et fixo et permanente bono beatus esse nemo potest." See also Wynpersse Dissert. de Xenocrate Chalcedonio (Lugd. Bat. 1822.) p. 174, sq.

ὑπάρχει τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἔργων βεβαιότης ὡς περὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς κατ' ἀρετήν· μονιμώτεραι γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αὗται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. τούτων δ' αὐτῶν αἱ τιμιώταται μονιμώταται διὰ τὸ μάλιστα καὶ συνεχέστατα καταζῆν ἐν αὐταῖς τοὺς μακαρίους· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔοικεν αἰτίῳ τοῦ μὴ γίγνεσθαι περὶ αὐτὰ λήθην. ὑπάρξει δὴ τὸ ζητούμενον τῷ εὐδαίμονι, καὶ ἔσται διὰ βίου τοιοῦτος· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἢ μάλιστα πάντων πράξει καὶ θεωρήσει τὰ κατ' ἀρετήν, καὶ τὰς τύχας οἴσει κάλλιστα καὶ πάντῃ πάντως ἐμμελῶς ὅ γ' ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ τετράγωνος ἄνευ ψόγου.

In what way good or ill fortune can affect Happiness.

Πολλῶν δὲ γινομένων κατὰ τύχην καὶ διαφερόντων μεγέθει καὶ μικρότητι, τὰ μὲν μικρὰ τῶν εὐτυχημάτων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, δῆλον ὡς οὐ ποιεῖ ῥοπὴν τῆς ζωῆς, τὰ δὲ μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ γιγνόμενα μὲν εὖ μακαριώτερον τὸν βίον ποιήσει (καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ συνεπικοσμεῖν πέφυκεν, καὶ ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῶν καλὴ καὶ σπουδαία γίγνεται), ἀνάπαλιν δὲ συμβαίνοντα θλίβει καὶ λυμαίνεται τὸ μακάριον· λύπας τε γὰρ ἐπιφέρει καὶ ἐμποδίζει πολλαῖς ἐνεργείαις. ὅμως δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαλάμπει τὸ καλόν, ἐπειδὰν φέρῃ τις εὐκόλως πολλὰς καὶ

2. *μονιμώτεραι*] Because the operation and exercise of Virtue is continually called into action.

12. *τετράγωνος*] See Stallbaum on Plato's Protag. p. 339. B.

20. *λυμαίνεται*] Compare Archytas De bono viro: *νόσοι μακραὶ σώματος καὶ πηρώσιες αἰσθαταρίων ἀπομαραίνοντι τὰν εὐθάλειαν τᾶς εὐδαιμοσύνας.* Frag. Pythag. p. 15. Ed. Gale. 1671. Stobæus, i. p. 40. Gaisf.

20. *τὸ μακάριον*] *ἄνδρα δὲ οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι, ὃν ἂν ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθέλῃ.* Plato, from Simonides, Protag. p. 344. C. Where see more upon this subject.

24. *φέρῃ τις*] Compare Archytas, ib. p. 19. *ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ οὕτω διάκειται ποτ' εὐτυχίαν ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ τῷ σώματι καλῶς ἔχων καὶ ῥωμαλέως. καὶ γὰρ*

μεγάλας ἀτυχίας, μὴ δι' ἀναλγησίαν, ἀλλὰ γεννάδας ὢν καὶ μεγαλόψυχος. εἰ δ' εἰσὶν αἱ ἐνέργειαι κύριαι τῆς ζωῆς, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτο τῶν μακαρίων ἄθλιος· οὐδέποτε γὰρ πράξει τὰ μισητὰ καὶ φαῦλα. τὸν γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἔμφρονα πάσας οἰόμεθα τὰς τύχας εὐσχημόνως φέρειν καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἀεὶ τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν, καθάπερ καὶ στρατηγὸν ἀγαθὸν τῷ παρόντι στρατοπέδῳ χρῆσθαι πολεμικώτατα καὶ σκυτοτόμον ἐκ τῶν δοθέντων σκυτῶν κάλλιστον ὑπόδημα ποιεῖν· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τεχνίτας ἅπαντας. εἰ δ' οὕτως, ἄθλιος μὲν οὐδέποτε γένοιτ' ἂν ὁ εὐδαίμων, οὐ μὴν μακάριός γε, ἂν Πριαμικαῖς τύχαις περιπέσῃ.

Οὐδὲ δὴ ποικίλος γε καὶ εὐμετάβολος· οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας κινηθήσεται ῥᾳδίως, οὐδ' ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων ἀτυχημάτων ἀλλ' ὑπὸ μεγάλων καὶ πολλῶν, ἔκ τε τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο πάλιν εὐδαίμων ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, ἐν πολλῷ τινὶ καὶ τελείῳ, μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν ἐν αὐτῷ γενόμενος ἐπήβολος. τί οὖν κωλύει λέγειν εὐδαίμονα τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν ἐνεργοῦντα καὶ τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀγαθοῖς ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένον, μὴ τὸν

Happiness not variable.

ἐκεῖνος οἷός τε καὶ θάλπος καὶ ψύχος ὑπομένειν, καὶ βάρος ἆραι μέγα, καὶ πολλὰς ἀτέρας εὐχερῶς ὑπομένειν κακοπαθείας. Stobæus, i. p. 44.

22. τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀγαθοῖς] The discussion of this question, how far external goods are requisite to Happiness, is necessarily incomplete at this stage of the inquiry. External goods are requisite to Happiness as instruments: as his paint, brushes, and easel to the artist; for though he has the faculty within himself, and these are no part of it, yet he cannot exercise it without them. External goods, therefore, are requisite to Happiness, as means for the development, employment, and preservation of its energies. Until, however, it has been determined in *what* energies, and according to what

τυχόντα χρόνον ἀλλὰ τέλειον βίον; ἢ προσθετέον καὶ βιωσόμενον οὕτω καὶ τελευτήσοντα κατὰ λόγον, ἐπειδὴ τὸ μέλλον ἀφανὲς ἡμῖν, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ τέλος καὶ τέλειον τίθεμεν πάντῃ πάντως. εἰ δ' οὕτω, μακαρίους ἐροῦμεν τῶν ζώντων οἷς ὑπάρχει καὶ ὑπάρξει τὰ λεχθέντα, μακαρίους δ' ἀνθρώπους. καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον διωρίσθω.

How far the prosperity or adversity of others can affect the dead.

Τὰς δὲ τῶν ἀπογόνων τύχας καὶ τῶν φίλων ἁπάντων τὸ μὲν μηδοτιοῦν συμβάλλεσθαι λίαν ἄφιλον φαίνεται καὶ ταῖς δόξαις ἐναντίον· πολλῶν δὲ καὶ παντοίας ἐχόντων διαφορὰς τῶν συμβαινόντων, καὶ τῶν μὲν μᾶλλον συνικνουμένων τῶν δ' ἧττον, καθ' ἕκαστον μὲν διαιρεῖν μακρὸν καὶ ἀπέραντον φαίνεται, καθόλου δὲ λεχθὲν καὶ τύπῳ τάχ' ἂν ἱκανῶς ἔχοι. εἰ δή, καθάπερ καὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν ἀτυχημάτων τὰ μὲν ἔχει τι βρῖθος καὶ ῥοπὴν πρὸς τὸν βίον τὰ δ' ἐλαφροτέροις ἔοικεν, οὕτω καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς φίλους ὁμοίως ἅπαντας, διαφέρει δὲ τῶν παθῶν ἕκαστον περὶ ζῶντας ἢ τελευτήσαντας συμβαίνειν πολὺ

virtues, Happiness principally consists, it cannot be determined how far external means are requisite to it. For should it hereafter appear that Happiness principally consists in the intellectual energies which can operate without external means, and in the moral energies no further than as man is an imperfect being; and if, for the employment even of the moral energies, but little means are requisite, (as the Widow was just, pious, and generous, even with her two mites,) it will be immediately seen that external means are not extensiveiy requisite even as instruments; and that few people are so situated as not to possess them to a sufficient degree for the attainment and preservation of Happiness. The reader must rest satisfied with thus much of this argument, till he arrives at the tenth Book.

8. ἀπογόνων τύχας] Having explained the principal question, he returns to the other mentioned at p. 36, 10. whether the prosperity or adversity of friends and relatives affect the dead.

μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ παράνομα καὶ δεινὰ προϋπάρχειν ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις ἢ πράττεσθαι, συλλογιστέον δὴ καὶ ταύτην τὴν διαφοράν, μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως τὸ διαπορεῖσθαι περὶ τοὺς κεκμηκότας εἴ τινος ἀγαθοῦ κοινωνοῦσιν ἢ τῶν ἀντικειμένων· ἔοικε γὰρ ἐκ τούτων εἰ καὶ δικνεῖται πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὁτιοῦν, εἴτ' ἀγαθὸν εἴτε τοὐναντίον, ἀφαυρόν τι καὶ μικρὸν ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ ἐκείνοις εἶναι, εἰ δὲ μή, τοσοῦτόν γε καὶ τοιοῦτον ὥστε μὴ ποιεῖν εὐδαίμονας τοὺς μὴ ὄντας μηδὲ τοὺς ὄντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὸ μακάριον. συμβάλλεσθαι μὲν οὖν τι φαίνονται τοῖς κεκμηκόσιν αἱ εὐπραξίαι τῶν φίλων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ δυσπραξίαι, τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ τηλικαῦτα ὥστε μήτε τοὺς εὐδαίμονας μὴ εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν μήτ' ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων μηδέν.

CHAP. IX.

In what class of Goods Happiness ought to be placed.

12 ΔΙΩΡΙΣΜΕΝΩΝ δὲ τούτων ἐπισκεψώμεθα περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας πότερα τῶν ἐπαινετῶν ἐστὶν ἢ *Happiness not of the δυνάμεις.*

1. προϋπάρχειν] *To exist before the play.* As, for instance, in the Œdipus Coloneus of Sophocles, where Œdipus is brought upon the stage, having already committed the dreadful deeds upon which the play turns. Such are also many of the plays of Euripides, where the previous history of the plot is narrated in the prologue.

CHAP. IX.

Before proceeding further in his Analysis, and examining that part of it which occupies the next six books, Aristotle interposes a question concerning the dignity of Happiness, and enquires among what class of Goods it is to be placed: whether among the faculties, the praiseworthy, or the honourable. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν θεῖα φαμὲν τὰ δὲ ἀνθρώπινα, καὶ τὰ μὲν θεῖα τίμια λέγομεν, ὡς ὑπάρχοντα ὑπὲρ ἔπαινον, καὶ τιμῆς διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν ἀξιούμενα· ἐπαινετὰ δὲ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα, ὡς τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι μὲν λειπόμενα ἐπαίνου δὲ μόνου τυγχάνοντα· εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἕτερα ἀνθρώπινα μὲν καὶ ταῦτα, ἐπαμφοτερί-

Nor of the ἐπαινετά.

μᾶλλον τῶν τιμίων· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τῶν γε δυνάμεων οὐκ ἔστιν. Φαίνεται δὴ πᾶν τὸ ἐπαινετὸν τῷ ποιόν τι εἶναι καὶ πρός τί πως ἔχειν ἐπαινεῖσθαι· τὸν γὰρ δίκαιον καὶ τὸν ἀνδρεῖον καὶ ὅλως τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπαινοῦμεν διὰ τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰ ἔργα, καὶ τὸν ἰσχυρὸν καὶ τὸν δρομικὸν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον τῷ ποιόν τινα πεφυκέναι καὶ ἔχειν πως πρὸς ἀγαθόν τι καὶ σπουδαῖον. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐπαίνων· γελοῖοι γὰρ φαίνονται πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀναφερόμενοι, τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει διὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους δι' ἀναφορᾶς, ὥσπερ εἴπαμεν. εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἔπαινος τῶν τοιούτων, δῆλον ὅτι τῶν ἀρίστων οὐκ ἔστιν ἔπαινος, ἀλλὰ μεῖζόν τι καὶ βέλτιον, καθάπερ καὶ φαίνεται· τούς τε γὰρ θεοὺς μακαρίζομεν καὶ εὐδαιμονίζομεν καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς θειοτάτους μακαρίζομεν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐπαινεῖ καθάπερ τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλ' ὡς θειότερόν τι καὶ βέλτιον μακαρίζει. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ Εὔδοξος καλῶς συνηγορῆσαι περὶ τῶν ἀριστείων τῇ

ζοντα δέ, ὡς καὶ κατορθοῦν δύνασθαι καὶ ἁμαρτάνειν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δυνάμεις λεγόμενα, ὥς τινας τῶν τεχνῶν ὑπάρχει εὑρεῖν, . . ζητεῖ ἐν τίσι τούτων τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τακτέον.—καὶ τὸ μὲν εἶναι αὐτὴν τινὰ τῶν δυνάμεων ἀπαγορεύει, ὅτι μηδ' ἐπαμφοτερίζει. ἁμαρτάνειν γὰρ ἢ εὐδαίμονα οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ποτὲ τὸν εὐδαίμονα. Eustrat. See note p. 5, 1.

17. μακαρίζομεν] Compare Hippodamus de Beat. ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος οὔτε τᾷ φύσει εὐδαίμων, ἀλλὰ μαθήσιος καὶ προνοίας ποτιδέεται, ποτὶ μὲν τὸ γίνεσθαι ἀγαθός, τᾶς ἀρετᾶς· ποτὶ δὲ τὸ γίνεσθαι εὐδαίμων, τᾶς εὐτύχιας. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐκ δύο τούτων ἁ ἀνθρωπίνα εὐδαιμονία συγκεφαλαιοῦται, ἐπαίνω τε καὶ μακαρισμῶ· ἐπαίνω μὲν τῶ ἐξ ἀρετᾶς, μακαρισμῶ δὲ τῶ ἐξ εὐτυχίας. τὰν μὲν ὦν ἀρεταν ἔχει διὰ τὰν θείαν μοῖραν, τὰν δὲ εὐτυχίαν, διὰ τὰν θνατάν.—Fragm. Pyth. p. 3. Stob. iii. 339. See also Archytas ib. p. 15. Stob. i. 40.

21. συνηγορῆσαι] *To have advocated the claims of pleasure to the ἀριστεῖα: sc. to have claimed for it the praise of being the most excellent of all things.*

ἡδονῇ· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐπαινεῖσθαι τῶν ἀγαθῶν οὖσαν μηνύειν ᾤετο ὅτι κρεῖττόν ἐστι τῶν ἐπαινετῶν, τοιοῦτον δ' εἶναι τὸν θεὸν καὶ τἀγαθόν· πρὸς ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ τἆλλα ἀναφέρεσθαι. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔπαινος τῆς ἀρετῆς· πρακτικοὶ γὰρ τῶν καλῶν ἀπὸ ταύτης· τὰ δ' ἐγκώμια τῶν ἔργων ὁμοίως καὶ τῶν σωματικῶν καὶ τῶν ψυχικῶν. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως οἰκειότερον ἐξακριβοῦν τοῖς περὶ τὰ ἐγκώμια πεπονημένοις, ἡμῖν δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τῶν τιμίων καὶ τελείων. ἔοικε δ' οὕτως ἔχειν καὶ διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἀρχή· ταύτης γὰρ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα πάντες πράττομεν, τὴν ἀρχὴν δὲ καὶ τὸ αἴτιον τῶν ἀγαθῶν τίμιόν τι καὶ θεῖον τίθεμεν.

But of the τίμια.

CHAP. X.

Of Virtue.

13 ΕΠΕΙ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ψυχῆς ἐνέργειά τις κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν, περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκεπτέον·

The consideration of Virtue requisite.

10. *τιμίων καὶ τελείων*] *τιμᾷ δ', ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἡμῶν οὐδεὶς ὀρθῶς, δοκεῖ δέ. θεῖον γὰρ ἀγαθόν που τιμή· τῶν δὲ κακῶν οὐδὲν τίμιον.* Plato de Leg. 727. By this Aristotle indistinctly indicates that Happiness is *σοφία*. See vi. 6. x. 6.

CHAP. X.

Having proceeded thus far in analysing his Definition of Happiness, Aristotle is now brought to the examination of a most important part of it.

It was said that Happiness is an energy of the soul according to Virtue, or the best of the Virtues: what then Virtue is, now remains to be considered. Until this be known, no *practical* benefit can be derived from this treatise. For how can we act according to Virtue, till we know what Virtue is, much less according to the best Virtues? This then remains to be discovered what Virtue is, and then what are the *best* Virtues.

Now the term *Virtue* (*ἀρετή*) is ap-

τάχα γὰρ οὕτως ἂν βέλτιον καὶ περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας θεωρήσαιμεν. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ κατ' ἀλήθειαν πολιτικὸς περὶ ταύτην μάλιστα πεπονῆσθαι· βούλεται γὰρ τοὺς πολίτας ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν καὶ τῶν νόμων ὑπηκόους. παράδειγμα δὲ τούτων ἔχομεν τοὺς Κρητῶν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων νομοθέτας, καὶ εἴ τινες ἕτεροι τοιοῦτοι γεγένηνται. εἰ δὲ τῆς πολιτικῆς ἐστὶν ἡ σκέψις αὕτη, δῆλον ὅτι γένοιτ' ἂν ἡ ζήτησις κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς προαίρεσιν. περὶ ἀρετῆς δὲ ἐπισκεπτέον ἀνθρωπίνης δῆλον ὅτι· καὶ γὰρ τἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώπινον ἐζητοῦμεν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀνθρωπίνην.

Not that of the Body, but the Soul.

Ἀρετὴν δὲ λέγομεν ἀνθρωπίνην οὐ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀλλὰ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς· καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν λέγομεν. εἰ δὲ ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ τὸν πολιτικὸν εἰδέναι πως τὰ περὶ ψυχήν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν ὀφθαλμοὺς θεραπεύσοντα καὶ πᾶν σῶμα, καὶ μᾶλλον ὅσῳ τιμιωτέρα καὶ βελτίων ἡ πολιτικὴ τῆς ἰατρικῆς. τῶν δ' ἰατρῶν οἱ χαρίεντες πολλὰ πραγματεύονται περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος

plied equally to inanimate as animate things: meaning no more than the perfection of their nature, or that quality which causes and enables them perfectly to execute the ἔργον or object of their being. But we are not seeking Virtue in this general sense, but the peculiar Virtue of man, which must consequently inhere in some part peculiar to him from all other animals, inasmuch as his ἔργον is distinct from all other animals; and such is the rational soul. Before, therefore, we can discover the nature of Virtue, it will be requisite to consider the nature of the soul; for if this be of more parts than one and they be distinct, virtue will probably be of more kinds than one. For if each part has its praiseworthy habits, then each part must have its peculiar virtues.

9. ἐξ ἀρχῆς] ὥστε δῆλον, ὅτι ἡ ζήτησις αὕτη ἀκόλουθος ἂν εἴη τῷ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τοῦ λόγου σκοπῷ· ἦν γὰρ ἐκεῖνος περὶ τοῦ τέλους τῆς πολιτικῆς. Paraph.

17. ὀφθαλμούς] This simile is taken from Plato. See the beautiful passage in the Charmides, p. 156.

γνῶσιν. Θεωρητέον δὴ καὶ τῷ πολιτικῷ περὶ ψυχῆς, θεωρητέον δὲ τούτων χάριν, καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον ἱκανῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰ ζητούμενα· τὸ γὰρ ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἐξακριβοῦν ἐργωδέστερον ἴσως ἐστὶ τῶν προκειμένων.

Therefore the nature of the Soul must be considered.

Λέγεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις ἀρκούντως ἔνια, καὶ χρηστέον αὐτοῖς. οἷον τὸ μὲν ἄλογον αὐτῆς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ λόγον ἔχον. ταῦτα δὲ πότερον διώρισται καθάπερ τὰ τοῦ σώματος μόρια καὶ πᾶν τὸ μεριστόν, ἢ τῷ λόγῳ δύο ἐστὶν ἀχώριστα πεφυκότα καθάπερ ἐν τῇ περιφερείᾳ τὸ κυρτὸν καὶ τὸ κοῖλον, οὐθὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ παρόν.

The soul is divided into, I. Rational. II. Irrational.

Τοῦ ἀλόγου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἔοικε κοινῷ καὶ φυτικῷ, λέγω δὲ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ τρέφεσθαι καὶ αὔξεσθαι· τὴν τοιαύτην γὰρ δύναμιν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς τρεφομένοις θείη τις ἂν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐμβρύοις, τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ταύτην καὶ ἐν τοῖς τελείοις· εὐλογώτερον γὰρ ἢ ἄλλην τινά. ταύτης μὲν οὖν κοινή τις ἀρετὴ καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνη φαίνεται· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις ἐνεργεῖν μάλιστα τὸ μόριον τοῦτο καὶ ἡ δύναμις αὕτη, ὁ δ' ἀγαθὸς καὶ κακὸς ἥκιστα διάδηλοι καθ' ὕπνον, ὅθεν φασὶν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν τὸ ἥμισυ τοῦ βίου τοὺς εὐδαίμονας τῶν ἀθλίων.

Irrational subdivided into; 1. Vegetative.

7. τὸ μὲν ἄλογον] This division originated with Plato. See Mag. Mor. p. 2. and the De Repub. iv. p. 349. For the opinions of philosophers previous to Aristotle touching the soul, see Aristotle De Anima, i. 2. And for the subject here discussed, Ib. ii. 2. and iii. 9. From this latter place we learn that Aristotle did not consider that the soul was really divisible, or that the rational part of it differed from the irrational as one member of the body from another. In the passage alluded to, he shows the absurdity which must necessarily result from instituting such a division as this, which Plato appears to have done. See also Trend. de Anima, p. 528.

συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο εἰκότως· ἀργία γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ὕπνος τῆς ψυχῆς ᾗ λέγεται σπουδαία καὶ φαύλη, πλὴν εἴ πῃ κατὰ μικρὸν διικνοῦνταί τινες τῶν κινήσεων, καὶ ταύτῃ βελτίω γίνεται τὰ φαντάσματα τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἢ τῶν τυχόντων. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἅλις, καὶ τὸ θρεπτικὸν ἐατέον, ἐπειδὴ τῆς ἀνθρωπικῆς ἀρετῆς ἄμοιρον πέφυκεν. Ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἄλλη τις φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλογος εἶναι, μετέχουσα μέντοι πῃ λόγου. τοῦ γὰρ ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ ἀκρατοῦς τὸν λόγον καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ λόγον ἔχον ἐπαινοῦμεν· ὀρθῶς γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ βέλτιστα παρακαλεῖ· φαίνεται δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον πεφυκός, ὃ μάχεταί τε καὶ ἀντιτείνει τῷ λόγῳ. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ καθάπερ τὰ παραλελυμένα τοῦ σώματος μόρια εἰς τὰ δεξιὰ προαιρουμένων κινῆσαι τοὐναντίον εἰς τὰ ἀριστερὰ παραφέρεται, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς οὕτως· ἐπὶ τἀναντία γὰρ αἱ ὁρμαὶ τῶν ἀκρατῶν. ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς σώμασι μὲν ὁρῶμεν τὸ παραφερόμενον, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐχ ὁρῶμεν. ἴσως δ' οὐδὲν ἧττον καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ νομιστέον εἶναί τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐναντιούμενον τούτῳ καὶ ἀντιβαῖνον. πῶς δ' ἕτερον, οὐδὲν διαφέρει. Λόγου δὲ καὶ τοῦτο φαίνεται μετέχειν, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν· πειθαρχεῖ γοῦν τῷ λόγῳ τὸ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς. ἔτι δ' ἴσως εὐηκοώτερόν ἐστι τὸ τοῦ σώφρονος καὶ ἀνδρείου· πάντα γὰρ ὁμοφωνεῖ τῷ λόγῳ. φαίνεται δὴ καὶ τὸ ἄλογον διττόν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ φυτικὸν οὐδαμῶς κοινωνεῖ λόγου, τὸ δ' ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικὸν μετέχει πως, ᾗ κατήκοόν ἐστιν αὐτοῦ καὶ πειθαρχικόν. οὕτω δὴ καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς

2. Appetitive.

Which latter may in one point of view be considered rational.

καὶ τῶν φίλων φαμὲν ἔχειν λόγον, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ τῶν μαθηματικῶν. ὅτι δὲ πείθεταί πως ὑπὸ λόγου τὸ ἄλογον, μηνύει καὶ ἡ νουθέτησις καὶ πᾶσα ἐπιτίμησίς τε καὶ παράκλησις. εἰ δὲ χρὴ καὶ τοῦτο φάναι λόγον ἔχειν, διττὸν ἔσται καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχον, τὸ μὲν κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὑτῷ, τὸ δ' ὥσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικόν τι. Διορίζεται δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ κατὰ τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην· Virtue divided according to

1. λόγον] Using the words λόγον ἔχειν in such a sense, as when we say, the son has the reason of his father, when he obeys his father: and not in the sense that the words are used by mathematicians.

7. διαφοράν] According to the sense in which you understand the Differentia, you will make a different division of the Soul.

I. If by *Rational* you mean *obedient to Reason*, you will divide thus;

The Soul.
- Irrational.
  - 1. Vegetative.
  - 2. Appetitive, when not obeying reason; E. g. in the Intemperate, &c.
- Rational.
  - 1. Appetitive, when obedient to reason; E. g. the Temperate.
  - 2. Intellectual, (κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὑτῷ.)

II. If by *Rational* you mean exercising Reason, you will divide thus;

The Soul.
- Irrational.
  - I. 1. Vegetative (αὐξητικόν). Its good ἕξις, or virtue, good growth.
  - II. 2. Appetitive (ὀρεκτικόν). Its good ἕξις, or virtue, perfect subjection to φρόνησις.
- Rational.
  - III. 1. Deliberative (λογιστικόν). Its virtue φρόνησις.
  - IV. 2. Scientific (ἐπιστημονικόν). Its virtue, σοφία.

these divisions of the Soul, into I. Moral. II. Intellectual.

λέγομεν γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς μὲν διανοητικὰς τὰς δὲ ἠθικάς, σοφίαν μὲν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν διανοητικάς, ἐλευθεριότητα δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην ἠθικάς. λέγοντες γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἤθους οὐ λέγομεν ὅτι σοφὸς ἢ συνετὸς ἀλλ' ὅτι πρᾶος ἢ σώφρων, ἐπαινοῦμεν δὲ καὶ τὸν σοφὸν κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν· τῶν ἕξεων δὲ τὰς ἐπαινετὰς ἀρετὰς λέγομεν.

Under II. and III. combined fall all the *moral* Virtues. Perfect moral virtue is, when the *ὄρεξις* of the one, and the *φρόνησις* of the other, are in perfect Harmony. Since, therefore, Happiness was defined to be an energy of the soul according to Virtue, or the best Virtues, we may now develope the Definition, and say that Happiness is an energy of the Soul according to *φρόνησις* and *σοφία* in a perfect life, &c.

4. *λέγοντες γάρ*] Aristotle subjoins this remark, to show that the moral and intellectual virtues are really distinct, a doctrine virtually denied by Socrates, and oppugned by Plato, both in the Menon and Protagoras.

The argument is an induction. If, when we praise a man for his moral habits, we never call him wise, prudent, &c. then wisdom, prudence, &c. are not moral habits. We never do call him wise, &c. when we praise his moral habits; therefore, &c. The same argument to the intellectual habits.

6. *ἐπαινοῦμεν—τὸν σοφόν*] Here again the author of the Mag. Mor. p. 12. differs from Aristotle. For after observing that in the rational part of the soul are produced *φρόνησις, ἀγχίνοια, σοφία, εὐμάθεια, μνήμη καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα·* and in the irrational *σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρία, καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι τοῦ ἤθους δοκοῦσιν ἐπαινεταὶ εἶναι·* he immediately subjoins, *κατὰ γὰρ ταύτας* (sc. the moral virtues) *ἐπαινετοὶ λεγόμεθα, κατὰ δὲ τὰς τοῦ τὸν λόγον ἔχοντος οὐδεὶς ἐπαινεῖται.*

INTRODUCTION TO BOOK II.

In the previous book it has been shown that Virtue is *essential* to Happiness[a]; before therefore we can attain to Happiness, we must first inquire into the nature of Virtue. But since all systematic treatises should commence with that which is easier and more familiar, Aristotle, repeating the division of Virtue mentioned in the last chapter, first proceeds to the examination of the Moral Virtues, which are more known and dispose us better for the reception of the Intellectual. This investigation occupies the four succeeding Books.

The following book is divided into three parts:

I. The investigation of the *origin* of Moral Virtue.
II. The *definition* of Moral Virtue.
III. The application of that definition to particulars.

In considering the first division of his subject, Aristotle tacitly refutes much of the doctrines of the Sophists. So long had these pretenders to universal knowledge been accustomed to trifle with words, and to argue indifferently upon either sides of a question, that at last they ventured to deny that there was any thing fixed or certain, or any real distinction between virtue and vice. The dogmas of the early philosophers, by which they endeavoured to solve the difficulties which encountered them in their physical enquiries, the Sophists applied to morals. Protagoras, the disciple of the celebrated Democritus[b], to whom Aristotle not unfrequently refers, asserted that man was the measure of all things[c],

[a] ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετήν. p. 26, 1. See also n.

[b] See Clem. Alex. Strom. i. §. 64.

[c] ὥσπερ Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγε, λέγων πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον εἶναι ἄνθρωπον, ὡς ἄρα οἷα μὲν ἂν ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τὰ πράγματα εἶναι, τοιαῦτα μὲν ἔστιν ἐμοί, οἷα δ' ἂν σοί, τοιαῦτα δ' αὖ σοί. Cratylus p. 385. E. n. Stallb. 386. C. Compare also Theæt. 152. A. where this

that all things were in a continual change, that there was no other science except that of the senses[d], and no other criterion of truth[e]. Thence it was inferred that truth was whatever any one thought it to be, and consequently that no one could form false opinions.[f]

Following these principles they asserted that Virtue and Justice did not exist by nature, but merely by arbitrary enactments[g], that one thing was beautiful and excellent by nature, another thing by law: they denied the existence of natural justice or moral sense, affirming that the will of the stronger was the rule of right; that obedience to nature dictated the unlimited gratification of the desires; in short, that he who was the greatest tyrant, and had the fullest means of gratifying every appetite, and followed the dictates of those appetites implicitly, was most in a state of nature, and possessed the greatest share of Happiness[h].

From this to the next step the transition was easy, that no one acted justly except he was induced to it by the hope of reward, or the dread of punishment. That justice was a mutual compact extorted by the fear of mankind. That Virtue was surrounded with pain and labour[i], that the pretender to it was as equally virtuous as the real possessor of it, and that he who acted virtuously merely from fear of the laws, was equally as

dictum is explained and refuted. See particularly, 161. D. 171. C. 177. C. sq. Diog. Laert. ix. §. 51; and Menag. ib. Sext. Emp. Hyp. i. 32; and Geel's Hist. Soph. p. 92.

d ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἄλλό τι ἐστὶν ἢ αἴσθησις. Plato's Theæt. 160.

e These notions he appears to have derived from his master. See the Metaph. iii. 5. p. 76. διὸ Δημόκριτός γέ φησιν, ἤτοι οὐθὲν εἶναι ἀληθὲς ἢ ἡμῖν γ' ἄδηλον. Compare also Cic. Acad. i. 12. ii. 23. and Sext. Emp. adv. Math. vii. §. 135.

f οὐδεὶς ψευδῆ δοξάζει. Theæt. 167. Euthyd. 286. τὰ δοκοῦντα πάντα ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ. Arist. Met. iii. 5. p. 75. Compare also Theæt. 161. D. ἑκάστῳ ἀληθὲς ἔσται ὃ ἂν δι' αἰσθήσεως δοξάζῃ, καὶ μήτε τὸ ἄλλου πάθος ἄλλος βέλτιον διακρινεῖ, μήτε τὴν δόξαν κυριώτερος ἔσται ἐπισκέψασθαι ἕτερος τὴν ἑτέρου, ὀρθὴ ἢ ψευδής, ἀλλ' ὃ πολλάκις εἴρηται, αὐτὸς τὰ αὑτοῦ ἕκαστος μόνος δοξάσει, ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ὀρθὰ καὶ ἀληθῆ. See also Cic. Acad. ii. 46.

g οὐ φύσει θέσει δὲ μόνον. Schol. in Theæt. 166. E.

h De Legg. 288. Repub. i. and ii.

i διὰ δόξαν ἐπιτηδευτέον αὐτὸ δὲ δι' αὑτὸ φευκτέον, ὡς ὂν χαλεπόν. Rep. 358.

virtuous as he who acted from principle; and, consequently, that men were to be judged wise, brave, just, and temperate, not from possessing the habits of wisdom, courage, justice, and temperance, but by performing the external acts.

These notions are indirectly refuted throughout the following book, and with them other opinions on the same subject advanced by Plato, in several of his dialogues, particularly in the Menon, Phædrus, Protagoras, and Phædon; where it is asserted that the moral virtues are not produced in us by teaching or nature, but that they are the gift of the divinity. According to Plato, the soul in its original state traversed Heaven with the Gods, contemplating the real essence of every Virtue, both speculative and practical, and when enclosed in the body did not lose those virtues, but reacquired the use of them by habit and exercise.

Aristotle, omitting all consideration of the divine origin of Virtue, as foreign to this treatise, only inquires whether they are produced by teaching, habit, or nature? And the sum of his reasoning is, that nature and teaching have some, but habit the greatest share in producing them. We are by nature, he says, endowed with an aptitude for the reception of moral virtue,—which aptitude he calls *natural virtue* in the last chapter of the Sixth book. Instruction and knowledge only teach us how to direct our actions, how to distinguish the good from the bad, and order our conduct for the attainment of Happiness; but as these are of only minor importance to the acquisition of Virtue, we infer that habit has the greatest share in its production. The Stoics, differing both from Plato and Aristotle, agreeing with them however in many points, rejected the division of the soul into rational and irrational, which the former had adopted[k] and placed all the virtues in the rational

[k] See Cicero Acad. i. 10, and Plutarch. de Virt. Mor. ix. 32. Hutten. *νομίζουσιν οὐκ εἶναι τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ ἄλογον διαφορᾷ τινι καὶ φύσει ψυχῆς τοῦ λογικοῦ διακεκριμένον ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος (ὃ δὴ καλοῦσι διάνοιαν*

part of the soul; and made the goodness or turpitude of actions consist in the truth or falsity of the judgment. They attributed accordingly almost every thing to instruction[l] and but little to habit. They taught that the seeds or sparks of Virtue, which they called *κοιναὶ ἐννόιαι*, and Cicero the "*semina innata virtutum*[m]," were innate, that these when fostered by right education, become perfect Virtue, but if depraved by the contrary, these sparks are extinguished, and vice springs up in their room. Such an opinion was wholly at variance with the tenets of Aristotle, according to whom the soul possesses the capacities for receiving and retaining Virtue; as Cicero correctly expresses it, "ad comprehendam ingeniis virtutem idonea[n]," but not the incipient and undeveloped habits.

This book divides itself into the following parts. In the 1st chapter, Aristotle treats of the efficient cause of Virtue; in the 2nd and 3rd, of its object-matter; in the 4th and 5th, of its definition; in the 6th, he applies the definition to particular cases; and in the 7th and 8th, explains certain questions respecting the mean.

καὶ ἡγεμονικόν) *διόλου τρεπόμενον*. They differed also from the earlier philosophers in banishing all emotions from the breast of the wise and good man. (See Cic. Acad. ii. 44.) Consequently they did not consider moral virtue to consist in the proper regulation of the passions.

[l] See Diog. Laert. vii. 91, and Fischer in Æschin. Socrat. p. 21.

[m] Tusculan. Disp. iii. 2. De Fin. v. 15.

[n] Est enim natura sic generata vis hominis ut ad omnem virtutem percipiendam facta videatur: ob eamque causam parvi virtutum simulacris, quarum in se habent semina, sine doctrina moventur. Sunt enim prima elementa naturæ; quibus auctis, virtutis quasi carmen efficitur. Cic. de Fin. v. 15. Compare also c. 21. and Acad. i. 5.

ARISTOTELIS

ETHICA NICOMACHEA.

LIB. II.

CHAP. I.

Of the causes of the origin and decay of moral virtue—that it is a habit produced by a repetition of certain actions—that the actions and habits reciprocally operate on each other.

ΔΙΤΤΗΣ δὲ τῆς ἀρετῆς οὔσης, τῆς μὲν διανοητικῆς τῆς δὲ ἠθικῆς, ἡ μὲν διανοητικὴ τὸ πλεῖον ἐκ διδασκαλίας ἔχει καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν, διόπερ ἐμπειρίας δεῖται καὶ χρόνου· ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους περιγίνεται, ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα

Difference of the Moral and Intellectual Virtues.

1. Διττῆς] δεῖ ἄρα . . . πρῶτον ὑπὲρ ἀρετῆς εἰπεῖν, τί τέ ἐστι καὶ ἐκ τίνων γίνεται. οὐθὲν γὰρ ἴσως ὄφελος εἰδέναι μὲν τὴν ἀρετήν, πῶς δὲ ἂν καὶ ἐκ τίνων μὴ ἐπαΐειν. Οὐ γὰρ μόνον ὅπως εἰδήσομεν τί ἐστι σκοπεῖσθαι δεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τίνων ἐστὶ σκέψασθαι· ἅμα γὰρ εἰδῆσαι βουλόμεθα, καὶ αὐτοὶ εἶναι τοιοῦτοι. Mag. Moral. p. 1.

2. τὸ πλεῖον] Intellectual virtue is not *entirely* produced by teaching. For some men are born with a greater degree of natural wisdom and genius than others, and have a greater natural aptitude to acquire and perfect these virtues.

4. ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους] καὶ τί δεῖ τὰ πολλὰ λέγειν; καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἦθος ἔθος ἐστὶ πολυχρόνιον καὶ τὰς ἠθικὰς ἀρετὰς ἐθικὰς ἄν τις λέγῃ, οὐκ ἄν τι πλημμελεῖν δόξειεν. Plutarch. de Liberis Educ. vol. vii. p. 8. ed. Hutten.

The word ἦθος (moral character), is derived from ἔθος (habit), and the ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταὶ are called ἐθικαί. But they are very distinct: for the ἔθος is the energy, but the ἦθος is a quality produced by this energy in the moral or pathetical (παθητικῷ) part of the soul. It is the end and ἔργον (object) of ἔθος.

The Moral Virtues are not given us by nature.

1. Because they are altered by habit.

ἔσχηκε μικρὸν παρεκκλῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους. Ἐξ οὗ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδεμία τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν φύσει ἡμῖν ἐγγίνεται· οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἄλλως ἐθίζεται, οἷον ὁ λίθος φύσει κάτω φερόμενος οὐκ ἂν ἐθισθείη ἄνω φέρεσθαι, οὐδ᾽ ἂν μυριάκις αὐτὸν ἐθίζῃ τις ἄνω ῥίπτων, οὐδὲ τὸ πῦρ κάτω, οὐδ᾽ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλως πεφυκότων ἄλλως ἂν ἐθισθείη. οὔτ᾽ ἄρα φύσει οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν ἐγγίνονται αἱ ἀρεταί, ἀλλὰ πεφυκόσι μὲν ἡμῖν δέξασθαι αὐτάς, τελειουμένοις δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἔθους.

2. Because we must perform the acts before we obtain the virtues.

Ἔτι ὅσα μὲν φύσει ἡμῖν παραγίνεται, τὰς δυνάμεις τούτων πρότερον κομιζόμεθα, ὕστερον δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀποδίδομεν. ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις ἰδεῖν ἢ πολλάκις ἀκοῦσαι τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐλάβομεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνάπαλιν ἔχοντες ἐχρησάμεθα, οὐ χρησάμενοι ἔσχομεν. τὰς δ᾽ ἀρετὰς λαμβάνομεν ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν· ἃ γὰρ δεῖ μαθόντας ποιεῖν, ταῦτα ποιοῦντες μανθάνομεν, οἷον οἰκοδομοῦντες οἰκοδόμοι γίνονται καὶ κιθαρίζοντες κιθαρισταί. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντες δίκαιοι γινόμεθα, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα σώφρονες, τὰ δ᾽ ἀνδρεῖα ἀνδρεῖοι.

3. And this is proved

Μαρτυρεῖ

3. οὐθὲν—τῶν φύσει] The scholiast explains the τὰ τῶν φύσει thus: οὗ ἡ τελειότης ἐκ φύσεως περιγίνεται, ἢ σύμφυτος οὖσα ὡς τῷ λίθῳ ἡ βαρύτης, ἢ ὕστερον ἐπιγινομένη ὡς ἡ ὀδόντων βλάστησις ἢ γενείων. Those things which act naturally (φύσει), either act only, or act and are acted upon. If they act only, from their energy their principle of action is not changed; and whilst it remains, their inclination to act remains likewise. If they be acted on, unless the effect produced be such as to remove their innate principle of action, that natural inclination still remains. But if they be so acted on that their innate principle of action be entirely removed, they are no longer natural. See Thos. Aquinas, in loc.

δὲ καὶ τὸ γινόμενον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν· οἱ γὰρ νομοθέται τοὺς πολίτας ἐθίζοντες ποιοῦσιν ἀγαθούς, καὶ τὸ μὲν βούλημα παντὸς νομοθέτου τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ὅσοι δὲ μὴ εὖ αὐτὸ ποιοῦσιν, ἁμαρτάνουσιν· καὶ διαφέρει τούτῳ πολιτεία πολιτείας, ἀγαθὴ φαύλης.

by the conduct of legislators.

Ἔτι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ γίνεται πᾶσα ἀρετὴ καὶ φθείρεται, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τέχνη· ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ κιθαρίζειν καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ κακοὶ γίνονται κιθαρισταί. ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ οἱ οἰκοδόμοι καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ πάντες· ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ εὖ οἰκοδομεῖν ἀγαθοὶ οἰκοδόμοι ἔσονται, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ κακῶς κακοί. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως εἶχεν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει τοῦ διδάξοντος, ἀλλὰ πάντες ἂν ἐγίνοντο ἀγαθοὶ ἢ κακοί. οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἔχει· πράττοντες γὰρ τὰ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους γινόμεθα οἱ μὲν δίκαιοι οἱ δὲ ἄδικοι, πράττοντες δὲ τὰ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς καὶ ἐθιζόμενοι φοβεῖσθαι ἢ θαρρεῖν οἱ μὲν ἀνδρεῖοι οἱ δὲ δειλοί. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ὀργάς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ σώφρονες καὶ πρᾶοι γίνονται, οἱ δ' ἀκόλαστοι καὶ ὀργίλοι, οἱ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ οὑτωσὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀναστρέφεσθαι, οἱ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ οὑτωσί. καὶ ἑνὶ δὴ λόγῳ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται. διὸ δεῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας ποιὰς ἀποδιδόναι·

4. Because Virtue and Vice (opposite effects) are produced from the same efficient cause.

6. ἔτι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν] In nature the same efficient cause cannot produce two opposite effects. But actions do produce two opposite effects; good actions produce virtue, bad actions destroy it; consequently nature is not the efficient cause of moral virtue. To make his argument more plain, Aristotle uses an illustration drawn from another class of habits, viz. the arts. If the moral virtues are produced and destroyed in the same way as the arts; but the arts, inasmuch as they are produced by energies, are not innate (οὐ φύσει); neither therefore are the virtues. See Phys. Ausc. iv. 3.

24. ἀποδιδόναι] *To perform energies of a certain quality.*

κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τούτων διαφορὰς ἀκολουθοῦσιν αἱ ἕξεις. οὐ μικρὸν οὖν διαφέρει τὸ οὕτως ἢ οὕτως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων ἐθίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάμπολυ, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ πᾶν.

CHAP. II.

That moral virtues are habits avoiding excess and defect—that they are perfect when we feel pleasure in exercising them—that their object matter (ὕλη) is pleasure and pain.

What kind of actions produce virtuous habits.

ΕΠΕΙ οὖν ἡ παροῦσα πραγματεία οὐ θεωρίας 2
ἕνεκά ἐστιν ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι (οὐ γὰρ ἵν' εἰδῶμεν τί ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἵν' ἀγαθοὶ γενώμεθα, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν ὄφελος αὐτῆς), ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι σκέψασθαι τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις, πῶς πρακτέον αὐτάς· αὗται γάρ εἰσι κύριαι καὶ τοῦ ποιὰς γενέσθαι τὰς ἕξεις, καθάπερ εἰρήκαμεν. τὸ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττειν κοινὸν καὶ ὑποκείσθω, ῥηθήσεται δ' ὕστερον περὶ αὐτοῦ,

If then virtue be a habit, and every habit is produced by the repetition of single acts, and as are the acts such are the habits resulting from them; it is plain that as virtue is a *good* habit, it must be produced by *good* actions.

What then are *good* actions? Till we know this we cannot acquire virtue, or proceed to practise the precepts of this treatise.

Omitting at present the consideration, that they must be done according to right reason, we gather by an induction of several instances, that *good* actions are generally those which avoid excess and defect, and are in a mean; consequently as the habit is similar to the acts by which it is produced, virtue will be ἕξις ἐν μεσότητι. This chapter divides itself into three parts;

The I. question, is; From what quality of actions are good habits produced?

II. How shall we know that we have attained them?

III. What is the object matter of them?

καὶ τί ἐστιν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς. Ἐκεῖνο δὲ προδιομολογείσθω, ὅτι πᾶς ὁ περὶ τῶν πρακτῶν λόγος τύπῳ καὶ οὐκ ἀκριβῶς ὀφείλει λέγεσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς εἴπομεν ὅτι κατὰ τὴν ὕλην οἱ λόγοι ἀπαιτητέοι· τὰ δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα οὐδὲν ἑστηκὸς ἔχει, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰ ὑγιεινά. τοιούτου δ᾽ ὄντος τοῦ καθόλου λόγου, ἔτι μᾶλλον ὁ περὶ τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστα λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τἀκριβές· οὔτε γὰρ ὑπὸ τέχνην οὔθ᾽ ὑπὸ παραγγελίαν οὐδεμίαν πίπτει, δεῖ δ᾽ αὐτοὺς ἀεὶ τοὺς πράττοντας τὰ πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν σκοπεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰατρικῆς ἔχει καὶ τῆς κυβερνητικῆς. ἀλλὰ καίπερ ὄντος τοιούτου τοῦ παρόντος λόγου πειρατέον βοηθεῖν.

Probable reasons ought only to be required in a *moral* treatise.

Πρῶτον οὖν τοῦτο θεωρητέον, ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα πέφυκεν ὑπὸ ἐνδείας καὶ ὑπερβολῆς φθείρεσθαι, (δεῖ γὰρ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς μαρτυρίοις χρῆσθαι) ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος καὶ τῆς ὑγιείας ὁρῶμεν· τά τε γὰρ ὑπερβάλλοντα γυμνάσια καὶ τὰ ἐλλείποντα φθείρει τὴν ἰσχύν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ποτὰ καὶ τὰ σιτία πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω γινόμενα φθείρει τὴν ὑγίειαν, τὰ δὲ σύμμετρα καὶ ποιεῖ καὶ αὔξει καὶ σώζει. οὕτως οὖν καὶ

1. Actions which avoid excess and defect generally produce good habits.

1. ὀρθὸς λόγος] Which subject is resumed in the sixth Book.

10. παραγγελίαν] *Set of precepts.*

16. ἐνδείας καὶ ὑπερβολῆς] Perhaps Aristotle when introducing this argument had in view the celebrated sentence, written by the seven wise men of Greece, and placed in the temple of Apollo; μηδὲν ἄγαν (See Plato's Protag. p. 343. D. Clem. Alex. ii. p. 45.) The merit of the discovery, however, that virtue is a mean situated between two vices, which are its extremes, appears to be due to the Pythagoreans. Compare Theages de Virtutibus: τῶ μὴ δέοντος εἴδεα δύο· τὸ μὲν ὑπερβολὰ τὸ δὲ ἔλλειψις. καὶ ἁ μὲν ὑπερβολὰ τὸ πλέον τοῦ δέοντός ἐστιν· ἁ δ᾽ ἔλλειψις τὸ ἔλαττον. ἁ δ᾽ ἀρετὰ ἕξις τίς ἐντι τοῦ δέοντος. Frag. Pythag. p. 32. See also Fran. Patricii Diss. Perip. p. 271.

ἐπὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας ἔχει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν· ὅ τε γὰρ πάντα φεύγων καὶ φοβούμενος καὶ μηδὲν ὑπομένων δειλὸς γίνεται, ὅ τε μηδὲν ὅλως φοβούμενος ἀλλὰ πρὸς πάντα βαδίζων θρασύς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ μὲν πάσης ἡδονῆς ἀπολαύων καὶ μηδεμιᾶς ἀπεχόμενος ἀκόλαστος, ὁ δὲ πάσας φεύγων, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀγροῖκοι, ἀναίσθητός τις· φθείρεται γὰρ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ὑπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς μεσότητος σώζεται.

The same actions which produce, are produced by the habits.

Ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον αἱ γενέσεις καὶ αἱ αὐξήσεις καὶ αἱ φθοραὶ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν γίνονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔσονται· καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν φανερωτέρων οὕτως ἔχει, οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος· γίνεται γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πολλὴν τροφὴν λαμβάνειν καὶ πολλοὺς πόνους ὑπομένειν, καὶ μάλιστα δύναται ταῦτα ποιεῖν ὁ ἰσχυρός. οὕτω δ' ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· ἔκ τε γὰρ τοῦ ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν γινόμεθα σώφρονες, καὶ γενόμενοι μάλιστα δυνάμεθα ἀπέχεσθαι αὐτῶν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας· ἐθιζόμενοι γὰρ καταφρονεῖν τῶν φοβερῶν καὶ ὑπομένειν αὐτὰ γινόμεθα ἀνδρεῖοι, καὶ γενόμενοι μάλιστα δυνησόμεθα ὑπομένειν τὰ φοβερά.

1. τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν] *Of the rest af the moral Virtues.* For of the intellectual Virtues there cannot be any excess. But the moral Virtues, consisting of reason and appetite governed by reason, it is the object of philosophy not to expel the appetites, as wholly evil, but to make them subservient to the better purposes of our nature. The reason is essentially and absolutely good, and cannot therefore be too highly cultivated. The appetite only relatively so, and when in any other state than that of moderation, becomes a positive evil.

6. ἀκόλαστος] *The intemperate:* *οἱ ἀγροῖκοι, the ascetic.* See c. 6.

Σημεῖον δὲ δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τῶν ἕξεων τὴν ἐπιγινομένην ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην τοῖς ἔργοις· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεχόμενος τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ χαίρων σώφρων, ὁ δ' ἀχθόμενος ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ὁ μὲν ὑπομένων τὰ δεινὰ καὶ χαίρων ἢ μὴ λυπούμενός γε ἀνδρεῖος, ὁ δὲ λυπούμενος δειλός.

II. Pleasure and pain the criterion of the perfection of the habits.

Περὶ ἡδονὰς γὰρ καὶ λύπας ἐστὶν ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετή· διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰ φαῦλα πράττομεν, διὰ δὲ τὴν λύπην τῶν καλῶν ἀπεχόμεθα. διὸ δεῖ ἦχθαί πως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων, ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησίν, ὥστε χαίρειν τε καὶ λυπεῖσθαι οἷς δεῖ· ἡ γὰρ ὀρθὴ παιδεία αὕτη ἐστίν.

III. Pleasure and pain the object-matter of Virtue, proved from eight considerations.

Ἔτι δ' εἰ ἀρεταί 2.
εἰσι περὶ πράξεις καὶ πάθη, παντὶ δὲ πάθει καὶ πάσῃ πράξει ἕπεται ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας.

Μηνύουσι δὲ καὶ αἱ κολάσεις γινόμεναι διὰ τού- 3.

7. περὶ ἡδονάς] D. Thomas I. Secundæ Art. 2. Quæst. 60. virtutem circa animi affectum versari dicit dupliciter; vel ut hunc producit actionique suæ habet annexum, vel ut eundem regit, qui est pro subjecta materia. Priore modo dictum est ab Aristotele omnes virtutes morales versari circa voluptatem et dolorem. Quoniam virtutum habitus conformati cognoscuntur ex voluptate quæ actionibus est adjuncta. Posteriore vero virtutes quædam dicuntur versari in regendis actionibus, ut justitia in emptione et venditione, liberalitas in largitione pecuniæ, aliæ in affectibus ut temperantia et continentia. Vid. Jac. Carpentarius in Alcin. Instit. ii. p. 134.

— ἡδονὰς γάρ] Aristotle proves that pleasure and pain are the object-matter of virtue, by eight reasons. Four of which are derived from considering virtue itself, four from the nature of man. In another Treatise Aristotle thus discusses the same subject: ἅπασα ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας τὰς σωματικάς. αὗται δὲ ἢ ἐν τῷ πράττειν, ἢ ἐν τῷ μεμνῆσθαι, ἢ ἐν τῷ ἐλπίζειν. αἱ μὲν οὖν ἐν τῇ πράξει κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν εἰσί, ὥστ' ὑπὸ αἰσθητοῦ τινος κινεῖσθαι. αἱ δ' ἐν τῇ μνήμῃ καὶ τῇ ἐλπίδι ἀπὸ ταύτης εἰσί, ἢ γὰρ οἷα ἔπαθον μεμνημένοι ἥδονται, ἢ ἐλπίζοντες οἷα μένουσιν. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη πᾶσαν τὴν τοιαύτην ἡδονὴν ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν γίγνεσθαι. Phys. Ausc. vii. 3. See Mag. Mor. p. 13.

10. Πλάτων] See Plato de Leg. p. 653. and Simplicius upon Aristot. Phys. Ausc. f. 149.

των· ἰατρεῖαι γάρ τινές εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ ἰατρεῖαι διὰ
4. τῶν ἐναντίων πεφύκασι γίνεσθαι. Ἔτι, ὡς καὶ πρότερον εἴπομεν, πᾶσα ψυχῆς ἕξις, ὑφ' οἵων πέφυκε γίνεσθαι χείρων καὶ βελτίων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν φύσιν ἔχει· δι' ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας φαῦλαι γίνονται, τῷ διώκειν ταύτας καὶ φεύγειν, ἢ ἃς μὴ δεῖ ἢ ὅτε οὐ δεῖ ἢ ὡς οὐ δεῖ ἢ ὁσαχῶς ἄλλως ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου διορίζεται τὰ τοιαῦτα. διὸ καὶ ὁρίζονται τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀπαθείας τινὰς καὶ ἠρεμίας· οὐκ εὖ δέ, ὅτι ἁπλῶς λέγουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ ὅτε, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προστίθεται. ὑπόκειται ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ εἶναι ἡ τοιαύτη περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας τῶν βελτίστων
5. πρακτική, ἡ δὲ κακία τοὐναντίον. Γένοιτο δ' ἂν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκ τούτων φανερὸν ἔτι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν. τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων τῶν εἰς τὰς αἱρέσεις καὶ τριῶν τῶν εἰς τὰς φυγάς, καλοῦ συμφέροντος

13. πᾶσα ψυχῆς ἕξις] See 55, 6. Every moral habit of the soul derives its complexion from the kind of acts by which it is improved or deteriorated, and employs itself upon them. But these are pleasure and pain; in pursuing pleasure or avoiding pain, when or as we ought not, we acquire vicious habits; in pursuing or avoiding them when and as we ought, we acquire virtuous habits. Virtue moderates and directs the perturbations occasioned by pleasure or pain, hence Virtue was called by the Stoics an apathy or serenity (ἠρέμια). But in that they called it an apathy *absolutely* without reference to a mean, or consideration of different circumstances, this definition is incorrect. Aristotle of course does not refer to the Stoics who existed not as a sect until a later period, but to opinions disseminated by Socrates, and afterwards adopted by the Stoics and others.

9. ὁρίζονται] The Cynics, from whom the Stoics borrowed this tenet. But he alludes particularly to Speusippus, who according to Clem. Alexand. (Strom. ii. p. 202.) introduced the word ἀοχλησία afterwards used by the Epicureans. So also Democritus according to Diog. Laert. ix. §. 45. τέλος δὲ εἶναι τὴν εὐθυμίαν, οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν οὖσαν τῇ ἡδονῇ ὡς ἔνιοι παρακούσαντες ἐξεδέξαντο, ἀλλὰ καθ' ἣν γαληνῶς καὶ εὐσταθῶς ἡ ψυχὴ διάγει, ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ταραττομένη φόβου ἢ δεισιδαιμονίας ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς πάθους. See Michelet in loco.

ἡδέος, καὶ τριῶν τῶν ἐναντίων, αἰσχροῦ βλαβεροῦ
λυπηροῦ, περὶ πάντα μὲν ταῦτα ὁ ἀγαθὸς κατορ-
θωτικός ἐστιν ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἁμαρτητικός, μάλιστα
δὲ περὶ τὴν ἡδονήν· κοινή τε γὰρ αὕτη τοῖς
ζῴοις, καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν αἵρεσιν παρακο-
λουθεῖ· καὶ γὰρ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον ἡδὺ
φαίνεται. Ἔτι δ' ἐκ νηπίου πᾶσιν ἡμῖν συντέ- 6.
θραπται· διὸ χαλεπὸν ἀποτρίψασθαι τοῦτο τὸ
πάθος ἐγκεχρωσμένον τῷ βίῳ. Κανονίζομεν 7.
δὲ καὶ τὰς πράξεις, οἱ μὲν μᾶλλον οἱ δ' ἧττον,
ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ· διὰ τοῦτ' οὖν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι
περὶ ταῦτα τὴν πᾶσαν πραγματείαν· οὐ γὰρ
μικρὸν εἰς τὰς πράξεις εὖ ἢ κακῶς χαίρειν καὶ
λυπεῖσθαι. Ἔτι δὲ χαλεπώτερον ἡδονῇ μά- 8.
χεσθαι ἢ θυμῷ, καθάπερ φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος, περὶ
δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον ἀεὶ καὶ τέχνη γίνεται καὶ
ἀρετή· καὶ γὰρ τὸ εὖ βέλτιον ἐν τούτῳ. ὥστε καὶ
διὰ τοῦτο περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πᾶσα ἡ πραγ-
ματεία καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ πολιτικῇ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ
εὖ τούτοις χρώμενος ἀγαθὸς ἔσται, ὁ δὲ κακῶς
κακός. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονὰς
καὶ λύπας, καὶ ὅτι ἐξ ὧν γίνεται, ὑπὸ τούτων
καὶ αὔξεται καὶ φθείρεται μὴ ὡσαύτως γινομένων,
καὶ ὅτι ἐξ ὧν ἐγένετο, περὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐνεργεῖ,
εἰρήσθω.

15. Ἡράκλειτος] ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Ἡράκλειτος λέγειν εἰς τὴν ἰσχὺν τοῦ θυμοῦ βλέψας, ὅτι λυπηρὰ ἡ κώλυσις αὐτοῦ· χαλεπὸν γάρ, φησι, θυμῷ μάχεσθαι. Eth. Eud. ii. 7. Aristot. Pol. v. 10. See also Plutarch, περὶ ἀοργησίας. ix. p. 434. Hutten.

CHAP. III.

The distinction between doing *virtuous acts* and doing *virtuously*.

Objection.

ΑΠΟΡΗΣΕΙΕ δ' ἄν τις, πῶς λέγομεν ὅτι δεῖ 3 τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντας δικαίους γίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα σώφρονας· εἰ γὰρ πράττουσι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ σώφρονα, ἤδη εἰσὶ δίκαιοι καὶ σώφρονες, ὥσπερ εἰ τὰ γραμματικὰ καὶ τὰ μουσικά, γραμματικοὶ καὶ μουσικοί.

Answer: that even in the arts we require somewhat more than the thing produced, to prove a man an artist.

Ἢ οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν οὕτως ἔχει; ἐνδέχεται γὰρ γραμματικόν τι ποιῆσαι καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ ἄλλου ὑποθεμένου. τότε οὖν ἔσται γραμματικός, ἐὰν καὶ γραμματικόν τι ποιήσῃ καὶ γραμματικῶς· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὑτῷ γραμματικήν.

2. The cases are not similar.

Ἔτι οὐδ' ὅμοιόν ἐστιν ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν γινόμενα τὸ εὖ ἔχει ἐν αὑτοῖς, ἀρκεῖ οὖν ταῦτά πως ἔχοντα γενέσθαι· τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς γινόμενα οὐκ ἐὰν αὐτά πως ἔχῃ, δικαίως ἢ σωφρόνως πράττεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ὁ πράττων πως ἔχων πράττῃ, πρῶτον μὲν ἐὰν εἰδώς, ἔπειτ' ἐὰν προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά, τὸ δὲ τρίτον καὶ ἐὰν βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων πράττῃ· ταῦτα δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας ἔχειν οὐ συνα-

It was said (p. 58), that by doing brave actions men *become* brave, and by doing temperate actions, temperate, and by doing just actions, just. But it may be asked; how can it be said that he who desires to become just, must do just actions? In another class of habits, the arts, he who produces a good piece of mechanism is a mechanic, and he who can play the harp is an harper, we say, without any reference to his ἕξις. To this objection Aristotle replies, by showing that they are not parallel cases: for in the arts we look only to the excellence of the thing produced, but in virtuous actions, almost entirely to the disposition of the agent.

ριθμεῖται, πλὴν αὐτὸ τὸ εἰδέναι· πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὰς ἀρετὰς τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι μικρὸν ἢ οὐδὲν ἰσχύει, τὰ δ' ἄλλα οὐ μικρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ πᾶν δύναται, ἅπερ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις πράττειν τὰ δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα περιγίνεται. Τὰ μὲν οὖν πράγματα δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα λέγεται, ὅταν ᾖ τοιαῦτα οἷα ἂν ὁ δίκαιος ἢ ὁ σώφρων πράξειεν· δίκαιος δὲ καὶ σώφρων ἐστὶν οὐχ ὁ ταῦτα πράττων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ οὕτω πράττων ὡς οἱ δίκαιοι καὶ οἱ σώφρονες πράττουσιν. εὖ οὖν λέγεται ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ δίκαια πράττειν ὁ δίκαιος γίνεται καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τὰ σώφρονα ὁ σώφρων· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μὴ πράττειν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν οὐδὲ μελλήσειε γενέσθαι ἀγαθός. ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὐ πράττουσιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν λόγον καταφεύγοντες οἴονται φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οὕτως ἔσεσθαι σπουδαῖοι, ὅμοιόν τι ποιοῦντες τοῖς κάμνουσιν, οἳ τῶν ἰατρῶν ἀκούουσι μὲν ἐπιμελῶς, ποιοῦσι δ' οὐθὲν τῶν προσταττομένων. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ' ἐκεῖνοι εὖ ἕξουσι τὸ σῶμα οὕτω θεραπευόμενοι, οὐδ' οὗτοι τὴν ψυχὴν οὕτω φιλοσοφοῦντες.

The previous conclusion resumed.

2. τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι] καὶ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται μηδὲν ἀκριβὲς περὶ ἀρετῆς εἰπεῖν εἰδότα σπουδαῖον εἶναι. Paraph.

5. εὖ οὖν λέγεται] Cicero giving a short analysis of the doctrines of the old Academy and Peripatetics, (nihil enim inter Peripateticos et illam veterem Academiam differebat,) thus describes their doctrine of moral virtue. "Morum autem putabant studia esse et quasi consuetudinem (ἔθος): quam partim exercitationis assiduitate, partim ratione formabant; in quibus erat philosophia ipsa. in qua quod inchoatum est neque absolutum progressio quædam ad virtutem appellatur: quod autem absolutum, id est virtus, quasi perfectio naturæ." Acad. i. 5.

5. δίκαια πράττειν] Although the acts done previous to the acquirement of the habit be not only imperfect, but also spring from unworthy motives, they may still lead to a perfect habit, and then the habit produces the perfect act. See Butler's Remarks upon the assertion of Lord Shaftesbury, that acts of obedience springing from selfishness only generate habits of selfishness. Analogy, i. 5.

CHAP. IV.

Virtue is either πάθος, δύναμις, or ἕξις—it is neither πάθος nor δύναμις, (for we are not praised according to them, but we are according to Virtue,)—and therefore it is ἕξις.

The Genus of Virtue investigated.

Virtue, not πάθος.

ΜΕΤΑ δὲ ταῦτα τί ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτέον. 4
ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα τρία ἐστί, πάθη δυνάμεις ἕξεις, τούτων ἄν τι εἴη ἡ ἀρετή. Λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ἐπιθυμίαν, ὀργήν, φόβον, θράσος, φθόνον, χαράν, φιλίαν, μῖσος, πόθον, ζῆλον, 5

After having thus proved that the virtues are not implanted in us by nature, but are acquired by the repetition of certain actions, and having shown what those actions are, next how we may understand when we have attained the virtues, and upon what object-matter those virtues are employed; Aristotle now proceeds to discover the definition of Virtue. This order of treating the subject was necessary; for if the opinion of some, that virtue is innate, had not been refuted in the outset, the definition which Aristotle presently gives of virtue (ἕξις προαιρετική) would be vain and nugatory.

We proceed therefore to discover first the *genus* of Moral Virtue. Now since the virtues of the soul are in the soul, and the Moral Virtues in the moral or appetitive part of the soul, and since pleasure and pain are the object matter upon which they are employed, it will be necessary to consider what those faculties are in the moral part of the soul, which are at all concerned with pleasure and pain. There are three, πάθη, δυνάμεις, ἕξεις. Pleasure and pain follow the πάθη,—the δυνάμεις are the capabilities of being affected by the πάθη, consequently by pleasure and pain,—the ἕξεις are those by which we are well or ill disposed to them, and consequently well or ill disposed in reference to pleasure and pain; Virtue is neither of the former, consequently it is the latter.

2. τρία] Compare Plutarch de Virt. Morali. c. 4. (Vol. ix. p. 399. Ed. Hutten): τρία γὰρ δὴ ταῦτά φασι περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπάρχειν, δύναμιν, πάθος, ἕξιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν δύναμις ἀρχὴ καὶ ὕλη τοῦ πάθους, οἷον ὀργιλότης, αἰσχυντηλία, θαρραλεότης. τὸ δὲ πάθος κίνησίς τις ἤδη τῆς δυνάμεως ἐξ ἔθους ἐγγινομένη. κακία μὲν ἂν φαύλως, ἀρετὴ δὲ ἂν καλῶς ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου παιδαγωγηθῇ τὸ πάθος. According to Giphanius, Aristotle enumerates only πάθος, δύναμις, and ἕξις, because as Virtue is a quality and these three with form (σχῆμα), which pertains only to material things, are the only species of quality, consequently Virtue must be one or more of these. See Categ. c. vi. (Ed. Tauch.)

ἔλεον, ὅλως οἷς ἕπεται ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη, δυνάμεις δὲ καθ' ἃς παθητικοὶ τούτων λεγόμεθα, οἷον καθ' ἃς δυνατοὶ ὀργισθῆναι ἢ λυπηθῆναι ἢ ἐλεῆσαι, ἕξεις δὲ καθ' ἃς πρὸς τὰ πάθη ἔχομεν εὖ ἢ κακῶς, οἷον πρὸς τὸ ὀργισθῆναι, εἰ μὲν σφοδρῶς ἢ ἀνειμένως, κακῶς ἔχομεν, εἰ δὲ μέσως, εὖ. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τἆλλα. πάθη μὲν οὖν οὐκ εἰσὶν οὔθ' αἱ ἀρεταὶ οὔθ' αἱ κακίαι, ὅτι οὐ λεγόμεθα κατὰ τὰ πάθη σπουδαῖοι ἢ φαῦλοι, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἢ τὰς κακίας λεγόμεθα, καὶ ὅτι κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη οὔτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα (οὐ γὰρ ἐπαινεῖται ὁ φοβούμενος οὐδὲ ὁ ὀργιζόμενος, οὐδὲ ψέγεται ὁ ἁπλῶς ὀργιζόμενος ἀλλ' ὁ πῶς), κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας ἐπαινούμεθα ἢ ψεγόμεθα. ἔτι ὀργιζόμεθα μὲν καὶ φοβούμεθα ἀπροαιρέτως, αἱ δ' ἀρεταὶ προαιρέσεις τινὲς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ προαιρέσεως. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη κινεῖσθαι λεγόμεθα, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας οὐ κινεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ διακεῖσθαί πως.

Διὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὐδὲ δυνάμεις εἰσίν· οὔτε γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ λεγόμεθα τῷ δύνασθαι πάσχειν ἁπλῶς οὔτε κακοί, οὔτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα. καὶ Virtue not δύναμις.

19. διακεῖσθαί πως] Virtue is an affection by which we are disposed or conformed (διακεῖσθαι) in a certain manner. Virtue is not however a disposition (διάθεσις), but a habit (ἕξις). In what way διάθεσις differs from ἕξις Aristotle thus explains in his Categories, cap. vi. (p. 48. ed. Tauchn.) διαφέρει δὲ ἕξις διαθέσεως τῷ χρονιώτερον εἶναι καὶ μονιμώτερον· τοιαῦται δὲ αἵ τε ἐπιστῆμαι καὶ αἱ ἀρεταί· ἥτε γὰρ ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ τῶν παραμονιμωτέρων εἶναι καὶ δυσκινήτων.——διαθέσεις δὲ λέγονται ἅ ἐστιν εὐκίνητα καὶ ταχὺ μεταβάλλοντα· οἷον θερμότης καὶ ψυχρότης, καὶ νόσος καὶ ὑγιεία, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. διάκειται μὲν γάρ πως κατὰ ταύτας ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ταχὺ δὲ μεταβάλλει, ἐκ θερμοῦ ψυχρὸς γενόμενος, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν εἰς τὸ νοσεῖν.

20. δυνάμεις] *Capacities of feeling, or being acted upon.* In which the present use of the term differs from that of p. 5, and elsewhere.

ἔτι δυνατοὶ μέν ἐσμεν φύσει, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ ἢ κακοὶ οὐ γινόμεθα φύσει· εἴπομεν δὲ περὶ τούτου πρότερον. Εἰ οὖν μήτε πάθη εἰσὶν αἱ ἀρεταὶ μήτε δυνάμεις, λείπεται ἕξεις αὐτὰς εἶναι. ὅ τι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τῷ γένει ἡ ἀρετή, εἴρηται.

Virtue is ἕξις.

CHAP. V.

That Virtue is a habit in a mean (ἐν μεσότητι) relative to ourselves.

The *Differentia* of Virtue investigated.

ΔΕΙ δὲ μὴ μόνον οὕτως εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἕξις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποία τις. ῥητέον οὖν ὅτι πᾶσα ἀρετή, οὗ ἂν ᾖ ἀρετή, αὐτό τε εὖ ἔχον ἀποτελεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ εὖ ἀποδίδωσιν, οἷον ἡ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετὴ τόν τε ὀφθαλμὸν σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ· τῇ γὰρ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετῇ εὖ ὁρῶμεν. ὁμοίως ἡ τοῦ ἵππου ἀρετὴ ἵππον τε σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ ἀγαθὸν δραμεῖν καὶ ἐνεγκεῖν τὸν ἐπιβάτην καὶ μεῖναι τοὺς πολεμίους. εἰ δὴ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πάντων οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετὴ

Having thus discovered the *Genus* of Virtue, it remains to investigate the *Differentia*. Now considering ἀρετὴ in its widest sense, we say, it is that which must produce good ἔργα; but good ἔργα, as we have said before (p. 57), are those which avoid excess and defect; therefore virtue, since every ἕξις reproduces the same ἔργα by which it was produced, (p. 58), must be a habit avoiding excess and defect, or ἕξις ἐν μεσότητι.

II. Virtue is of the more difficult, the mean is the more difficult; therefore Virtue is of the mean.

But the mean is of two kinds, the absolute and relative which is the mean to us; and this is the mean which Moral Virtue aims at. Therefore Virtue is ἕξις ἐν μεσότητι τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς.

12. ἀρετή] The reader must again be cautioned not to apply the restricted signification of *moral* Virtue to this term. The meaning of the word is well expressed by Cicero, de Legibus i. 8. "Est autem virtus nihil aliud, quam in se perfecta et ad summum perducta natura." This is a literal translation of Aristotle. See n. p. 26, 3.

εἴη ἂν ἕξις ἀφ' ἧς ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος γίνεται καὶ ἀφ' ἧς εὖ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον ἀποδώσει. πῶς δὲ τοῦτ' ἔσται, ἤδη μὲν εἰρήκαμεν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὧδ' ἔσται φανερόν, ἐὰν θεωρήσωμεν ποία τίς ἐστιν ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς. Ἐν παντὶ δὴ συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ ἔστι λαβεῖν τὸ μὲν πλεῖον τὸ δ' ἔλαττον τὸ δ' ἴσον, καὶ ταῦτα ἢ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς· τὸ δ' ἴσον μέσον τι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως. λέγω δὲ τοῦ μὲν πράγματος μέσον τὸ ἴσον ἀπέχον ἀφ' ἑκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν πᾶσιν, πρὸς ἡμᾶς δὲ ὃ μήτε πλεονάζει μήτε ἐλλείπει. τοῦτο δ' οὐχ ἕν, οὐδὲ ταὐτὸν πᾶσιν, οἷον εἰ τὰ δέκα πολλὰ τὰ δὲ δύο ὀλίγα, τὰ ἓξ μέσα λαμβάνουσι κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα· ἴσῳ γὰρ ὑπερέχει τε καὶ ὑπερέχεται, τοῦτο δὲ μέσον ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν. τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐχ οὕτω ληπτέον· οὐ γὰρ εἴ τῳ δέκα μναῖ φαγεῖν πολὺ δύο δὲ ὀλίγον, ὁ ἀλείπτης ἓξ μνᾶς προστάξει· ἔστι γὰρ ἴσως καὶ τοῦτο πολὺ τῷ ληψομένῳ ἢ ὀλίγον· Μίλωνι μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγον, τῷ δὲ ἀρχομένῳ τῶν γυμνασίων πολύ. ὁμοίως ἐπὶ δρόμου καὶ πάλης. οὕτω δὴ πᾶς ἐπιστήμων τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μὲν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν φεύγει, τὸ δὲ μέσον ζητεῖ καὶ τοῦθ' αἱρεῖται, μέσον δὲ οὐ τὸ τοῦ πράγματος ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς. Εἰ δὴ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη οὕτω τὸ ἔργον εὖ ἐπιτελεῖ, πρὸς

The mean of two kinds, absolute and relative.

Virtue aims at the *relative* mean.

5. συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ] *Discrete or continuous.* Of the former are numbers; of the latter are lines, surfaces and solids.

26. ἐπιστήμη] This is an argument *a minori.* If every art, which is inferior to virtue, aims at the mean, and performs its ἔργα well by looking to that mean, much more will virtue, which is superior to every art, do the same; as also does nature. Nature is superior to art, for art imitates nature;

τὸ μέσον βλέπουσα καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ἄγουσα τὰ ἔργα (ὅθεν εἰώθασιν ἐπιλέγειν τοῖς εὖ ἔχουσιν ἔργοις ὅτι οὔτ' ἀφελεῖν ἔστιν οὔτε προσθεῖναι, ὡς τῆς μὲν ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως φθειρούσης τὸ εὖ, τῆς δὲ μεσότητος σωζούσης), οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ τεχνῖται, ὡς λέγομεν, πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες ἐργάζονται, ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ πάσης τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα καὶ ἀμείνων ἐστίν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις, τοῦ μέσου ἂν εἴη στοχαστική. λέγω δὲ τὴν ἠθικήν· αὕτη γάρ ἐστι περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις, ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ τὸ μέσον. οἷον καὶ φοβηθῆναι καὶ θαρρῆσαι καὶ ἐπιθυμῆσαι καὶ ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἐλεῆσαι καὶ ὅλως ἡσθῆναι καὶ λυπηθῆναι ἔστι καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, καὶ ἀμφότερα οὐκ εὖ· τὸ δ' ὅτε δεῖ καὶ ἐφ' οἷς καὶ πρὸς οὓς καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ ὡς δεῖ, μέσον τε καὶ ἄριστον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ τὸ μέσον. ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις ἐστίν, ἐν οἷς ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἁμαρτάνεται καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις ψέγεται, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐπαινεῖται καὶ κατορθοῦται· ταῦτα δ' ἄμφω τῆς ἀρετῆς. μεσότης τις ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή, στοχαστική γε οὖσα τοῦ μέσου.

Virtue is of the mean because it is more difficult.

Ἔτι τὸ μὲν ἁμαρτάνειν πολλαχῶς ἐστίν (τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι εἴκαζον, τὸ δ'

but virtue is still better, for it is the perfection of nature, nature itself capable of obtaining its proper end.

The word ἐπιστήμη is sometimes used by Aristotle to denote an art as well as a science.

9. λέγω δὲ τὴν ἠθικήν] Moral virtue only aims at the mean, and not the Intellectual. For it is not required in Intellectual virtue that we should understand but moderately, and avoid excess in knowledge. See p. 58. n.

25. Πυθαγόρειοι] See the συστοχία of the Pythagoreans, quoted above, p. 17, 7. n.

ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου), τὸ δὲ κατορθοῦν μοναχῶς· διὸ καὶ τὸ μὲν ῥᾴδιον τὸ δὲ χαλεπόν, ῥᾴδιον μὲν τὸ ἀποτυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ, χαλεπὸν δὲ τὸ ἐπιτυχεῖν. καὶ διὰ ταῦτ' οὖν τῆς μὲν κακίας ἡ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις, τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἡ μεσότης· "ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί."

Ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν. μεσότης δὲ δύο κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν· καὶ ἔτι τῷ τὰς μὲν ἐλλείπειν τὰς δ' ὑπερβάλλειν τοῦ δέοντος ἔν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι, τὴν δ' ἀρετὴν τὸ μέσον καὶ εὑρίσκειν καὶ αἱρεῖσθαι. διὸ κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα μεσότης ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή, κατὰ

Complete definition of Virtue.

2. χαλεπόν] ἴσως γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ λεγόμενον ἀληθές, ὅτι χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά. Plato, de Rep. p. 435.

6. ἐσθλοί] Cujus poetæ versus sit nescitur: Zwingero et Giphanio videtur esse Theognidis. ZELL.

12. πάθεσι—πράξεσι,] The object matter of some moral virtues are passions, of others, actions. See the division in the succeeding chapter.

14. κατὰ—τὴν οὐσίαν] Virtue is both a mean and an extreme. A mean if you look to its essence and definition (κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα), but an extreme if you look to its excellence and its quality.

15. τί ἦν εἶναι] Quum fixæ et constantis Aristotelis dicendi formulæ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι s. τὸ τί ἦν mentio inciderit, liceat mihi occasione oblata ita uti, ut, quod in hoc dicendi modo obscurum videatur, paucis illustrem. Quæritur, quæ tandem in hac dictione propria sit formæ imperfecti ἦν ratio et conditio? Omni linguæ usui facile aptius putaveris τὸ τί ἐστι. Sed disertis verbis Aristotelis alterum ab altero discernit, Metaphys. vii. 4. Z. p. 134. Brand. διὸ καὶ νῦν ἐπεὶ τὸ λεγόμενον φανερὸν καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ὁμοίως ὑπάρξει πρώτως μὲν καὶ ἁπλῶς τῇ οὐσίᾳ εἶτα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ τί ἐστιν οὐχ ἁπλῶς τί ἦν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ποιῷ ἢ ποσῷ τί ἦν εἶναι. (Illius τὸ τί ἐστι exempla v. Metaph. vii. 9. Z. p. 144. xiii. 4. p. 266. Brand.) E loco laudato intelligitur, τὸ τί ἐστιν ab Aristotele severius adstringi ad rationem, quale quid sit vel quantum sit, ut τὸ τί ἦν generalius et totius dicatur. Quod discrimen quomodo inest his formis inter se diversis (ἐστὶ—ἦν)? Fortasse Aristoteles propterea imperfectum τὸ τί ἦν elegit, quod οὐσία, forma, in qua

Some actions and passions never admit of a mean.

δὲ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ εὖ ἀκρότης. Οὐ πᾶσα δ' ἐπιδέχεται πρᾶξις οὐδὲ πᾶν πάθος τὴν μεσότητα· ἔνια γὰρ εὐθὺς ὠνόμασται συνειλημμένα μετὰ τῆς φαυλότητος, οἷον ἐπιχαιρεκακία ἀναισχυντία φθόνος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων μοιχεία κλοπὴ ἀνδροφονία· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ψέγεται τῷ αὐτὰ φαῦλα εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐχ αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ αὐτῶν οὐδ' αἱ ἐλλείψεις. οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν οὐδέποτε περὶ αὐτὰ κατορθοῦν, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ἁμαρτάνειν· οὐδ' ἔστι τὸ εὖ ἢ μὴ εὖ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν τῷ ἣν δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὡς μοιχεύειν, ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς τὸ ποιεῖν ὁτιοῦν τούτων ἁμαρτάνειν ἐστίν. ὅμοιον οὖν τὸ ἀξιοῦν καὶ περὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν καὶ δειλαίνειν καὶ ἀκολασταίνειν εἶναι μεσότητα καὶ ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν· ἔσται γὰρ οὕτω γε ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως μεσότης καὶ ὑπερβολῆς ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἐλλείψεως. ὥσπερ δὲ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ

hoc τὸ τί ἦν positum est, ante materiam et prior menti informatur. Unde τὸ τί ἦν proprie illud, quod res esset, si a materia secretum et per se poneretur abstractum. Etsi hanc explicationem Platonis ideas quodammodo olere judicaveris, egregie tamen probatur loco Aristotelis Metaph. vii. 7. Z. p. 140. Brand. ὥστε συμβαίνει τρόπον τινὰ τὴν ὑγίειαν ἐξ ὑγιείας γίνεσθαι καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν ἐξ οἰκίας, τῆς ἄνευ ὕλης τὴν ἔχουσαν ὕλην· ἡ γὰρ ἰατρική ἐστι καὶ οἰκοδομικὴ τὸ εἶδος τῆς ὑγιείας καὶ τῆς οἰκίας. λέγω δ' οὐσίαν ἄνευ ὕλης τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. Cf. vii. 7. Z. p. 139. Br. Trendelenburg l. l. p. 41.

1. οὐ πᾶσα—πρᾶξις] Having observed that we ought to aim at the mean in all our actions, Aristotle subjoins, in order that men may not continue in vice, through pretence of aiming at a mean in it, that not all actions admit of a mean, but some are always extremes, whether followed more or less, and consequently always culpable. Of this he brings several instances. Were it not so, he observes, we should be reduced to this absurdity, that there would be an excess of defect, and a defect of excess. For, if there is a mean of excess, there is also a defect of excess, and the reverse. And so likewise would there be an excess and defect of that which has no excess and defect, that is, the mean. Which is absurd.

καὶ ἔλλειψις διὰ τὸ τὸ μέσον εἶναί πως ἄκρον, οὕτως οὐδὲ ἐκείνων μεσότης οὐδὲ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν πράττηται ἁμαρτάνεται· ὅλως γὰρ οὔθ' ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως μεσότης ἐστιν, οὔτε μεσότητος ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις.

CHAP. VI.

An application of this general principle to particular instances.

7 ΔΕΙ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ μόνον καθόλου λέγεσθαι, In ACTIONS. ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα ἐφαρμόττειν· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς περὶ τὰς πράξεις λόγοις οἱ μὲν καθόλου κενώτεροί εἰσιν, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ μέρους ἀληθινώτεροι· περὶ γὰρ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα αἱ πράξεις, δέον δ' ἐπὶ τούτων συμφωνεῖν. ληπτέον οὖν ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς διαγραφῆς. Περὶ μὲν οὖν φόβους καὶ θάρρη 1. ἀνδρεία. ἀνδρεία μεσότης· τῶν δ' ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ μὲν i. θρασύτης. ii. δειλία. τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ ἀνώνυμος (πολλὰ δ' ἐστὶν ἀνώνυμα), ὁ δ' ἐν τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλλων θρασύς, ὁ δὲ τῷ

6. καθόλου] In the Politics, Aristotle thus uses this term: δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ κατὰ μέρος μᾶλλον ἐπισκοποῦσι· καθόλου γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες ἐξαπατῶσιν ἑαυτούς. i. 5. (p. 24. ed. Goett.)

9. κενώτεροι] Too vague for practical purposes. Aristotle says it is not sufficient to give a mere abstract definition of virtue, but we must apply the definition to particulars. For in moral science particulars have a greater weight and more influence on the mind than universals; for universals appear to derive their certainty from particulars, and moral science is intended for practice which turns upon particulars. We must therefore descend and apply our definition to each single virtue, that the nature of them may be more clearly understood, and the definition confirmed by those instances which appeal directly to the senses.

10. δέον—συμφωνεῖν] It is necessary to apply it to particulars, and shew that it agrees with them.

12. διαγραφῆς] *A diagram or delineation;* such as he gives in the subsequent books.

In ACTIONS.

μὲν φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλων τῷ δὲ θαρρεῖν ἐλλείπων δειλός.

2. σωφροσύνη.
i. ἀκολασία.
ii. Anon.

Περὶ ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας οὐ πάσας, ἧττον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς λύπας, μεσότης μὲν σωφροσύνη, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀκολασία. ἐλλείποντες δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς οὐ πάνυ γίνονται· διόπερ οὐδ' ὀνόματος τετυχήκασιν οὐδ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι, ἔστωσαν δὲ ἀναίσθητοι.

3. ἐλευθεριότης.
i. ἀσωτία.
ii. ἀνελευθερία.

Περὶ δὲ δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ λῆψιν μεσότης μὲν ἐλευθεριότης, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἀσωτία καὶ ἀνελευθερία. ἐναντίως δ' ἑαυταῖς ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄσωτος ἐν μὲν προέσει ὑπερβάλλει ἐν δὲ λήψει ἐλλείπει, ὁ δ' ἀνελεύθερος ἐν μὲν λήψει ὑπερβάλλει ἐν δὲ προέσει ἐλλείπει. νῦν μὲν οὖν τύπῳ καὶ ἐπὶ κεφαλαίῳ λέγομεν, ἀρκούμενοι αὐτῷ τούτῳ· ὕστερον δὲ ἀκριβέστερον περὶ αὐτῶν διορισθήσεται.

4. μεγαλοπρέπεια.
i. βαναυσία.
ii. μικροπρέπεια.

Περὶ δὲ τὰ χρήματα καὶ ἄλλαι διαθέσεις εἰσί, μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοπρέπεια (ὁ γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπὴς διαφέρει ἐλευθερίου· ὁ μὲν γὰρ περὶ μεγάλα, ὁ δὲ περὶ μικρά), ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀπειροκαλία καὶ βαναυσία, ἔλλειψις δὲ μικροπρέπεια· διαφέρουσι δ' αὗται τῶν περὶ τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, πῇ δὲ διαφέρουσιν, ὕστερον ῥηθήσεται.

5. μεγαλοψυχία.
i. χαυνότης.
ii. μικροψυχία.

Περὶ δὲ τιμὴν καὶ ἀτιμίαν μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοψυχία, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ χαυνότης τις λεγομένη, ἔλλειψις δὲ μικροψυχία·

6. Anon.
i. φιλοτιμία.
ii. ἀφιλοτιμία.

Ὡς δ' ἐλέγομεν ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, περὶ μικρὰ διαφέρουσαν, οὕτως ἔχει τις καὶ πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν, περὶ τιμὴν οὖσαν μεγάλην, αὐτὴ

4. σωφροσύνη] This and its opposite habit is considered at greater length in the Seventh Book. See also iii. 7.

15. ὕστερον δὲ ἀκριβέστερον] See iv. 1.

22. ὕστερον ῥηθήσεται] See iv. 2.

περὶ μικρὰν οὖσα· ἔστι γὰρ ὡς δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι In ACTIONS. τιμῆς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἧττον, λέγεται δ' ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων ταῖς ὀρέξεσι φιλότιμος, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἀφιλότιμος, ὁ δὲ μέσος ἀνώνυμος. ἀνώνυμοι δὲ καὶ αἱ διαθέσεις, πλὴν ἡ τοῦ φιλοτίμου φιλοτιμία. ὅθεν ἐπιδικάζονται οἱ ἄκροι τῆς μέσης χώρας. καὶ ἡμεῖς δὲ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε τὸν μέσον φιλότιμον καλοῦμεν ἔστι δ' ὅτε ἀφιλότιμον, καὶ ἔστιν ὅτε μὲν ἐπαινοῦμεν τὸν φιλότιμον ἔστι δ' ὅτε τὸν ἀφιλότιμον. διὰ τίνα δ' αἰτίαν τοῦτο ποιοῦμεν, ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς ῥηθήσεται· νῦν δὲ περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν λέγωμεν κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον.

Ἔστι δὲ καὶ περὶ ὀργὴν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις 7. Anon. i. ὀργιλότης. ii. ἀοργησία. καὶ μεσότης, σχεδὸν δὲ ἀνωνύμων ὄντων αὐτῶν τὸν μέσον πρᾶον λέγοντες τὴν μεσότητα πραότητα καλέσομεν· τῶν δ' ἄκρων ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων ὀργίλος ἔστω, ἡ δὲ κακία ὀργιλότης, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἀόργητός τις, ἡ δ' ἔλλειψις ἀοργησία. Εἰσὶ 8. ἀλήθεια. i. ἀλαζονεία. ii. εἰρωνεία. δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι τρεῖς μεσότητες, ἔχουσαι μέν τινα ὁμοιότητα πρὸς ἀλλήλας, διαφέρουσαι δ' ἀλλήλων· πᾶσαι μὲν γάρ εἰσι περὶ λόγων καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν, διαφέρουσι δὲ ὅτι ἡ μέν ἐστι περὶ τἀληθὲς τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς, αἱ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ· τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ τὸ δ' ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον. ῥητέον οὖν καὶ περὶ τούτων, ἵνα μᾶλλον κατίδωμεν ὅτι ἐν πᾶσιν ἡ μεσότης ἐπαινετόν, τὰ δ' ἄκρα οὔτ' ὀρθὰ οὔτ' ἐπαινετὰ ἀλλὰ ψεκτά. ἔστι μὲν οὖν καὶ τού-

6. ἐπιδικάζονται] Comparatio est a fundis seu possessionibus vacantibus sumpta; nam ut in vacuum fundum viam utrimque invadere et occupare student ita et nomen locumque medii hujus nomine vacantis occupare student extremi. GIPH.

11. ῥηθήσεται] See iv. 3.

In ACTIONS.

των τὰ πλείω ἀνώνυμα· πειρατέον δ', ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, αὐτοὺς ὀνοματοποιεῖν σαφηνείας ἕνεκεν καὶ τοῦ εὐπαρακολουθήτου. περὶ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀληθὲς ὁ μὲν μέσος ἀληθής τις καὶ ἡ μεσότης ἀλήθεια λεγέσθω, ἡ δὲ προσποίησις ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον ἀλαζονεία καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν ἀλαζών, ἡ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον εἰρωνεία καὶ εἴρων.

9. εὐτραπελία. i. βωμολοχία. ii. ἀγροικία.

Περὶ δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ ὁ μὲν μέσος εὐτράπελος καὶ ἡ διάθεσις εὐτραπελία, ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ βωμολοχία καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν βωμολόχος, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἀγροῖκός τις καὶ ἡ ἕξις ἀγροικία.

10. φιλία. i. ἀρέσκεια or κολακεία. ii. δυσκολία.

Περὶ δὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ἡδὺ τὸ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὁ μὲν ὡς δεῖ ἡδὺς ὢν φίλος καὶ ἡ μεσότης φιλία, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων, εἰ μὲν οὐδενὸς ἕνεκα, ἄρεσκος, εἰ δ' ὠφελείας τῆς αὑτοῦ, κόλαξ, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀηδὴς δύσερίς τις καὶ δύσκολος.

In PASSIONS. 1. αἰδώς. i. κατάπληξις. ii. ἀναισχυντία.

Εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη μεσότητες· ἡ γὰρ αἰδὼς ἀρετὴ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπαινεῖται δὲ καὶ ὁ αἰδήμων. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὁ μὲν λέγεται μέσος, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων, ὡς ὁ καταπλήξ, ὁ πάντα αἰδούμενος· ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἢ ὁ μηδὲ ὅλως ἀναίσχυντος· ὁ δὲ μέσος αἰδήμων.

2. νέμεσις. i. φθόνος. ii. ἐπιχαιρεκακίας.

Νέμεσις δὲ μεσότης φθόνου καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας. εἰσὶ δὲ περὶ λύπην καὶ ἡδονὴν τὰς ἐπὶ τοῖς συμβαίνουσι τοῖς πέλας γινομένας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ νεμεσητικὸς λυπεῖται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίως εὖ πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ φθονερὸς ὑπερβάλλων τοῦτον ἐπὶ πᾶσι λυπεῖται, ὁ δ' ἐπιχαιρέκακος τοσοῦτον ἐλλείπει τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι ὥστε καὶ χαίρειν. ἀλλὰ

20. ὁ καταπλήξ] οὔτε ὡς ὁ καταπλὴξ ἐν παντὶ καὶ πάντως εὐλαβηθήσεται. Mag. Mor. i. 30.

22. νέμεσις] See the Rhetoric, ii. 9.

περὶ μὲν τούτων καὶ ἄλλοθι καιρὸς ἔσται· περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης, ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἁπλῶς λέγεται, μετὰ ταῦτα διελόμενοι περὶ ἑκατέρας ἐροῦμεν πῶς μεσότητές εἰσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν λογικῶν ἀρετῶν.

CHAP. VII.

That the Virtues and Vices are in mutual opposition.

The mean and extremes in mutual opposition.

8 ΤΡΙΩΝ δὲ διαθέσεων οὐσῶν, δύο μὲν κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν, μιᾶς δ' ἀρετῆς τῆς μεσότητος, πᾶσαι πάσαις ἀντίκεινταί πως· αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄκραι καὶ τῇ μέσῃ καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι εἰσίν, ἡ δὲ μέση ταῖς ἄκραις· ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ ἴσον πρὸς μὲν τὸ ἔλαττον μεῖζον πρὸς δὲ τὸ μεῖζον ἔλαττον, οὕτως αἱ μέσαι ἕξεις πρὸς μὲν τὰς ἐλλείψεις ὑπερβάλλουσι, πρὸς δὲ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς ἐλλείπουσιν ἔν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν. ὁ γὰρ ἀνδρεῖος πρὸς μὲν τὸν δειλὸν θρασὺς φαίνεται, πρὸς δὲ τὸν θρασὺν δειλός· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ σώφρων πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἀναίσθητον ἀκόλαστος, πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἀκόλαστον ἀναίσθητος, ὁ δ' ἐλευθέριος πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἀνελεύθερον ἄσωτος, πρὸς δὲ τὸν

2. δικαιοσύνης] See the Fifth Book.

3. πῶς μεσότητες] See v. 7. near the end.

4. λογικῶν] In the Sixth Book.

10. ἐναντίαι] Correctly speaking, one thing only can be opposed to one thing, as white to black, and this is called absolute opposition. White is opposed to grey, black, brown, &c. by another kind of opposition; called by the logicians, *oppositio secundum quid*, according to which the extremes are opposed to the mean. On this subject see the Categories, Chap. viii.

ἄσωτον ἀνελεύθερος. διὸ καὶ ἀπωθοῦνται τὸν μέσον οἱ ἄκροι ἑκάτερος πρὸς ἑκάτερον, καὶ καλοῦσι τὸν ἀνδρεῖον ὁ μὲν δειλὸς θρασὺν ὁ δὲ θρασὺς δειλόν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνάλογον.

The opposition between extremes greater than between the mean and extremes.

Οὕτω δ' ἀντικειμένων ἀλλήλοις τούτων, πλείων ἐναντιότης ἐστὶ τοῖς ἄκροις πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ πρὸς τὸ μέσον· πορρωτέρω γὰρ ταῦτα ἀφέστηκεν ἀλλήλων ἢ τοῦ μέσου, ὥσπερ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μικροῦ καὶ τὸ μικρὸν τοῦ μεγάλου ἢ ἄμφω τοῦ ἴσου.

Some extremes more opposed to the mean than others. 1. From the nature of the things themselves.

Ἔτι πρὸς μὲν τὸ μέσον ἐνίοις ἄκροις ὁμοιότης τις φαίνεται, ὡς τῇ θρασύτητι πρὸς τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ τῇ ἀσωτίᾳ πρὸς τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα· τοῖς δὲ ἄκροις πρὸς ἄλληλα πλείστη ἀνομοιότης. τὰ δὲ πλεῖστον ἀπέχοντα ἀλλήλων ἐναντία ὁρίζονται, ὥστε καὶ μᾶλλον ἐναντία τὰ πλεῖον ἀπέχοντα. πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέσον ἀντίκειται μᾶλλον ἐφ' ὧν μὲν ἡ ἔλλειψις ἐφ' ὧν δὲ ἡ ὑπερβολὴ οἷον ἀνδρείᾳ μὲν οὐχ ἡ θρασύτης ὑπερβολὴ οὖσα, ἀλλ' ἡ δειλία ἔλλειψις οὖσα, τῇ δὲ σωφροσύνῃ οὐχ ἡ ἀναισθησία ἔνδεια οὖσα, ἀλλ' ἡ ἀκολασία ὑπερβολὴ οὖσα. διὰ δύο δ' αἰτίας τοῦτο συμβαίνει, μίαν μὲν τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος· τῷ γὰρ ἐγγύτερον εἶναι καὶ ὁμοιότερον τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον τῷ μέσῳ, οὐ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον ἀντιτίθεμεν μᾶλλον, οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁμοιότερον εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἡ θρασύτης καὶ ἐγγύτερον, ἀνομοιότερον

3. τὸν ἀνδρεῖον] "Timidus vocat se cautum parcum sordidus." Ter.

7. πορρωτέρω—ἀφέστηκεν] Some extremes are further from the mean than others; and this for two reasons. Either because they have naturally less resemblance and are further from the nature of the mean; or because our appetites are more inclined to them.

δ' ἡ δειλία, ταύτην μᾶλλον ἀντιτίθεμεν· τὰ γὰρ ἀπέχοντα πλεῖον τοῦ μέσου ἐναντιώτερα δοκεῖ εἶναι. Μία μὲν οὖν αἰτία αὕτη, ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος, ἑτέρα δὲ ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν· πρὸς ἃ γὰρ αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον πεφύκαμέν πως, ταῦτα μᾶλλον ἐναντία τῷ μέσῳ φαίνεται. οἷον αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον πεφύκαμεν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονάς, διὸ εὐκατάφοροί ἐσμεν μᾶλλον πρὸς ἀκολασίαν ἢ πρὸς κοσμιότητα. ταῦτ' οὖν μᾶλλον ἐναντία λέγομεν, πρὸς ἃ ἡ ἐπίδοσις μᾶλλον γίνεται· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ ἀκολασία ὑπερβολὴ οὖσα ἐναντιωτέρα ἐστὶ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ.

2. From the disposition of men towards them.

CHAP. VIII.

Recapitulation of the whole Book.

9 ΟΤΙ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ ἠθικὴ μεσότης, καὶ πῶς, καὶ ὅτι μεσότης δύο κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν, καὶ ὅτι τοιαύτη ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ στοχαστικὴ τοῦ μέσου εἶναι τοῦ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν, ἱκανῶς εἴρηται. διὸ καὶ ἔργον ἐστὶ σπουδαῖον εἶναι· ἐν ἑκάστῳ γὰρ τὸ μεσὸν λαβεῖν ἔργον, οἷον κύκλου τὸ μέσον οὐ παντὸς ἀλλὰ τοῦ εἰδότος. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ μὲν ὀργισθῆναι παντὸς καὶ ῥᾴδιον, καὶ τὸ δοῦναι ἀργύριον καὶ δαπανῆσαι· τὸ δ' ᾧ, καὶ ὅσον, καὶ ὅτε, καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα, καὶ ὥς, οὐκέτι παντὸς οὐδὲ ῥᾴδιον· διόπερ

Recapitulation.

10. ἐπίδοσις] *Our inclination is greater.* Some writers, however, translate this term by the word *incrementum, progressio.* See Plato de Leg. p. 676.

τὸ εὖ καὶ σπάνιον καὶ ἐπαινετὸν καὶ καλόν. διὸ δεῖ τὸν στοχαζόμενον τοῦ μέσου πρῶτον μὲν ἀποχωρεῖν τοῦ μᾶλλον ἐναντίου· καθάπερ καὶ ἡ Καλυψὼ παραινεῖ "τούτου μὲν καπνοῦ καὶ κύματος ἐκτὸς ἔεργε νῆα·" τῶν γὰρ ἄκρων τὸ μέν ἐστιν ἁμαρτωλότερον, τὸ δ' ἧττον. ἐπεὶ οὖν τοῦ μέσου τυχεῖν ἄκρως χαλεπόν, κατὰ τὸν δεύτερόν φασι πλοῦν τὰ ἐλάχιστα ληπτέον τῶν κακῶν· τοῦτο δ' ἔσται μάλιστα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ὃν λέγομεν. Σκοπεῖν δὲ δεῖ πρὸς ἃ καὶ αὐτοὶ εὐκατάφοροί ἐσμεν· ἄλλοι γὰρ πρὸς ἄλλα πεφύκαμεν. τοῦτο δ' ἔσται γνώριμον ἐκ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς λύπης τῆς γινομένης περὶ ἡμᾶς. εἰς τοὐναντίον δ' ἑαυτοὺς ἀφέλκειν δεῖ· πολὺ γὰρ ἀπαγαγόντες τοῦ ἁμαρτάνειν εἰς τὸ μέσον ἥξομεν, ὅπερ οἱ τὰ διεστραμμένα τῶν ξύλων ὀρθοῦντες ποιοῦσιν. ἐν παντὶ δὲ μάλιστα φυλακτέον τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ ἀδέκαστοι κρίνομεν αὐτήν. ὅπερ οὖν οἱ δημογέροντες ἔπαθον πρὸς τὴν Ἑλένην,

General rules for attaining the mean.

3. τοῦ μᾶλλον ἐναντίου] *From the further extreme.*

4. Καλυψώ] Supposed to be an oversight for Circe. See Hom. Od. xii. 108, and 219.

7. τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν] Plato likewise uses this proverb in the Philebus, p. 19. See Stallb. ibid. δεύτερος δ' εἶναι πλοῦς δοκεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν αὐτὸν αὐτόν. The Scholiast upon the Phædon (Bekk. p. 381.) thus explains it: παροιμία δεύτερος πλοῦς ἐπὶ τῶν ἀσφαλῶς τι πραττόντων, παρ' ὅσον οἱ διαμαρτόντες κατὰ τὸν πρότερον πλοῦν ἀσφαλῶς παρασκευάζονται τὸν δεύτερον.

18. ἀδέκαστοι] Translatum est verbum a forensibus judiciis. Nam hæc corrumpere qui conabantur ii decuriis judicum aliquid polliceri atque largiri solebant; quæ erat decuratio quædam, id est, distinctio judicum aut tribuum ad dandam pecuniam emendaque suffragia. CAM.

19. Ἑλένην] Hom. Il. iii. 156.

οὐ νέμεσις Τρῶας καὶ ἐϋκνήμιδας Ἀχαιοὺς
τοιῇδ' ἀμφὶ γυναικὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἄλγεα πάσχειν·
αἰνῶς ἀθανάτῃσι θεῇς εἰς ὦπα ἔοικεν·
ἀλλὰ καὶ ὣς τοίη περ ἐοῦσ' ἐν νηυσὶ νεέσθω
μηδ' ἡμῖν τεκέεσσί τ' ὀπίσσω πῆμα λίποιτο.

τοῦτο δεῖ παθεῖν καὶ ἡμᾶς πρὸς τὴν ἡδονήν, καὶ ἐν πᾶσι τὴν ἐκείνων ἐπιλέγειν φωνήν· οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὴν ἀποπεμπόμενοι ἧττον ἁμαρτησόμεθα. ταῦτ' οὖν ποιοῦντες, ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν, μάλιστα δυνησόμεθα τοῦ μέσου τυγχάνειν.

To give exact rules not possible.

Χαλεπὸν δ' ἴσως τοῦτο, καὶ μάλιστ' ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστον· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον διορίσαι πῶς καὶ τίσι καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις καὶ πόσον χρόνον ὀργιστέον· καὶ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ὁτὲ μὲν τοὺς ἐλλείποντας ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ πράους φαμέν, ὁτὲ δὲ τοὺς χαλεπαίνοντας ἀνδρώδεις ἀποκαλοῦμεν. ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν μικρὸν τοῦ εὖ παρεκβαίνων οὐ ψέγεται, οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἧττον, ὁ δὲ πλέον· οὗτος γὰρ οὐ λανθάνει. ὁ δὲ μέχρι τίνος καὶ ἐπὶ πόσον ψεκτὸς οὐ ῥᾴδιον τῷ λόγῳ ἀφορίσαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν αἰσθητῶν· τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα, καὶ ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις. τὸ μὲν ἄρα τοσοῦτο δῆλον ὅτι ἡ μέση ἕξις ἐν πᾶσιν ἐπαινετή, ἀποκλίνειν δὲ δεῖ ὁτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ὁτὲ δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν· οὕτω γὰρ ῥᾷστα τοῦ μέσου καὶ τοῦ εὖ τευξόμεθα.

6. ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστον] *In particular cases.* The senses only take cognizance of individual acts, and as these cannot be reduced under one unvarying rule, they will not admit of the certainty of Science.

11. τοῦ εὖ παρεκβαίνων] Compare iv. 5, near the end.

INTRODUCTION TO BOOK III.

HAVING thus far considered the nature of moral virtue, Aristotle now proceeds to the investigation of a question which had occupied the attention not only of the poet and philosophers[a] in the early periods of Greek literature, but had also lately been revived with fresh energy, and occupied a prominent part in the discourses of Socrates, and the dialogues of Plato. Socrates had asserted that Vice is the mere result of ignorance, and that no one acts viciously, except against his will and from want of knowledge. A doctrine which might have been expected from one who asserted that the Virtues are sciences, that pure reason is the type of all that is excellent, that nothing done without reason is good, nothing with it is bad. Thus he argues: πάντας γὰρ οἶμαι προαιρουμένους ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων, ἃ ἂν οἴωνται συμφορώτατα αὑτοῖς εἶναι, ταῦτα πράττειν. νομίζω οὖν τοὺς μὴ ὀρθῶς πράττοντας οὔτε σοφοὺς οὔτε σώφρονας εἶναι. ἔφη δὲ καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν σοφίαν εἶναι. τά τε γὰρ δίκαια καὶ πάντα ὅσα ἀρετῇ πράττεται, καλά τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι· καὶ οὔτ' ἂν τοὺς ταῦτα εἰδότας ἄλλο ἀντὶ τούτων οὐδὲν προελέσθαι, οὔτε τοὺς μὴ ἐπισταμένους δύνασθαι πράττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ἐγχειρῶσιν ἁμαρτάνειν. οὕτω καὶ τὰ καλά τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ τοὺς μὲν σοφοὺς πράττειν, τοὺς δὲ μὴ σοφοὺς οὐ δύνασθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ἐγχειρῶσιν ἁμαρτάνειν. ἐπεὶ οὖν τά τε δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄλλα καλά τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ πάντα ἀρετῇ πράττεται, δῆλον εἶναι ὅτι καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ἄλλη πᾶσα ἀρετὴ σοφία ἐστι[b]. And again, in the Gorgias, he endeavours to show that the wicked man does not act as he *will*, but as he thinks to be best[c], that the

[a] See a discussion upon this subject in the Pythagorean fragments in Gale's Opuscula Mythol. p. 47.

[b] Xen. Mem. iii. 9, 4. Compare Arist. Eth. vi. 10. near the end.

[c] οὐδὲν γὰρ ποιεῖν ὧν βούλονται, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν· ποιεῖν μέντοι ὅτι ἂν αὐτοῖς δόξῃ βέλτιστον εἶναι. Gorg. 466. E.

will is universally directed towards good; that the exercise of virtuous habits is voluntary, since the reason is unimpeded and the principles of action free; but that vice is altogether involuntary; as much as the actions of the body which are influenced by a disease which impedes and clogs its natural energies[d].

That the will in its natural, that is, its perfect state, is invariably towards good, Aristotle appears to concede[e], but it by no means follows that every wicked action must necessarily be involuntary, or that the deterioration of the will is not self-caused. Men do on their own confession act contrary to conviction; they do submit to have their reason mastered by their desires, and submit themselves *deliberately* to such subjection. And they do all this knowing the effects which must be consequently brought upon themselves by such actions, that every evil act places them in a less advantageous position for the resisting of evil, and of distinguishing between virtue and vice, depraves the will, and eventually renders it incapable of exertion towards good. But then such persons have *voluntarily* submitted to lose this freedom, and having been perfect masters of all the single steps which led to this state must be considered voluntary agents. And even granting the assumption made by Socrates, that he who pursues vice or performs a vicious act does so from want of knowledge, from not being able to see how much more Virtue is his real interest and eventually a greater good, it still remains to be enquired how far he has been and is the author of his own ignorance. For if from carelessness or from any other cause he has brought upon

[d] De Legib. ix. The principal sources of information upon this subject are, Xenophon's Memorab. i. 2, 49. iii. 95. iv. 2, 22. and 31. Plato's Protagor. p. 352. sq. Gorg. p. 468. B. 509. E. Hipp. Min. 374. Phæd. p. 68. The entire dialogue of the Menon and De Legibus, p. 860. sq.

[e] ἆρα φατέον ἁπλῶς μὲν καὶ κατ' ἀλήθειαν βουλητὸν εἶναι τἀγαθόν, ἑκάστῳ δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον; τῷ μὲν οὖν σπουδαίῳ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν εἶναι, τῷ δὲ φαύλῳ τὸ τυχόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων τοῖς μὲν εὖ διακειμένοις ὑγιεινά ἐστι τὰ κατ' ἀλήθειαν τοιαῦτα ὄντα, τοῖς δ' ἐπινόσοις ἕτερα. iii. 4.

himself a degree of blindness so as not to be able fairly to weigh and appreciate the difference of good and evil, and so consequently pursues evil as a greater good, he is nevertheless a voluntary agent[f]. For most if not all men are by nature endowed with capacities sufficient for such discrimination, and with a natural bias towards good[g]; nor are these lost except from our own fault. That men, under the influence of temptation, suffer a temporary dereliction of knowledge, may be the case, but then it is their own fault to be so influenced by temptation; for nothing from without can tempt a man, unless there be something from within to correspond to that temptation to render him susceptible of impressions from it[h]. And over these inward feelings he has almost unlimited control, otherwise he must ever be tempted alike by the same objects; which self-denial, if he has omitted to acquire, he has himself to blame if, having let slip the opportunities of acquiring it, when the time of temptation arrives he sinks under its influence. And this is evident from the general sense and conduct of mankind, who punish those who break the laws without stopping to consider whether they have had the means of knowing or capacity of obeying those laws, as taking it for granted that they ought to have had and consequently could have acquired them[i].

This book then is divided into the following parts. In the 1st chapter Aristotle considers the nature of the Voluntary and Involuntary generally. In the 2d, the principle of Moral Action, or *προαίρεσις*. In the 3d, of Deliberation, which is antecedent to *προαίρεσις*, and which is employed upon the means. In the 4th, of Will,

[f] *εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀγνοῶν τις πράττει ἐξ ὧν ἔσται ἄδικος, ἑκὼν ἄδικος ἂν εἴη, οὐ μὴν ἐάν γε βούληται, ἄδικος ὢν παύσεται.* iii. 5.

[g] *πᾶσι γὰρ δοκεῖ ἕκαστα τῶν ἠθῶν ὑπάρχειν φύσει πως.* vi. 10. Compare also x. 2. *καὶ ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις ἐστί τι φυσικὸν ἀγαθὸν κρεῖττον ἢ καθ' αὑτά, ὃ ἐφίεται τοῦ οἰκείου ἀγαθοῦ.* These are the same as the opinions of Socrates, and probably were derived from him.

[h] See Butler's Analogy i. 4. Compare also p. 89, 2. *γελοῖον δὴ τὸ αἰτιᾶσθαι τὰ ἐκτός, ἀλλὰ μὴ αὑτὸν εὐθήρατον ὄντα ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων.*

[i] See this point fully discussed in vii. 3.

which is antecedent to deliberation, and is directed to ends. In the 5th, how far man is a voluntary agent in the formation of his good and evil habits. And in the remainder of the book, how far his general definition is applicable to particular instances.

ARISTOTELIS

ETHICA NICOMACHEA.

LIB. III.

CHAP. I.

Of Voluntary and Involuntary Actions.

ΤΗΣ ἀρετῆς δὴ περὶ πάθη τε καὶ πράξεις οὔσης, καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἑκουσίοις ἐπαίνων καὶ ψόγων γινομένων, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις συγγνώμης, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἐλέου, τὸ ἑκούσιον καὶ

Involuntary actions proceed either from compulsion or ignorance.

In the second Book Aristotle after explaining the Genus of Virtue, (Chap. 4.) by investigating its origin and its efficient cause, (Chaps. 1. 2.) completed his definition, (Chap. 5.) and explained several other questions necessary for a clearer understanding of its nature. In this third Book he proceeds to the discussion of each of the virtues singly; more fully describing those parts he had briefly touched before, in order that our knowledge of virtue and of the nature of the Chief Good, which is the end and aim of his treatise, may be perfect and complete. But before he can proceed to this part of his inquiry, it is necessary to resolve certain doubts and to meet certain objections which would be immediately raised against his definition of Virtue. For it may be asked, how far he is correct in stating that Virtue is in our power, that it depends upon our actions, that it is ἕξις προαιρετική. p. 69. To answer these objections he branches out into a somewhat wider field of investigation in order to grapple with that much disputed question, so prominent in the mythology, poetry, history and philosophy of his nation, the necessity or spontaneity of human actions; accurately describing and defining the nature of the Voluntary and Involuntary, before he speaks directly of προαίρεσις.

Ἐπεὶ οὖν φαίνεται ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὂν τὸ σπουδαῖον εἶναι, ἀναγκαῖον τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ ἑκουσίου, τί ἐστι τὸ ἑκούσιον· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ κυριώτατον κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν, τὸ ἑκούσιον. Mag. Mor. p. 19.

ἀκούσιον ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως διορίσαι τοῖς περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκοποῦσι, χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τοῖς νομοθετοῦσι πρός τε τὰς τιμὰς καὶ τὰς κολάσεις. δοκεῖ δὲ ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ βίᾳ ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν γινόμενα.

The *compulsory* defined.

Βίαιον δὲ οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν, τοιαύτη οὖσα ἐν ᾗ μηδὲν συμβάλλεται ὁ πράττων ἢ ὁ πάσχων, οἷον εἰ πνεῦμα κομίσαι ποι ἢ ἄνθρωποι κύριοι ὄντες.

The difficulties respecting *mixed* actions (partly voluntary partly involuntary) explained.

Ὅσα δὲ διὰ φόβον μειζόνων κακῶν πράττεται ἢ διὰ καλόν τι, οἷον εἰ τύραννος προστάττοι αἰσχρόν τι πρᾶξαι κύριος ὢν γονέων καὶ τέκνων, καὶ πράξαντος μὲν σώζοιντο, μὴ πράξαντος δ' ἀποθνήσκοιεν, ἀμφισβήτησιν ἔχει πότερον ἀκούσιά ἐστιν ἢ ἑκούσια. τοιοῦτον δέ τι συμβαίνει καὶ περὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς χειμῶσιν ἐκβολάς· ἁπλῶς μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἀποβάλλεται ἑκών, ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ δ' αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἅπαντες οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες. μικταὶ μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αἱ τοιαῦται πράξεις, ἐοίκασι δὲ μᾶλλον ἑκουσίοις· αἱρεταὶ γάρ εἰσι τότε ὅτε πράττονται, τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς πράξεως κατὰ τὸν καιρόν ἐστιν. καὶ τὸ ἑκούσιον δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον,

1. ἴσως] There is some difficulty in this term. The Greek Scholiast thinks that Aristotle does not question whether it is necessary or not to define the nature of the *voluntary* or *involuntary;* but whether it is necessary at this point of the investigation. He therefore understands πρῶτον, with this sense: perhaps it is necessary before we proceed further, before we complete our definition of Virtue, and what we have to say about it. Probably the word is here used merely to avoid an appearance of dogmatism, of which Aristotle is very cautious, even in those points where his reasoning is most conclusive. See x. 1.

7. κύριοι ὄντες] *Stronger than ourselves.*

19. τὸ δὲ τέλος] At the time when the action was done, the agents were voluntary, they could either throw their goods overboard, or they could forbear. And the nature of the action is to be determined, according to what it was at the time it was doing; the end of every action is at that time. It is then done and finished, nothing subsequent can alter its nature, or make it spontaneous or otherwise.

ὅτε πράττει, λεκτέον. πράττει δὲ ἑκών· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ κινεῖν τὰ ὀργανικὰ μέρη ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις πράξεσιν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστίν· ὧν δ' ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ἀρχή, ἐπ' αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ πράττειν καὶ μή. ἑκούσια δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἁπλῶς δ' ἴσως ἀκούσια· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ἕλοιτο καθ' αὑτὸ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν.

Ἐπὶ ταῖς πράξεσι δὲ ταῖς τοιαύταις ἐνίοτε καὶ ἐπαινοῦνται, ὅταν αἰσχρόν τι ἢ λυπηρὸν ὑπομένωσιν ἀντὶ μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν· ἂν δ' ἀνάπαλιν, ψέγονται· τὰ γὰρ αἴσχισθ' ὑπομεῖναι ἐπὶ μηδενὶ καλῷ ἢ μετρίῳ φαύλου. Ἐπ' ἐνίοις δ' ἔπαινος μὲν οὐ γίνεται, συγγνώμη δ', ὅταν διὰ τοιαῦτα πράξῃ τις ἃ μὴ δεῖ, ἃ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν ὑπερτείνει καὶ μηδεὶς ἂν ὑπομείναι. Ἔνια δ' ἴσως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκασθῆναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀποθανετέον παθόντι τὰ δεινότατα· καὶ γὰρ τὸν Εὐριπίδου Ἀλκμαίωνα

1. Such actions are sometimes *praised*, and 2. Sometimes *blamed*.
3. Sometimes *pardoned*.
4. Sometimes not.

7. ἐπὶ ταῖς πράξεσι] It sometimes happens that the authors of those actions which are called mixed are *praised* for their conduct; when, for instance, they suffer some great indignity or pain for the attainment of a great and noble object. On the contrary they are *blamed* if rather than incur pain they endure disgrace. Thirdly, if after having endured pain men give way at last through the excess of torment as surpassing what human nature can bear, they are *pitied* or *pardoned*, if they do not thereby incur very great disgrace. And with reference to the first class of actions, some things, says Aristotle, bring such infamy upon us, (such as would Isabella's acceding to Angelo's proposal in "Measure for Measure,") that we ought not to submit to them, whatever may be the benefit resulting from such submission. As Cicero observes in his De Officiis, i. 45. "Sunt enim quædam partim ita fœda, partim ita flagitiosa, ut ea, ne conservandæ quidem patriæ causa sapiens facturus sit." But how to direct our conduct and form our choice in many cases is very difficult, especially when the disgrace and labour to be undergone is about equal to the glory to be obtained. And still more difficult is it to adhere to our purpose in such instances, where our resolution has been formed; for although we perceive that those things are disgraceful to which we are compelled, yet from the dread of coming pain we are too frequently induced to change our purposes. And hence it is that they who, without compulsion, endure pain for a good purpose, are praised; and they blamed, who suffer themselves to be overcome by pain and do what is disgraceful.

16. Εὐριπίδου] Euripides p. 349. (Ed. Oxon. 1833.)

Involuntariness from ignorance distinguished and defined.

2 Τὸ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν οὐχ ἑκούσιον μὲν ἅπαν ἐστίν, ἀκούσιον δὲ τὸ ἐπίλυπον καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ· ὁ γὰρ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράξας ὁτιοῦν, μηδὲν δὲ δυσχεραίνων ἐπὶ τῇ πράξει, ἑκὼν μὲν οὐ πέπραχεν, ὅ γε μὴ ᾔδει, οὐδ' αὖ ἄκων, μὴ λυπούμενός γε. τοῦ δὴ δι' ἄγνοιαν ὁ μὲν ἐν μεταμελείᾳ ἄκων δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ μὴ μεταμελόμενος, ἐπεὶ ἕτερος ἔστω, οὐχ ἑκών· ἐπεὶ γὰρ διαφέρει, βέλτιον ὄνομα ἔχειν ἴδιον. ἕτερον δ' ἔοικε καὶ τὸ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράττειν τοῦ ἀγνοοῦντα ποιεῖν· ὁ γὰρ μεθύων ἢ ὀργιζόμενος οὐ δοκεῖ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράττειν, ἀλλὰ διά τι τῶν εἰρημένων, οὐκ εἰδὼς δέ, ἀλλ' ἀγνοῶν. ἀγνοεῖ μὲν οὖν πᾶς ὁ μοχθηρὸς ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ὧν ἀφεκτέον, καὶ διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἁμαρτίαν ἄδικοι

9. δι' ἄγνοιαν πράττειν] *To act through ignorance.* That is, an ignorance of particulars; which, as they are extraneous to ourselves, if we are ignorant of them, we are not blameworthy. Such an ignorance as this is an external cause (ἀρχή), a kind of external instrument although within ourselves. Hence these actions are said to be done, δι' ἄγνοιαν, as though ignorance, and not we ourselves, were the agent. But to act in a state of ignorance (ἀγνοοῦντα ποιεῖν), an ignorance of principles, is an ignorance of which we ourselves are the authors, and for which we are culpable. Thus to drink a glass of brandy instead of wine, not knowing that it was brandy, and so to cause drunkenness, is to act δι' ἄγνοιαν, and is excusable if it be followed by repentance; but to get drunk, not knowing that drunkenness is a vice, is to act ἀγνοῶν, and is not excusable. The following table will make the division of these actions more clear.

Actions.

Voluntary.	Involuntary.	Non Voluntary.
ἀγνοῶν, or	δι' ἄγνοιαν,	δι' ἄγνοιαν,
Ignorance of the principle.	Ignorance of some circumstantia of the fact.	*Ignorantia facti.*
Ignorantia juris.	*Ignoruntia facti.*	Being not followed with repentance is blameable.
Blameable.	Attended with repentance is not blameable.	

καὶ ὅλως κακοὶ γίνονται. τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον βούλεται λέγεσθαι οὐκ εἴ τις ἀγνοεῖ τὸ συμφέρον· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια αἰτία τοῦ ἀκουσίου ἀλλὰ τῆς μοχθηρίας, οὐδ' ἡ καθόλου (ψέγονται γὰρ διά γε ταύτην) ἀλλ' ἡ καθ' ἕκαστα, ἐν οἷς καὶ περὶ ἃ ἡ πρᾶξις· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ συγγνώμη· ὁ γὰρ τούτων τι ἀγνοῶν ἀκουσίως πράττει. Ἴσως οὖν οὐ χεῖρον διορίσαι αὐτά, τίνα καὶ πόσα ἐστί, τίς τε δὴ καὶ τί καὶ περὶ τί ἢ ἐν τίνι πράττει, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ τίνι, οἷον ὀργάνῳ, καὶ ἕνεκα τίνος, οἷον σωτηρίας, καὶ πῶς, οἷον ἠρέμα ἢ σφόδρα. ἅπαντα μὲν οὖν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν ἀγνοήσειε μὴ μαινόμενος, δῆλον δ' ὡς οὐδὲ τὸν πράττοντα· πῶς γὰρ ἑαυτόν γε; ὃ δὲ πράττει, ἀγνοήσειεν ἄν τις, οἷον λέγοντές φασιν ἐκπεσεῖν αὐτούς, ἢ οὐκ εἰδέναι ὅτι ἀπόρρητα ἦν, ὥσπερ Αἰσχύλος τὰ μυστικά, ἢ δεῖξαι βουλόμενος ἀφεῖναι, ὡς ὁ τὸν καταπέλτην. οἰηθείη δ' ἄν τις καὶ

In what ignorance of the fact can consist.

2. ἀγνοεῖ τὸ συμφέρον] *Is ignorant of his own good.*

3. ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια — οὐδ' ἡ καθόλου] There is a difference between one and the other. The ignorance of the Universal (ἡ καθόλου) is when a person has lived so long in a state of vice as not to be able to distinguish good from bad, virtue from vice. (See vii. 2. n. ad fin.) He knows not what end he ought to pursue. The ignorance ἐν προαιρέσει is not yet arrived to such a desperate state as this; it distinguishes between good and bad, it knows what end it should pursue, but does not select the proper means to that end. The first is the ignorance of the intemperate (ἀκόλαστος), who knows not that intemperance is a vice; the second is the ignorance or rather error of the incontinent (ἀκρατής), who knows that lust should be avoided and continence observed, but who being overcome by his passions prefers their gratification, and moves out of the line which leads to the end he ought to pursue See Mag. Mor. p. 19.

The first then is a general ignorance, as when a man is ignorant that adultery is a crime; the second a particular, as when he is ignorunt (overborne by his passions) that this particular instance of adultery is a crime.

τὸν υἱὸν πολέμιον εἶναι ὥσπερ ἡ Μερόπη, καὶ ἐσφαιρῶσθαι τὸ λελογχωμένον δόρυ, ἢ τὸν λίθον κίσσηριν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ παίσας ἀποκτεῖναι ἄν· καὶ δεῖξαι βουλόμενος, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀκροχειριζόμενοι, πατάξειεν ἄν. περὶ πάντα δὴ ταῦτα τῆς ἀγνοίας οὔσης, ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις, ὁ τούτων τι ἀγνοήσας ἄκων δοκεῖ πεπραχέναι, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τοῖς κυριωτάτοις· κυριώτατα δ' εἶναι δοκεῖ, ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα. τοῦ δὴ κατὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἄγνοιαν ἀκουσίου λεγομένου ἔτι δεῖ τὴν πρᾶξιν λυπηρὰν εἶναι καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ.

The voluntary defined.

Actions done from passion or desire are voluntary, and why.

Ὄντος δ' ἀκουσίου τοῦ βίᾳ καὶ δι' ἄγνοιαν, τὸ 3
ἑκούσιον δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ
εἰδότι τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις. Ἴσως
γὰρ οὐ καλῶς λέγεται ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ διὰ θυμὸν
ἢ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν. Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἔτι
τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ἑκουσίως πράξει, οὐδ' οἱ παῖδες.
2. Εἶτα πότερον οὐδὲν ἑκουσίως πράττομεν τῶν δι'
ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ θυμόν, ἢ τὰ καλὰ μὲν ἑκουσίως
τὰ δ' αἰσχρὰ ἀκουσίως; ἢ γελοῖον ἑνός γε αἰτίου
ὄντος; ἄτοπον δὲ ἴσως τὸ ἀκούσια φάναι ὧν δεῖ
3. ὀρέγεσθαι. Δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι ἐπί τισι

14. Ἴσως γὰρ] Excludit quemdam errorem: et primo ponit ipsum. Quidam enim putabant non omne id esse voluntarium cujus principium est intra, cum scientia circumstantiarum. Potest enim contingere quod illud principium, quod est intra, non sit appetitus rationalis qui dicitur voluntas, a qua denominatur voluntarium, sed aliqua passio appetitus sensitivi, puta ira vel concupiscentia vel aliquid aliud hujusmodi, quod Philosophus dicit non esse bene dictum. Et notandum quod quia passiones appetitus sensitivi excitantur a rebus exterioribus apprehensis per sensum, hic error ejusdem rationis esse videtur cum eo quem supra removit, secundum quem dicebatur quod res exteriores inferunt violentiam. Sed illud fuit ibi dicendum, ubi agebatur de violento cujus principium est extra. Hoc autem est hic agendum ubi agitur de voluntario cujus principium est intra, nam passiones intra nos sunt. —Thos. Aquin.

καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν τινῶν, οἷον ὑγιείας καὶ μαθήσεως. 4.
Δοκεῖ δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀκούσια λυπηρὰ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ
κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν ἡδέα. *Ἔτι δὲ τί διαφέρει τῷ* 5.
ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ κατὰ λογισμὸν ἢ θυμὸν ἁμαρτηθέντα; φευκτὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄμφω, δοκεῖ δὲ οὐχ ἧττον ἀνθρωπικὰ εἶναι τὰ ἄλογα πάθη. αἱ δὲ πράξεις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀπὸ θυμοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας. ἄτοπον δὴ τὸ τιθέναι ἀκούσια ταῦτα.

CHAP. II.

Of Choice or προαίρεσις.

4 ΔΙΩΡΙΣΜΕΝΩΝ *δὲ τοῦ τε ἑκουσίου καὶ τοῦ ἀκουσίου, περὶ προαιρέσεως ἕπεται διελθεῖν· οἰκειότατον γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ μᾶλλον τὰ ἤθη κρίνειν τῶν πράξεων.* [προαίρεσις closely allied to virtue.]

Ἡ προαίρεσις δὴ ἑκούσιον μὲν φαίνεται, οὐ ταὐτὸν δέ, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πλέον τὸ ἑκούσιον· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἑκουσίου καὶ παῖδες καὶ τἆλλα ζῷα κοινωνεῖ, προαιρέσεως δ' οὔ, καὶ τὰ ἐξαίφνης ἑκούσια μὲν λέγομεν, κατὰ προαίρεσιν δ' οὔ. [1. προαίρεσις is not the voluntary merely.]

Οἱ δὲ λέγοντες αὐτὴν ἐπι- [2. Προαίρεσις is not desire.]

6. τὰ ἄλογα πάθη] The irrational passions and appetites appear to be a part of man as man, (ἀνθρωπικά), inasmuch as they can be made obedient to reason. Therefore the acts which spring from them must be considered the actions of man as such, and consequently voluntary, since no involuntary action (involving neither praise nor blame, and having nothing to do with his moral nature) is attributed to man.

10. περὶ προαιρέσεως] *Concerning choice.* This word is generally translated *deliberate choice.* But all choice implies deliberation. It is evident from the nominal definition given of it at the end of this chapter, (πρὸ ἑτέρων αἱρετόν) that *choice* is the proper and primary meaning of the word. But unless we also give a secondary sense to these words, neither *choice* nor *deliberate choice* will convey the full meaning of the term as technically employed by Aristotle.

θυμίαν ἢ θυμὸν ἢ βούλησιν ἤ τινα δόξαν οὐκ ἐοί-
1. κασιν ὀρθῶς λέγειν. Οὐ γὰρ κοινὸν ἡ προαίρεσις
2. καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων, ἐπιθυμία δὲ καὶ θυμός. Καὶ ὁ
ἀκρατὴς ἐπιθυμῶν μὲν πράττει, προαιρούμενος δ'
οὔ· ὁ ἐγκρατὴς δ' ἀνάπαλιν προαιρούμενος μέν,
3. ἐπιθυμῶν δ' οὔ. Καὶ προαιρέσει μὲν ἐπιθυμία
4. ἐναντιοῦται, ἐπιθυμίᾳ δ' ἐπιθυμία οὔ. Καὶ ἡ μὲν
ἐπιθυμία ἡδέος καὶ ἐπιλύπου, ἡ προαίρεσις δ' οὔτε
3. Nor θυμός. λυπηροῦ οὔθ' ἡδέος. Θυμὸς δ' ἔτι ἧττον· ἥκιστα
γὰρ τὰ διὰ θυμὸν κατὰ προαίρεσιν εἶναι δοκεῖ.
4. Nor will. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ βούλησίς γε, καίπερ σύνεγγυς
φαινόμενον· προαίρεσις μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τῶν
ἀδυνάτων, καὶ εἴ τις φαίη προαιρεῖσθαι, δοκοίη ἂν
ἠλίθιος εἶναι· βούλησις δ' ἐστὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων, οἷον
2. ἀθανασίας. Καὶ ἡ μὲν βούλησίς ἐστι καὶ περὶ
τὰ μηδαμῶς δι' αὐτοῦ πραχθέντα ἄν, οἷον ὑποκρι-
τήν τινα νικᾶν ἢ ἀθλητήν. προαιρεῖται δὲ τὰ
τοιαῦτα οὐδείς, ἀλλ' ὅσα οἴεται γενέσθαι ἂν δι'
3. αὐτοῦ. Ἔτι δ' ἡ μὲν βούλησις τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶ
μᾶλλον, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οἷον
ὑγιαίνειν βουλόμεθα, προαιρούμεθα δὲ δι' ὧν
ὑγιανοῦμεν, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν βουλόμεθα μὲν καὶ
φαμέν, προαιρούμεθα δὲ λέγειν οὐχ ἁρμόζει· ὅλως
γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ προαίρεσις περὶ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι.
Nor opinion. Οὐδὲ δὴ δόξα ἂν εἴη· ἡ μὲν γὰρ δόξα δοκεῖ περὶ

6. προαιρέσει μὲν ἐπιθυμία] Desire is opposed to προαίρεσις as in the incontinent person; the evil that he would not that he does. Two opposites cannot exist together at the same time in the same subject, but two desires may possess a man at the same time, consequently desire cannot be the opposite (ἐναντίον) of desire; but bad desires and προαίρεσις, which is a pure and perfect principle, inducing men to feel and act virtuously, cannot exist in the same mind simultaneously, and consequently are ἐναντία. See the Categories chap. viii.

πάντα εἶναι, καὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον περὶ τὰ ἀΐδια καὶ
τὰ ἀδύνατα ἢ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν· καὶ τῷ ψευδεῖ καὶ
ἀληθεῖ διαιρεῖται, οὐ τῷ κακῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ, ἡ
προαίρεσις δὲ τούτοις μᾶλλον. ὅλως μὲν οὖν δόξῃ
ταὐτὸν ἴσως οὐδὲ λέγει οὐδείς. Ἀλλ' οὐδέ Nor any particular opinion.
τινι· τῷ γὰρ προαιρεῖσθαι τἀγαθὰ ἢ τὰ κακὰ
ποιοί τινές ἐσμεν, τῷ δὲ δοξάζειν οὔ. Καὶ προαι- 2.
ρούμεθα μὲν λαβεῖν ἢ φυγεῖν ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων,
δοξάζομεν δὲ τί ἐστιν ἢ τίνι συμφέρει ἢ πῶς·
λαβεῖν δ' ἢ φυγεῖν οὐ πάνυ δοξάζομεν. Καὶ ἡ 3.
μὲν προαίρεσις ἐπαινεῖται τῷ εἶναι οὗ δεῖ μᾶλλον
ἢ τῷ ὀρθῶς, ἡ δὲ δόξα τῷ ὡς ἀληθῶς. Καὶ προαι- 4.
ρούμεθα μὲν ἃ μάλιστα ἴσμεν ἀγαθὰ ὄντα, δοξά-
ζομεν δὲ ἃ οὐ πάνυ ἴσμεν. Δοκοῦσί τε οὐχ οἱ 5.
αὐτοὶ προαιρεῖσθαί τε ἄριστα καὶ δοξάζειν, ἀλλ'
ἔνιοι δοξάζειν μὲν ἄμεινον, διὰ κακίαν δ' αἱρεῖσθαι

5. οὐδέ τινι] Aristotle says, that προαίρεσις is not opinion *generally*; nor is it any *particular* opinion; that is to say, it is not merely a correct opinion respecting morals, concerning what is good or bad, virtuous or vicious. For προαίρεσις is a vital active principle, mere opinion is not.

Hujus differentiæ autem ratio est, quia bonus vel malus dicitur aliquis non secundum potentiam, sed secundum actum, ut habetur in nono Metaphysicæ; id est non ex hoc quod est potens bene operari, sed ex hoc quod bene operatur: ex hoc autem, quod homo est perfectus secundum intellectum fit homo potens bene operari, non autem bene operatur, sicut ille qui habet habitum grammaticæ ex hoc ipso est potens bene loqui congrue. Sed ad hoc, quod congrue loquatur, requiritur quod hoc velit, quia habitus est quo quis agit cum voluerit, ut dicit Com. in 3. de Anima. Unde patet quod bona voluntas facit hominem bene operari secundum quamcumque potentiam vel habitum rationi obedientem. Et ideo aliquis dicitur simpliciter bonus homo ex hoc, quod habet bonam voluntatem. Ex hoc autem quod habet bonum intellectum non dicitur bonus homo simpliciter sed secundum quid, puta bonus grammaticus. Et ideo quia electio pertinet ad voluntatem, opinio autem ad intellectum, ex electione dicimur boni vel mali non autem ex opinione.—Thos. Aquinas.

12. ἡ δὲ δόξα] Compare the Philebus, p. 40. ΣΩ. τί δέ; πονηρὰς δόξας καὶ χρηστὰς ἄλλως ἢ ὅτι ἀληθεῖς καὶ ψευδεῖς γιγνομένας ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν; ΠΡΩ. οὐκ ἄλλως.

οὐχ ἃ δεῖ. εἰ δὲ προγίνεται δόξα τῆς προαιρέσεως ἢ παρακολουθεῖ, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· οὐ τοῦτο γὰρ σκοποῦμεν, ἀλλ' εἰ ταὐτόν ἐστι δόξῃ τινί. Τί οὖν ἢ ποῖόν τί ἐστιν, ἐπειδὴ τῶν εἰρημένων οὐθέν; ἑκούσιον μὲν δὴ φαίνεται, τὸ δ' ἑκούσιον οὐ πᾶν προαιρετόν. ἀλλ' ἆρά γε τὸ προβεβουλευμένον; ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας. ὑποσημαίνειν δ' ἔοικε καὶ τοὔνομα ὡς ὂν πρὸ ἑτέρων αἱρετόν.

Nominal definition of προαιρέσεως.

CHAP. III.

Of Deliberation, or βούλευσις.

What is the object-matter of deliberation.

ΒΟΥΛΕΥΟΝΤΑΙ δὲ πότερα περὶ πάντων καὶ πᾶν βουλευτόν ἐστιν, ἢ περὶ ἐνίων οὐκ ἔστι βουλή; λεκτέον δ' ἴσως βουλευτὸν οὐχ ὑπὲρ οὗ βουλεύσαιτ' ἄν τις ἠλίθιος ἢ μαινόμενος, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ νοῦν ἔχων. περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀϊδίων οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται, οἷον περὶ τοῦ κόσμου ἢ τῆς διαμέτρου

1. εἰ δὲ προγίνεται] Sciendum tamen quod opinio cum pertineat ad vim cognoscitivam, per se loquendo, præcedit electionem, quæ pertinet ad vim appetivam quæ movetur a cognoscitiva. Per accidens tamen contingit quandoque quod opinio sequitur electionem. Puta, cum aliquis ex affectu eorum quæ diligit, mutat opinionem quam prius habebat.—Thos. Aquinas.

7. μετὰ λόγου] See vi. 1.

15. τῆς διαμέτρου] The side of the square is incommensurable with its diagonal. It is somewhat remarkable that some should have thought that Aristotle alludes here to the quadrature of the circle, since it was not till the time of Archimedes that it was shown that the circumference and diameter of a circle are incommensurable. See Trendelenburg in Aristot. de Anima, p. 500. Quadratum proximum est, ad quod exemplum pertineat. Hujus enim latera cum linea diagonali communem mensuram non habent. Quod e Pythagoreo, quod vocatur, theoremate facile intelliges. Redit enim linea diagonalis ad radicem e duobus inveniendam.

$$1^2+1^2=x^2$$
$$2=x^2$$
$$\sqrt{2}=x$$

Est autem $\sqrt{2}$ numerus irrationalis i. e. numerus cujus ratio cum uno comparata in infinitum abit. Unde facile sequitur ἡ διάμετρος ἀσύμμετρος.

καὶ τῆς πλευρᾶς, ὅτι ἀσύμμετροι. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἐν κινήσει, ἀεὶ δὲ κατὰ ταὐτὰ γινομένων, εἴτ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἴτε καὶ φύσει ἢ διά τινα αἰτίαν ἄλλην, οἷον τροπῶν καὶ ἀνατολῶν. οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἄλλοτε ἄλλως, οἷον αὐχμῶν καὶ ὄμβρων. οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης, οἷον θησαυροῦ εὑρέσεως. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπικῶν πάντων, οἷον πῶς ἂν Σκύθαι ἄριστα πολιτεύοιντο οὐδεὶς Λακεδαιμονίων βουλεύεται. οὐ γὰρ γένοιτ' ἂν τούτων οὐθὲν δι' ἡμῶν.

We deliberate merely concerning that which is in our power.

Βουλευόμεθα δὲ περὶ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν πρακτῶν· ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἔστι λοιπά. αἴτια γὰρ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φύσις καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη, ἔτι δὲ νοῦς καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου. τῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ἕκαστοι βουλεύονται περὶ τῶν δι' αὐτῶν πρακτῶν. καὶ περὶ μὲν τὰς ἀκριβεῖς καὶ αὐτάρκεις τῶν ἐπιστημῶν οὐκ ἔστι βουλή, οἷον περὶ γραμμάτων (οὐ γὰρ διστάζομεν πῶς γραπτέον)· ἀλλ' ὅσα γίνεται δι' ἡμῶν, μὴ ὡσαύτως δ' ἀεί, περὶ τούτων βουλευόμεθα, οἷον περὶ τῶν κατὰ ἰατρικὴν καὶ χρηματιστικήν, καὶ περὶ κυβερνητικὴν μᾶλλον ἢ γυμναστικήν, ὅσῳ ἧττον διηκρίβωται, καὶ ἔτι περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ὁμοίως, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἢ τὰς ἐπιστήμας· μᾶλλον γὰρ περὶ αὐτὰς

13. πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου] That is anger, desire, or whatever else may be included under the term appetite, (ὄρεξις).

22. περὶ τὰς τέχνας] For the arts are in contingent, the sciences, properly so called, in necessary matter. See vi. c. 2. 3. But the Greeks generally divided the sciences into two classes; the exact (ἀκριβεῖς, αὐτάρκεις) and the conjectural (στοχαστικαί.) Of the first are Geometry, in the general use of those terms, Physics, Grammar, &c.; among the second are Politics, Medicine, Rhetoric, Dialectics, &c. The latter, being acquired by care and experience, are more the subject of deliberation than the former, because they proceed not upon unvarying rules, and their results are uncertain.

διστάζομεν· τὸ βουλεύεσθαι δὲ ἐν τοῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ἀδήλοις δὲ πῶς ἀποβήσεται, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἀδιόριστον. συμβούλους δὲ παραλαμβάνομεν εἰς τὰ μεγάλα, ἀπιστοῦντες ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ὡς οὐχ ἱκανοῖς διαγνῶναι. Βουλευόμεθα δ' οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη. οὔτε γὰρ ἰατρὸς βουλεύεται εἰ ὑγιάσει, οὔτε ῥήτωρ εἰ πείσει, οὔτε πολιτικὸς εἰ εὐνομίαν ποιήσει, οὐδὲ τῶν λοιπῶν οὐδεὶς περὶ τοῦ τέλους· ἀλλὰ θέμενοι τέλος τι, πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται σκοποῦσι, καὶ διὰ πλειόνων μὲν φαινομένου γίνεσθαι διὰ τίνος ῥᾷστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἐπισκοποῦσι, δι' ἑνὸς δ' ἐπιτελουμένου πῶς διὰ τούτου ἔσται κἀκεῖνο διὰ τίνος, ἕως ἂν ἔλθωσιν ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον, ὃ ἐν τῇ εὑρέσει ἔσχατόν ἐστιν· ὁ γὰρ βουλευόμενος ἔοικε ζητεῖν καὶ ἀναλύειν τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον ὥσπερ διάγραμμα. Φαίνεται δ' ἡ μὲν ζήτησις οὐ πᾶσα εἶναι βούλευσις, οἷον αἱ μαθηματικαί, ἡ δὲ βούλευσις πᾶσα ζήτησις, καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον ἐν τῇ

And therefore not concerning ends but means.

Βούλευσις not the same as ζήτησις.

5. οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν] Since deliberation is only of things in our own power, it cannot be of ends but of means to ends, for the first are not in our power, upon them βούλησις energizes. Compare the Rhetoric, I. 1. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε ἑνός τινος γένους ἀφωρισμένου ἡ ῥητορική, . . φανερόν. καὶ ὅτι οὐ τὸ πεῖσαι ἔργον αὐτῆς, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἰδεῖν τὰ ὑπάρχοντα πιθανὰ περὶ ἕκαστον, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις πάσαις· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἰατρικῆς τὸ ὑγιᾶ ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ μέχρι οὗ ἐνδέχεται, μέχρι τούτου προαγαγεῖν· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἀδυνάτους μεταλαβεῖν ὑγιείας ὅμως θεραπεῦσαι καλῶς.

17. ζήτησις] See vi. 7.

19. καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει] This is familiarly and easily explained by Simplicius in his Introduction to the Categories, and also by Ammonius on the same. καθόλου γὰρ τῆς μὲν θεωρίας τὸ τέλος γίνεται ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως ἔμπαλιν δέ, τῆς πράξεως τὸ τέλος ἀρχὴ τῆς θεωρίας. οἷον, ὁ οἰκοδόμος ἐπιταγεὶς οἶκον λέγει καθ' ἑαυτόν, ἐπετάγην οἶκον ποιῆσαι, ὅπερ ἐστὶ σκέπασμα κωλυτικὸν ὄμβρων καὶ καυμάτων, τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο μὴ γενομένης ὀροφῆς. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν ἄρχεται τῆς θεωρίας, προβαίνων δέ φησιν ἀλλὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο μὴ γενομένων τοίχων, οὗτοι δὲ οὐκ ἂν γένοιντο μὴ ὑποβληθέντων θεμελίων, οἱ δὲ θεμέλιοι οὐκ ἂν βληθεῖεν μὴ ὀρυχθείσης

ἀναλύσει πρῶτον εἶναι ἐν τῇ γενέσει. κἂν μὲν ἀδυνάτῳ ἐντύχωσιν, ἀφίστανται, οἷον εἰ χρημάτων δεῖ, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ οἷόν τε ποριfeaturedθῆναι· ἐὰν δὲ δυνατὸν φαίνηται, ἐγχειροῦσι πράττειν. δυνατὰ δὲ ἃ δι' ἡμῶν γένοιτ' ἄν· τὰ γὰρ διὰ τῶν φίλων δι' ἡμῶν πως ἐστίν· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν ἡμῖν. ζητεῖται δ' ὁτὲ μὲν τὰ ὄργανα, ὁτὲ δ' ἡ χρεία αὐτῶν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς ὁτὲ μὲν δι' οὗ, ὁτὲ δὲ πῶς ἢ διὰ τίνος. ἔοικε δή, καθάπερ εἴρηται, ἄνθρωπος εἶναι ἀρχὴ τῶν πράξεων· ἡ δὲ βουλὴ περὶ τῶν αὐτῷ πρακτῶν, αἱ δὲ πράξεις ἄλλων ἕνεκα. οὐκ ἂν οὖν εἴη βουλευτὸν τὸ τέλος ἀλλὰ τὰ πρὸς τὰ τέλη. οὐδὲ δὴ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, οἷον εἰ ἄρτος τοῦτο ἢ πέπεπται ὡς δεῖ· αἰσθήσεως γὰρ ταῦτα. εἰ δὲ ἀεὶ βουλεύσεται, εἰς ἄπειρον ἥξει.

τῆς γῆς· ἐνταῦθα κατέληξεν ἡ θεωρία, ἐντεῦθεν οὖν ἄρχεται ἡ πρᾶξις. πρότερον γὰρ ὀρύττει τὴν γῆν, εἶθ' οὕτω βάλλει τὸν θεμέλιον, εἶτα ἐγείρει τοίχους, καὶ ὕστερον ἐπιτίθησι τὴν ὀροφήν, ἥτις ἐστὶ τέλος τῆς πράξεως· ἡ δ' ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως τέλος τῆς θεωρίας.

10. *ἄνθρωπος εἶναι ἀρχή*] From what has been said, it is evident that man is the principle of his own actions, and that all things do not happen by fate or necessity. For if man deliberates merely upon actions which are in his own power, it is plain that there must be such actions, or otherwise there would be no such thing as deliberation. Since actions also are for something ulterior, it follows that deliberation is not of ends but of means: that is to say, not of ends as ends. For in our progress to some final end, each end becomes a mean to the final end, and all the ends are therefore means and the subject of deliberation, except the last. As, for instance, A deliberates whether he shall go to Town. In this case it might appear that the going to Town was in itself an end, and consequently that ends *are* the subject of deliberation. But in reality it is not. For the end which the mind bears in view is the welfare of A, and the deliberation is in reality, whether his going to Town will be the means of promoting a certain end, his welfare, &c. This point then being determined, that which was before a mean, the going to Town, becomes an end, and he now deliberates concerning the means to this end, the conveyance or such like, which in its turn becomes an end, until he arrives at the last point in this analysis, so that each end in its turn becomes a mean and the subject of deliberation.

Difference of βουλεύσεως and προαιρέσεως.

Βουλευτὸν δὲ καὶ προαιρετὸν τὸ αὐτό, πλὴν ἀφωρισμένον ἤδη τὸ προαιρετόν· τὸ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς προκριθὲν προαιρετόν ἐστιν. παύεται γὰρ ἕκαστος ζητῶν πῶς πράξει, ὅταν εἰς αὐτὸν ἀναγάγῃ τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ ἡγούμενον· τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ προαιρούμενον. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχαίων πολιτειῶν, ἃς Ὅμηρος ἐμιμεῖτο· οἱ γὰρ βασιλεῖς ἃ προέλοιντο ἀνήγγελλον τῷ δήμῳ. ὄντος δὲ τοῦ προαιρετοῦ βουλευτοῦ ὀρεκτοῦ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις ἂν εἴη βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν· ἐκ τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι γὰρ κρίναντες ὀρεγόμεθα κατὰ τὴν βούλευσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν προαίρεσις τύπῳ εἰρήσθω, καὶ περὶ ποῖά ἐστι, καὶ ὅτι τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Will, or βουλήσεως.

Whether the Will is invariably towards Good or not?

Ἡ δὲ βούλησις ὅτι μὲν τοῦ τέλους ἐστίν, εἴρηται, δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῖς μὲν τὸ βουλητὸν τἀγαθὸν λέγουσι μὴ εἶναι βουλητὸν 6

5. ἡγούμενον] That is, to the νοῦς πρακτικὸς within himself. This phraseology was probably suggested by the reasoning of Plato in the Philebus, p. 28, sq. who compares the one supreme Intelligence (νοῦς βασιλεύς) which rules and orders the universe, to the lesser intelligence directing the little world, which man calls himself.

7. Ὅμηρος] See the Iliad ii. 53, sq. and 83, sq.

10. προαίρεσις] This consideration is resumed in vi. 1. For Aristotle is compelled to defer the further explanation of it until he treats of the Intellectual Virtues; προαίρεσις consisting partly of our Intellectual (νοῦς), and partly of our moral nature (ὄρεξις).

18. τὸ βουλητὸν τἀγαθόν] Compare Plato, Philebus p. 22. Εἰ δέ τις ἄλλα ᾑρεῖθ' ἡμῶν, παρὰ φύσιν ἂν τὴν τοῦ ἀληθῶς αἱρετοῦ ἐλάμβανεν ἄκων, ἐξ ἀγνοίας

ὃ βούλεται ὁ μὴ ὀρθῶς αἱρούμενος (εἰ γὰρ ἔσται βουλητόν, καὶ ἀγαθόν· ἦν δ᾽, εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχε, κακόν), τοῖς δ᾽ αὖ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν τὸ βουλητὸν λέγουσι μὴ εἶναι φύσει βουλητόν, ἀλλ᾽ ἑκάστῳ τὸ δοκοῦν· ἄλλο δ᾽ ἄλλῳ φαίνεται, καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχε, τἀναντία. εἰ δὲ δὴ ταῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκει, ἆρα φατέον ἁπλῶς μὲν καὶ κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν βουλητὸν εἶναι τἀγαθόν, ἑκάστῳ δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον; τῷ μὲν οὖν σπουδαίῳ τὸ κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν εἶναι, τῷ δὲ φαύλῳ τὸ τυχόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων τοῖς μὲν εὖ διακειμένοις ὑγιεινά ἐστι τὰ κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν τοιαῦτα ὄντα, τοῖς δ᾽ ἐπινόσοις ἕτερα. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πικρὰ καὶ γλυκέα καὶ θερμὰ καὶ βαρέα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστα· ὁ σπουδαῖος γὰρ ἕκαστα κρίνει ὀρθῶς, καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις τἀληθὲς αὐτῷ φαίνεται. καθ᾽ ἑκάστην γὰρ ἕξιν ἴδιά ἐστι καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα, καὶ διαφέρει πλεῖ-

ἤ τινος ἀνάγκης οὐκ εὐδαίμονες See also this question discussed in Plato's dialogue, Gorgias, p. 466. and in Cudworth's Im. Moral. p. 38. sq.

4. ἀλλ᾽ ἑκάστῳ τὸ δοκοῦν] This was, in effect, the doctrine of the celebrated Sophist Protagoras. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος ἔφη πάντων εἶναι χρημάτων μέτρον τὸν ἄνθρωπον· οὐδὲν ἕτερον λέγων, ἢ τὸ δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι παγίως. τούτου δὲ γινομένου, τὸ αὐτὸ συμβαίνει καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι.—μέτρον δ᾽ εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον. (Arist. Metaph. X. 6. p. 221.) Of this sentiment, however, he was not the author, but probably derived it from Heraclitus. (See Arist. Metaph. iii. 3. p. 66. ed. Tauch.) At all events, Anaxagoras and Democritus held it before him, using the same arguments as Protagoras, for the supposed proof of it. Of the former Aristotle says; Ἀναξαγόρου δὲ καὶ ἀπόφθεγμα μνημονεύεται πρὸς τῶν ἑταίρων τινάς, ὅτι τοιαῦτα αὐτοῖς τὰ ὄντα οἷα ἂν ὑπολάβωσι. Met. iii. 5. The whole chapter should be consulted for the history and refutation of this celebrated dogma. See also Geel's Hist. Sophistarum, p. 87. Plato's Theætetus, p. 152. See Introduction to Book ii. p. 49.

8. τὸ φαινόμενον] Compare Arist. Met. xi. 7. p. 248. Ed. Tauch. ἐπιθυμητὸν μὲν τὸ φαινόμενον καλόν, βουλητὸν δὲ τὸ πρῶτον τὸ ὂν καλόν. ὀρεγόμεθα δὲ ὅτι δοκεῖ, μᾶλλον ἢ δοκεῖ διότι ὀρεγόμεθα· ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἡ νόησις.

στον ἴσως ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ τἀληθὲς ἐν ἑκάστοις ὁρᾶν, ὥσπερ κανὼν καὶ μέτρον αὐτῶν ὤν. τοῖς πολλοῖς δὲ ἡ ἀπάτη διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἔοικε γίνεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ οὖσα ἀγαθὸν φαίνεται. αἱροῦνται οὖν τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς ἀγαθόν, τὴν δὲ λύπην ὡς κακὸν φεύγουσιν.

CHAP. V.

That Vice, as well as Virtue, is voluntary and in our own power.

Virtue and Vice are voluntary.

ΟΝΤΟΣ δὴ βουλητοῦ μὲν τοῦ τέλους, βουλευτῶν δὲ καὶ προαιρετῶν τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος,

2. *μέτρον*] Aristotle seems to have derived the particular use of this phraseology from Protagoras and the Sophists, as also did Plato. Compare the expressions: *μέτρον—τὸν ἄνθρωπον*, and *μέτρον τὸ φαινόμενον*. See the note, p. 101, 4. The sum of the reasoning is this; the *good* man *only*, and not *every* one, as Protagoras thought, is the rule and measure (*κανὼν καὶ μέτρον*) of what is good and true.

CHAP. V.

Having thus determined the nature of the voluntary, of *προαίρεσις*, of deliberation, and will, which are the principles of human action, Aristotle now applies what has been said to Virtue and Vice.

His object in the following Chapter is to show, that Vice is as voluntary as Virtue. Virtue was generally acknowledged to be voluntary in his time: this indeed could not consistently be denied by men, who praised others and required praise in return for their good actions. The reasoning in this chapter appears, however, to be chiefly directed against Socrates, whose opinions on this subject are thus briefly stated in the Mag. Mor. i. 9. (p. 16. Ed. Tauch.) *Σωκράτης ἔφη, οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν γενέσθαι τὸ σπουδαίους εἶναι ἢ φαύλους. εἰ γάρ τις, φησίν, ἐρωτήσειεν ὁντινοῦν, πότερον ἂν βούλοιτο δίκαιος εἶναι ἢ ἄδικος, οὐθεὶς ἂν λέγοιτο τὴν ἀδικίαν. ὁμοίως δ' ἐπ' ἀνδρείας καὶ δειλίας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως, δῆλον ὡς εἰ φαῦλοί τινές εἰσιν, οὐκ ἂν ἑκόντες εἴησαν φαῦλοι.* [*ὥστε δῆλον, ὅτι οὐδὲ σπουδαῖοι.*] See Plato de Legibus v. 731. ix. 860. And Butler's Analogy i. 5. and 6.

7. *ὄντος δὴ βουλητοῦ*] If *βούλησις* is of the ends, and *βούλευσις* of the means, and *βούλευσις* is only of actions in our own power, moral actions as being the objects of *βούλευσις* must also be in our power. And if the actions are, so must the habits which spring from them; and these habits are virtues or vices. Consequently Virtue and Vice is in our own power.

αἱ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἂν εἶεν καὶ ἑκούσιοι, αἱ δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐνέργειαι περὶ ταῦτα, ἐφ' ἡμῖν δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετή, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ κακία. ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὸ πράττειν, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν, καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ μή, καὶ τὸ ναί· ὥστ' εἰ τὸ πράττειν καλὸν ὂν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστί, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔσται αἰσχρὸν ὄν, καὶ εἰ τὸ μὴ πράττειν καλὸν ὂν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ τὸ πράττειν αἰσχρὸν ὂν ἐφ' ἡμῖν. εἰ δ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὰ καλὰ πράττειν καὶ τὰ αἰσχρά, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν, τοῦτο δ' ἦν τὸ ἀγαθοῖς καὶ κακοῖς εἶναι, ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἄρα τὸ ἐπιεικέσι καὶ φαύλοις εἶναι.

If man is the ἀρχὴ of his own actions, his actions are voluntary.

Τὸ δὲ λέγειν ὡς οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν πονηρὸς οὐδ' ἄκων μάκαρ, ἔοικε τὸ μὲν ψευδεῖ τὸ δ' ἀληθεῖ· μακάριος μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἄκων, ἡ δὲ μοχθηρία ἑκούσιον. ἢ τοῖς γε νῦν εἰρημένοις ἀμφισβητητέον, καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον οὐ φατέον ἀρχὴν εἶναι οὐδὲ γεννητὴν τῶν πράξεων ὥσπερ καὶ τέκνων. εἰ δὲ ταῦτα φαίνεται καὶ μὴ ἔχομεν εἰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς ἀναγαγεῖν παρὰ τὰς ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ὧν καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ

1. *περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις*] *Actions which have reference to the end. αἱ δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν κ. τ. λ. but the energies of Virtue are upon acts done with a view to a certain end:* that is, with a view of becoming virtuous and happy.

11. *τοῦτο δ' ἦν*] See p. 63.

13. *ἑκών*] Compare Plato's Protag. p. 345. D. *οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ἀπαίδευτος ἦν Σιμωνίδης ὥστε τούτους φάναι ἐπαινεῖν, ὃς ἂν ἑκὼν μηδὲν κακὸν ποιῇ, ὡς ὄντων τινῶν οἳ ἑκόντες κακὰ ποιοῦσιν. ἐγὼ γὰρ σχεδόν τι οἶμαι τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐδεὶς τῶν σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν ἡγεῖται οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων ἑκόντα ἐξαμαρτάνειν, οὐδὲ αἰσχρά τι καὶ κακὰ ἑκόντα ἐργάζεσθαι, ἀλλ' εὖ ἴσασιν ὅτι πάντες οἱ τὰ αἰσχρὰ καὶ κακὰ ποιοῦντες ἄκοντες ποιοῦσι.* Where see Stallbaum's note for further authorities.

Παροιμία γὰρ τοῦτο, ᾗ καὶ Ἐπίχαρμος ὁ Συρακούσιος κέχρηται, ἐν οἷς φησίν· ἀλλὰ μὲν ἐγὼν ἀναγκαῖος ταῦτα πάντα ποιέω. οἴομαι δὲ ὡς οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν πόνηρος οὐδ' ἄταν ἔχων. Ἐν Ἡρακλεῖ δὲ ταῦτα τῷ Παραφόρῳ κεῖται. Schol. in loco.

20. *ὧν καὶ αἱ ἀρχαί*] This is otherwise expressed and at more length by the author of the Mag. Mor.

The fact of reward being attached to good, and punishment to bad actions, proves they are voluntary.

αὐτὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἑκούσια. Τούτοις δ' ἔοικε μαρτυρεῖσθαι καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὑφ' ἑκάστων καὶ ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῶν νομοθετῶν· κολάζουσι γὰρ καὶ τιμωροῦνται τοὺς δρῶντας μοχθηρά, ὅσοι μὴ βίᾳ ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἧς μὴ αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι, τοὺς δὲ τὰ καλὰ πράττοντας τιμῶσιν, ὡς τοὺς μὲν προτρέψοντες, τοὺς δὲ κωλύσοντες. καίτοι ὅσα μήτ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστὶ μήθ' ἑκούσια, οὐδεὶς προτρέπεται πράττειν, ὡς οὐδὲν πρὸ ἔργου ὂν τὸ πεισθῆναι μὴ θερμαίνεσθαι ἢ ἀλγεῖν ἢ πεινῆν ἢ ἄλλ' ὁτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἧττον πεισόμεθα αὐτά.

For even for bad actions done through ignorance, if

Καὶ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ τῷ ἀγνοεῖν κολάζουσιν, ἐὰν αἴτιος εἶναι δοκῇ τῆς ἀγνοίας, οἷον τοῖς μεθύουσι διπλᾶ τὰ

p. 17, 18. That argument may be thus represented. Every principle is productive of something similar to itself, a dog of a dog, a tree of a tree, and so on. And as are the principles such are their results. If then the actions of men are constantly varying and he has power to change them, as we see he has, so also he has power to change his principles, and of form good to bad, and vice versâ, and consequently he is master of his own principles and accordingly of his moral conduct.

3. κολάζουσι] Not only from the way we punish, but also resent injuries.

4. δι' ἄγνοιαν] See p. 90.

12. κολάζουσιν] The difference observable in our treatment of bad actions done from ignorance is a proof, that we punish men only for their voluntary actions. For we pardon them when they are not the cause of their own ignorance, we punish them when they are.

— αἴτιος—τῆς ἀγνοίας] A man is the cause of his ignorance in two ways, either directly or indirectly. Directly, as in the case of the drunkard who inebriates himself, and places himself in a state of ignorance: and who consequently deserves a double punishment. One for intoxication, and another for doing what he ought not in that state. For both are voluntary. Drunkenness is the cause of his ignorance, and he himself is the cause of his drunkenness.

Indirectly a man is the cause of his own ignorance, when he neglects to do that which he ought to do. When he neglects to make himself acquainted with the plain laws of his country. Or when in youth he neglects to cultivate those habits and capacities which are to fit him for the state of manhood. That such ignorance is culpable and consequently voluntary is clear, from men being punished for it.

13. διπλᾶ] Such was the law of Pittacus. Of which see Pol. ii. 12. Rhet. ii. 25.

ἐπιτίμια· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ· κύριος γὰρ τοῦ μὴ μεθυσθῆναι, τοῦτο δ' αἴτιον τῆς ἀγνοίας. καὶ τοὺς ἀγνοοῦντάς τι τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις, ἃ δεῖ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ μὴ χαλεπά ἐστι, κολάζουσιν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅσα δι' ἀμέλειαν ἀγνοεῖν δοκοῦσιν, ὡς ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ὂν τὸ μὴ ἀγνοεῖν· τοῦ γὰρ ἐπιμεληθῆναι κύριοι.

the ignorance be self-caused, men are punished.

Ἀλλ' ἴσως τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ὥστε μὴ ἐπιμεληθῆναι. ἀλλὰ τοῦ τοιούτους γενέσθαι αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι ζῶντες ἀνειμένως, καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκους ἢ ἀκολάστους εἶναι, οἱ μὲν κακουργοῦντες, οἱ δὲ ἐν πότοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις διάγοντες· αἱ γὰρ περὶ ἕκαστα ἐνέργειαι τοιούτους ποιοῦσιν. τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν μελετώντων πρὸς ἡντινοῦν ἀγωνίαν ἢ πρᾶξιν· διατελοῦσι γὰρ ἐνεργοῦντες. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν περὶ ἕκαστα αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται, κομιδῇ ἀναισθήτου.

And even if from natural carelessness and neglect they acquire bad habits, those habits are voluntary.

Ἔτι δ' ἄλογον τὸν ἀδικοῦντα μὴ βούλεσθαι ἄδικον

Nay more, if men have

7. ἀλλ' ἴσως] Aristotle now examines into the origin of the objections against the spontaneity of evil, dividing them into two heads. Those which are drawn from a consideration of the disposition of the agent, by which he is inclined to evil contrary to his will, and those from a consideration of a defective apprehension (φαντασία.)

8. μὴ ἐπιμεληθῆναι] One objects, and says that some men are naturally careless, that their vices are to be ascribed to nature rather than themselves, and that having unwillingly acquired a confirmed bad habit, they can no longer help acting in conformity to that habit. To which Aristotle replies; they are themselves the authors of that habit, willingly performing the single acts which led to it, and are therefore voluntary agents, even although their conduct may now occasion them pain.

If a person should further object, that he did not know that performing the single acts would lead to a habit, Aristotle says this is incredible. For all men are born with a certain degree both of virtue and prudence. (See Introduction, p. 83.)

17. ἔτι δ' ἄλογον] Aristotle meets a *second* objection. If it be in our power, says the objector, to become vicious, it would also be in our power, when we pleased to cease being vicious: but this is by no means the case; for many after living in a state of vice, have become so habituated to

acquired a confirmed bad habit for which they are sorry, that habit is voluntary.

εἶναι ἢ τὸν ἀκολασταίνοντα ἀκόλαστον. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀγνοῶν τις πράττει ἐξ ὧν ἔσται ἄδικος, ἑκὼν ἄδικος ἂν εἴη, οὐ μὴν ἐάν γε βούληται, ἄδικος ὢν παύσεται καὶ ἔσται δίκαιος· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ νοσῶν ὑγιής. καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, ἑκὼν νοσεῖ, ἀκρατῶς βιοτεύων καὶ ἀπειθῶν τοῖς ἰατροῖς. τότε μὲν οὖν ἐξῆν αὐτῷ μὴ νοσεῖν, προεμένῳ δ' οὐκέτι, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἀφέντι λίθον ἔτ' αὐτὸν δυνατὸν ἀναλαβεῖν· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐπ' αὐτῷ τὸ βαλεῖν καὶ ῥῖψαι· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ καὶ τῷ ἀκολάστῳ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν ἐξῆν τοιούτοις μὴ γενέσθαι, διὸ ἑκόντες εἰσίν· γενομένοις δ' οὐκέτι ἔξεστι μὴ εἶναι. Οὐ μόνον δ' αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς κακίαι

So also for bodily

it, that they can no longer desist from it; many have lived so long in a course of intemperance, that intemperance has become necessary to their very existence; and though they fervently desire it, they cannot return to temperance. Aristotle says, such men performed the single acts, which led to this confirmed bad habit, spontaneously, and they know that these single acts would lead to such a habit; it is absurd therefore to suppose, that a man who has done every thing voluntarily and knew that such effects must follow from such a cause, to say that wishing for the cause he did not wish for the effect. For though it may be that he did not wish the effect of his ill actions to follow, absolutely and in itself, yet he wished that the effect should be, rather than that the cause should not be. But that this man cannot correct the vicious habits he has contracted, that is, cannot make undone the single acts which led to these habits, though he is desirous of so doing, proves not he is an involuntary agent. As when a man has it in his power to fling or forbear flinging a stone, if he flings it, he acts voluntarily, however anxious he may be when it is out of his hand to have recalled the act. So though the recalling of it is no longer in his own power, the act is voluntary, and was so at the time of his doing it. See p. 35, 15.

13. *οὐ μόνον*] This is a tacit reply to Socrates, who, wishing to show that a man's moral deformities were contrary to his inclination, instanced, as a parallel, bodily diseases and deformities. "Now no one," said Socrates, "blames a man for these, thereby acknowledging that they are involuntary." Be it so, says Aristotle, but then we do blame men even for bodily deformities, where *they have themselves been the causes of them.* And our making this distinction, and blaming them only for those of which they themselves are the cause, is a proof that these actions, for which we

ἑκούσιοί εἰσιν, ἀλλ' ἐνίοις καὶ αἱ τοῦ σώματος, οἷς καὶ ἐπιτιμῶμεν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ διὰ φύσιν αἰσχροῖς οὐδεὶς ἐπιτιμᾷ, τοῖς δὲ δι' ἀγυμνασίαν καὶ ἀμέλειαν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀσθένειαν καὶ πήρωσιν· οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἂν ὀνειδίσειε τυφλῷ φύσει ἢ ἐκ νόσου ἢ ἐκ πληγῆς, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐλεῆσαι· τῷ δ' ἐξ οἰνοφλυγίας ἢ ἄλλης ἀκολασίας πᾶς ἂν ἐπιτιμήσαι. τῶν δὴ περὶ τὸ σῶμα κακιῶν αἱ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐπιτιμῶνται, αἱ δὲ μὴ ἐφ' ἡμῖν οὔ. εἰ δ' οὕτω, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἱ ἐπιτιμώμεναι τῶν κακιῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἂν εἶεν. Εἰ δέ τις λέγοι ὅτι

deformities, where they are self-inflicted, we blame men.

And even if men are

blame mankind, are voluntary; since, therefore, we blame them for vicious habits, such habits are voluntary. A similar argument on the same subject is urged by the sophist Protagoras. ὅσα γὰρ ἡγοῦνται ἀλλήλους κακὰ ἔχειν ἄνθρωποι φύσει ἢ τύχῃ οὐδεὶς θυμοῦται οὐδὲ νουθετεῖ οὐδὲ διδάσκει οὐδὲ κολάζει τοὺς ταῦτα ἔχοντας, ἵνα μὴ τοιοῦτοι ὦσιν, ἀλλ' ἐλεοῦσιν· οἷον τοὺς αἰσχροὺς ἢ σμικροὺς ἢ ἀσθενεῖς τίς οὕτως ἀνόητος ὥστε τι τούτων ἐπιχειρεῖν ποιεῖν; ὅσα δὲ ἐξ ἐπιμελείας καὶ ἀσκήσεως καὶ διδαχῆς οἴονται γίγνεσθαι ἀγαθὰ ἀνθρώποις, ἐάν τις ταῦτα μὴ ἔχῃ, ἀλλὰ τἀναντία τούτων κακά, ἐπὶ τούτοις που οἵ τε θυμοὶ γίγνονται καὶ αἱ κολάσεις καὶ αἱ νουθετήσεις. Plato's Protag. p. 323.

11. εἰ δέ τις] This was the principal objection of the day, which Aristotle now proceeds to refute. The objection may be thus stated:

To pursue Good, we must first desire it, but to desire it we must first apprehend it. But that apprehension is not in our own power, but is a natural faculty, a species of mental vision, over which we have no control, and which we receive from nature as any other sense or outward faculty. Since every one therefore follows what he apprehends to be good, and cannot alter his apprehension, he who mistakes good for evil, as does the wicked man, and acts according to that apprehension, is not blameable, but his errors are to be referred to nature or necessity. Consequently Vice is involuntary.

1. To this objection Aristotle replies, that we have power to regulate this apprehension. For since our apprehension of good and evil is regulated by our habits, and our habits are in our own power, consequently so is our apprehension (φαντασία.) See p. 101, 15.

2. But if it be not so, if we have no power over our apprehension of the end, but it is fixed by nature unchangeably in every one, if it be the case with the bad man it is also the case with the good man; and then Virtue is in no respect more voluntary than Vice, which is contrary to the objector's own acknowledgment.

Or if, notwithstanding such a theory, good men are voluntary agents because

not masters of their imagination, they are still voluntary agents.

πάντες ἐφίενται τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ, τῆς δὲ φαντασίας οὐ κύριοι, ἀλλ' ὁποῖός ποθ' ἕκαστός ἐστι, τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ τέλος φαίνεται αὐτῷ· εἰ μὲν οὖν ἕκαστος ἑαυτῷ τῆς ἕξεώς ἐστί πως αἴτιος, καὶ τῆς φαντασίας ἔσται πως αὐτὸς αἴτιος. εἰ δὲ μή, οὐθεὶς αὑτῷ αἴτιος τοῦ κακὰ ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν τοῦ τέλους ταῦτα πράττει, διὰ τούτων οἰόμενος αὑτῷ τὸ ἄριστον ἔσεσθαι, ἡ δὲ τοῦ τέλους ἔφεσις οὐκ αὐθαίρετος, ἀλλὰ φῦναι δεῖ ὥσπερ ὄψιν ἔχοντα, ᾗ κρινεῖ καλῶς καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἀγαθὸν αἱρήσεται, καὶ ἔστιν εὐφυής, ᾧ τοῦτο καλῶς πέφυκεν· (τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον, καὶ ὃ παρ' ἑτέρου μὴ οἷόν τε λαβεῖν μηδὲ μαθεῖν, ἀλλ' οἷον ἔφυ, τοιοῦτον ἕξει, καὶ τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ καλῶς τοῦτο πεφυκέναι ἡ τελεία

they put in practice the means, that is, the single acts leading to this natural end, (φυσικὸν τέλος), so also, notwithstanding such a theory, vicious men are voluntary agents. So that whether we have power over this apprehension, or whether we have not, we are nevertheless voluntary agents. Virtue and Vice is voluntary and in our own power.

Such is the reasoning of this somewhat intricate passage, in which Aristotle has not at all entered into an examination of the nature of φαντασία, as he has done in his Treatise de Anima iii. 3. And this is somewhat remarkable, for, as Aquinas observes, there may be two kinds of apprehension (φαντασία). One which is purely speculative, which does not depend upon any particular disposition, which neither regulates nor is regulated by the conduct; and one which is practical, of which Aristotle here speaks, depending upon the habits or the temper of the moment; so that this also is of two kinds. For an object may appear good not absolutely, but at this or that particular time, or in this and that frame of mind, since the desire is influenced as well by the accidental temper of mind as by the habit. According to the former is the apprehension of an object being good which is only accidentally good; as to men who are in fear of shipwreck, the casting of their goods overboard appears to be good. But the apprehension of that which is really and absolutely good, is to be derived only from the cultivation of virtuous habits.

5. εἰ δὲ μή, οὐθείς] *But if not, and if no one*, &c. ἡ δὲ τοῦ τέλους ἔφεσις *and if the aiming at the end*, &c. The apodosis is at εἰ δὴ ταῦτ' ἐστιν κ. τ. λ. p. 109, 1.

καὶ ἀληθινὴ ἂν εἴη εὐφυΐα·) εἰ δὴ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, τί μᾶλλον ἡ ἀρετὴ τῆς κακίας ἔσται ἑκούσιον; ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὁμοίως, τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ κακῷ, τὸ τέλος φύσει ἢ ὁπωσδήποτε φαίνεται καὶ κεῖται, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πρὸς τοῦτ' ἀναφέροντες πράττουσιν ὁπωσδήποτε. εἴτε δὴ τὸ τέλος μὴ φύσει ἑκάστῳ φαίνεται οἱονδήποτε, ἀλλά τι καὶ παρ' αὐτόν ἐστιν, εἴτε τὸ μὲν τέλος φυσικόν, τῷ δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ πράττειν ἑκουσίως τὸν σπουδαῖον ἡ ἀρετὴ ἑκούσιόν ἐστιν, οὐθὲν ἧττον καὶ ἡ κακία ἑκούσιον ἂν εἴη· ὁμοίως γὰρ καὶ τῷ κακῷ ὑπάρχει τὸ δι' αὐτὸν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ τέλει. εἰ οὖν, ὥσπερ λέγεται, ἑκούσιοί εἰσιν αἱ ἀρεταί (καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἕξεων συναίτιοί πως αὐτοί ἐσμεν, καὶ τῷ ποιοί τινες εἶναι τὸ τέλος τοιόνδε τιθέμεθα), καὶ αἱ κακίαι ἑκούσιοι ἂν εἶεν· ὁμοίως γάρ.

8 Κοινῇ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἴρηται ἡμῖν τό τε γένος τύπῳ, ὅτι μεσότητές εἰσιν, καὶ ὅτι ἕξεις, ὑφ' ὧν τε γίνονται, καὶ ὅτι τούτων πρακτικαὶ καθ' αὑτάς, καὶ ὅτι ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἑκούσιοι, καὶ οὕτως ὡς ἂν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος προστάξῃ. Οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ αἱ πράξεις ἑκούσιοί εἰσι καὶ αἱ ἕξεις·

Brief recapitulation of the subject.

That actions are more in our own

14. συναίτιοι] *Joint authors*. By which expression he seems to acknowledge that nature and chance (for instance, being born of good parents) may have some influence in forming our habits.

20. καθ' αὑτάς] *Per se: by reason of their essence, not accidentally.* For not only may a good habit be accidentally the cause of good actions which do not spring from itself as such, but vice also may *accidentally* be the cause of good actions though not as vice, καθ' αὑτήν.

21. οὐχ ὁμοίως αἱ πράξεις] Actions which result from habit are no longer equally in our power, as they were previous to the formation of the habit, but approach rather to the nature of the involuntary and natural, for custom is second nature. The habit from which they spring is beyond our control, nor however desirous, can we be rid of it otherwise than indirectly: as it was formed by degrees so must it be

power than the habits.

τῶν μὲν γὰρ πράξεων ἀπ' ἀρχῆς μέχρι τοῦ τέλους κύριοί ἐσμεν, εἰδότες τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, τῶν ἕξεων δὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς, καθ' ἕκαστα δὲ ἡ πρόσθεσις οὐ γνώριμος, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρρωστιῶν· ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἦν οὕτως ἢ μὴ οὕτω χρήσασθαι, διὰ τοῦτο ἑκούσιοι.

CHAP. VI.

Application of the definition to several particulars.

FEAR—COURAGE—FOOLHARDINESS.

PAIN. Courage defined.

ΑΝΑΛΑΒΟΝΤΕΣ δὴ περὶ ἑκάστης, εἴπωμεν 9 τίνες εἰσὶ καὶ περὶ ποῖα καὶ πῶς· ἅμα δ' ἔσται δῆλον καὶ πόσαι εἰσίν. καὶ πρῶτον περὶ ἀνδρείας. ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη,

corrected. And thus it is that the ἀρχὴ only of habits, that is the single acts which lead to their formation and not the entire habits themselves, are in our power. This argument appears to have been intended against the Platonists, though I do not remember to have seen it explicitly stated in any of Plato's dialogues. Plotinus however has endeavoured to show that, while the habits of bad men are involuntary, single acts are however voluntary. De Providentia, ii. 10.

CHAP. VI.

Upon the first perusal of the Ethics the reader should omit what follows of this Book, together with the fourth and fifth, proceeding immediately to the sixth. Afterwards reading the omitted books in connexion, having first read the sixth chapter of the second Book. Generally upon this and the succeeding chapters the reader will do well to consult the second Book of Aristotle's Rhetoric, and the Characters of Theophrastus.

9. πρῶτον περὶ ἀνδρείας] Non ut vult Eustratius, ideo a fortitudine incipit, quod sit longe difficillima et præstantissima omnium virtutum sed quia mirabili judicio Aristoteles virtutes, quippe cum sint appetitus ad rationem directi, eo ordine persequitur quo in hominis natura a vitioribus ad excellentiora progrediente appetitus unus ex altero pendet; ita ut potius a virtutibus, minus præstantibus, i. e. fortitudine et temperantia circa dolores et voluptates versantibus, profectus, postremo ad præstantissimam nempe sapientiam libro vi. perveniat quæ in summo cognoscendi appetitu posita est. MICH.

PAIN. Courage.

ἤδη καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται, φοβούμεθα δὲ δηλονότι τὰ φοβερά, ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν κακά· διὸ καὶ τὸν φόβον ὁρίζονται προσδοκίαν κακοῦ. Φοβούμεθα μὲν οὖν πάντα τὰ κακά, οἷον ἀδοξίαν πενίαν νόσον ἀφιλίαν θάνατον, ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ πάντα δοκεῖ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι· ἔνια γὰρ καὶ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι καὶ καλόν, τὸ δὲ μὴ αἰσχρόν, οἷον ἀδοξίαν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φοβούμενος ἐπιεικὴς καὶ αἰδήμων, ὁ δὲ μὴ φοβούμενος ἀναίσχυντος. λέγεται δ' ὑπό τινων ἀνδρεῖος κατὰ μεταφοράν· ἔχει γάρ τι ὅμοιον τῷ ἀνδρείῳ· ἄφοβος γάρ τις καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος. πενίαν δ' ἴσως οὐ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι οὐδὲ νόσον, οὐδ' ὅλως ὅσα μὴ ἀπὸ κακίας μηδὲ δι' αὑτόν. ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὁ περὶ ταῦτα ἄφοβος ἀνδρεῖος. λέγομεν δὲ καὶ τοῦτον καθ' ὁμοιότητα· ἔνιοι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς κινδύνοις δειλοὶ ὄντες ἐλευθέριοί εἰσι καὶ πρὸς χρημάτων ἀποβολὴν εὐθαρσῶς ἔχουσιν. οὐδὲ δὴ εἴ τις ὕβριν περὶ παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκα φοβεῖται ἢ φθόνον ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων, δειλός ἐστιν· οὐδ' εἰ θαρρεῖ μέλλων μαστιγοῦσθαι, ἀνδρεῖος. Περὶ ποῖα οὖν τῶν φοβερῶν ὁ ἀνδρεῖος; ἢ περὶ τὰ μέγιστα; οὐθεὶς γὰρ ὑπομενετικώτερος τῶν δεινῶν. φοβερώτατον δ' ὁ θάνατος· πέρας γάρ, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι τῷ τεθνεῶτι δοκεῖ οὔτ' ἀγαθὸν

Its object-matter distinguished and defined. 1. What evils are not properly its object-matter.

2. What are.

1. πρότερον] See ii. 6.

3. ὁρίζονται] Plato in Protagora, p. 358. προσδοκίαν τινὰ λέγω κακοῦ τοῦτο, εἴτε φόβον εἴτε δέος καλεῖτε. Laches, p. 198. MICH.

4. πάντα τὰ κακά] See the Rhet. ii. 5. Tractat autem in prima de objecto fortitudinis materiaque ejusdem. Omnis enim habitus habet objectum quoddam circa quod versatur. Procedimus enim in cognitione nostra ex objectis ad actus, et ab actibus ad potentias, et a potentiis ad essentias; a notioribus ad ea quæ nobis sunt minus nota. Acciaj.

23. πέρας γάρ] "Mors ultima linea "rerum." Hor.

PAIN.
Courage.

οὔτε κακὸν εἶναι. δόξειε δ' ἂν οὐδὲ περὶ θάνατον τὸν ἐν παντὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι, οἷον εἰ ἐν θαλάττῃ ἢ ἐν νόσοις. ἐν τίσιν οὖν; ἢ ἐν τοῖς καλλίστοις; τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ ἐν πολέμῳ· ἐν μεγίστῳ γὰρ καὶ καλλίστῳ κινδύνῳ. ὁμόλογοι δὲ τούτοις εἰσὶ καὶ αἱ τιμαὶ αἱ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ παρὰ τοῖς μονάρχοις. κυρίως δὴ λέγοιτ' ἂν ἀνδρεῖος ὁ περὶ τὸν καλὸν θάνατον ἀδεής, καὶ ὅσα θάνατον ἐπιφέρει ὑπόγυια ὄντα· τοιαῦτα δὲ μάλιστα τὰ κατὰ πόλεμον. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν θαλάττῃ καὶ ἐν νόσοις ἀδεὴς ὁ ἀνδρεῖος, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ὡς οἱ θαλάττιοι· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεγνώκασι τὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ τὸν θάνατον τὸν τοιοῦτον δυσχεραίνουσιν, οἱ δὲ εὐέλπιδές εἰσι παρὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν. ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἀνδρίζονται ἐν οἷς ἐστὶν ἀλκὴ ἢ καλὸν τὸ ἀποθανεῖν· ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις δὲ φθοραῖς οὐθέτερον ὑπάρχει.

Courage and its extremes compared.

Τὸ δὲ φοβερὸν οὐ πᾶσι μὲν τὸ αὐτό, λέγομεν 10 δέ τι καὶ ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν παντὶ φοβερὸν τῷ γε νοῦν ἔχοντι, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἄνθρωπον διαφέρει μεγέθει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. ὁ δὲ ἀνδρεῖος ἀνέκπληκτος

9. ὑπόγυια ὄντα] πλησίον τι φαινόμενα καὶ μὴ πόῤῥω. Eud. Eth. iii. 1. Compare the Rhet. ii. 5. οὐ γὰρ πάντα τὰ κακὰ φοβοῦνται, οἷον εἰ ἔσται ἄδικος ἢ βραδύς, ἀλλ' ὅσα λύπας μεγάλας ἢ φθορὰς δύναται, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐὰν μὴ πόῤῥω ἀλλὰ σύνεγγυς φαίνηται ὥστε μέλλειν. τὰ γὰρ πόῤῥω σφόδρα οὐ φοβοῦνται.

16. οὐθέτερον] A most unusual orthography, in which Bekker is by no means consistent, sometimes writing οὐθὲν and οὐδέν, sometimes μηθὲν or μηδέν. Goettling thinks that this form was not introduced till after the battle of Leuctra. See his note on Arist. Polit. i. 1. p. 278. The same writer has appended the following note upon this subject to Trendelenburg's edition of Arist. de Anima, p. 202. δ in θ mutatum esse in οὐθὲν et οὐθέτερον non videtur; potius a Bœotis Æolensibus, quorum οὐθὲν fuisse proprium dicitur (V. Eustat. p. 1814.) pro spiritu aspero θ ascitum esse ut in θαμά et ἅμα, in θάλασσα et ἅλς atque hoc post pugnam Leuctricam ad reliquos etiam transiisse Græcos, ut multa alia, ad fidem propius esse videtur.

PAIN. Courage.

ὡς ἄνθρωπος. φοβήσεται μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὡς δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος ὑπομενεῖ, τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα· τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος τῆς ἀρετῆς. ἔστι δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ταῦτα φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ ἔτι τὰ μὴ φοβερὰ ὡς τοιαῦτα φοβεῖσθαι. γίνεται δὲ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡ μὲν ὅτι οὐ δεῖ, ἡ δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὡς δεῖ, ἡ δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὅτε, ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἃ δεῖ καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα ὑπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος, καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν, ἀνδρεῖος· κατ' ἀξίαν γάρ, καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος, πάσχει καὶ πράττει ὁ ἀνδρεῖος. τέλος δὲ πάσης ἐνεργείας ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν. καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ ἡ ἀνδρεία καλόν. τοιοῦτον δὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος· ὁρίζεται γὰρ ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει. καλοῦ δὴ ἕνεκα ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ὑπομένει καὶ πράττει τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν.

The extremes considered.

Τῶν δ' ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ μὲν τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ ἀνώνυμος (εἴρηται δ' ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς πρότερον ὅτι πολλά ἐστιν ἀνώνυμα), εἴη δ' ἄν τις μαινύμενος ἢ ἀνάλγητος, εἰ μηθὲν φοβοῖτο, μήτε σεισμὸν μήτε τὰ κύματα, καθάπερ φασὶ τοὺς Κελτούς.

1. The Foolhardy.

Ὁ δὲ τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλλων περὶ τὰ φοβερὰ θρασύς. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἀλαζὼν εἶναι ὁ θρασὺς καὶ προσποιητικὸς ἀνδρείας. ὡς οὖν ἐκεῖνος περὶ τὰ φοβερὰ ἔχει, οὕτως οὗτος βούλεται φαίνεσθαι· ἐν οἷς οὖν

12. τέλος δὲ] If the habit be honourable the end must also be honourable. For every energy produced by a virtuous habit is for the sake of virtue. The brave man will therefore do and endure, as a brave man, and for the sake of virtue. Each action also appears from the end to be either honourable or disgraceful. But courage is honourable, therefore the end of courage, for which sake courage is exercised, is also honourable.

18. πρότερον] See p. 71, 14.

I

PAIN. Courage.

δύναται, μιμεῖται. διὸ καὶ εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν θρασύδειλοι· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ θρασυνόμενοι τὰ φοβερὰ οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν.

2. The fearful.

Ὁ δὲ τῷ φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλων δειλός· καὶ γὰρ ἃ μὴ δεῖ καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκολουθεῖ αὐτῷ. ἐλλείπει δὲ καὶ τῷ θαρρεῖν· ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς λύπαις ὑπερβάλλων μᾶλλον καταφανής ἐστιν. δύσελπις δή τις ὁ δειλός· πάντα γὰρ φοβεῖται. ὁ δ' ἀνδρεῖος ἐναντίως· τὸ γὰρ θαρρεῖν εὐέλπιδος.

And compared with the mean.

Περὶ ταὐτὰ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὅ τε δειλὸς καὶ ὁ θρασὺς καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος, διαφόρως δ' ἔχουσι πρὸς αὐτά· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν, ὁ δὲ μέσως ἔχει καὶ ὡς δεῖ· καὶ οἱ μὲν θρασεῖς προπετεῖς, καὶ βουλόμενοι πρὸ τῶν κινδύνων ἐν αὐτοῖς δ' ἀφίστανται, οἱ δ' ἀνδρεῖοι ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ὀξεῖς, πρότερον δ' ἡσύχιοι.

Recapitulation of the subject, and the distinction of courage from five improper kinds of it.

Καθάπερ οὖν εἴρηται, ἡ ἀνδρεία μεσότης ἐστὶ 11
περὶ θαρραλέα καὶ φοβερά, ἐν οἷς εἴρηται, καὶ ὅτι καλὸν αἱρεῖται καὶ ὑπομένει, ἢ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν τὸ μή. τὸ δ' ἀποθνήσκειν φεύγοντα πενίαν ἢ ἔρωτα ἤ τι λυπηρὸν οὐκ ἀνδρείου, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δειλοῦ· μαλακία γὰρ τὸ φεύγειν τὰ ἐπίπονα, καὶ οὐχ ὅτι καλὸν ὑπομένει, ἀλλὰ φεύγων κακόν. ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ ἀνδρεία τοιοῦτόν τι.

1. Political.

Λέγονται

10. δειλός] Cf. Theophrasti Characteres, xxv. περὶ δειλίας. Describuntur enim ab Aristotelis discipulo, hoc ipsum magistri opus nimirum respiciente, singuli naturales appetitus, quemadmodum toto animo potiti et ad extremum provecti vitiosam singulorum hominum indolem perficiunt. MICH.

16. πρότερον δ' ἡσύχιοι] Compare Polonius' advice to Laertes.

Beware
Of entrance to a quarrel: but, being in,
Bear it, that the opposer may beware of thee. Hamlet, i. 3.

PAIN. Courage.

δὲ καὶ ἕτεραι κατὰ πέντε τρόπους, πρῶτον μὲν ἡ πολιτική· μάλιστα γὰρ ἔοικεν· δοκοῦσι γὰρ ὑπομένειν τοὺς κινδύνους οἱ πολῖται διὰ τὰ ἐκ τῶν νόμων ἐπιτίμια καὶ τὰ ὀνείδη καὶ διὰ τὰς τιμάς. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀνδρειότατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι παρ' οἷς οἱ δειλοὶ ἄτιμοι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι ἔντιμοι. τοιούτους δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρος ποιεῖ, οἷον τὸν Διομήδην καὶ τὸν Ἕκτορα.

Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχείην ἀναθήσει·

καὶ Διομήδης,

Ἕκτωρ γάρ ποτε φήσει ἐνὶ Τρώεσσ' ἀγορεύων,
Τυδείδης ὑπ' ἐμεῖο.

ὡμοίωται δ' αὕτη μάλιστα τῇ πρότερον εἰρημένῃ, ὅτι δι' ἀρετὴν γίνεται· δι' αἰδῶ γὰρ καὶ διὰ καλοῦ ὄρεξιν (τιμῆς γάρ) καὶ φυγὴν ὀνείδους, αἰσχροῦ ὄντος. τάξαι δ' ἄν τις καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων ἀναγκαζομένους εἰς ταὐτό· χείρους δ', ὅσῳ οὐ δι' αἰδῶ ἀλλὰ διὰ φόβον αὐτὸ δρῶσι, καὶ φεύγοντες οὐ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ λυπηρόν· ἀναγκάζουσι γὰρ οἱ κύριοι, ὥσπερ ὁ Ἕκτωρ

ὃν δέ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης πτώσσοντα νοήσω,
οὔ οἱ ἄρκιον ἐσσεῖται φυγέειν κύνας.

καὶ οἱ προστάττοντες, κἂν ἀναχωρῶσι τύπτοντες

2. πολιτική] Such particularly was the courage of the Romans.

7. Ὅμηρος] See Iliad xxii. 100. and viii. 148. sq.

20. Ἕκτωρ] Agamemnon hos versus (Iliad. ii. 391 et 393.) pronuntiat, ut est etiam apud ipsum Aristotelem, Polit. iii. 14. Hector tamen simillima profert Iliad. xv. 348—351. Nec mirum, quod in utroque loco Aristotelis hi versus paulo aliter scribantur, quam nunc apud Homerum legimus, cum memoriter eos philosophus auditoribus haud dubie recitaverit. MICH.

PAIN. Courage.

τὸ αὐτὸ δρῶσι, καὶ οἱ πρὸ τῶν τάφρων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων παρατάττοντες· πάντες γὰρ ἀναγκάζουσιν. δεῖ δ' οὐ δι' ἀνάγκην ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅτι καλόν.

2. Experience.

Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐμπειρία ἡ περὶ ἕκαστα ἀνδρεία τις εἶναι· ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ᾠήθη ἐπιστήμην εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν. τοιοῦτοι δὲ ἄλλοι μὲν ἐν ἄλλοις, ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς δ' οἱ στρατιῶται· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου, ἃ μάλιστα συνεωράκασιν οὗτοι· φαίνονται δὴ ἀνδρεῖοι, ὅτι οὐκ ἴσασιν οἱ ἄλλοι οἷά ἐστιν. εἶτα ποιῆσαι καὶ μὴ παθεῖν μάλιστα δύνανται ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας, δυνάμενοι χρῆσθαι τοῖς ὅπλοις καὶ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ὁποῖα ἂν εἴη καὶ πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι καὶ πρὸς τὸ μὴ παθεῖν κράτιστα. ὥσπερ οὖν ἀνόπλοις ὡπλισμένοι μάχονται καὶ ἀθληταὶ ἰδιώταις· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀγῶσιν οὐχ οἱ ἀνδρειότατοι μαχιμώτατοί εἰσιν, ἀλλ' οἱ μάλιστα ἰσχύοντες καὶ τὰ σώματα ἄριστα ἔχοντες. οἱ στρατιῶται δὲ δειλοὶ γίνονται, ὅταν ὑπερτείνῃ ὁ κίνδυνος καὶ λείπωνται τοῖς πλήθεσι καὶ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς· πρῶτοι γὰρ φεύγουσι, τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ μένοντα ἀποθνήσκει, ὅπερ κἀπὶ τῷ Ἑρμαίῳ συνέβη. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ αἰσχρὸν τὸ φεύγειν

6. Σωκράτης] See the Laches, p. 195, and the Protagoras, p. 360.

22. τῷ Ἑρμαίῳ] Ἕρμαιον ἐν Κορωνείᾳ τῆς Βοιωτίας τόπος οὕτως λεγόμενος ἐστὶ πεδινὸς ἐν αὐτῇ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνωμάλων ὄντων. ἐν ᾧ παρατεταγμένοι ποτὲ Κορωνεῖς σὺν τοῖς βοηθήσασιν αὐτοῖς στρατιώταις, ἐκ τοῦ μετὰ τοίχου μετὰ τῶν Βοιωταρχῶν, ὅτε τὴν πόλιν κατέλαβον, καὶ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν εἶχεν ὑφ' ἑαυτῷ Ὀνόμαρχος ὁ Φωκεὺς προδοθεῖσαν αὐτῷ, αὐτοὶ μὲν μείναντες ἀπέθανον ὑπὸ τῶν ἀμφὶ τὸν Ὀνόμαρχον, ἀποκλείσαντες τὰς πύλας ἵνα αὐτοῖς μηδὲ βουλομένοις ἐξείη φυγεῖν καὶ καταλιπεῖν τὴν πατρίδα. οἱ δὲ τῶν Βοιωτῶν βοηθήσαντες αὐτοῖς στρατιῶται ἐκ τοῦ μετὰ τοίχου ἔφυγον εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς μάχης, αἰσθόμενοι ἵνα τεθνάναι τῶν Βοιωταρχῶν Χάρωνα. Schol.

PAIN. Courage.

καὶ ὁ θάνατος τῆς τοιαύτης σωτηρίας αἱρετώτερος· οἱ δὲ καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκινδύνευον ὡς κρείττους ὄντες, γνόντες δὲ φεύγουσι, τὸν θάνατον μᾶλλον τοῦ αἰσχροῦ φοβούμενοι· ὁ δ' ἀνδρεῖος οὐ τοιοῦτος.

3. Anger.

Καὶ τὸν θυμὸν δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν ἐπιφέρουσιν· ἀνδρεῖοι γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσι καὶ οἱ διὰ θυμὸν ὥσπερ τὰ θηρία ἐπὶ τοὺς τρώσαντας φερόμενοι, ὅτι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι θυμοειδεῖς· ἰτητικώτατον γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους, ὅθεν καὶ Ὅμηρος "σθένος ἔμβαλε θυμῷ" καὶ "μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἔγειρε" καὶ "δριμὺ δ' ἀνὰ ῥῖνας μένος" καὶ "ἔζεσεν αἷμα·" πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔοικε σημαίνειν τὴν τοῦ θυμοῦ ἔγερσιν καὶ ὁρμήν. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρεῖοι διὰ τὸ καλὸν πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ θυμὸς συνεργεῖ αὐτοῖς· τὰ θηρία δὲ διὰ λύπην· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πληγῆναι ἢ φοβεῖσθαι, ἐπεὶ ἐάν γε ἐν ὕλῃ ἢ ἐν ἕλει ᾖ, οὐ προσέρχονται.

4. Insensibility.

Οὐ δή ἐστιν ἀνδρεῖα διὰ τὸ ὑπ' ἀλγηδόνος καὶ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον ὁρμᾶν, οὐθὲν τῶν δεινῶν προορῶντα, ἐπεὶ οὕτω γε κἂν οἱ ὄνοι ἀνδρεῖοι εἶεν πεινῶντες· τυπτόμενοι γὰρ οὐκ ἀφίστανται τῆς νομῆς· καὶ οἱ μοιχοὶ δὲ διὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν τολμηρὰ πολλὰ δρῶσιν. οὐ δή ἐστιν ἀνδρεῖα τὰ δι' ἀλγηδόνος ἢ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον. φυσικωτάτη δ' ἔοικεν ἡ διὰ τὸν θυμὸν εἶναι, καὶ προσλαβοῦσα προαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἀνδρεία εἶναι. καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι δὴ ὀργι-

5. τὸν θυμόν] Aristotle probably alludes to Plato's Repub. p. 442.

9. Ὅμηρος] See Iliad Π. 529. Ε. 510. Odyss. Ω. 317, 318.

11. ἔζεσεν] Theocritus xx. 15.

14. διὰ τὸ καλόν] See note, p. 113, 12.

20. ὄνοι] Respicere videtur notum locum de Ajacis fortitudine apud Homer. Iliad. Λ. 558. adnotanti Camerario quoque et Giphanio. ZELL.

PAIN. Courage.

ζόμενοι μὲν ἀλγοῦσι, τιμωρούμενοι δ' ἥδονται· οἱ δὲ διὰ ταῦτα μαχόμενοι μάχιμοι μέν, οὐκ ἀνδρεῖοι δέ· οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ καλὸν οὐδ' ὡς ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ πάθος· παραπλήσιον δ' ἔχουσί τι.

4. Sanguine hope.

Οὐδὲ δὴ οἱ εὐέλπιδες ὄντες ἀνδρεῖοι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πολλάκις καὶ πολλοὺς νενικηκέναι θαρροῦσιν ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις. παρόμοιοι δέ, ὅτι ἄμφω θαρραλέοι· ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἀνδρεῖοι διὰ τὰ προειρημένα θαρραλέοι, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ οἴεσθαι κρείττους εἶναι καὶ μηθὲν ἀντιπαθεῖν. τοιοῦτον δὲ ποιοῦσι καὶ οἱ μεθυσκόμενοι· εὐέλπιδες γὰρ γίνονται. ὅταν δὲ αὐτοῖς μὴ συμβῇ τοιαῦτα, φεύγουσιν· ἀνδρείου δ' ἦν τὰ φοβερὰ ἀνθρώπῳ ὄντα καὶ φαινόμενα ὑπομένειν, ὅτι καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν τὸ μή. διὸ καὶ ἀνδρειοτέρου δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἐν τοῖς αἰφνιδίοις φόβοις ἄφοβον καὶ ἀτάραχον εἶναι ἢ ἐν τοῖς προδήλοις· ἀπὸ ἕξεως γὰρ μᾶλλον, ἢ καὶ ὅτι ἧττον ἐκ παρασκευῆς· τὰ προφανῆ μὲν γὰρ κἂν ἐκ λογισμοῦ καὶ λόγου τις προέλοιτο, τὰ δ' ἐξαίφνης κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν.

5. Ignorance of the danger.

Ἀνδρεῖοι δὲ φαίνονται καὶ οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες, καί εἰσιν οὐ πόρρω τῶν εὐελπίδων, χείρους δ' ὅσῳ ἀξίωμα οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν, ἐκεῖνοι δέ. διὸ καὶ μένουσί τινα χρόνον· οἱ δ' ἠπατημένοι, ἐὰν γνῶσιν ὅτι ἕτερον ἢ ὑποπτεύσωσι, φεύγουσιν· ὅπερ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἔπαθον περιπεσόντες τοῖς Λάκωσιν ὡς Σικυωνίοις. οἵ τε δὴ ἀνδρεῖοι εἴρηνται ποῖοί τινες, καὶ οἱ δοκοῦντες ἀνδρεῖοι.

Courage more conversant with φοβερὰ than θαῤῥαλέα.

Περὶ θάρρη δὲ καὶ φόβους ἡ ἀνδρεία οὖσα οὐχ 12

25. Οἱ Ἀργεῖοι] See Xenophon's Hellenics iv. 10.

PAIN. Courage.

ὁμοίως περὶ ἄμφω ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον περὶ τὰ φοβερά· ὁ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ἀτάραχος καὶ περὶ ταῦθ' ὡς δεῖ ἔχων ἀνδρεῖος μᾶλλον ἢ ὁ περὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. τῷ δὴ τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν, ὡς εἴρηται, ἀνδρεῖοι λέγονται. διὸ καὶ ἐπίλυπον ἡ ἀνδρεία, καὶ δικαίως ἐπαινεῖται· χαλεπώτερον γὰρ τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν ἢ τῶν ἡδέων ἀπέχεσθαι. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος ἡδύ, ὑπὸ τῶν κύκλῳ δ' ἀφανίζεσθαι, οἷον κἂν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι γίνεται· τοῖς γὰρ πύκταις τὸ μὲν τέλος ἡδύ, οὗ ἕνεκα, ὁ στέφανος καὶ αἱ τιμαί, τὸ δὲ τύπτεσθαι ἀλγεινόν, εἴπερ σάρκινοι, καὶ λυπηρόν, καὶ πᾶς ὁ πόνος· διὰ δὲ τὸ πολλὰ ταῦτ' εἶναι, μικρὸν ὂν τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα οὐδὲν ἡδὺ φαίνεται ἔχειν. εἰ δὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν, ὁ μὲν θάνατος καὶ τὰ τραύματα λυπηρὰ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ καὶ ἄκοντι ἔσται, ὑπομένει δὲ αὐτά, ὅτι καλὸν ἢ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν τὸ μή. καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μᾶλλον τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχῃ πᾶσαν καὶ εὐδαιμονέστερος ᾖ, μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῷ θανάτῳ λυπηθήσεται· τῷ τοιούτῳ γὰρ μάλιστα ζῆν ἄξιον, καὶ οὗτος μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν ἀποστερεῖται εἰδώς· λυπηρὸν δὲ τοῦτο. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἧττον ἀνδρεῖος, ἴσως δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον, ὅτι τὸ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ καλὸν ἀντ' ἐκείνων αἱρεῖται. οὐ δὴ ἐν ἁπάσαις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς τὸ ἡδέως ἐνεργεῖν ὑπάρχει, πλὴν ἐφ' ὅσον τοῦ τέλους ἐφάπτεται. στρατιώτας δ' οὐδὲν ἴσως κωλύει μὴ τοὺς τοιούτους κρατίστους εἶναι, ἀλλὰ

The end pleasant, but the means painful.

9. κύκλῳ] *Things which stand around it*; things which intervene between us and the end.

PAIN. Courage.

τοὺς ἧττον μὲν ἀνδρείους, ἄλλο δ' ἀγαθὸν μηδὲν ἔχοντας· ἕτοιμοι γὰρ οὗτοι πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους, καὶ τὸν βίον πρὸς μικρὰ κέρδη καταλλάττονται. περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρείας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω· τί δ' ἐστίν, οὐ χαλεπὸν τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.

CHAP. VII.

INTEMPERANCE—TEMPERANCE—ANON.

PLEASURE. The object-matter of Temperance and Intemperance.

ΜΕΤΑ δὲ ταύτην περὶ σωφροσύνης λέγωμεν· 13
δοκοῦσι γὰρ τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν αὗται εἶναι αἱ ἀρεταί. ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ ἡδονὰς ἡ σωφροσύνη, εἴρηται ἡμῖν· ἧττον γὰρ καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐστὶ περὶ τὰς λύπας· ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία φαίνεται. περὶ ποίας οὖν τῶν ἡδονῶν, νῦν ἀφορίσωμεν.

Pleasures divided into 1. Mental.

Διῃρήσθωσαν δὲ αἱ ψυχικαὶ καὶ αἱ σωματικαί, οἷον φιλοτιμία, φιλομάθεια· ἑκάτερος γὰρ τούτων χαίρει, οὗ φιλητικός ἐστιν, οὐθὲν πάσχοντος τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῆς διανοίας· οἱ δὲ περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς οὔτε σώφρονες οὔτε ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται. ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' οἱ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ὅσαι μὴ σωματικαί εἰσιν· τοὺς γὰρ φιλομύθους καὶ διηγητικοὺς καὶ περὶ τῶν τυχόντων κατατρίβοντας τὰς ἡμέρας ἀδολέσχας, ἀκολάστους δ' οὐ λέγομεν, οὐδὲ τοὺς

These habits are more clearly defined in the Seventh book, to which the reader is referred for further information.

22. ἀδολέσχας] See Theophrast. Charact. iii. περὶ ἀδολεσχίας. vii. περὶ λαλιᾶς. viii. περὶ λογοποιΐας.

λυπουμένους ἐπὶ χρήμασιν ἢ φίλοις. Περὶ δὲ τὰς σωματικὰς εἴη ἂν ἡ σωφροσύνη, οὐ πάσας δὲ οὐδὲ ταύτας· οἱ γὰρ χαίροντες τοῖς διὰ τῆς ὄψεως, οἷον χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι καὶ γραφῇ, οὔτε σώφρονες οὔτε ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται· καίτοι δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι καὶ ὡς δεῖ χαίρειν καὶ τούτοις, καὶ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀκοήν· τοὺς γὰρ ὑπερβεβλημένως χαίροντας μέλεσιν ἢ ὑποκρίσει οὐθεὶς ἀκολάστους λέγει, οὐδὲ τοὺς ὡς δεῖ σώφρονας. Οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ τὴν ὀσμήν, πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός· τοὺς γὰρ χαίροντας μήλων ἢ ῥόδων ἢ θυμιαμάτων ὀσμαῖς οὐ λέγομεν ἀκολάστους, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοὺς μύρων καὶ ὄψων· χαίρουσι γὰρ τούτοις οἱ ἀκόλαστοι, ὅτι διὰ τούτων ἀνάμνησις γίνεται αὐτοῖς τῶν ἐπιθυμητῶν. ἴδοι δ' ἄν τις καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅταν πεινῶσι, χαίροντας ταῖς τῶν βρωμάτων ὀσμαῖς. τὸ δὲ τοιούτοις χαίρειν ἀκολάστου· τούτῳ γὰρ ἐπιθυμητὰ ταῦτα. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις κατὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἡδονὴ πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὐδὲ γὰρ ταῖς ὀσμαῖς τῶν λαγωῶν αἱ κύνες χαίρουσιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ βρώσει· τὴν δ' αἴσθησιν ἡ ὀσμὴ ἐποίησεν. οὐδ' ὁ λέων τῇ φωνῇ τοῦ βοός, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἐδωδῇ· ὅτι δ' ἐγγύς ἐστι, διὰ τῆς φωνῆς ᾔσθετο, καὶ χαίρειν δὴ ταύτῃ φαίνεται. ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' ἰδὼν ἢ εὑρὼν ἔλαφον ἢ ἄγριον αἶγα, ἀλλ' ὅτι βορὰν ἕξει. Περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας δὴ ἡδονὰς ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀκο-

PLEASURE. 2. Bodily. i. But of these, neither the pleasures of sight,

ii. Nor hearing,

iii. Nor smell,

iv. But of touch, or more properly taste, are the chief object-matter of temperance and intemperance.

3. οἱ γὰρ χαίροντες] See vii. c. 4.

11. κατὰ συμβεβηκός] The Intemperate delight in the smell of viands and unguents, but only accidentally, from association.

25. ἰδὼν ἔλαφον] Respexisse videtur. Iliad. Γ. 23. ZELL.

PLEASURE. Temperance.

λασία ἐστὶν ὧν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα κοινωνεῖ, ὅθεν ἀνδραποδώδεις καὶ θηριώδεις φαίνονται· αὗται δ' εἰσὶν ἁφὴ καὶ γεῦσις. φαίνονται δὴ καὶ τῇ γεύσει ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ οὐθὲν χρῆσθαι· τῆς γὰρ γεύσεώς ἐστιν· ἡ κρίσις τῶν χυμῶν, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ τοὺς οἴνους δοκιμάζοντες καὶ τὰ ὄψα ἀρτύοντες· οὐ πάνυ δὲ χαίρουσι τούτοις, ἢ οὐχ οἵ γε ἀκόλαστοι, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀπολαύσει, ἣ γίνεται πᾶσα δι' ἁφῆς καὶ ἐν σιτίοις καὶ ἐν ποτοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀφροδισίοις λεγομένοις. διὸ καὶ ηὔξατό τις ὀψοφάγος ὢν τὸν φάρυγγα αὐτῷ μακρότερον γεράνου γενέσθαι, ὡς ἡδόμενος τῇ ἁφῇ. κοινοτάτη δὴ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καθ' ἣν ἡ ἀκολασία· καὶ δόξειεν ἂν δικαίως ἐπονείδιστος εἶναι, ὅτι οὐχ ᾗ ἄνθρωποί ἐσμεν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ' ᾗ ζῷα.

In which to delight to excess is brutishness.

Τὸ δὴ τοιούτοις χαίρειν καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαπᾶν θηριῶδες. καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐλευθεριώταται τῶν διὰ τῆς ἁφῆς ἡδονῶν ἀφῄρηνται, οἷον αἱ ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις διὰ τρίψεως καὶ τῆς θερμασίας γινόμεναι· οὐ γὰρ περὶ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα ἡ τοῦ ἀκολάστου ἁφή, ἀλλὰ περί τινα μέρη.

Desires are of two kinds: 1. Common.

Τῶν δ' ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν κοιναὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, αἱ δ' ἴδιοι καὶ ἐπίθετοι· οἷον ἡ μὲν τῆς τροφῆς φυσική· πᾶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ ἐνδεὴς ξηρᾶς ἢ ὑγρᾶς τροφῆς, ὁτὲ δ' ἀμφοῖν, καὶ εὐνῆς, φησὶν Ὅμηρος, ὁ νέος καὶ ἀκμάζων· τὸ δὲ τοιᾶσδε ἢ τοιᾶσδε, οὐκέτι πᾶς, οὐδὲ τῶν αὐτῶν. διὸ φαίνεται ἡμέτερον εἶναι. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ'

12. κοινοτάτη] κοινοτάτη γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ἁφὴ ἐν πάσαις ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἁφῇ τινι πᾶσαι αἱ αἰσθήσεις αἰσθάνονται. Paraph. See also De Part. Animal. ii. 8.

20. ἐπιθυμιῶν] Having thus explained the object-matter of temperance and intemperance, he now explains how the temperate, intemperate, and insensible, use or abuse them. How their desires are regulated in reference to pleasure.

24. Ὅμηρος] See Iliad Ω. 129.

PLEASURE. Temperance.

ἔχει γέ τι καὶ φυσικόν· ἕτερα γὰρ ἑτέροις ἐστὶν ἡδέα, καὶ ἔνια πᾶσιν ἡδίω τῶν τυχόντων. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς φυσικαῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ὀλίγοι ἁμαρτάνουσι καὶ ἐφ' ἕν, ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖον· τὸ γὰρ ἐσθίειν τὰ τυχόντα ἢ πίνειν ἕως ἂν ὑπερπλησθῇ, ὑπερβάλλειν ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τῷ πλήθει· ἀναπλήρωσις γὰρ τῆς ἐνδείας ἡ φυσικὴ ἐπιθυμία. διὸ λέγονται οὗτοι γαστρίμαργοι, ὡς παρὰ τὸ δέον πληροῦντες αὐτήν. τοιοῦτοι δὲ γίνονται οἱ λίαν ἀνδραποδώδεις.

2. Particular.

Περὶ δὲ τὰς ἰδίας τῶν ἡδονῶν πολλοὶ καὶ πολλαχῶς ἁμαρτάνουσιν· τῶν γὰρ φιλοτοιούτων λεγομένων ἢ τῷ χαίρειν οἷς μὴ δεῖ, ἢ τῷ μᾶλλον, ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοί, ἢ μὴ ὡς δεῖ, κατὰ πάντα δ' οἱ ἀκόλαστοι ὑπερβάλλουσιν· καὶ γὰρ χαίρουσιν ἐνίοις οἷς οὐ δεῖ (μισητὰ γάρ), καὶ εἴ τισι δεῖ χαίρειν τῶν τοιούτων, μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ χαίρουσιν.

How far, and in what sense, pain is the object-matter of these habits.

Ἡ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς ὑπερβολὴ ὅτι ἀκολασία καὶ ψεκτόν, δῆλον· περὶ δὲ τὰς λύπας οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας τῷ ὑπομένειν λέγεται σώφρων ἀκόλαστος δὲ τῷ μή, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος τῷ λυπεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ ὅτι τῶν ἡδέων οὐ τυγχάνει (καὶ τὴν λύπην δὲ ποιεῖ αὐτῷ ἡ ἡδονή), ὁ δὲ σώφρων τῷ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ καὶ τῷ ἀπέχεσθαι τοῦ ἡδέος.

The extremes considered. 1. The excessive or intemperate.

Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀκόλαστος ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἡδέων πάντων ἢ τῶν μάλιστα, καὶ ἄγεται ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ὥστε ἀντὶ τῶν ἄλλων ταῦθ' αἱρεῖσθαι· διὸ καὶ λυπεῖται καὶ ἀποτυγχάνων καὶ ἐπιθυμῶν· μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἡ ἐπιθυμία· ἀτόπῳ δ' ἔοικε τὸ δι' ἡδονὴν λυπεῖ-

5. ἀναπλήρωσις] A definition derived from the Pythagoreans, and adopted by Plato. See the Philebus, p. 35. n. Stallb. and x. 2.

PLEASURE. Temperance. 2. The defective, which is nameless.

σθαι. Ἐλλείποντες δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ ἧττον ἢ δεῖ χαίροντες οὐ πάνυ γίνονται· οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπική ἐστιν ἡ τοιαύτη ἀναισθησία· καὶ γὰρ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα διακρίνει τὰ βρώματα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν χαίρει τοῖς δ' οὔ· εἰ δέ τῳ μηθέν ἐστιν ἡδὺ μηδὲ διαφέρει ἕτερον ἑτέρου, πόρρω ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἄνθρωπος εἶναι· οὐ τέτευχε δ' ὁ τοιοῦτος ὀνόματος διὰ τὸ μὴ πάνυ γίνεσθαι.

And compared with the mean.

Ὁ δὲ σώφρων μέσως περὶ ταῦτ' ἔχει· οὔτε γὰρ ἥδεται οἷς μάλιστα ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δυσχεραίνει, οὔθ' ὅλως οἷς μὴ δεῖ οὔτε σφόδρα τοιούτῳ οὐδενί, οὔτ' ἀπόντων λυπεῖται οὐδ' ἐπιθυμεῖ, ἢ μετρίως, οὐδὲ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅτε μὴ δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅλως τῶν τοιούτων οὐθέν· ὅσα δὲ πρὸς ὑγίειάν ἐστιν ἢ πρὸς εὐεξίαν ἡδέα ὄντα, τούτων ὀρέξεται μετρίως καὶ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδέων μὴ ἐμποδίων τούτοις ὄντων ἢ παρὰ τὸ καλὸν ἢ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν. ὁ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχων μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾷ τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς τῆς ἀξίας· ὁ δὲ σώφρων οὐ τοιοῦτος, ἀλλ' ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος.

Intemperance contrasted with cowardice in three points.

Ἑκουσίῳ δὲ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἡ ἀκολασία τῆς 15
δειλίας. ἡ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἡδονήν, ἡ δὲ διὰ λύπην, ὧν τὸ μὲν αἱρετόν, τὸ δὲ φευκτόν. καὶ ἡ μὲν λύπη ἐξίστησι καὶ φθείρει τὴν τοῦ ἔχοντος φύσιν, ἡ δὲ ἡδονὴ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον ποιεῖ, μᾶλλον δ' ἑκούσιον· διὸ καὶ ἐπονειδιστότερον. καὶ γὰρ ἐθισθῆναι ῥᾷον πρὸς αὐτά· πολλὰ γὰρ ἐν τῷ βίῳ τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ οἱ ἐθισμοὶ ἀκίνδυνοι. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν φοβερῶν ἀνάπαλιν. δόξειε δ' ἂν οὐχ ὁμοίως ἑκούσιον ἡ

3. ἀναισθησία] See Theophrast. Charact. xiv. περὶ ἀναισθησίας.

29. ἑκούσιον] Vult demonstrare Aristoteles singulas actiones ignavas minus

PLEASURE. Temperance.

δειλία εἶναι τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστον· αὐτὴ μὲν γὰρ ἄλυπος, ταῦτα δὲ διὰ λύπην ἐξίστησιν, ὥστε καὶ τὰ ὅπλα ῥίπτειν καὶ τἆλλα ἀσχημονεῖν· διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ βίαια εἶναι. τῷ δ' ἀκολάστῳ ἀνάπαλιν τὰ μὲν καθ' ἕκαστα ἑκούσια, ἐπιθυμοῦντι γὰρ καὶ ὀρεγομένῳ, τὸ δ' ὅλον ἧττον· οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ἀκόλαστος εἶναι. Τὸ δ' ὄνομα τῆς ἀκολασίας καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς παιδικὰς ἁμαρτίας φέρομεν· ἔχουσι γάρ τινα ὁμοιότητα. πότερον δ' ἀπὸ ποτέρου καλεῖται, οὐθὲν πρὸς τὰ νῦν διαφέρει, δῆλον δ' ὅτι τὸ ὕστερον ἀπὸ τοῦ προτέρου. οὐ κακῶς δ' ἔοικε μετενηνέχθαι· κεκολάσθαι γὰρ δεῖ τὸ τῶν αἰσχρῶν ὀρεγόμενον καὶ πολλὴν αὔξησιν ἔχον, τοιοῦτον δὲ μάλιστα ἡ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ παῖς· κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν γὰρ ζῶσι καὶ τὰ παιδία, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τούτοις ἡ τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις. εἰ οὖν μὴ ἔσται εὐπειθὲς καὶ ὑπὸ τὸ ἄρχον, ἐπὶ πολὺ ἥξει· ἄπληστος γὰρ ἡ τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις καὶ πανταχόθεν τῷ ἀνοήτῳ, καὶ ἡ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐνέργεια αὔξει τὸ συγγενές, κἂν μεγάλαι καὶ σφοδραὶ ὦσι, καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκκρούουσιν. διὸ δεῖ μετρίας εἶναι αὐτὰς καὶ ὀλίγας, καὶ τῷ λόγῳ μηθὲν ἐναντιοῦσθαι. τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον εὐπειθὲς λέγομεν καὶ κεκολασμένον· ὥσπερ γὰρ

Of the application of the term Intemperance, to boyish faults.

spontaneas esse habitu ignaviæ (δοκεῖ βίαια εἶναι). Itaque quod probaturus est, forsan non jam initio ut concessum asseveravit. Sensus est: "Ignaviam minus fugimus quam actiones ignavas, quia non ipsa affert dolores, sed actiones secundum eam factæ; quod autem dolore nos afficit est violentum; itaque actiones ignavæ, violentæ videntur, ignavia vero ipsa spontanea." MICH.

11. τοῦ προτέρου] καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν παιδικῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἐπὶ ταύτην τὴν ἀκολασίαν τὸ ὄνομα μετενεχθῆναι. Paraph.

19. συγγενές] ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία εἰ μὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου κολάζοιτο, ἐπὶ πολὺ ἥξει· καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν ἐνεργειῶν αὐξανομένη καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκκρούει πολλάκις. Paraph.

PLEASURE. Temperance.

τὸν παῖδα δεῖ κατὰ τὸ πρόσταγμα τοῦ παιδαγωγοῦ ζῆν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν κατὰ τὸν λόγον. διὸ δεῖ τοῦ σώφρονος τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν συμφωνεῖν τῷ λόγῳ· σκοπὸς γὰρ ἀμφοῖν τὸ καλόν, καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ σώφρων ὧν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε· οὕτω δὲ τάττει καὶ ὁ λόγος. ταῦτ' οὖν ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω περὶ σωφροσύνης.

1. πρόσταγμα τοῦ παιδαγωγοῦ] See a somewhat similar comparison used by Aristotle on this subject, p. 46, 31.

INTRODUCTION TO BOOK IV.

In this Book Aristotle continues to apply his general definition of virtue to the particular species of it. In the previous Book he had explained two of the eleven virtues, of which he has given a brief sketch in Book ii. 6, namely, Courage and Temperance. In this, he now proceeds to the consideration of the remaining eight. Of which two, Liberality and Magnificence, have money for their object-matter. Two, Magnanimity and Modesty, honour. The next, Clemency, anger. The three last have regard to the daily intercourse of social life, Sincerity, Wit, and Politeness. And in the last Chapter, he examines whether Modesty is to be classed among the virtues or not.

The latter part of the preceding and the whole of the present Book is frequently illustrated by Theophrastus, the disciple of Aristotle, in his Characters.

ARISTOTELIS

ETHICA NICOMACHEA.

LIB. IV.

CHAP. I.

Of the Habits employed on the giving and taking of Money.

PRODIGALITY—LIBERALITY—ILLIBERALITY.

ΛΕΓΩΜΕΝ δ' ἑξῆς περὶ ἐλευθεριότητος, δοκεῖ δ' εἶναι ἡ περὶ χρήματα μεσότης· ἐπαινεῖται γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, οὐδ' ἐν οἷς ὁ σώφρων, οὐδ' αὖ ἐν ταῖς κρίσεσιν, ἀλλὰ περὶ δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ λῆψιν, μᾶλλον δ' ἐν τῇ

MONEY. Giving and taking.

Liberality. The object-matter of their habits.

2. ἡ περὶ χρήματα] Quælibet virtus mediocritas esse videtur circa eam materiam et objecta, circa quæ cum bene se habet laudatur, at liberalitas laudatur cum bene se habet circa pecunias, ergo ipsa est mediocritas circa pecunias tanquam circa suam materiam, et non circa res bellicas, aut circa ea quæ afferunt voluptates. Et declarat philosophus quid intelligit per pecunias; sc. non solum nummos, sed omnia etiam quæ pretio et nummis æstimari ét mensurari possunt.

Notandum quod objectum sive materia cujuslibet virtutis est duplex, propinquum et remotum. Nam fortitudo versatur circa timores et fiducias tanquam circa materiam propinquam: circa pericula bellica et mortem, tanquam circa remotum. Idem est de temperantia, cujus materia propinqua sunt voluptates cupiditates et hujusmodi: remota vero sunt illa quæ afferunt cupiditates et efficiunt voluptatem, ut cibus potus et res veneresæ. Liberalitatis est etiam duplex materia; propinqua est cupiditas pecuniarum, remota vero sunt ipsæ pecuniæ: et hoc dicitur quia virtutes non solum circa actus versari videntur, sed etiam circa affectus quos moderantur.—Acciaj.

MONEY. Giving and taking.

δόσει. χρήματα δὲ λέγομεν πάντα ὅσων ἡ ἀξία νομίσματι μετρεῖται. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀσωτία καὶ

Liberality.

ἡ ἀνελευθερία περὶ χρήματα ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις· καὶ τὴν μὲν ἀνελευθερίαν προσάπτομεν ἀεὶ τοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ περὶ χρήματα σπουδάζουσι, τὴν δ' ἀσωτίαν ἐπιφέρομεν ἐνίοτε συμπλέκοντες· τοὺς γὰρ ἀκρατεῖς καὶ εἰς ἀκολασίαν δαπανηροὺς ἀσώτους καλοῦμεν. διὸ καὶ φαυλότατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι· πολλὰς γὰρ ἅμα κακίας ἔχουσιν. οὐ δὴ οἰκείως προσαγορεύονται· βούλεται γὰρ ἄσωτος εἶναι ὁ ἕν τι κακὸν ἔχων, τὸ φθείρειν τὴν οὐσίαν· ἄσωτος γὰρ ὁ δι' αὑτὸν ἀπολλύμενος, δοκεῖ δ' ἀπώλειά τις αὑτοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἡ τῆς οὐσίας φθορά, ὡς τοῦ ζῆν διὰ τούτων ὄντος. οὕτω δὴ τὴν ἀσωτίαν ἐκδεχόμεθα. ὧν δ' ἐστὶ χρεία, ἔστι τούτοις χρῆσθαι καὶ εὖ καὶ κακῶς· ὁ πλοῦτος δ' ἐστὶ τῶν χρησίμων· ἑκάστῳ δ' ἄριστα χρῆται ὁ ἔχων τὴν περὶ τοῦτο ἀρετήν· καὶ πλούτῳ δὴ χρήσεται ἄριστα ὁ ἔχων τὴν περὶ τὰ χρήματα ἀρετήν. οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλευθέριος.

The actions of the liberal.

Χρῆσις δ' εἶναι δοκεῖ χρημάτων δαπάνη καὶ δόσις· ἡ δὲ λῆψις καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ κτῆσις μᾶλλον. διὸ μᾶλλόν ἐστι τοῦ ἐλευθερίου τὸ διδόναι οἷς δεῖ ἢ λαμβάνειν ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ. τῆς γὰρ ἀρετῆς μᾶλλον τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ τὸ εὖ πάσχειν, καὶ τὰ καλὰ πράττειν μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ αἰσχρὰ μὴ πράττειν· οὐκ ἄδηλον δ' ὅτι τῇ μὲν δόσει ἕπεται τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ καλὰ πράττειν, τῇ δὲ λήψει

1. *ἀξία*] See v. c. 7.

10. *οἰκείως προσαγορεύονται*] *οὐδὲ οἰκείως προσαγορεύονται ἑνὶ ὀνόματι μίαν κακίαν δηλοῦντι.* Paraph.

MONEY. Giving and taking.

Liberality.

τὸ εὖ πάσχειν ἢ μὴ αἰσχροπραγεῖν. καὶ ἡ χάρις τῷ διδόντι, οὐ τῷ μὴ λαμβάνοντι, καὶ ὁ ἔπαινος δὲ μᾶλλον. καὶ ῥᾷον δὲ τὸ μὴ λαβεῖν τοῦ δοῦναι· τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἧττον προΐενται μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ λαμβάνουσι τὸ ἀλλότριον. καὶ ἐλευθέριοι δὲ λέγονται οἱ διδόντες· οἱ δὲ μὴ λαμβάνοντες οὐκ εἰς ἐλευθεριότητα ἐπαινοῦνται, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἧττον εἰς δικαιοσύνην· οἱ δὲ λαμβάνοντες οὐδ' ἐπαινοῦνται πάνυ. φιλοῦνται δὲ σχεδὸν μάλιστα οἱ ἐλευθέριοι τῶν ἀπ' ἀρετῆς· ὠφέλιμοι γάρ, τοῦτο
2 δ' ἐν τῇ δόσει. Αἱ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις καλαὶ καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα. καὶ ὁ ἐλευθέριος οὖν δώσει τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ ὀρθῶς· οἷς γὰρ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα καὶ ὅτε, καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα ἕπεται τῇ ὀρθῇ δόσει. καὶ ταῦτα ἡδέως ἢ ἀλύπως· τὸ γὰρ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἡδὺ ἢ ἄλυπον, ἥκιστα δὲ λυπηρόν. ὁ δὲ διδοὺς οἷς μὴ δεῖ, ἢ μὴ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ διά τιν' ἄλλην αἰτίαν, οὐκ ἐλευθέριος ἀλλ' ἄλλος τις ῥηθήσεται. οὐδ' ὁ λυπηρῶς· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἕλοιτ' ἂν τὰ χρήματα τῆς καλῆς πράξεως, τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἐλευθερίου. οὐδὲ λήψεται δὲ ὅθεν μὴ δεῖ· οὐδὲ γάρ ἐστι τοῦ μὴ τιμῶντος τὰ χρήματα ἡ τοιαύτη λῆψις. οὐκ ἂν εἴη δὲ οὐδ' αἰτητικός· οὐ γάρ ἐστι τοῦ εὖ ποιοῦντος εὐχερῶς εὐεργετεῖσθαι. ὅθεν δὲ δεῖ, λήψεται, οἷον ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων κτημάτων, οὐχ ὡς καλὸν ἀλλ' ὡς ἀναγκαῖον, ὅπως ἔχῃ διδόναι. οὐδ' ἀμελήσει τῶν ἰδίων, βουλόμενός γε διὰ τούτων τισὶν ἐπαρκεῖν. οὐδὲ τοῖς τυχοῦσι δώσει, ἵνα ἔχῃ διδόναι οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ οὗ

And the modes and conditions he will observe in them.

10. τῶν ἀπ' ἀρετῆς] Sc. τῶν σπουδαίων. See the Rhetoric, i. 9.

11. κατ' ἀρετὴν] See p. 113, 115.

MONEY. Giving and taking.

Liberality.

καλόν. ἐλευθερίου δ' ἐστὶ σφόδρα καὶ τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν ἐν τῇ δόσει, ὥστε καταλείπειν ἑαυτῷ ἐλάττω· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐπιβλέπειν ἐφ' ἑαυτὸν ἐλευθερίου. κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δ' ἡ ἐλευθεριότης λέγεται· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ πλήθει τῶν διδομένων τὸ ἐλευθέριον, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ τοῦ διδόντος ἕξει, αὕτη δὲ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δίδωσιν.

Certain peculiarities respecting him.

Οὐθὲν δὴ κωλύει ἐλευθεριώτερον εἶναι τὸν τὰ ἐλάττω διδόντα, ἐὰν ἀπ' ἐλαττόνων διδῷ. ἐλευθεριώτεροι δὲ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν οἱ μὴ κτησάμενοι ἀλλὰ παραλαβόντες τὴν οὐσίαν· ἄπειροί τε γὰρ τῆς ἐνδείας, καὶ πάντες ἀγαπῶσι μᾶλλον τὰ αὑτῶν ἔργα, ὥσπερ οἱ γονεῖς καὶ οἱ ποιηταί. πλουτεῖν δ' οὐ ῥᾴδιον τὸν ἐλευθέριον, μήτε ληπτικὸν ὄντα μήτε φυλακτικόν, προετικὸν δὲ καὶ μὴ τιμῶντα δι' αὑτὰ τὰ χρήματα ἀλλ' ἕνεκα τῆς δόσεως. διὸ καὶ ἐγκαλεῖται τῇ τύχῃ ὅτι οἱ μάλιστα ἄξιοι ὄντες ἥκιστα πλουτοῦσιν. συμβαίνει δ' οὐκ ἀλόγως τοῦτο· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε χρήματ' ἔχειν μὲ ἐπιμελούμενον ὅπως ἔχῃ, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. οὐ μὴν δώσει γε οἷς οὐ δεῖ οὐδ' ὅτε μὴ δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι πράττοι κατὰ τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, καὶ εἰς ταῦτα ἀναλώσας οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι εἰς ἃ δεῖ ἀναλίσκειν. ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴρηται, ἐλευθέριός ἐστιν ὁ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δαπανῶν καὶ εἰς ἃ δεῖ· ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων ἄσωτος. διὸ τοὺς τυράννους οὐ λέγομεν ἀσώτους· τὸ γὰρ πλῆθος τῆς κτήσεως οὐ δοκεῖ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι ταῖς δόσεσι καὶ ταῖς δαπάναις ὑπερβάλλειν.

Recapitulation.

Τῆς

4. κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν] Liberality has no fixed or definite measure, but must depend upon the fortunes and station of the individual. See p. 40. n.

11. πάντες ἀγαπῶσι] See Plato's Repub. p. 330.

MONEY. Giving and taking.

Liberality.

ἐλευθεριότητος δὴ μεσότητος οὔσης περὶ χρημάτων δόσιν καὶ λῆψιν, ὁ ἐλευθέριος καὶ δώσει καὶ δαπανήσει εἰς ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ, ὁμοίως ἐν μικροῖς καὶ μεγάλοις, καὶ ταῦτα ἡδέως· καὶ λήψεται δ' ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ. τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ περὶ ἄμφω οὔσης μεσότητος, ποιήσει ἀμφότερα ὡς δεῖ· ἕπεται γὰρ τῇ ἐπιεικεῖ δόσει ἡ τοιαύτη λῆψις, ἡ δὲ μὴ τοιαύτη ἐναντία ἐστίν. αἱ μὲν οὖν ἑπόμεναι γίγνονται ἅμα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, αἱ δ' ἐναντίαι δῆλον ὡς οὔ. ἐὰν δὲ παρὰ τὸ δέον καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἔχον συμβαίνῃ αὐτῷ ἀναλίσκειν, λυπήσεται, μετρίως δὲ καὶ ὡς δεῖ· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ καὶ ἥδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ. καὶ εὐκοινώνητος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλευθέριος εἰς χρήματα· δύναται γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι, μὴ τιμῶν γε τὰ χρήματα, καὶ μᾶλλον ἀχθόμενος εἴ τι δέον μὴ ἀνάλωσεν ἢ λυπούμενος εἰ μὴ δέον τι ἀνάλωσε, καὶ τῷ Σιμωνίδῃ οὐκ ἀρεσκόμενος. ὁ δ' ἄσωτος
3 καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαμαρτάνει· οὔτε γὰρ ἥδεται ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ οὐδὲ ὡς δεῖ οὔτε λυπεῖται· ἔσται δὲ προϊοῦσι φανερώτερον· Εἴρηται δ' ἡμῖν ὅτι ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις εἰσὶν ἡ ἀσωτία καὶ ἡ ἀνελευθερία, καὶ ἐν δυσίν, ἐν δόσει καὶ λήψει· καὶ τὴν δαπάνην γὰρ εἰς τὴν δόσιν τίθεμεν. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀσωτία τῷ διδόναι καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν ὑπερβάλλει, τῷ δὲ λαμβάνειν ἐλλείπει, ἡ δ' ἀνελευθερία τῷ διδόναι μὲν ἐλλείπει, τῷ λαμβάνειν δ' ὑπερβάλλει, πλὴν ἐπὶ μικροῖς. τὰ μὲν οὖν

The extremes, prodigality and illiberality, compared and defined.

18. Σιμωνίδῃ] See the Rhet. iii. 2.

28. πλὴν ἐπὶ μικροῖς] Liberalis largitur ut debet non aliter in parvis quam in magnis; avarus *tamen* superat

MONEY. Giving and taking.

Liberality.

τῆς ἀσωτίας οὐ πάνυ συνδυάζεται· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον μηδαμόθεν λαμβάνοντα πᾶσι διδόναι· ταχέως γὰρ ἐπιλείπει ἡ οὐσία τοὺς ἰδιώτας διδόντας, οἵπερ καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἄσωτοι εἶναι, ἐπεὶ ὅ γε τοιοῦτος δόξειεν ἂν οὐ μικρῷ βελτίων εἶναι τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου. εὐίατός τε γάρ ἐστι καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἡλικίας καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀπορίας, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον δύναται ἐλθεῖν. ἔχει γὰρ τὰ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου· καὶ γὰρ δίδωσι καὶ οὐ λαμβάνει, οὐδέτερον δ' ὡς δεῖ οὐδ' εὖ. εἰ δὴ τοῦτο ἐθισθείη ἤ πως ἄλλως μεταβάλοι, εἴη ἂν ἐλευθέριος· δώσει γὰρ οἷς δεῖ, καὶ οὐ λήψεται ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ. διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ οὐκ εἶναι φαῦλος τὸ ἦθος· οὐ γὰρ μοχθηροῦ οὐδ' ἀγεννοῦς τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν διδόντα καὶ μὴ λαμβάνοντα, ἠλιθίου δέ. ὁ δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἄσωτος πολὺ δοκεῖ βελτίων τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου εἶναι διά τε τὰ εἰρημένα, καὶ ὅτι ὁ μὲν ὠφελεῖ πολλούς, ὁ δὲ οὐθένα, ἀλλ' οὐδ' αὑτόν.

Peculiarities of prodigality.

Ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀσώτων, καθάπερ εἴρηται, καὶ λαμβάνουσιν ὅθεν μὴ δεῖ, καὶ εἰσὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἀνελεύθεροι. ληπτικοὶ δὲ γίνονται διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι μὲν ἀναλίσκειν, εὐχερῶς δὲ τοῦτο ποιεῖν μὴ δύνασθαι· ταχὺ γὰρ ἐπιλείπει αὐτοὺς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα. ἀναγκάζονται οὖν ἑτέρωθεν πορίζειν. ἅμα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ μηθὲν τοῦ καλοῦ φροντίζειν ὀλιγώρως καὶ

accipiendi modum *in parvis tantum*, quippe cum in magnis esset spoliator, non avarus. Lambinus male vertit πλὴν *præterquam*, quasi sensus esset in parvis. Eustratius aperte pro nobis facit: πλὴν ἐπὶ μικροῖς οὗτοι ἐπονείδιστοί εἰσιν, οἷον καὶ οἱ μικρολίπται καλούμενοι· οἱ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τὰ μεγάλα λαμβάνειν ὑπερβάλλοντες οἷοί εἰσι καὶ οἱ τύραννοι ἄπληστοι καὶ πλεονέκται καὶ ἄδικοι καὶ ἀσεβεῖς, οὐκ ἀνελεύθεροι καλοῦνται. MICH.

1. συνδυάζεται] Michelet and others read συναύξεται.

MONEY. Giving and taking. — Liberality.

πάντοθεν λαμβάνουσιν· διδόναι γὰρ ἐπιθυμοῦσι, τὸ δὲ πῶς ἢ πόθεν οὐθὲν αὐτοῖς διαφέρει. διόπερ οὐδ' ἐλευθέριοι αἱ δόσεις αὐτῶν εἰσίν· οὐ γὰρ καλαί, οὐδὲ τούτου αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα, οὐδὲ ὡς δεῖ· ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε οὓς δεῖ πένεσθαι, τούτους πλουσίους ποιοῦσι, καὶ τοῖς μὲν μετρίοις τὰ ἤθη οὐδὲν ἂν δοῖεν, τοῖς δὲ κόλαξιν ἢ τιν' ἄλλην ἡδονὴν πορίζουσι πολλά. διὸ καὶ ἀκόλαστοι αὐτῶν εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοί· εὐχερῶς γὰρ ἀναλίσκοντες καὶ εἰς τὰς ἀκολασίας δαπανηροί εἰσι, καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῆν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀποκλίνουσιν· ὁ μὲν οὖν ἄσωτος ἀπαιδαγώγητος γενόμενος εἰς ταῦτα μεταβαίνει, τυχὼν δ' ἐπιμελείας εἰς τὸ μέσον καὶ τὸ δέον ἀφίκοιτ' ἄν.

Of Illiberality.

Ἡ δ' ἀνελευθερία ἀνίατός ἐστιν· δοκεῖ γὰρ τὸ γῆρας καὶ πᾶσα ἀδυναμία ἀνελευθέρους ποιεῖν. καὶ συμφυέστερον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἀσωτίας· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ φιλοχρήματοι μᾶλλον ἢ δοτικοί. καὶ διατείνει δ' ἐπὶ πολύ, καὶ πολυειδές ἐστιν· πολλοὶ γὰρ τρόποι δοκοῦσι τῆς ἀνελευθερίας εἶναι. ἐν δυσὶ γὰρ οὖσα, τῇ τ' ἐλλείψει τῆς δόσεως καὶ τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τῆς λήψεως, οὐ πᾶσιν ὁλόκληρος παραγίνεται, ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε χωρίζεται, καὶ οἱ μὲν τῇ λήψει ὑπερβάλλουσιν, οἱ δὲ τῇ δόσει ἐλλείπουσιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις προσηγορίαις οἷον φειδωλοί, γλίσχροι, κίμβικες, πάντες τῇ δόσει ἐλλείπουσι, τῶν δ' ἀλλοτρίων οὐκ ἐφίενται οὐδὲ βούλονται λαμβάνειν, οἱ μὲν διά τινα ἐπιείκειαν

14. ἀνελευθερία] See the Charact. of Theophrast. xxii. περὶ ἀνελευθερίας.

26. φειδωλοί] Compare Aristoph. Plutus, 236.

MONEY. Giving and taking. — Liberality.

καὶ εὐλάβειαν τῶν αἰσχρῶν. δοκοῦσι γὰρ ἔνιοι ἢ φασί γε διὰ τοῦτο φυλάττειν, ἵνα μή ποτ' ἀναγκασθῶσιν αἰσχρόν τι πρᾶξαι. τούτων δὲ καὶ ὁ κυμινοπρίστης καὶ πᾶς ὁ τοιοῦτος· ὠνόμασται δ' ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς τοῦ μηθενὶ ἂν δοῦναι. οἱ δ' αὖ διὰ φόβον ἀπέχονται τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ὡς οὐ ῥᾴδιον τὸ αὐτὸν μὲν τὰ ἑτέρων λαμβάνειν, τὰ δ' αὑτοῦ ἑτέρους μή· ἀρέσκει οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸ μήτε λαμβάνειν μήτε διδόναι. οἱ δ' αὖ κατὰ τὴν λῆψιν ὑπερβάλλουσι τῷ πάντοθεν λαμβάνειν καὶ πᾶν, οἷον οἱ τὰς ἀνελευθέρους ἐργασίας ἐργαζόμενοι, πορνοβοσκοὶ καὶ πάντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι, καὶ τοκισταὶ κατὰ μικρὸν ἐπὶ πολλῷ. πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ λαμβάνουσι, καὶ ὁπόσον οὐ δεῖ. κοινὸν δ' ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἡ αἰσχροκέρδεια φαίνεται· πάντες γὰρ ἕνεκα κέρδους, καὶ τούτου μικροῦ, ὀνείδη ὑπομένουσιν. τοὺς γὰρ τὰ μεγάλα μὴ ὅθεν δὲ δεῖ λαμβάνοντας, μηδὲ ἃ δεῖ, οὐ λέγομεν ἀνελευθέρους, οἷον τοὺς τυράννους πόλεις πορθοῦντας καὶ ἱερὰ συλῶντας, ἀλλὰ πονηροὺς μᾶλλον καὶ ἀσεβεῖς καὶ ἀδίκους. ὁ μέντοι κυβευτὴς καὶ ὁ λωποδύτης καὶ ὁ λῃστὴς τῶν ἀνελευθέρων εἰσίν· αἰσχροκερδεῖς γάρ. κέρδους γὰρ ἕνεκεν ἀμφότεροι πραγματεύονται καὶ ὀνείδη ὑπομένουσιν, καὶ οἱ μὲν κινδύνους τοὺς μεγίστους ἕνεκα τοῦ λήμματος, οἱ δ' ἀπὸ τῶν φίλων κερδαίνουσιν, οἷς δεῖ διδόναι. ἀμφότεροι δὴ ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ κερδαίνειν βουλόμενοι αἰσχροκερδεῖς, καὶ πᾶσαι δὴ αἱ τοιαῦται λήψεις ἀνελεύθεροι. εἰκότως δὲ τῇ ἐλευθεριότητι ἀνε-

4. κυμινοπρίστης] See the Commentators on Aristophan. Vesp. 1311.

13. κατὰ μικρόν] Lending small sums upon great interest.

λευθερία ἐναντίον λέγεται· μεῖζόν τε γάρ ἐστι κακὸν τῆς ἀσωτίας, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ ταύτην ἁμαρτάνουσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν λεχθεῖσαν ἀσωτίαν. περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐλευθεριότητος καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων κακιῶν τοσαῦτ' εἰρήσθω.

MONEY. Giving and taking.

Liberality.

CHAP. II.

Of the Habits employed upon the expending of Money with sumptuousness.

VULGAR PROFUSION—MAGNIFICENCE—MEANNESS.

4 ΔΟΞΕΙΕ δ' ἂν ἀκόλουθον εἶναι καὶ περὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας διελθεῖν· δοκεῖ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὴ περὶ χρήματά τις ἀρετὴ εἶναι. οὐχ ὥσπερ δ' ἡ ἐλευθεριότης διατείνει περὶ πάσας τὰς ἐν χρήμασι πράξεις, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰς δαπανηρὰς μόνον· ἐν τούτοις δ' ὑπερέχει τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος μεγέθει. καθάπερ γὰρ τοὔνομα αὐτὸ ὑποσημαίνει, ἐν μεγέθει πρέπουσα δαπάνη ἐστίν. τὸ δὲ μέγεθος πρός τι. οὐ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ δαπάνημα τριηράρχῳ καὶ ἀρχιθεωρῷ. τὸ πρέπον δὴ πρὸς αὐτόν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ καὶ περὶ ἅ. ὁ δ' ἐν μικροῖς ἢ ἐν μετρίοις κατ' ἀξίαν δαπανῶν οὐ λέγεται μεγαλοπρεπής, οἷον τὸ "πολλάκι δόσκον ἀλήτῃ" ἀλλ' ὁ ἐν μεγάλοις οὕτως, ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἐλευθέριος, ὁ δ' ἐλευθέριος οὐθὲν μᾶλλον μεγαλοπρεπής· τῆς τοιαύτης δ' ἕξεως ἡ μὲν ἔλλειψις μικροπρέπεια

MONEY. Sumptuous spending.

Magnificence. The object-matter of these habits.

18. πολλάκι] See Homer's Odys. P. 420.

20. οὐθὲν μᾶλλον] οὐδαμῶς. *Is not the more.*

MONEY. Sumptuous spending.

Magnificence.

καλεῖται, ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ βαναυσία καὶ ἀπειροκαλία καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται, οὐχ ὑπερβάλλουσαι τῷ μεγέθει περὶ ἃ δεῖ, ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ λαμπρυνόμεναι· ὕστερον δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐροῦμεν.

The peculiarities of the magnificent.

Ὁ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἐπιστήμονι ἔοικεν· τὸ πρέπον γὰρ δύναται θεωρῆσαι καὶ δαπανῆσαι μεγάλα ἐμμελῶς. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴπομεν, ἡ ἕξις ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ὁρίζεται, καὶ ὧν ἐστίν. αἱ δὴ τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς δαπάναι μεγάλαι καὶ πρέπουσαι. τοιαῦτα δὴ καὶ τὰ ἔργα· οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται μέγα δαπάνημα καὶ πρέπον τῷ ἔργῳ. ὥστε τὸ μὲν ἔργον τῆς δαπάνης ἄξιον δεῖ εἶναι, τὴν δὲ δαπάνην τοῦ ἔργου, ἢ καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν. δαπανήσει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα· κοινὸν γὰρ τοῦτο ταῖς ἀρεταῖς. καὶ ἔτι ἡδέως καὶ προετικῶς· ἡ γὰρ ἀκριβολογία μικροπρεπές. καὶ πῶς κάλλιστον καὶ πρεπωδέστατον, σκέψαιτ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ πόσου καὶ πῶς ἐλαχίστου. ἀναγκαῖον δὴ καὶ ἐλευθέριον τὸν μεγαλοπρεπῆ εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος δαπανήσει ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ. ἐν τούτοις δὲ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, οἷον μέγεθος, περὶ ταὐτὰ τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος οὔσης, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης δαπάνης τὸ ἔργον ποιήσει μεγαλοπρεπέστερον. οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ κτήματος καὶ ἔργου· κτῆμα μὲν γὰρ τὸ πλείστου ἄξιον τιμιώτατον, οἷον χρυσός, ἔργον

3. περὶ ἃ δεῖ] Supra diximus ad p. 72. in universum hujus virtutis mediocritatem esse proportionem quandam. Jam nunc triplicem hujus proportionis rationem profert, cum decorum hujus virtutis exstat, si proportio servetur: spectatur autem decorum I. et personæ quæ impendit, II. et rei in quam impendit, III. et pecuniæ quæ impenditur, qua partitione ipse in describendo magnifico infra utetur. MICH.

7. ἐν ἀρχῇ] See p. 55.

MONEY. Sumptuous spending.

Magnificence. Both in public, (which are more especially his object).

δὲ τὸ μέγα καὶ καλόν. τοῦ γὰρ τοιούτου ἡ θεωρία θαυμαστή, τὸ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὲς θαυμαστόν. καὶ ἔστιν ἔργου ἀρετὴ μεγαλοπρέπεια ἐν μεγέθει. Ἔστι δὲ τῶν δαπανημάτων, οἷα λέγομεν τὰ τίμια, οἷον τὰ περὶ θεοὺς ἀναθήματα καὶ κατασκευαὶ καὶ θυσίαι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὅσα περὶ πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον, καὶ ὅσα πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν εὐφιλοτίμητά ἐστιν, οἷον εἴ που χορηγεῖν οἴονται δεῖν λαμπρῶς ἢ τριηραρχεῖν ἢ καὶ ἑστιᾶν τὴν πόλιν. ἐν ἅπασι δ' ὥσπερ εἴρηται, καὶ πρὸς τὸν πράττοντα ἀναφέρεται τὸ τίς ὢν καὶ τίνων ὑπαρχόντων· ἄξια γὰρ δεῖ τούτων εἶναι, καὶ μὴ μόνον τῷ ἔργῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ ποιοῦντι πρέπειν. διὸ πένης μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη μεγαλοπρεπής· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀφ' ὧν πολλὰ δαπανήσει πρεπόντως· ὁ δ' ἐπιχειρῶν ἠλίθιος· παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γὰρ καὶ τὸ δέον, κατ' ἀρετὴν δὲ τὸ ὀρθῶς. πρέπει δὲ καὶ οἷς τὰ τοιαῦτα προϋπάρχει δι' αὐτῶν ἢ διὰ τῶν προγόνων ἢ ὧν αὐτοῖς μέτεστιν, καὶ τοῖς εὐγενέσι καὶ τοῖς ἐνδόξοις καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα μέγεθος ἔχει καὶ ἀξίωμα. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτος ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής, καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δαπανήμασιν ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια, ὥσπερ εἴρηται· μέγιστα γὰρ καὶ ἐντιμότατα. Τῶν δὲ ἰδίων ὅσα εἰσάπαξ γίνεται, οἷον γάμος καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον, καὶ εἰ περί τι πᾶσα ἡ πόλις σπουδάζει ἢ οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ περὶ ξένων δὲ ὑποδοχὰς καὶ ἀποστολάς, καὶ

And in private acts.

2. θεωρία] θεωροὶ dicebantur quicumque ad conventus sacrorum aut solennia sacrificia aut etiam oracula ablegabantur. Quorum scilicet princeps erat ἀρχιθέωρος. Dixere autem et θεωρίαν hanc ipsam administrationem. CAM.

MONEY. Sumptuous spending.

Magnificence.

δωρεὰς καὶ ἀντιδωρεάς· οὐ γὰρ εἰς ἑαυτὸν δαπανηρὸς ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ κοινά, τὰ δὲ δῶρα τοῖς ἀναθήμασιν ἔχει τι ὅμοιον. μεγαλοπρεποῦς δὲ καὶ οἶκον κατασκευάσασθαι πρεπόντως τῷ πλούτῳ· κόσμος γάρ τις καὶ οὗτος. καὶ περὶ ταῦτα μᾶλλον δαπανᾶν ὅσα πολυχρόνια τῶν ἔργων· κάλλιστα γὰρ ταῦτα. καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις τὸ πρέπον· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ ἁρμόζει θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώποις, οὐδ' ἐν ἱερῷ καὶ τάφῳ· καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δαπανημάτων ἕκαστον μέγα ἐν τῷ γένει, καὶ μεγαλοπρεπέστατον μὲν τὸ ἐν μεγάλῳ μέγα, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ ἐν τούτοις μέγα. καὶ διαφέρει τὸ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ μέγα τοῦ ἐν τῷ δαπανήματι· σφαῖρα μὲν γὰρ ἢ λήκυθος ἡ καλλίστη ἔχει μεγαλοπρέπειαν παιδικοῦ δώρου, ἡ δὲ τούτου τιμὴ μικρὸν καὶ ἀνελεύθερον. διὰ τοῦτό ἐστι τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, ἐν ᾧ ἂν ποιῇ γένει, μεγαλοπρεπῶς ποιεῖν· τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον οὐκ εὐυπέρβλητον, καὶ ἔχον κατ' ἀξίαν τοῦ δαπανήματος.

Vulgar Profuseness.

Τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ 6
μεγαλοπρεπής, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων καὶ βάναυσος τῷ παρὰ τὸ δέον ἀναλίσκειν ὑπερβάλλει, ὥσπερ εἴρηται. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς μικροῖς τῶν δαπανημάτων πολλὰ ἀναλίσκει καὶ λαμπρύνεται παρὰ μέλος, οἷον ἐρανιστὰς γαμικῶς ἑστιῶν, καὶ κωμῳδοῖς χορηγῶν ἐν τῷ παρόδῳ πορφύραν εἰσφέρων, ὥσπερ οἱ Μεγαρεῖς. καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιήσει οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ τὸν πλοῦτον ἐπιδεικ-

20. βάναυσος] οἱ ἑδραῖοι τεχνῖται καὶ παρὰ βαύνῳ, ὅ ἐστι καμίνῳ, τὸ ἔργον διατιθέμενοι. οἱ δὲ βάναυσον τὸν ἀπάνθρωπον καὶ ὑπερήφανον. ἔνιοι δὲ βαναύσου χειρὸς τῆς ὑβριστικῆς ἢ τεχνικῆς. Schol. upon Plato's Theæt. in Bekker. Com. Cr. ii. 363. See Heindorf's note on Theæt. p. 176. §. 85.

νύμενος, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα οἰόμενος θαυμάζεσθαι, καὶ οὗ μὲν δεῖ πολλὰ ἀναλῶσαι, ὀλίγα δαπανῶν, οὗ δ' ὀλίγα, πολλά. Ὁ δὲ μικροπρεπὴς περὶ πάντα ἐλλείψει, καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀναλώσας ἐν μικρῷ τὸ καλὸν ἀπολεῖ, καὶ ὅ τι ἂν ποιῇ μέλλων, καὶ σκοπῶν πῶς ἂν ἐλάχιστον ἀναλώσαι, καὶ ταῦτ' ὀδυρόμενος, καὶ πάντ' οἰόμενος μείζω ποιεῖν ἢ δεῖ. εἰσὶ μὲν οὖν αἱ ἕξεις αὗται κακίαι, οὐ μὴν ὀνείδη γ' ἐπιφέρουσι διὰ τὸ μήτε βλαβεραὶ τῷ πέλας εἶναι μήτε λίαν ἀσχήμονες.

MONEY. Sumptuous spending.

Magnificence. Meanness.

CHAP. III.

Habits employed upon the desire of Honour, or ambition of being distinguished.

THE VAIN-GLORIOUS—NOBLE-MINDED—MEAN-MINDED.

7 Ἡ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία περὶ μεγάλα μὲν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὀνόματος ἔοικεν εἶναι, περὶ ποῖα δ' ἐστὶ πρῶτον λάβωμεν. διαφέρει δ' οὐθὲν τὴν ἕξιν ἢ τὸν κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν σκοπεῖν. δοκεῖ δὲ μεγαλόψυχος εἶναι ὁ μεγάλων αὑτὸν ἀξιῶν ἄξιος ὤν· ὁ γὰρ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν αὐτὸ ποιῶν ἠλίθιος, τῶν δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν οὐδεὶς ἠλίθιος οὐδ' ἀνόητος. μεγαλόψυχος μὲν οὖν ὁ εἰρημένος. ὁ γὰρ μικρῶν ἄξιος καὶ τούτων ἀξιῶν ἑαυτὸν σώφρων, μεγαλόψυχος δ' οὔ· ἐν μεγέθει γὰρ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι, οἱ

HONOR. Ambition of receiving.

Noblemindedness. The object-matter of these habits.

11. ἡ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία] Quod hanc virtutem Aristoteles nostro loco tam copiose et accurate præ multis et aliis describit, haud dubie eo pertinet, quia eadem veterum Atheniensium imprimis propria habebatur. ZELL.

22. τὸ κάλλος] Compare the Rhetoric i. 5.

HONOR. Ambition of receiving.

μικροὶ δ᾽ ἀστεῖοι καὶ σύμμετροι, καλοὶ δ᾽ οὔ. ὁ δὲ μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιῶν ἀνάξιος ὢν χαῦνος·

Noblemindedness.

ὁ δὲ μειζόνων ἢ ἄξιος οὐ πᾶς χαῦνος. ὁ δ᾽ ἐλαττόνων ἢ ἄξιος μικρόψυχος, ἐάν τε μεγάλων ἐάν τε μετρίων, ἐάν τε καὶ μικρῶν ἄξιος ὢν ἔτι ἐλαττόνων αὐτὸν ἀξιοῖ. καὶ μάλιστα ἂν δόξειεν ὁ μεγάλων ἄξιος· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐποίει, εἰ μὴ τοσούτων ἦν ἄξιος; ἔστι δὴ ὁ μεγαλόψυχος τῷ μὲν μεγέθει ἄκρος, τῷ δὲ ὡς δεῖ μέσος· τοῦ γὰρ κατ᾽ ἀξίαν αὐτὸν ἀξιοῖ. οἱ δ᾽ ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν. εἰ δὲ δὴ μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιοῖ ἄξιος ὤν, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν μεγίστων, περὶ ἓν μάλιστα ἂν εἴη. ἡ δ᾽ ἀξία λέγεται πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά. μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἂν θείημεν ὃ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπονέμομεν, καὶ οὗ μάλιστ᾽ ἐφίενται οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις ἆθλον, τοιοῦτον δ᾽ ἡ τιμή· μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν. περὶ τιμὰς δὴ καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχός ἐστιν ὡς δεῖ. καὶ ἄνευ δὲ λόγου φαίνονται οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι περὶ τιμὴν εἶναι· τιμῆς γὰρ μάλισθ᾽ οἱ μεγάλοι ἀξιοῦσιν ἑαυτούς, κατ᾽ ἀξίαν δέ. ὁ δὲ μικρόψυχος ἐλλείπει καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου ἀξίωμα. ὁ δὲ χαῦνος πρὸς ἑαυτὸν μὲν ὑπερβάλλει, οὐ μὴν τόν γε μεγαλόψυχον.

Peculiarities of the noble-minded.

Ὁ δὲ μεγαλόψυχος, εἴπερ τῶν μεγίστων ἄξιος, ἄριστος ἂν εἴη· μείζονος γὰρ ἀεὶ ὁ βελτίων ἄξιος, καὶ μεγίστων ὁ ἄριστος. τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρα μεγαλόψυχον δεῖ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. καὶ δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν εἶναι μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἐν

13. τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά] See the Rhetoric i. 5.

19. ἄνευ δὲ λόγου] *Without argument.* Is self-evident.

ἑκάστῃ ἀρετῇ μέγα, οὐδαμῶς τ' ἂν ἁρμόζοι μεγαλοψύχῳ φεύγειν παρασείσαντι, οὐδ' ἀδικεῖν· τίνος γὰρ ἕνεκα πράξει αἰσχρά, ᾧ οὐθὲν μέγα; καθ' ἕκαστα δ' ἐπισκοποῦντι πάμπαν γελοῖος φαίνοιτ' ἂν ὁ μεγαλόψυχος μὴ ἀγαθὸς ὤν. οὐκ εἴη δ' ἂν οὐδὲ τιμῆς ἄξιος φαῦλος ὤν· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ ἆθλον ἡ τιμή, καὶ ἀπονέμεται τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς. ἔοικε μὲν οὖν ἡ μεγαλοψυχία οἷον κόσμος τις εἶναι τῶν ἀρετῶν· μείζους γὰρ αὐτὰς ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ ἐκείνων. διὰ τοῦτο χαλεπὸν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μεγαλόψυχον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἄνευ καλοκἀγαθίας. Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν περὶ τιμὰς καὶ

HONOR. Ambition of receiving.

Noblemindedness.

His actions.

2. παρασείσαντι] sc. χεῖρας.

11. ἄνευ καλοκἀγαθίας] *Without philosophy*. The great attention paid by Socrates to the *lovely* as well as the virtuous (τὸ καλόν τε καὶ ἄγαθον), and the intimate connection between the two, is familiar to the reader of Plato's Dialogues. From habituating the mind to love that which is beautiful to the senses, Socrates wished to lead his disciples gradually to the contemplation of that which was really and unchangingly beautiful, until the love of that which is supremely good and supremely beautiful ended in one and the same thing. (See Repub. 401—2. Sympos. 210.) τοῦτο γάρ δή ἐστι τὸ ὀρθῶς ἐπὶ τὰ ἐρωτικὰ ἰέναι ἢ ὑπ' ἄλλου ἄγεσθαι ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ τῶνδε τῶν καλῶν ἐκείνου ἕνεκα τοῦ καλοῦ ἀεὶ ἐπανιέναι, ὥσπερ ἐπαναβαθμοῖς χρώμενον, ἀπὸ ἑνὸς ἐπὶ δύο καὶ ἀπὸ δυοῖν ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ καλὰ σώματα, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν σωμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ μαθήματα, ἔστ' ἂν ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο τὸ μάθημα τελευτήσῃ, ὅ ἐστιν οὐκ ἄλλου ἢ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ μάθημα, καὶ γνῷ αὐτὸ τελευτῶν ὃ ἔστι καλόν. Symp. 211. c. With Socrates then and his disciples the enquiry after the beautiful and the virtuous was never separated, and hence they called those who sought for moral beauty, and consequently the virtuous and good, καλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοί. In subsequent times, however, though this term retained its meaning, the inquiry after beauty and virtue was disunited, as is well expressed by a modern writer. "Sed vis et natura τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ deinde apparuit maxime, postquam id Cynici tandemque Stoici a pulcro et decoro exemplo ipsi suo, vivendi philosophandique ratione disjunxerunt. Nam apud germanos Socraticos sic illa conjuncta fuerant, ut nec pulcrum æstimarent nisi quod bonum, nec bonum nisi quod idem pulcrum esset. Unde virtutem vocare amabant καλοκἀγαθίαν. Sed Aristippus et Cyrenaici τὸ καλόν, Antisthenes et Cynici, e quorum secta Stoici extiterunt, τὸ ἀγαθὸν unice, certe maxime prosecuti sunt. Heusde Init. Phil. Plat. ii. 1. 49.

HONOR. Ambition of receiving.

Noblemindedness.

ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχός ἐστι, καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν ταῖς μεγάλαις καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν σπουδαίων μετρίως ἡσθήσεται, ὡς τῶν οἰκείων τυγχάνων ἢ καὶ ἐλαττόνων· ἀρετῆς γὰρ παντελοῦς οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀξία τιμή· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἀποδέξεταί γε τῷ μὴ ἔχειν αὐτοὺς μείζω αὐτῷ ἀπονέμειν. τῆς δὲ παρὰ τῶν τυχόντων καὶ ἐπὶ μικροῖς πάμπαν ὀλιγωρήσει· οὐ γὰρ τούτων ἄξιος. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀτιμίας· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται δικαίως περὶ αὐτόν. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὁ μεγαλόψυχος περὶ τιμάς, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ πλοῦτον καὶ δυναστείαν καὶ πᾶσαν εὐτυχίαν καὶ ἀτυχίαν μετρίως ἕξει, ὅπως ἂν γίνηται, καὶ οὔτ' εὐτυχῶν περιχαρὴς ἔσται οὔτ' ἀτυχῶν περίλυπος. οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τιμὴν οὕτως ἔχει ὡς μέγιστον ὄν. αἱ γὰρ δυναστεῖαι καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος διὰ τὴν τιμήν ἐστιν αἱρετά· οἱ γοῦν ἔχοντες αὐτὰ τιμᾶσθαι δι' αὐτῶν βούλονται. ᾧ δὴ καὶ ἡ τιμὴ μικρόν ἐστι, τούτῳ καὶ τἆλλα. διὸ ὑπερόπται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι.

Success contributes to noble-mindedness.

8 Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ εὐτυχήματα συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς μεγαλοψυχίαν. οἵ γὰρ εὐγενεῖς ἀξιοῦνται τιμῆς καὶ οἱ δυναστεύοντες ἢ οἱ πλουτοῦντες· ἐν ὑπεροχῇ γάρ, τὸ δ' ἀγαθῷ ὑπερέχον πᾶν ἐντιμότερον. διὸ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μεγαλοψυχοτέρους ποιεῖ· τιμῶνται γὰρ ὑπὸ τινῶν. κατ' ἀλήθειαν δ' ὁ ἀγαθὸς μόνος τιμητέος· ᾧ δ' ἄμφω ὑπάρχει, μᾶλλον ἀξιοῦνται τιμῆς. οἱ δ' ἄνευ ἀρετῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἔχοντες

See also De Geer's Diat. in Polit. Platon. principia, p. 93.

In common use, however, this term was employed to denote those who had enjoyed the honours of the state in opposition to the undistinguished populace (τῷ δήμῳ). See Stallb. Introd. to the Meno of Plato, p. xii. Ed. 1827.

HONOR. Ambition of receiving. Noblemindedness.

οὔτε δικαίως ἑαυτοὺς μεγάλων ἀξιοῦσιν οὔτε ὀρθῶς μεγαλόψυχοι λέγονται· ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς παντελοῦς οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα. ὑπερόπται δὲ καὶ ὑβρισταὶ καὶ οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθὰ γίγνονται. ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς οὐ ῥᾴδιον φέρειν ἐμμελῶς τὰ εὐτυχήματα· οὐ δυνάμενοι δὲ φέρειν καὶ οἰόμενοι τῶν ἄλλων ὑπερέχειν ἐκείνων μὲν καταφρονοῦσιν, αὐτοὶ δ᾽ ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι πράττουσιν. μιμοῦνται γὰρ τὸν μεγαλόψυχον οὐχ ὅμοιοι ὄντες, τοῦτο δὲ δρῶσιν ἐν οἷς δύνανται· τὰ μὲν οὖν κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν οὐ πράττουσι, καταφρονοῦσι δὲ τῶν ἄλλων. ὁ δὲ μεγαλόψυχος δικαίως καταφρονεῖ (δοξάζει γὰρ ἀληθῶς), οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τυχόντως.

His conduct in reference to, 1. Fortitude.

Οὐκ ἔστι δὲ μικροκίνδυνος οὐδὲ φιλοκίνδυνος διὰ τὸ ὀλίγα τιμᾶν, μεγαλοκίνδυνος δέ, καὶ ὅταν κινδυνεύῃ, ἀφειδὴς τοῦ βίου ὡς οὐκ ἄξιον ὂν πάντως ζῆν.

2. Liberality.

Καὶ οἷος εὖ ποιεῖν, εὐεργετούμενος δ᾽ αἰσχύνεται· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχοντος, τὸ δ᾽ ὑπερεχομένου. καὶ ἀντευεργετικὸς πλειόνων· οὕτω γὰρ προσοφλήσει ὁ ὑπάρξας καὶ ἔσται εὖ πεπονθώς. δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ μνημονεύειν οὓς ἂν ποιήσωσιν εὖ, ὧν δ᾽ ἂν πάθωσιν οὔ· ἐλάττων γὰρ ὁ παθὼν εὖ τοῦ ποιήσαντος, βούλεται δ᾽ ὑπερέχειν. καὶ τὰ μὲν ἡδέως ἀκούει, τὰ δ᾽ ἀηδῶς· διὸ καὶ τὴν Θέτιν οὐ λέγειν τὰς εὐεργεσίας τῷ Διί· οὐδ᾽ οἱ Λάκωνες πρὸς

20. δοκοῦσι] See Thucyd. ii. 40.

24. Θέτιν] See Homer's Il. I. 503.

25. οἱ Λάκωνες] τὸ δὲ περὶ Λακεδαιμονίων τοιοῦτον ἱστορεῖ Καλλισθένης ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν, ὅτι Θηβαίων εἰς τὴν Λακωνικὴν ἐμβαλλόντων ἔπεμψαν Λακεδαιμόνιοι πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους συμμαχίας δεόμενοι· λέγοντες δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ὅσα μὲν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πεποιήκασιν εὖ, τούτων ἐπελάθοντο ἰόντες, ἃ δ᾽ αὐτοὶ χρηστὰ πρὸς Ἀθηναίων ἐπεπόνθεισαν, τούτων ἐμέμνηντο, ὡς διὰ τούτων αὐτοὺς ἐπαξόμενοι πρὸς τὴν συμμαχίαν μᾶλλον. Schol. See however Xenophon's Hist. Gr. vi. 5. §. 33.

HONOR. Ambition of receiving.

Noblemindedness. In his manners, conduct, and outward circumstances.

τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἀλλ' ἃ πεπόνθεσαν εὖ. Μεγαλοψύχου δὲ καὶ τὸ μηθενὸς δεῖσθαι ἢ μόγις, ὑπηρετεῖν δὲ προθύμως, καὶ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἐν ἀξιώματι καὶ εὐτυχίαις μέγαν εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς μέσους μέτριον· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχειν χαλεπὸν καὶ σεμνόν, τῶν δὲ ῥᾴδιον, καὶ ἐν ἐκείνοις μὲν σεμνύνεσθαι οὐκ ἀγεννές, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ταπεινοῖς φορτικόν, ὥσπερ εἰς τοὺς ἀσθενεῖς ἰσχυρίζεσθαι. καὶ εἰς τὰ ἔντιμα μὴ ἰέναι, ἢ οὗ πρωτεύουσιν ἄλλοι· καὶ ἀργὸν εἶναι καὶ μελλητὴν ἀλλ' ἢ ὅπου τιμὴ μεγάλη ἢ ἔργον, καὶ ὀλίγων μὲν πρακτικόν, μεγάλων δὲ καὶ ὀνομαστῶν. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ καὶ φανερόμισον εἶναι καὶ φανερόφιλον· τὸ γὰρ λανθάνειν φοβουμένου. καὶ μέλειν τῆς ἀληθείας μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς δόξης, καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν φανερῶς· παρρησιαστὴς γὰρ διὰ τὸ καταφρονεῖν. διὸ καὶ ἀληθευτικός, πλὴν ὅσα μὴ δι' εἰρωνείαν· εἴρωνα δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς. καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον μὴ δύνασθαι ζῆν ἀλλ' ἢ πρὸς φίλον· δουλικὸν γάρ, διὸ καὶ πάντες οἱ κόλακες θητικοὶ καὶ οἱ ταπεινοὶ κόλακες. οὐδὲ θαυμαστικός· οὐθὲν γὰρ μέγα αὐτῷ ἐστίν. οὐδὲ μνησίκακος· οὐ γὰρ μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἀπομνημονεύειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ κακά, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον παρορᾶν. οὐδ' ἀνθρωπολόγος· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ αὑτοῦ ἐρεῖ οὔτε περὶ ἑτέρου· οὔτε γὰρ ἵνα ἐπαινῆται μέλει αὐτῷ οὔθ' ὅπως οἱ ἄλλοι ψέγωνται, οὐδ' αὖ ἐπαινετικός ἐστιν· διόπερ οὐδὲ

16. διὰ τὸ καταφρονεῖν] Compare the same use of this word in Thucydides, ii. 62.

24. ἀνθρωπολόγος] Not given to talking about other people and their affairs. Which is much more in reality the case with the truly magnanimous, the philosopher, as Plato observes. See Theæt. p. 173.

HONOR. Ambition of receiving.

Noblemindedness.

κακολόγος, οὐδὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, εἰ μὴ δι' ὕβριν. καὶ περὶ ἀναγκαίων ἢ μικρῶν ἥκιστα ὀλοφυρτικὸς καὶ δεητικός· σπουδάζοντος γὰρ οὕτως ἔχειν περὶ ταῦτα. καὶ οἷος κεκτῆσθαι μᾶλλον τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἄκαρπα τῶν καρπίμων καὶ ὠφελίμων· αὐτάρκους γὰρ μᾶλλον. καὶ κίνησις δὲ βραδεῖα τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ φωνὴ βαρεῖα, καὶ λέξις στάσιμος· οὐ γὰρ σπευστικὸς ὁ περὶ ὀλίγα σπουδάζων, οὐδὲ σύντονος ὁ μηθὲν μέγα οἰόμενος· ἡ δ' ὀξυφωνία καὶ ἡ ταχυτὴς διὰ τούτων.

The extremes considered. 1. The Mean-minded.

Τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μεγαλόψυχος, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων
9 μικρόψυχος, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων χαῦνος. οὐ κακοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι οὐδ' οὗτοι· οὐ γὰρ κακοποιοί εἰσιν· ἡμαρτημένοι δέ. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μικρόψυχος ἄξιος ὢν ἀγαθῶν ἑαυτὸν ἀποστερεῖ ὧν ἄξιός ἐστι, καὶ ἔοικε κακὸν ἔχειν τι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ ἀγνοεῖν δ' ἑαυτόν· ὠρέγετο γὰρ ἂν ὧν ἄξιος ἦν, ἀγαθῶν γε ὄντων. οὐ μὴν ἠλίθιοί γε οἱ τοιοῦτοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὀκνηροί. ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ δόξα δοκεῖ καὶ χείρους ποιεῖν· ἕκαστοι γὰρ ἐφίενται τῶν κατ' ἀξίαν, ἀφίστανται δὲ καὶ τῶν πράξεων τῶν καλῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὡς ἀνάξιοι ὄντες, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν.

2. The Vain-glorious.

Οἱ δὲ χαῦνοι ἠλίθιοι καὶ ἑαυτοὺς ἀγνοοῦντες, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐπιφανῶς· ὡς γὰρ ἄξιοι ὄντες τοῖς ἐντίμοις ἐπιχειροῦσιν, εἶτα

5. ἄκαρπα] See Aristotle's Rhetoric, i. 9.

20. ὀκνηροί] Prætulerim lectionem νοεροί· *sunt potius intelligentes*, i. e. ut Eustratius interpretatur, "acres nimis et considerabundi (δριμεῖς καὶ ἐπινοητικοί)." MICH. Were such a reading adopted, these characters would much resemble that of Shakspeare's Hamlet. See also Herod. vii. 50.

24. χαῦνοι] See Theophrast. Charact. xxiv. περὶ ὑπερηφανίας.

HONOR. Ambition of receiving.

Noblemindedness.

ἐξελέγχονται· καὶ ἐσθῆτι κοσμοῦνται καὶ σχήματι καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, καὶ βούλονται τὰ εὐτυχήματα φανερὰ εἶναι αὐτῶν, καὶ λέγουσι περὶ αὐτῶν ὡς διὰ τούτων τιμηθησόμενοι. ἀντιτίθεται δὲ τῇ μεγαλοψυχίᾳ ἡ μικροψυχία μᾶλλον τῆς χαυνότητος· καὶ γὰρ γίγνεται μᾶλλον καὶ χεῖρόν ἐστιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν μεγαλοψυχία περὶ τιμήν ἐστι μεγάλην, ὥσπερ εἴρηται.

CHAP. IV.

Habits employed upon the desire of Honor in small things.

AMBITIOUS—NAMELESS—UNAMBITIOUS.

HONOR in small things.

The object-matter of these habits.

ΕΟΙΚΕ δὲ καὶ περὶ ταύτην εἶναι ἀρετή τις, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ἐλέχθη, ἣ δόξειεν ἂν παραπλησίως ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ ἐλευθεριότης πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν. ἄμφω γὰρ αὗται τοῦ μὲν μεγάλου ἀφεστᾶσι, περὶ δὲ τὰ μέτρια καὶ τὰ μικρὰ διατιθέασιν ἡμᾶς ὡς δεῖ. ὥσπερ δ' ἐν λήψει καὶ δόσει χρημάτων μεσότης ἐστὶ καὶ ὑπερβολή τε καὶ ἔλλειψις, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τιμῆς ὀρέξει τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἧττον, καὶ τὸ ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ. τόν τε γὰρ φιλότιμον ψέγομεν ὡς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ τῆς τιμῆς ἐφιέμενον, τόν τε ἀφιλότιμον ὡς οὐδ'

CHAP. IV.

These habits bear the same relation to those in the last Chapter, as Liberality and its extremes to Magnificence and its extremes. Liberality being concerned with the spending of small, Magnificence of great sums. So noblemindedness is concerned with great, these habits with small honors.

10. πρώτοις] See p. 72.

16. ὑπερβολή] See Theoph. Charact. xxi. περὶ μικροφιλοτιμίας.

HONOR in small things.

ἐπὶ τοῖς καλοῖς προαιρούμενον τιμᾶσθαι. Ἔστι δ᾽ ὅτε τὸν φιλότιμον ἐπαινοῦμεν ὡς ἀνδρώδη καὶ φιλόκαλον, τὸν δὲ ἀφιλότιμον ὡς μέτριον καὶ σώφρονα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις εἴπομεν. δῆλον δ᾽ ὅτι πλεοναχῶς τοῦ φιλοτοιούτου λεγομένου οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ φέρομεν τὸν φιλότιμον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπαινοῦντες μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί, ψέγοντες δ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ. ἀνωνύμου δ᾽ οὔσης τῆς μεσότητος, ὡς ἐρήμης ἔοικεν ἀμφισβητεῖν τὰ ἄκρα· ἐν οἷς δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις, καὶ τὸ μέσον. ὀρέγονται δὲ τιμῆς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἧττον, ἔστι δ᾽ ὅτε καὶ ὡς δεῖ· ἐπαινεῖται γοῦν ἡ ἕξις αὕτη, μεσότης οὖσα περὶ τιμὴν ἀνώνυμος. φαίνεται δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὴν φιλοτιμίαν ἀφιλοτιμία, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀφιλοτιμίαν φιλοτιμία, πρὸς ἀμφότερα δὲ ἀμφότερά πως. ἔοικε δὲ τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς. ἀντικεῖσθαι δ᾽ ἐνταῦθ᾽ οἱ ἄκροι φαίνονται διὰ τὸ μὴ ὠνομάσθαι τὸν μέσον.

The extremes of this Habit assume sometimes the appearance of the mean.

CHAP. V.

THE CHOLERIC—THE MERCIFUL—ANON.

ΠΑΘΟΣ.

11 ΠΡΑΟΤΗΣ δ᾽ ἐστὶ μὲν μεσότης περὶ ὀργάς, ἀνωνύμου δ᾽ ὄντος τοῦ μέσου, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ

The object-matter of these habits.

9. ἐρήμης] See p. 75. 6.

14. ἀνώνυμος] We have no terms to express these habits or the relation they bear to the previous, or the extremes of the Liberal to those of the Magnificent. Those which I have used must therefore be understood in a sense restricted by the matter, upon which they are said to be employed.

ΠΑΘΟΣ.

Mercifulness.

τῶν ἄκρων, ἐπὶ τὸν μέσον τὴν πραότητα φέρομεν, πρὸς τὴν ἔλλειψιν ἀποκλίνουσαν, ἀνώνυμον οὖσαν. ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ ὀργιλότης τις λέγοιτ' ἄν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πάθος ἐστὶν ὀργή, τὰ δ' ἐμποιοῦντα πολλὰ καὶ διαφέροντα.

The merciful.

Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ οἷς δεῖ ὀργιζόμενος, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὅσον χρόνον, ἐπαινεῖται· πρᾶος δὴ οὗτος ἂν εἴη, εἴπερ ἡ πραότης ἐπαινεῖται. βούλεται γὰρ ὁ πρᾶος ἀτάραχος εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος τάξῃ, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον χρόνον χαλεπαίνειν. ἁμαρτάνειν δὲ δοκεῖ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν· οὐ γὰρ τιμωρητικὸς ὁ πρᾶος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον συγγνωμονικός.

The extremes considered. 1. The defective.

Ἡ δ' ἔλλειψις, εἴτ' ἀοργησία τίς ἐστιν εἴθ' ὅ τι δή ποτε, ψέγεται. οἱ γὰρ μὴ ὀργιζόμενοι ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ ἠλίθιοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, καὶ οἱ μὴ ὡς δεῖ μηδ' ὅτε μηδ' οἷς δεῖ· δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι οὐδὲ λυπεῖσθαι, μὴ ὀργιζόμενός τε οὐκ εἶναι ἀμυντικός. τὸ δὲ προπηλακιζόμενον ἀνέχεσθαι καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους περιορᾶν ἀνδραποδῶδες.

2. The choleric.

Ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ κατὰ πάντα μὲν γίνεται· καὶ γὰρ οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ ἐφ' οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ θᾶττον, καὶ πλείω χρόνον· οὐ μὴν ἅπαντά γε τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει. οὐ γὰρ ἂν δύναιτ' εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ κακὸν καὶ ἑαυτὸ ἀπόλλυσι, κἂν ὁλόκληρον ᾖ, ἀφόρητον γίνεται. οἱ μὲν οὖν ὀργίλοι ταχέως μὲν ὀργίζονται καὶ οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ἐφ' οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, παύονται

8. βούλεται γάρ] Ut supra βούλεται γὰρ ὁ ἄσωτος εἶναι. Id est, *eo est animo mansuetus.* CAM.

21. ἡ δ' ὑπερβολή] See the Rhetoric, i. 2.

ΠΑΘΟΣ,

Mercifulness,

δὲ ταχέως· ὃ καὶ βέλτιστον ἔχουσιν. συμβαίνει δ' αὐτοῖς τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ κατέχουσι τὴν ὀργὴν ἀλλ' ἀνταποδιδόασιν ᾗ φανεροί εἰσι διὰ τὴν ὀξύτητα, εἶτ' ἀποπαύονται. Ὑπερβολῇ δ' εἰσὶν οἱ ἀκρόχολοι ὀξεῖς καὶ πρὸς πᾶν ὀργίλοι καὶ ἐπὶ παντί· ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα. Οἱ δὲ πικροὶ δυσδιάλυτοι, καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ὀργίζονται· κατέχουσι γὰρ τὸν θυμόν. παῦλα δὲ γίνεται, ὅταν ἀνταποδιδῷ· ἡ γὰρ τιμωρία παύει τῆς ὀργῆς, ἡδονὴν ἀντὶ τῆς λύπης ἐμποιοῦσα. τούτου δὲ μὴ γινομένου τὸ βάρος ἔχουσιν· διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἐπιφανὲς εἶναι οὐδὲ συμπείθει αὐτοὺς οὐδείς, ἐν αὐτῷ δὲ πέψαι τὴν ὀργὴν χρόνου δεῖ. εἰσὶ δ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑαυτοῖς ὀχληρότατοι καὶ τοῖς μάλιστα φίλοις. Χαλεποὺς δὲ λέγομεν τοὺς ἐφ' οἷς τε μὴ δεῖ χαλεπαίνοντας καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ πλείω χρόνον, καὶ μὴ διαλλαττομένους ἄνευ τιμωρίας ἢ κολάσεως. Τῇ πραότητι δὲ μᾶλλον τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἀντιτίθεμεν· καὶ γὰρ μᾶλλον γίνεται· ἀνθρωπικώτερον γὰρ τὸ τιμωρεῖ-

Three species of this excess.
1. ἀκρόχολοι.
2. πικροί.
3. χαλεποί.

This extreme further from the mean than the other.

4. ὑπερβολῇ] Aristotle enumerates three species of anger and angry persons. οἱ ἀκρόχολοι—οἱ πικροί—οἱ χαλεποί. The I. (whom we in our language generally term *hasty*) are such as are easily provoked, which is their principal fault, nevertheless they retain their anger but for a short time. The II. the bitter and implacable, are guilty of three faults: first because they retain their anger long and are not satisfied till they have had their revenge; secondly, because they hide their feelings in their own breast, and do not allow the persons who have offended them the means of reconciliation; and thirdly, because they are morose even to their best friends and companions. The III. the violent and savage, which like the former admit of no reconciliation till they have been revenged, who are likewise guilty of two faults besides, first in being angry more than they ought, and secondly in retaining that anger longer than they ought. But they differ from the former, inasmuch as they do not conceal their feelings.

12. πέψαι] Cf. Homer's Il. Α. 81—3.

εἴπερ γάρ τε χόλον γε καὶ αὐτῆμαρ
καταπέψῃ
ἀλλά γε καὶ μετόπισθεν ἔχει κότον
ὄφρα τελέσσῃ.
ἐν στήθεσσιν ἑοῖσι.

ΠΡΑΟΤΗΣ.

Mercifulness.

A slight transgression of the mean not blamed.

σθαι. καὶ πρὸς τὸ συμβιοῦν οἱ χαλεποὶ χείρους. ὃ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρότερον εἴρηται, καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον διορίσαι τὸ πῶς καὶ τίσι καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις καὶ πόσον χρόνον ὀργιστέον, καὶ τὸ μέχρι τίνος ὀρθῶς ποιεῖ τις ἢ ἁμαρτάνει. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ μικρὸν παρεκβαίνων οὐ ψέγεται, οὔτ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον οὔτ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ ἧττον· ἐνίοτε γὰρ τοὺς ἐλλείποντας ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ πράους φαμέν, καὶ τοὺς χαλεπαίνοντας ἀνδρώδεις ὡς δυναμένους ἄρχειν. ὁ δὴ πόσον καὶ πῶς παρεκβαίνων ψεκτός, οὐ ῥᾴδιον τῷ λόγῳ ἀποδοῦναι· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς καθ᾽ ἕκαστα καὶ τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις. ἀλλὰ τό γε τοσοῦτον δῆλον, ὅτι ἡ μὲν μέση ἕξις ἐπαινετή, καθ᾽ ἣν οἷς δεῖ ὀργιζόμεθα καὶ ἐφ᾽ οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, αἱ δ᾽ ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις ψεκταί, καὶ ἐπὶ μικρὸν μὲν γινόμεναι ἠρέμα, ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ μᾶλλον, ἐπὶ πολὺ δὲ σφόδρα. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τῆς μέσης ἕξεως ἀνθεκτέον. αἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν ὀργὴν ἕξεις εἰρήσθωσαν.

CHAP. VI.

THE OFFICIOUS—THE POLITE—THE CONTENTIOUS.

SOCIALITY.

Politeness. The object-matter of these habits. And

ΕΝ δὲ ταῖς ὁμιλίαις καὶ τῷ συζῆν καὶ λόγων 12 καὶ πραγμάτων κοινωνεῖν οἱ μὲν ἄρεσκοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, οἱ πάντα πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ

2. πρότερον] See ii. 6.

6. μικρὸν παρεκβαίνων] Compare p. 79. 5.

CHAP. VI.

The discussion of these virtues is particularly appropriate to the Athenians. See Thuc. ii. 137. sq.

22. ἄρεσκοι] See Theophrast. Charact. v. περὶ ἀρεσκείας.

SOCIALITY.

Politeness. that they are distinguished by the different ends which they have in view.

οὐθὲν ἀντιτείνοντες, ἀλλ' οἰόμενοι δεῖν ἄλυποι τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν εἶναι. οἱ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας τούτοις πρὸς πάντα ἀντιτείνοντες καὶ τοῦ λυπεῖν οὐδ' ὁτιοῦν φροντίζοντες δύσκολοι καὶ δυσέριδες καλοῦνται. ὅτι μὲν οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι ἕξεις ψεκταί εἰσιν, οὐκ ἄδηλον, καὶ ὅτι ἡ μέση τούτων ἐπαινετή, καθ' ἣν ἀποδέξεται ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δυσχερανεῖ. ὄνομα δ' οὐκ ἀποδέδοται αὐτῇ τι, ἔοικε δὲ μάλιστα φιλίᾳ· τοιοῦτος γάρ ἐστιν ὁ κατὰ τὴν μέσην ἕξιν οἷον βουλόμεθα λέγειν τὸν ἐπιεικῆ φίλον, τὸ στέργειν προσλαβόντα. διαφέρει δὲ τῆς φιλίας, ὅτι ἄνευ πάθους ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ στέργειν οἷς ὁμιλεῖ· οὐ γὰρ τῷ φιλεῖν ἢ ἐχθαίρειν ἀποδέχεται ἕκαστα ὡς δεῖ, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιοῦτος εἶναι. ὁμοίως γὰρ πρὸς ἀγνῶτας καὶ γνωρίμους καὶ συνήθεις καὶ ἀσυνήθεις αὐτὸ ποιήσει, πλὴν καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις ὡς ἁρμόζει· οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως προσήκει συνήθων καὶ ὀθνείων φροντίζειν, οὐδ' αὖ λυπεῖν.

Of Politeness.

Καθόλου μὲν οὖν εἴρηται ὅτι ὡς δεῖ ὁμιλήσει, ἀναφέρων δὲ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον στοχάσεται τοῦ μὴ λυπεῖν ἢ συνηδύνειν. ἔοικε μὲν γὰρ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας εἶναι τὰς ἐν ταῖς ὁμιλίαις γινομένας, τούτων δ' ὅσας μὲν αὐτῷ ἐστὶ μὴ καλὸν ἢ βλαβερὸν συνηδύνειν, δυσχερανεῖ, καὶ προαιρήσεται λυπεῖν. κἂν τῷ ποιοῦντι δ' ἀσχημοσύνην φέρῃ, καὶ ταύτην μὴ μικράν, ἢ βλάβην, ἡ δ' ἐναντίωσις μικρὰν λύπην, οὐκ ἀποδέξεται ἀλλὰ δυσχερανεῖ. διαφερόντως δ' ὁμιλήσει τοῖς

11. διαφέρει] Præstat hic habitus amicitiæ, quæ quidem non ipsa virtus inter instrumenta tantum virtutis numeratur, quum amore ductus, non ratione, amicus recte agat. MICH.

SOCIALITY.

Politeness.

ἐν ἀξιώμασι καὶ τοῖς τυχοῦσι, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἧττον γνωρίμοις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας διαφοράς, ἑκάστοις ἀπονέμων τὸ πρέπον, καὶ καθ' αὑτὸ μὲν αἱρούμενος τὸ συνηδύνειν, λυπεῖν δ' εὐλαβούμενος, τοῖς δ' ἀποβαίνουσιν, ἐὰν ᾖ μείζω, συνεπόμενος, λέγω δὲ τῷ καλῷ καὶ τῷ συμφέροντι. καὶ ἡδονῆς δ' ἕνεκα τῆς εἰσαῦθις μεγάλης μικρὰ λυπήσει.

The extremes.

Ὁ μὲν οὖν μέσος τοιοῦτός ἐστιν, οὐκ ὠνόμασται δέ, τοῦ δὲ συνηδύνοντος ὁ μὲν τοῦ ἡδὺς εἶναι στοχαζόμενος μὴ δι' ἄλλο τι ἄρεσκος, ὁ δ' ὅπως ὠφέλειά τις αὐτῷ γίγνηται εἰς χρήματα καὶ ὅσα διὰ χρημάτων, κόλαξ· ὁ δὲ πᾶσι δυσχεραίνων εἴρηται ὅτι δύσκολος καὶ δύσερις. ἀντικεῖσθαι δὲ φαίνεται τὰ ἄκρα ἑαυτοῖς διὰ τὸ ἀνώνυμον εἶναι τὸ μέσον.

CHAP. VII.

THE VAIN-GLORIOUS—THE SINCERE—THE SELF-DETRACTOR.

SOCIALITY.

Sincerity. The object-matter of these habits.

ΠΕΡΙ τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ σχεδόν ἐστι καὶ ἡ τῆς ἀλα- 13
ζονείας μεσότης· ἀνώνυμος δὲ καὶ αὐτή. οὐ χεῖρον δὲ καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐπελθεῖν· μᾶλλόν τε γὰρ ἂν εἰδείημεν τὰ περὶ τὸ ἦθος, καθ' ἕκαστον διελθόντες, καὶ μεσότητας εἶναι τὰς ἀρετὰς πιστεύσαιμεν ἄν, ἐπὶ πάντων οὕτως ἔχον συνιδόντες. ἐν δὴ τῷ συζῆν οἱ μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ὁμιλοῦντες

Chap. VII.

Aristotle now proceeds to discuss another class of habits, which are concerned with the conversation and intercourse of daily life. To express the mean of these habits, the Greek possesses no appropriate term, although we may very well define it by the words *sincerity* or *candour*. Being that virtue which neither exaggerates nor extenuates its own merits.

SOCIALITY.

Sincerity.

εἴρηνται, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀληθευόντων τε καὶ ψευδομένων εἴπωμεν ὁμοίως ἐν λόγοις καὶ πράξεσι καὶ τῷ προσποιήματι. δοκεῖ δὴ ὁ μὲν ἀλαζὼν προσποιητικὸς τῶν ἐνδόξων εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὑπαρχόντων καὶ μειζόνων ἢ ὑπάρχει, ὁ δὲ εἴρων ἀνάπαλιν ἀρνεῖσθαι τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἢ ἐλάττω ποιεῖν, ὁ δὲ μέσος αὐθέκαστός τις ὢν ἀληθευτικὸς καὶ τῷ βίῳ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ὁμολογῶν εἶναι περὶ αὑτόν, καὶ οὔτε μείζω οὔτε ἐλάττω. ἔστι δὲ τούτων ἕκαστα καὶ ἕνεκά τινος ποιεῖν καὶ μηθενός. ἕκαστος δ' οἷός ἐστι, τοιαῦτα λέγει καὶ πράττει καὶ οὕτω ζῇ, ἐὰν μή τινος ἕνεκα πράττῃ. καθ' αὑτὸ δὲ τὸ μὲν ψεῦδος φαῦλον καὶ ψεκτόν, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς καλὸν καὶ ἐπαινετόν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀληθευτικὸς μέσος ὢν ἐπαινετός, οἱ δὲ ψευδόμενοι ἀμφότεροι μὲν ψεκτοί, μᾶλλον δ' ὁ ἀλαζών. Περὶ ἑκατέρου δ' εἴπωμεν, πρότερον δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἀληθευτικοῦ. οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐν ταῖς ὁμολογίαις ἀληθεύοντος λέγομεν, οὐδ' ὅσα εἰς ἀδικίαν ἢ δικαιοσύνην συντείνει (ἄλλης γὰρ ἂν εἴη ταῦτ' ἀρετῆς), ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς μηθενὸς τοιούτου διαφέροντος καὶ ἐν λόγῳ καὶ ἐν βίῳ ἀληθεύει τῷ τὴν ἕξιν τοιοῦτος εἶναι. δόξειε δ' ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐπιεικὴς εἶναι. ὁ γὰρ φιλαλήθης, καὶ ἐν οἷς μὴ διαφέρει ἀληθεύων, ἀληθεύσει καὶ ἐν οἷς διαφέρει ἔτι μᾶλλον· ὡς γὰρ

The sincere described.

5. εἴρων] Recessit paulo longius in hoc vitio describendo Theophrastus a magistro. Non enim apud eum εἰρωνία cap. i. tam lenis est dissimulatio, qualis ille Socraticus lusus, quem eundem et Aristoteles hoc loco intelligit, sed potius aliquanto robustior nequitia simulantis quidvis et dissimulantis, nec per jocum nec satis modeste, sed ut alteri incommodet. Copiosus in hoc discrimine explicando est Casaubonus. ZELL.

7. αὐθέκαστος] See Zell's note upon this passage.

SOCIALITY.

Sincerity.

αἰσχρὸν τὸ ψεῦδος εὐλαβήσεται, ὅ γε καὶ καθ' αὑτὸ ηὐλαβεῖτο· ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἐπαινετός. ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀποκλίνει· ἐμμελέστερον γὰρ φαίνεται διὰ τὸ ἐπαχθεῖς τὰς ὑπερβολὰς εἶναι.

The vain-glorious.

Ὁ δὲ μείζω τῶν ὑπαρχόντων προσποιούμενος μηθενὸς ἕνεκα φαύλῳ μὲν ἔοικεν (οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔχαιρε τῷ ψεύδει), μάταιος δὲ φαίνεται μᾶλλον ἢ κακός. εἰ δ' ἕνεκά τινος, ὁ μὲν δόξης ἢ τιμῆς οὐ λίαν ψεκτός, ὡς ὁ ἀλαζών, ὁ δὲ ἀργυρίου, ἢ ὅσα εἰς ἀργύριον, ἀσχημονέστερος. οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἀλαζών, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει· κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν γὰρ καὶ τῷ τοιόσδε εἶναι ἀλαζών ἐστιν, ὥσπερ καὶ ψεύστης ὁ μὲν τῷ ψεύδει αὐτῷ χαίρων, ὁ δὲ δόξης ὀρεγόμενος ἢ κέρδους. οἱ μὲν οὖν δόξης χάριν ἀλαζονευόμενοι τὰ τοιαῦτα προσποιοῦνται ἐφ' οἷς ἔπαινος ἢ εὐδαιμονισμός, οἱ δὲ κέρδους, ὧν καὶ ἀπόλαυσίς ἐστι τοῖς πέλας καὶ ἃ διαλαθεῖν ἔστι μὴ ὄντα, οἷον μάντιν σοφὸν ἢ ἰατρόν. διὰ τοῦτο οἱ πλεῖστοι προσποιοῦνται τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ἀλαζονεύονται· ἔστι γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὰ εἰρημένα.

The self-detractor.

Οἱ δ' εἴρωνες ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον λέγοντες χαριέστεροι μὲν τὰ ἤθη φαίνονται· οὐ γὰρ κέρδους ἕνεκα δοκοῦσι λέγειν, ἀλλὰ

5. ὁ δὲ μείζω] See Theophrast. Charact. xxiii. περὶ ἀλαζονείας.

11. ἐν τῇ δυνάμει—προαιρέσει] Arrogance consists in the principle and determination, and not in the power of boasting. Just as the liar. For a liar is not he who can but who will tell a lie. And, equally as the arrogant, he is guilty of this fault either because he delights in a lie, or for the sake of glory or gain. For the sake of glory he pretends to the goods of nature or chance, as beauty, riches, and the like; for sake of gain to those things which bring pleasure to others, the reality of which is not easily detected. The first are foolish rather than vicious, or rather are both foolish, and, in some degree, vicious. The latter still worse, not indeed as far as this habit is concerned, but because they are also unjust.

φεύγοντες τὸ ὀγκηρόν· μάλιστα δὲ καὶ οὗτοι τὰ ἔνδοξα ἀπαρνοῦνται, οἷον καὶ Σωκράτης ἐποίει. οἱ δὲ καὶ τὰ μικρὰ καὶ τὰ φανερὰ προσποιούμενοι βαυκοπανοῦργοι λέγονται καὶ εὐκαταφρόνητοί εἰσιν. καὶ ἐνίοτε ἀλαζονεία φαίνεται, οἷον ἡ τῶν Λακώνων ἐσθής· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ λίαν ἔλλειψις ἀλαζονικόν. οἱ δὲ μετρίως χρώμενοι τῇ εἰρωνείᾳ καὶ περὶ τὰ μὴ λίαν ἐμποδὼν καὶ φανερὰ εἰρωνευόμενοι χαρίεντες φαίνονται. ἀντικεῖσθαι δ' ὁ ἀλαζὼν φαίνεται τῷ ἀληθευτικῷ· χείρων γάρ. SOCIALITY. — Sincerity.

CHAP. VIII.

THE BUFFOON—THE WIT—THE ASCETICAL.

14 ΟΥΣΗΣ δὲ καὶ ἀναπαύσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ, καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ διαγωγῆς μετὰ παιδιᾶς, δοκεῖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα εἶναι ὁμιλία τις ἐμμελής, καὶ οἷα δεῖ λέγειν καὶ ὥς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀκούειν. διοίσει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐν τοιούτοις λέγειν ἢ τοιούτων ἀκούειν. δῆλον δ' ὡς καὶ περὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ὑπερβολή τε καὶ ἔλλειψις SOCIALITY. — Wit. The object-matter of these habits.

2. Σωκράτης] The εἰρωνεία of Socrates appears to be the ironical manner in which he always extenuates his abilities when arguing with the Sophists. This might readily be confirmed by numerous passages, but the subject cannot be easily discussed within the compass of a note.

On self-detraction, or self-blame, Lord Chesterfield has some very good remarks.

4. βαυκοπανοῦργοι] βαυκοπανούργους φησίν, ὡς ἐν ἀπὸ ἑνὸς εἰπεῖν, τοὺς σεμνοπανούργους. βαῦκον γὰρ ἔλεγον οἱ παλαιοὶ τὸν τρυφερόν· μετενηνέχθαι δ' ἔοικε τὸ ὄνομα ἀπὸ τῶν βαυκίδων ὅ ἐστιν εἶδος ὑποδημάτων Ἰωνικῶν. Aspas.

6. Λακώνων] οἱ Λάκωνες ἐσθῆτας εἶχον διηκούσας μόνον ἄχρι γονάτων καὶ ἀγκώνων. τοῦτο δὲ ἐποίουν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐγκράτειάν τινα καὶ μετριότητα ἐπιδεικνύμενοι. διὰ δὲ τὴν σφόδρα εὐτέλειαν τὴν τῆς ἀλαζονείας δόξαν οὐ διαπεφεύγασι. Schol. Par. quoted by ZELL.

SOCIALITY.

Wit.

The mean and extremes generally considered.

τοῦ μέσου. Οἱ μὲν οὖν τῷ γελοίῳ ὑπερβάλλοντες βωμολόχοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ φορτικοί, γλιχόμενοι πάντως τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ μᾶλλον στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ γέλωτα ποιῆσαι ἢ τοῦ λέγειν εὐσχήμονα καὶ μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν σκωπτόμενον· οἱ δὲ μήτ' αὐτοὶ ἂν εἰπόντες μηθὲν γελοῖον τοῖς τε λέγουσι δυσχεραίνοντες ἄγριοι καὶ σκληροὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. οἱ δ' ἐμμελῶς παίζοντες εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται, οἷον εὔτροποι· τοῦ γὰρ ἤθους αἱ τοιαῦται δοκοῦσι κινήσεις εἶναι, ὥσπερ δὲ τὰ σώματα ἐκ τῶν κινήσεων κρίνεται, οὕτω καὶ τὰ ἤθη.

Buffoonery and wit often confounded.

Ἐπιπολάζοντος δὲ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ τῶν πλείστων χαιρόντων τῇ παιδιᾷ καὶ τῷ σκώπτειν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ οἱ βωμολόχοι εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται ὡς χαρίεντες. ὅτι δὲ διαφέρουσι, καὶ οὐ μικρόν, ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλον.

The mean particularly described.

Τῇ μέσῃ δ' ἕξει οἰκεῖον καὶ ἡ ἐπιδεξιότης ἐστίν· τοῦ δ' ἐπιδεξίου ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα λέγειν καὶ ἀκούειν οἷα

2. *βωμολόχοι*] Cur Græcis dicantur Scurræ *βωμολόχοι*, varia redditur ratio. Scholiastes Græcus *βωμολόχους* proprie ait esse aves, quæ cibi avidissimæ soleant etiam *λοχᾷν τοῖς βωμοῖς*, captantes si quid ex hostiis in iis reliquiarum remanserit, et hinc dictos et Scurras hoc nomine, quasi ut aves illæ undique cibum, ita et Scurræ undique captent risum. Ex Suida hanc verbi rationem et originem elicio: *βωμολόχους* proprie esse, qui dum victimæ immolentur iis astant emendicantes particulam aut dolo captantes, qui, quia de plebe et viles fere fuerint, hinc factum ut omnes viliores et nullius rei homines dicantur *βωμολόχοι*, qui rursus mendici hostiarum, quia blandis verbis, et risum sacrificanti moventibus uterentur, ut facilius quid impetrarent. Hinc factum ut quicumque ridiculis uterentur dicerentur *βωμολόχοι*. GIPH.

5. *οἱ δὲ μήτ'*]

Now by two-headed Janus,
Nature hath framed strange-fellows in her time:
Some that will evermore peep through their eyes,
And laugh like parrots at a bagpiper;
And others of such vinegar aspéct,
That they'll not show their teeth in way of smile
Though Nestor swear the jest be laughable.

Merch. of Venice, I. 1.

SOCIALITY.

Wit.

τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ καὶ ἐλευθερίῳ ἁρμόττει· ἔστι γάρ τινα πρέποντα τῷ τοιούτῳ λέγειν ἐν παιδιᾶς μέρει καὶ ἀκούειν, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου παιδιὰ διαφέρει τῆς τοῦ ἀνδραποδώδους, καὶ αὖ τοῦ πεπαιδευμένου καὶ ἀπαιδεύτου. ἴδοι δ' ἄν τις καὶ ἐκ τῶν κωμῳδιῶν τῶν παλαιῶν καὶ τῶν καινῶν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἦν γελοῖον ἡ αἰσχρολογία, τοῖς δὲ μᾶλλον ἡ ὑπόνοια· διαφέρει δ' οὐ μικρὸν ταῦτα πρὸς εὐσχημοσύνην. πότερον οὖν τὸν εὖ σκώπτοντα ὁριστέον τῷ λέγειν ἃ πρέπει ἐλευθερίῳ, ἢ τῷ μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν ἀκούοντα, ἢ καὶ τέρπειν; ἢ καὶ τό γε τοιοῦτον ἀόριστον; ἄλλο γὰρ ἄλλῳ μισητόν τε καὶ ἡδύ. τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ ἀκούσεται· ἃ γὰρ ὑπομένει ἀκούων, ταῦτα καὶ ποιεῖν δοκεῖ. οὐ δὴ πᾶν ποιήσει· τὸ γὰρ σκῶμμα λοιδόρημά τί ἐστιν, οἱ δὲ νομοθέται ἔνια λοιδορεῖν κωλύουσιν· ἔδει δ' ἴσως καὶ σκώπτειν. ὁ δὴ χαρίεις καὶ ἐλευθέριος οὕτως ἕξει, οἷον νόμος ὢν ἑαυτῷ. τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μέσος ἐστίν, εἴτ' ἐπιδέξιος εἴτ' εὐτράπελος λέγεται. Ὁ δὲ βωμολόχος ἥττων ἐστὶ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεχόμενος, εἰ γέλωτα ποιήσει, καὶ τοιαῦτα λέγων ὧν οὐθὲν ἂν εἴποι ὁ χαρίεις, ἔνια δ' οὐδ' ἂν ἀκοῦσαι. ὁ δ' ἄγριος εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας ὁμιλίας ἀχρεῖος· οὐθὲν γὰρ συμβαλλόμενος πᾶσι δυσχεραίνει. δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ ἀνάπαυσις καὶ ἡ παιδιὰ ἐν τῷ βίῳ εἶναι ἀναγκαῖον. τρεῖς οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι ἐν τῷ βίῳ μεσότητες, εἰσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι περὶ λόγων τινῶν καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν. διαφέρουσι δ' ὅτι ἡ μὲν

The extremes compared.

5. τῶν κωμῳδιῶν] See Hor. Ars Poet. 281. sq. The reader may compare the annals of dramatic poetry in our own country, in the times of Charles II. and George I.

25. ἀνάπαυσις] Compare x. 4.

SOCIALITY. — Wit.

περὶ ἀλήθειάν ἐστιν, αἱ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ. τῶν δὲ περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἡ μὲν ἐν ταῖς παιδιαῖς, ἡ δ' ἐν ταῖς κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον βίον ὁμιλίαις.

CHAP. IX.

BASHFULNESS.

Bashfulness not a habit.

ΠΕΡΙ δὲ αἰδοῦς ὥς τινος ἀρετῆς οὐ προσήκει 15 λέγειν· πάθει γὰρ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἢ ἕξει. ὁρίζεται γοῦν φόβος τις ἀδοξίας, ἀποτελεῖται δὲ τῷ περὶ τὰ δεινὰ φόβῳ παραπλήσιον· ἐρυθραίνονται γὰρ οἱ αἰσχυνόμενοι, οἱ δὲ τὸν θάνατον φοβούμενοι ὠχριῶσιν. σωματικὰ δὴ φαίνεταί πως εἶναι ἀμφότερα, ὅπερ δοκεῖ πάθους μᾶλλον ἢ ἕξεως εἶναι. οὐ πάσῃ δ' ἡλικίᾳ τὸ πάθος ἁρμόζει, ἀλλὰ τῇ νέᾳ· οἰόμεθα γὰρ δεῖν τοὺς τηλικούτους αἰδήμονας εἶναι διὰ τὸ πάθει ζῶντας πολλὰ ἁμαρτάνειν, ὑπὸ τῆς αἰδοῦς δὲ κωλύεσθαι. καὶ ἐπαινοῦμεν τῶν μὲν νέων τοὺς αἰδήμονας, πρεσβύτερον δ' οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐπαινέσειεν ὅτι αἰσχυντηλός· οὐθὲν γὰρ οἰόμεθα δεῖν αὐτὸν πράττειν ἐφ' οἷς ἐστὶν αἰσχύνη. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπιεικοῦς ἐστὶν ἡ αἰσχύνη, εἴπερ γίγνεται ἐπὶ τοῖς φαύλοις· οὐ γὰρ πρακτέον τὰ τοιαῦτα: εἰ δ' ἐστὶ

4. περὶ δὲ αἰδοῦς] In hoc capite agitur de verecundia seu pudore, utrum etiam sit in numero moralium virtutum recensenda. Cicero quidem in Partition. Oratoriis post enumerationem aliarum virtutum, eam postremo loco recenset, et non virtutem nominat, sed eam dicit esse custodem omnium virtutum, quæ dedecus fugit et laudem sequitur. Plutarchus pudorem non virtutem, sed calcar et stimulum ad omnem virtutem esse dicit. Plato in Protagora inquit, deum hominibus donasse pudorem et justitiam ut essent civitatum ornamenta et vincula et altrices amicitiæ. MAG.

6. ἀδοξίας] See the Rhetoric, ii. 6.

τὰ μὲν κατ' ἀλήθειαν αἰσχρὰ τὰ δὲ κατὰ δόξαν, οὐθὲν διαφέρει· οὐδέτερα γὰρ πρακτέα, ὥστ' οὐκ αἰσχυντέον. φαύλου δὲ καὶ τὸ εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἷον πράττειν τι τῶν αἰσχρῶν. τὸ δ' οὕτως ἔχειν ὥστ' εἰ πράξειέ τι τῶν τοιούτων αἰσχύνεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' οἴεσθαι ἐπιεικῆ εἶναι, ἄτοπον· ἐπὶ τοῖς ἑκουσίοις γὰρ ἡ αἰδώς, ἑκὼν δὲ ὁ ἐπιεικὴς οὐδέποτε πράξει τὰ φαῦλα. εἴη δ' ἂν ἡ αἰδὼς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἐπιεικές· εἰ γὰρ πράξαι, αἰσχύνοιτ' ἄν· οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς. εἰ δ' ἡ ἀναισχυντία φαῦλον καὶ τὸ μὴ αἰδεῖσθαι τὰ αἰσχρὰ πράττειν, οὐθὲν μᾶλλον τὸ τοιαῦτα πράττοντα αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐπιεικές. οὐκ ἔστι δ' οὐδ' ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἀρετή, ἀλλά τις μικτή· δειχθήσεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον. νῦν δὲ περὶ δικαιοσύνης εἴπωμεν.

11. ἀναισχυντία] See Theophrast. Charact. ix. περὶ ἀναισχυντίας.

14. ὕστερον] In the seventh Book.

INTRODUCTION TO BOOK V.

As in order to arrive at a knowledge of the species, we must first consider individuals[a], in other words, to know the abstract we must first consider the concrete, so to discover the nature of *Justice* (δικαιοσύνη), we must first consider that of *just actions* (δίκαια); and if we learn what these are, we shall learn what are *unjust actions* (ἄδικα), and consequently what is *Injustice* (ἀδικία); for the same science is of contraries, though the same habit (ἕξις) is not[b].

If then the concrete (δίκαια) be used in more senses than one, so will the abstract (δικαιοσύνη), and so will their opposites ἄδικα and ἀδικία: and if the latter so also the former. The terms ἄδικα or ἄδικος are used in more senses than one, for they imply one who transgresses the laws (παράνομος), and also one who in the distribution of this world's goods gives less and takes more than he ought (ἄνισος). Gives less, not that he always absolutely gives less, for when evils are to be shared he gives the greater evil to his neighbour; nevertheless as the greater evil is the less good, he may be said always to give less good.

[a] αἰεὶ δ' ἐστὶ πᾶς ὅρος καθόλου· οὐ γάρ τινι ὀφθαλμῷ λέγει τὸ ὑγιεινὸν ὁ ἰατρός, ἀλλ' ἢ παντὶ ἢ εἴδει ἀφορίσας. ῥᾷόν τε τὸ καθέκαστον ὁρίσασθαι ἢ τὸ καθόλου. διὸ δεῖ ἀπὸ τῶν καθέκαστον ἐπὶ τὰ καθόλου μεταβαίνειν. καὶ γὰρ αἱ ὁμωνυμίαι λανθάνουσι μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς καθόλου ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἀδιαφόροις. Analyt. Post. ii. 12, 23. The whole chapter deserves the most attentive perusal by those who wish to be acquainted with the admirable method by which Aristotle proceeds to investigate his definitions.

[b] See note, p. 170, 6.

Since then the ἄδικος is he who is παράνομος and ἄνισος, Injustice will be, an ἕξις παράνομος and an ἕξις πλεονεκτική. Consequently Justice will be an ἕξις νομίμη, (observant of the laws), and an ἕξις ἐν ἰσότητι or ἴση, (observant of equality).

But since the laws inculcate the practice of universal Virtue, and forbid all Vice, an ἕξις νομίμη is that which is observant of universal Virtue: and therefore this Justice, which is termed *universal*, will not differ from Virtue, except in being relative, Virtue having regard only to one's self, but Justice having reference to others as well as to one's self. And therefore all further discussion of this division is needless, having been already included in the consideration of Virtue.

It remains then for us to discuss the other division of Justice, which is a part of the former, bearing the same relation to it as a species to a genus, or a part to a whole, and therefore called *particular justice* (μερικὴ δικαιοσύνη.)

Now the class of actions upon which this is employed, is the distribution and division of this world's good, for when a man is just or unjust with respect to other actions, that kind of Justice or Injustice is expressed by a word specifying the particular act. Thus if a man commits adultery he is called an adulterer, but if he is guilty of this crime to obtain money by it, he is rather called πλεονέκτης, sc. ἄδικος. It is clear, therefore, that the μερικὴ ἀδικία, and μερικὴ δικαιοσύνη are used in a different sense from the ὅλη ἀδικία &c. the one, namely the former, being on all actions, the latter upon those only which regard this world's goods.

Now since men stand in two relations in this life, one in relation to the state, the other, in relation to each other as individuals, there will likewise be two kinds of Justice, one belonging to the former, the other to the latter. The first of these is distinguished by the name of *Distributive Justice*, the latter of *Corrective Justice*. The former regulating the rewards or punishments issued by the State, the latter the voluntary or

involuntary dealings of one man, in his private relation, with another.


Now since in the distribution of the State-rewards regard must be had to the merits of Individuals to be rewarded, (and that merit is measured by their ἀξία, according to the degree in which they contribute to the object of the state,) this Justice must observe two ratios; a ratio of the persons to be rewarded, and a ratio of the rewards to be distributed. That is, if the persons be unequal they shall receive unequal rewards, and if equal, equal; and so on. But that proportion which consists of two ratios is Geometrical Proportion; consequently the *Distributive Justice* must be according to Geometrical Proportion, and the rules which apply to one, will apply to the other. Thus let A, B, be two persons, *a*, *b*, the rewards they are respectively to receive. Then

$$A : B :: a : b$$
$$A : a :: B : b$$
$$A + a : a :: B + b : b$$
$$\text{or } A + a : A :: B + b : B.$$

That is, A rewarded is to his original state as B rewarded is to his original state.

But in the case of *Corrective Justice*, no regard is had to the persons of the Individuals who have done or received the wrong, for in this case all in the eye of the law are equal. When injustice therefore has been committed in the private dealings of men, and one man has more and the other less than he ought, their original ratio is lost, and this the law strives to correct, by reducing the injured and injuring party to their original state, or to a similar ratio as before. It merely therefore considers one ratio, that of the things, and consequently acts according to Arithmetical Proportion; by how much the greater exceeds the middle term, taking from it and adding to the less. For by how much the less falls short, the greater exceeds the middle.

The following Analysis will more clearly show the divisions of these habits.



The following passage from Plato will shew how much in the treatment of this subject Aristotle was indebted to his suggestion. *ἡ μὲν αἵρεσις οὕτω γιγνομένη μέσον ἂν ἔχοι μοναρχικῆς καὶ δημοκρατικῆς πολιτείας, ἧς ἀεὶ δεῖ μεσεύειν τὴν πολιτείαν· δοῦλοι γὰρ ἂν καὶ δεσπόται οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιντο φίλοι, οὐδὲ ἐν ἴσαις τιμαῖς διαγορευόμενοι φαῦλοι καὶ σπουδαῖοι. τοῖς γὰρ ἀνίσοις τὰ ἴσα ἄνισα γίγνοιτ' ἄν, εἰ μὴ τυγχάνοι τοῦ μέτρου. διὰ γὰρ ἀμφότερα ταῦτα στάσεων αἱ πολιτεῖαι πληροῦνται. παλαιὸς γὰρ λόγος ἀληθὴς ὤν, ὡς ἰσότης φιλότητα ἀπεργάζεται, μάλα μὲν ὀρθῶς εἴρηται καὶ ἐμμελῶς, ἥ τις δ' ἐστί ποτε ἰσότης ἡ τοῦτο αὐτὸ δυναμένη, διὰ τὸ μὴ σφόδρα σαφὴς εἶναι σφόδρα ἡμᾶς διαταράττει. δυοῖν γὰρ ἰσοτήτοιν οὔσαιν, ὁμωνύμοιν μέν, ἔργῳ δὲ εἰς πολλὰ σχεδὸν ἐναντίαιν, τὴν μὲν ἑτέραν εἰς τὰς τιμὰς πᾶσα πόλις ἱκανὴ παραγαγεῖν καὶ πᾶς νομοθέτης, τὴν μέτρῳ ἴσην καὶ σταθμῷ καὶ ἀριθμῷ*[a], *κλήρῳ ἀπευθύνων εἰς τὰς διανομὰς αὐτήν· τὴν δὲ ἀληθεστάτην καὶ ἀρίστην ἰσότητα οὐκέτι ῥᾴδιον παντὶ ἰδεῖν*[b]. *Διὸς γὰρ δὴ κρίσις ἐστί, καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀεὶ σμικρὰ μὲν ἐπαρκεῖ, πᾶν δὲ ὅσον ἂν ἐπαρκέσῃ πόλεσιν ἢ καὶ ἰδιώταις, πάντ' ἀγαθὰ ἀπεργάζεται· τῷ μὲν γὰρ μείζονι πλείω, τῷ δὲ ἐλάττονι σμικρότερα νέμει, μέτρια διδοῦσα πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν ἑκατέρῳ, καὶ δὴ καὶ τιμὰς μείζοσι μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀεὶ μείζους, τοῖς δὲ τοὐναντίον ἔχουσιν ἀρετῆς τε καὶ παιδείας τὸ πρέπον ἑκα-*

[a] Arithmetical Proportion. [b] Geometrical Proportion.

τέροις ἀπονέμει κατὰ λόγον. ἔστι γὰρ δή που καὶ τὸ πολιτικὸν ἡμῖν ἀεὶ τοῦτ' αὐτὸ τὸ δίκαιον[c].

The rest of this book is then employed in the discussion of certain questions relative to the definition, and explaining the difference between the actions done from habit and not from habit, which will be better understood by consulting the following table.

RELATIVE HABITS.

Particular Justice and Injustice.

Extreme on the side of excess.	Mean.	Extreme on the side of defect.
τὸ πλέον.	τὸ μέσον or ἴσον.	τὸ ἔλαττον.
ἀδικία, the habit.	δικαιοσύνη, the habit.	No habit.
ἄδικον.	δίκαιον.	ἄδικον.
ἄδικος.	δίκαιος.	ἀδικούμενος.
ἀδίκημα, the act.	δικαιοπράγημα, the act.	ἄδικόν τι or πως.
ἀδικεῖν—must always suppose an ἀδικούμενος.	δικαιοπραγεῖν.	ἀδικεῖσθαι—must always suppose an ἄδικος.
No habit.	No habit.	No habit.
μὴ ἐκ προαιρέσεως.	μὴ ἐκ προαιρέσεως.	μὴ ἐκ προαιρέσεως.
ἄδικός πως.	δίκαιός πως, more correctly δικαιούμενος, reduced to justice or equality.	ἀδικούμενός πως, more correctly, βλαπτόμενος.
ἀδικόν τι, or πως, or βλαβή, the act.	δικαίωμα or δίκαιόν τι, the act.	ἀδικόν τι or βλαβή, the sufferance.
ἀδικεῖ πως, or ἄδικα πράττει κατὰ συμβεβηκός.	δίκαια πράττει πως or κατὰ συμβεβηκός.	ἄδικα πάσχει πως or κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

But
κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς is,

βίᾳ. | ἀγνοούμενον. | μὴ ἀγνοούμενον, or εἰδὼς μὴ προβουλεύσας δέ, sc. διὰ θυμὸν καὶ ἄλλα πάθη.

ἀγνοούμενον: ἀτύχημα. παραλόγως. | ἁμάρτημα. μὴ παραλόγως.

(βίᾳ and ἀτύχημα): ἡ ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν.

(ἁμάρτημα and μὴ ἀγνοούμενον): ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐκ προαιρέσεως.

[c] De Legg. p. 757. See also Gorg. p. 508.

ARISTOTELIS

ETHICA NICOMACHEA.

LIB. V.

CHAP. I.

Of Justice and Injustice. That there is a universal and a particular Justice and Injustice.

The meaning of the terms applied to these habits and their acts, examined and defined.

ΠΕΡΙ δὲ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας σκεπτέον, περὶ ποίας τε τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι πράξεις, καὶ ποία μεσότης ἐστὶν ἡ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τίνων μέσον. ἡ δὲ σκέψις ἡμῖν ἔστω κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν μέθοδον τοῖς προειρημένοις. ὁρῶμεν δὴ πάντας τὴν τοιαύτην ἕξιν βουλομένους λέγειν δικαιοσύνην, ἀφ' ἧς πρακτικοὶ τῶν δικαίων εἰσὶ καὶ ἀφ' ἧς δικαιοπραγοῦσι καὶ βούλονται τὰ δίκαια· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ ἀδικίας,

Chap. I.

The thirty-third Chapter of the first Book of the Magna Moralia, contains a very clear and intelligible analysis of the important parts of this book.

8. ἀφ' ἧς δικαιοπραγοῦσι καὶ βούλονται τὰ δίκαια] *From which they do just acts, and have the will to do them.* Aristotle adds the *will*, in order to separate them from the *intellectual* habits, into which the will does not enter as a component part. He who possesses the science of medicine, whether he will exercise it or whether he will forbear, still possesses the intellectual habit, the science; but he only possesses the moral habits of justice or temperance, not who *can* but who has the *will* to exercise them.

ἀφ' ἧς ἀδικοῦσι καὶ βούλονται τὰ ἄδικα. διὸ καὶ ἡμῖν πρῶτον ὡς ἐν τύπῳ ὑποκείσθω ταῦτα. οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει τρόπον ἐπί τε τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ δυνάμεων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἕξεων. δύναμις μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι, ἕξις δ' ἡ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων οὔ, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς ὑγιείας οὐ πράττεται τὰ ἐναντία, ἀλλὰ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ μόνον· λέγομεν γὰρ ὑγιεινῶς βαδίζειν, ὅταν βαδίζῃ ὡς ἂν ὁ ὑγιαίνων. Πολλάκις μὲν οὖν γνωρίζεται ἡ ἐναντία ἕξις ἀπὸ τῆς ἐναντίας, πολλάκις δὲ αἱ ἕξεις ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων· ἐάν τε γὰρ ἡ εὐεξία ᾖ φανερά, καὶ ἡ καχεξία φανερὰ γίνεται, καὶ ἐκ τῶν εὐεκτικῶν ἡ εὐεξία καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τὰ εὐεκτικά. εἰ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ εὐεξία πυκνότης σαρκός, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν καχεξίαν εἶναι μανότητα σαρκὸς καὶ τὸ εὐεκτικὸν τὸ ποιητικὸν πυκνότητος ἐν σαρκί. ἀκολουθεῖ δ' ὡς

That the nature of one habit may be discovered from its contrary habit, and both from their *subjects*.

4. *ἐπιστημῶν καὶ δυνάμεων*] *δυνάμεις λέγει τὴν διαλεκτικὴν καὶ ῥητορικήν. ἐπιστήμας δὲ μουσικὴν καὶ ἰατρικήν.* Schol. *Ἐπιστήμη* is not here used in the strict sense to which Aristotle afterwards confines it.

6. *ἕξις δ' ἡ ἐναντία*] He who possesses the science of physic knows and can administer whatever is conducive to health or to disease, for his science takes cognizance of both, of opposites, and is employed upon both. But the same habit is not employed upon contraries, cannot produce contrary *ἔργα*. Healthy acts can only proceed from a healthy habit, unhealthy acts from an unhealthy habit. He only who has the habit of justice can perform just acts, and he only who has the habit of injustice perform unjust acts, neither *quoad* the habit can the just man perform acts of injustice, nor the unjust man acts of justice. Consequently *just* acts must be performed by a just man, and if we know one, we may from it discover the other, and *vice versa*. A very learned dissertation upon the word *δύναμις*, and its particular use in Aristotle, will be found in Trendelenburg's Edition of Arist. De Anima, p. 295.

11. *ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων*] Ab iis rebus quæ pariunt eos et quæ sunt tamquam fundamenta strataque illorum. Victor.

17. *ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ*] *οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἡ ἐναντία ἀπὸ τῆς ἐναντίας γνωρίζεται. τοῦ γὰρ φιλεῖν, ὡς ἐν Τοπικοῖς εἶπε, πολλαχῶς λεγομένου, τὸ μισεῖν πολλαχῶς οὐ λέγεται. ὥστε ἐπὶ τούτου, οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ θατέρου θάτερον γνω-*

ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ἐὰν θάτερα πλεοναχῶς λέγηται, καὶ
2 θάτερα πλεοναχῶς λέγεσθαι, οἷον εἰ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ τὸ ἄδικον. ἔοικε δὲ πλεοναχῶς λέγεσθαι ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀδικία, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ σύνεγγυς εἶναι τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν αὐτῶν λανθάνει καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πόρρω δήλη μᾶλλον· ἡ γὰρ διαφορὰ πολλὴ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν, οἷον ὅτι καλεῖται κλεὶς ὁμωνύμως ἥ τε ὑπὸ τὸν αὐχένα τῶν ζῴων καὶ ᾗ τὰς θύρας κλείουσιν. Εἰλήφθω δὴ ὁ ἄδικος ποσαχῶς λέγεται. δοκεῖ δὲ ὅ τε παράνομος ἄδικος εἶναι καὶ ὁ πλεονέκτης καὶ ὁ ἄνισος, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ὁ δίκαιος ἔσται ὅ τε νόμιμος καὶ ὁ ἴσος. τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἄρα τὸ νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἴσον, τὸ δ' ἄδικον τὸ παράνομον καὶ τὸ ἄνισον. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ πλεονέκτης ὁ ἄδικος, περὶ τἀγαθὰ ἔσται, οὐ πάντα, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὅσα εὐτυχία καὶ ἀτυχία, ἃ ἐστὶ μὲν ἁπλῶς ἀεὶ ἀγαθά, τινὶ δ'

That ἄδικος implies 1. παράνομος. 2. πλεονέκτης.

ῥισθήσεται. Schol. See the Topics, i. 13. which furnishes the best comment upon this passage.

4. ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ σύνεγγυς] But on account of the close affinity of the things themselves, the equivocation in their names is not so clearly seen, as it is in things which are very remote in their natures from each other. Thus the equivocation in the term *key*, (to suit the illustration to our own language,) meaning either the key of a book, or the key of a lock, as the things themselves to which the term is applied are so widely and specifically different, is instantly perceived; but the equivocation in the term *justice*, applying either to a particular justice, or to justice universally, the things themselves being closely allied and differing from each other, only as a part from a whole, is not so easily seen. The word ὁμώνυμα corresponds to our term *equivocal*, (Aristotle not recognizing the division into Analogous,) as συνώνυμα corresponds to *univocal*. See Categ. c. i.

17. ἁπλῶς ἀεὶ ἀγαθά] Those things are said to be simply good which are so considered in themselves, and without any reference to the effects which they may produce. Thus health, riches, beauty, &c. are simply or absolutely good, though very frequently, relatively speaking, positive evils. Thus too, poverty is an absolute evil, though in many instances a relative good. In those persons, for instance, upon whom it acts as a task-master, and brings them from vice to virtue, &c.

οὐκ ἀεί. οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι ταῦτα εὔχονται καὶ διώκουσιν· δεῖ δ' οὔ, ἀλλ' εὔχεσθαι μὲν τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὰ καὶ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, αἱρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθά. ὁ δ' ἄδικος οὐκ ἀεὶ τὸ πλέον αἱρεῖται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ἐπὶ τῶν ἁπλῶς κακῶν· ἀλλ' ὅτι δοκεῖ καὶ τὸ μεῖον κακὸν ἀγαθόν πως εἶναι, τοῦ δ' ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶν ἡ πλεονεξία, διὰ τοῦτο δοκεῖ πλεονέκτης εἶναι. ἔστι δ' ἄνισος· τοῦτο γὰρ περιέχει καὶ κοινόν.

CHAP. II.

That Universal Justice is a habit of perfect obedience to the laws; and consequently as the laws demand the practice of every Virtue, and abstinence from every Vice, Universal Justice is Universal Virtue, and differs from it only in being relative.

That τὰ νομιμὰ are δίκαια.

ΕΠΕΙ δ' ὁ παράνομος ἄδικος ἦν ὁ δὲ νόμιμος 3 δίκαιος, δῆλον ὅτι πάντα τὰ νόμιμά ἐστί πως δίκαια· τά τε γὰρ ὡρισμένα ὑπὸ τῆς νομοθετικῆς νόμιμά ἐστι, καὶ ἕκαστον τούτων δίκαιον εἶναι φαμέν. οἱ δὲ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσι περὶ ἁπάντων, στοχαζόμενοι ἢ τοῦ κοινῇ συμφέροντος πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἢ τοῖς κυρίοις, κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ κατ'

8. *ἔστι δ' ἄνισος*] That is to say, the notion of more and less is included in the word *ἄνισος*. The unjust man is called *παράνομος* and *πλεονέκτης* or *ἄνισος*. If we make use of the term *ἄνισος* which includes the notion of more or less, then we must suppose that the unjust man takes more of his share of good, and less of his share of evil; but if *πλεονέκτης*, more of his share of good.

11. *ἐστί πως δίκαια*] *πρόσκειται τὸ πῶς δίκαιος, ὅτι μὴ κατὰ τὴν ἰδίως λεγομένην δικαιοσύνην πάντα τὰ νόμιμα δίκαια, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν κοινῶς. καὶ ὅσον γὰρ τοῖς νόμοις πειθόμενός τις ταῦτα ποιεῖ δίκαιος ἐστί, καὶ αὐτὰ δικαῖα. αὐτὰ δὲ καθ' αὐτὰ ἢ ἀνδρεῖα ἢ σωφρονικά εἰσιν, ἢ ἐξ οἵας ἂν εἴη ἀρετῆς.* Schol.

15. *στοχαζόμενοι ἢ τοῦ κοινῇ συμφέροντος*] See the discussion concerning justice prefixed by Plato to his dialogue, De Republica.

ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον τοιοῦτον· ὥστε ἕνα μὲν τρόπον δίκαια λέγομεν τὰ ποιητικὰ καὶ φυλακτικὰ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας καὶ τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς τῇ πολιτικῇ κοινωνίᾳ. προστάττει δ' ὁ νόμος καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρείου ἔργα ποιεῖν, οἷον μὴ λείπειν τὴν τάξιν μηδὲ φεύγειν μηδὲ ῥίπτειν τὰ ὅπλα, καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώφρονος, οἷον μὴ μοιχεύειν μηδ' ὑβρίζειν, καὶ τὰ τοῦ πράου, οἷον μὴ τύπτειν μηδὲ κακηγορεῖν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς καὶ μοχθηρίας τὰ μὲν κελεύων τὰ δ' ἀπαγορεύων, ὀρθῶς μὲν ὁ κείμενος ὀρθῶς, χεῖρον δ' ὁ ἀπεσχεδιασμένος. Αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀρετὴ μέν ἐστι τελεία, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολλάκις κρατίστη τῶν ἀρετῶν

That the habit, of which these actions are the object-

12. ἀρετὴ μέν ἐστι τελεία] The expression τελεία ἀρετή (*perfect virtue*) is used in three senses. I. The *moral* habit of fortitude is called τελεία ἀρετὴ in contradistinction to *natural* fortitude. II. A union of all the moral habits is called τελεία ἀρετή. and this only, correctly speaking, is perfect virtue. And, lastly, that habit is called perfect virtue which is κατὰ τὴν νομιμότητα, engaged in rendering perfect obedience to the laws. This is indeed very similar to the second, including under it every other moral habit, and differing from it only in this; the second is considered merely in reference to its being a habit of the soul (ἕξις ψυχῆς), but this in reference to the laws, in being relative. So that perfect virtue and universal justice are in their subject and essence (τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ) the same, and differ only in the way of considering them. If considered as a habit of the soul, then it is universal virtue, if as preservative of social happiness, then it is called justice. The latter however is more perfect than the former, inasmuch as he who possesses it uses perfect virtue not to himself only, but also to others.

12. ἀρετή ἐστι τελεία] Compare Theages de Virtutibus: ὅκα τὸ μὲν κρέσσον ἄρχῃ μέρος τᾶς ψυχᾶς τὸ δὲ χέρηον ἄρχηται, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἡγῆται τὸ δ' ἕπηται, ἀμφότερα δὲ συνευδοκῆται καὶ συνομολογῆται ἀλλήλοις, τόκα δὲ γίνεται ἀρετὰ καὶ παναγαθία περὶ ὅλαν τὰν ψυχάν. καὶ ὅκα μὲν τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν ἕπηται μέρος τᾶς ψυχᾶς τῷ λογιστικῷ γίνεται σωφροσύνα· ὅκα δὲ τὸ θυμοειδές, ἀνδρειότης· ὅκα δὲ τὰ μέρεα πάντα δικαιότας· αὕτα γάρ ἐστιν ἁ διείργουσα τάς τε κακίας πάσας τᾶς ψυχᾶς καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων. καὶ ἔστιν ἁ δικαιότας σύνταγμά τι τᾶς ἁρμογᾶς τῶν μερέων τᾶς ψυχᾶς καὶ ἀρετὰ τελεία καὶ πανυπερτάτα. πάντα γὰρ ἐν ταύτᾳ. Frag. Pythag. Ed. Gale, p. 31.

matter, is perfect virtue, but relative.

εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ οὔθ' ἕσπερος οὔθ' ἑῷος οὕτω θαυμαστός· καὶ παροιμιαζόμενοί φαμεν "ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ συλλήβδην πᾶσ' ἀρετὴ ἔνι." καὶ τελεία μάλιστα ἀρετή, ὅτι τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς χρῆσίς ἐστιν. τελεία δ' ἐστίν, ὅτι ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν καὶ πρὸς ἕτερον δύναται τῇ ἀρετῇ χρῆσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον καθ' αὑτόν· πολλοὶ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς οἰκείοις τῇ ἀρετῇ δύνανται χρῆσθαι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς ἕτερον ἀδυνατοῦσιν. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εὖ δοκεῖ ἔχειν τὸ τοῦ Βίαντος, ὅτι ἀρχὴ ἄνδρα δείξει· πρὸς ἕτερον γὰρ καὶ ἐν κοινωνίᾳ ἤδη ὁ ἄρχων. διὰ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ δικαιοσύνη μόνη τῶν ἀρετῶν, ὅτι πρὸς ἕτερόν ἐστιν· ἄλλῳ γὰρ τὰ συμφέροντα πράττει, ἢ ἄρχοντι ἢ κοινωνῷ. κάκιστος μὲν οὖν ὁ καὶ πρὸς αὑτὸν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους χρώμενος τῇ μοχθηρίᾳ, ἄριστος δ' οὐχ ὁ πρὸς αὑτὸν τῇ ἀρετῇ ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔργον χαλεπόν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη οὐ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἀλλ' ὅλη ἀρετή ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἡ ἐναντία ἀδικία μέρος κακίας ἀλλ' ὅλη κακία.

That this habit differs from perfect virtue, κατὰ τὸ εἶναι.

Τί δὲ διαφέρει ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη αὕτη, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ἡ αὐτή, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλ'

3. *ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ*] Theognis v. 147.

12. *ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν*] He glances at the words of the Sophist Thrasymachus in Plato's Repub. p. 343. *ἀγνοεῖς ὅτι ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν τῷ ὄντι, τοῦ κρείττονός τε καὶ ἄρχοντος ξυμφέρον, οἰκεία δὲ τοῦ πειθομένου τε καὶ ὑπηρετοῦντος βλάβη.* See also the Gorgias, generally.

23. *ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ἡ αὐτή*] It is the same habit, differing only according to our mode of considering it; the *subjectum formale*, or *formal part of the essence* is not the same. If we consider it as a habit *of the soul*, then it is *universal virtue*; if we consider it in reference to our *social condition*, then it is *universal justice*. The same expression occurs again and in the same sense in vi. 6.

When Aristotle expresses the *whole essence*, he uses the term *τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι*.

ἡ μὲν πρὸς ἕτερον, δικαιοσύνη, ἡ δὲ τοιάδε ἕξις, ἁπλῶς ἀρετή.

CHAP. III.

That besides the Universal Justice, there is a Particular Justice. What it is.

4 ΖΗΤΟΥΜΕΝ δέ γε τὴν ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνην· ἔστι γάρ τις, ὥς φαμέν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀδικίας τῆς κατὰ μέρος. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι ἔστιν· κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἄλλας μοχθηρίας ὁ ἐνεργῶν ἀδικεῖ μέν, πλεονεκτεῖ δ' οὐδέν, οἷον ὁ ῥίψας τὴν ἀσπίδα διὰ δειλίαν ἢ κακῶς εἰπὼν διὰ χαλεπότητα ἢ οὐ βοηθήσας χρήμασι δι' ἀνελευθερίαν· ὅταν δὲ πλεονεκτῇ, πολλάκις κατ' οὐδεμίαν τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κατὰ

That there is a particular injustice called πλεονεξία.

CHAP. III.

After Aristotle has shown that νομίμη δικαιοσύνη is an aggregate of all the moral virtues, he now proceeds to show that there is another justice, which is a species of virtue distinct from the other virtues, as one species from another, and from the universal or νομίμη δικαιοσύνη as a part from a whole. For this habit concurs with the other moral habits in forming universal justice, and is a constituent part of it.

This assertion he then proceeds to prove by a consideration of the opposite habit, in conformity with his own observation at p. 170, 10. (πολλάκις μὲν γνωρίζεται ἡ ἐναντία ἕξις ἀπὸ τῆς ἐναντίας). If there is a particular injustice which is a part of universal vice, then there will be a particular justice which is a part of universal virtue. The rest of the Chapter is taken up with proving the minor, that there is such a particular injustice, and that this vice is the taking more of relative good than is fair (sc. πλεονεξία). For he who acts viciously from the influence of avarice, timidity, and such evil habits is not said to be πλεονέκτης, consequently he who acts from πλεονεξία, acts under the influence of a vicious habit, or particular injustice, different from the above-mentioned vicious habits, and consequently from universal vice, or universal injustice, of which they are the constituent parts. That is, he acts from a particular injustice, different from the universal injustice, and consequently there is such a particular injustice so differing, which is called πλεονεξία. 2dly. The object of πλεονεξία is different from every other vice, therefore πλεονεξία itself is different.

πάσας, κατὰ πονηρίαν δέ γε τινά (ψέγομεν γάρ) καὶ κατ' ἀδικίαν. ἔστιν ἄρα γε ἄλλη τις ἀδικία ὡς μέρος τῆς ὅλης, καὶ ἄδικόν τι ἐν μέρει
2. τοῦ ὅλου ἀδίκου τοῦ παρὰ τὸν νόμον. Ἔτι εἰ ὁ μὲν τοῦ κερδαίνειν ἕνεκα μοιχεύει καὶ προσλαμβάνων, ὁ δὲ προστιθεὶς καὶ ζημιούμενος δι' ἐπιθυμίαν, οὗτος μὲν ἀκόλαστος δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ πλεονέκτης, ἐκεῖνος δ' ἄδικος, ἀκόλαστος
3. δ' οὔ· δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι διὰ τὸ κερδαίνειν. Ἔτι περὶ μὲν τἆλλα πάντα ἀδικήματα γίνεται ἡ ἐπαναφορὰ ἐπί τινα μοχθηρίαν ἀεί, οἷον εἰ ἐμοίχευσεν, ἐπ' ἀκολασίαν, εἰ ἐγκατέλιπε τὸν παραστάτην, ἐπὶ δειλίαν, εἰ ἐπάταξεν, ἐπ' ὀργήν· εἰ δ' ἐκέρδανεν, ἐπ' οὐδεμίαν μοχθηρίαν ἀλλ' ἢ ἐπ' ἀδικίαν. ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἔστι τις ἀδικία παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἄλλη ἐν μέρει, συνώνυμος, ὅτι ὁ ὁρισμὸς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει· ἄμφω γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον ἔχουσι τὴν δύναμιν, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν περὶ τιμὴν ἢ χρήματα ἢ σωτηρίαν, ἢ εἴ τινι ἔχοιμεν ἑνὶ ὀνόματι περιλαβεῖν ταῦτα πάντα, καὶ δι' ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ κέρδους, ἡ δὲ περὶ ἅπαντα περὶ ὅσα ὁ σπουδαῖος.

10. περὶ μὲν τἆλλα] If all vicious acts, besides their common name of *injustice*, are referable each to their own peculiar vices, as an act of adultery to intemperance, of desertion to cowardice, and so on, but every act of undue gain is referred to injustice, it is plain that there is an injustice corresponding to intemperance, cowardice, and so on, bearing the same relation to universal injustice, as these do; that is, as parts to a whole. Consequently there is an injustice differing from universal injustice as a part from a whole. Of both the term injustice is predicated univocally (συνωνύμως) because the definition of their genus is the same; both of them being relative habits.

CHAP. IV.

After some observations as to the relation of the Particular to Universal Justice, the consideration of the Universal is dismissed, and Particular Justice is divided into Distributive and Corrective.

That the *particular* injustice bears the same relation to the Universal as the *more* to the *unequal.*

5 ΟΤΙ μὲν οὖν εἰσὶ δικαιοσύναι πλείους, καὶ ὅτι ἔστι τις καὶ ἑτέρα παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετήν, δῆλον· τίς δὲ καὶ ὁποία τις, ληπτέον. διώρισται δὴ τὸ ἄδικον τό τε παράνομον καὶ τὸ ἄνισον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον τό τε νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἴσον. κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὸ παράνομον ἡ πρότερον εἰρημένη ἀδικία ἐστίν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἄνισον καὶ τὸ πλέον οὐ ταὐτὸν ἀλλ' ἕτερον ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὅλον (τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλέον ἅπαν ἄνισον, τὸ δ' ἄνισον οὐ πᾶν πλέον), καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ ἡ ἀδικία οὐ ταὐτὰ ἀλλ' ἕτερα ἐκείνων, τὰ μὲν ὡς μέρη τὰ δ' ὡς ὅλα· μέρος γὰρ αὕτη ἡ ἀδικία τῆς ὅλης ἀδικίας, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῆς δικαιοσύνης. ὥστε καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν μέρει δικαιοσύνης καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν μέρει ἀδικίας λεκτέον, καὶ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου ὡσαύτως.

The consideration of the *Universal* Justice dismissed.

Ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετὴν τεταγμένη δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀδικία, ἡ μὲν τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς οὖσα χρῆσις πρὸς ἄλλον, ἡ δὲ τῆς κακίας, ἀφείσθω. καὶ τὸ δίκαιον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄδικον τὸ κατὰ

6. ἡ πρότερον—ἀδικία] That is, *the universal injustice.*

7. τὸ ἄνισον καὶ τὸ πλέον] The same ratio which the more (τὸ πλέον) has to the unequal (τὸ ἄνισον), *particular* justice has to *uniersal* justice: for both are contained as parts in a whole, *particular* in *universal* justice, the *more* in the *unequal.* For as the more is contained under the unequal as a species under a genus, and is therefore not the same as the *unequal*, so is the particular injustice included under the universal injustice, and differs from it as a species from a genus, as a part from a whole.

ταύτας φανερὸν ὡς διοριστέον· σχεδὸν γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν νομίμων τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς πραττόμενά ἐστιν· καθ' ἑκάστην γὰρ ἀρετὴν προστάττει ζῆν καὶ καθ' ἑκάστην μοχθηρίαν κωλύει ὁ νόμος. τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς ἐστὶ τῶν νομίμων ὅσα νενομοθέτηται περὶ παιδείαν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινόν. περὶ δὲ τῆς καθ' ἕκαστον παιδείας, καθ' ἣν ἁπλῶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός ἐστι, πότερον τῆς πολιτικῆς ἐστὶν ἢ ἑτέρας, ὕστερον διοριστέον· οὐ γὰρ ἴσως ταὐτὸν ἀνδρί τ' ἀγαθῷ εἶναι καὶ πολίτῃ παντί.

Particular Justice divided into 1. Distributive. 2. Corrective.

Τῆς δὲ κατὰ μέρος δικαιοσύνης καὶ τοῦ κατ' αὐτὴν δικαίου ἓν μέν ἐστιν εἶδος τὸ ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς τιμῆς ἢ χρημάτων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα μεριστὰ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας (ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἔστι καὶ ἄνισον ἔχειν καὶ ἴσον ἕτερον ἑτέρου), ἓν δὲ τὸ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι διορθωτικόν. τούτου δὲ μέρη δύο· τῶν γὰρ συναλλαγμάτων τὰ μὲν ἑκούσιά ἐστι τὰ δ' ἀκούσια, ἑκούσια μὲν τὰ τοιάδε οἷον πρᾶσις, ὠνή, δανεισμός, ἐγγύη, χρῆσις, παρακαταθήκη, μίσθωσις· ἑκούσια δὲ λέγεται, ὅτι ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων τούτων ἑκούσιος. τῶν δ' ἀκουσίων τὰ μὲν λαθραῖα, οἷον κλοπή, μοιχεία, φαρμακεία, προαγωγεία, δουλαπατία, δολοφονία, ψευδομαρτυρία, τὰ δὲ βίαια, οἷον αἰκία, δεσμός, θάνατος, ἁρπαγή, πήρωσις, κακηγορία, προπηλακισμός.

10. οὐ γὰρ ἴσως ταὐτὸν] See the Politics iii. 4. This is indeed one of the principal objects in Aristotle's Politics, to examine how a state shall be so governed, that the final end of the actions of each individual shall harmonize with and promote the final end of the state. See the note to the last chapter of the Tenth Book of the Ethics.

CHAP. V.

Of Distributive Justice. That it is according to Geometrical Proportion.

That the just act (τὸ δίκαιον) is a mean (μέσον τι).

6 ΕΠΕΙ δ' ὅ τ' ἄδικος ἄνισος καὶ τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ μέσον τί ἐστι τοῦ ἀνίσου. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἴσον· ἐν ὁποίᾳ γὰρ πράξει ἐστὶ τὸ πλέον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον, ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ ἴσον. εἰ οὖν τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον, τὸ δίκαιον ἴσον· ὅπερ καὶ ἄνευ λόγου δοκεῖ πᾶσιν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἴσον μέσον, τὸ δίκαιον μέσον τι ἂν εἴη.

That as far as it is a mean it must be between two *things* at least; as far as it is just between two *persons*.

Ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἐν ἐλαχίστοις δυσίν· ἀνάγκη τοίνυν τὸ δίκαιον μέσον τε καὶ ἴσον εἶναι [καὶ πρός τι] καὶ τισίν, καὶ ᾗ μὲν μέσον, τινῶν (ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ πλεῖον καὶ ἔλαττον), ᾗ δ' ἴσον ἐστί, δυοῖν, ᾗ δὲ δίκαιον, τισίν. ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον ἐν ἐλαχίστοις εἶναι τέτταρσιν· οἷς τε γὰρ δίκαιον τυγχάνει ὄν, δύο ἐστί, καὶ ἐν οἷς τὰ πράγματα, δύο. καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἔσται ἰσότης, οἷς καὶ ἐν οἷς· ὡς γὰρ ἐκεῖνα ἔχει τὰ ἐν οἷς, οὕτω κἀκεῖνα ἔχει·

CHAP. V.

9. καὶ πρός τι] These words Dr. Cardwell has omitted in his edition, and Bekker included in brackets. Aristotle wishes to prove that the distributive justice must be according to Geometrical proportion. He says, therefore, that every just act inasmuch as it is ἴσον or μέσον, (ἐστὶ τὸ ἴσον μέσον) must be between two things, for there can be no ἴσον where there is not more and less, no μέσον where there are not two extremes. Likewise as every act of justice is relative (πρός τι) that is, εἰς ἕτερον ἴσον, (to use the words of the Mag. Mor. p. 37.) and must presuppose an act of injustice, and consequently the injurer and the injured, the ἄδικος and ἀδικούμενος, every act of distributive justice must presuppose two persons as well as two things, and must therefore be in four terms at the least.

εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἴσοι, οὐκ ἴσα ἕξουσιν, ἀλλ' ἐντεῦθεν αἱ μάχαι καὶ τὰ ἐγκλήματα, ὅταν ἢ ἴσοι μὴ ἴσα ἢ μὴ ἴσοι ἴσα ἔχωσι καὶ νέμωνται. ἔτι ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν τοῦτο δῆλον· τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς ὁμολογοῦσι πάντες κατ' ἀξίαν τινὰ δεῖν εἶναι, τὴν μέντοι ἀξίαν οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν λέγουσι πάντες ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν δημοκρατικοὶ ἐλευθερίαν, οἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχικοὶ πλοῦτον, οἱ δ' εὐγένειαν, οἱ δ' ἀριστοκρατικοὶ ἀρετήν.

This justice is therefore in Geometrical disjunctive proportion.

Ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον ἀνάλογόν τι. τὸ γὰρ ἀνάλογον οὐ μόνον ἐστὶ μοναδικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἴδιον, ἀλλ' ὅλως ἀριθμοῦ· ἡ γὰρ ἀναλογία ἰσότης ἐστὶ λόγων, καὶ ἐν τέτταρσιν ἐλαχίστοις. ἡ μὲν οὖν διῃρημένη ὅτι ἐν τέτταρσι, δῆλον. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ συνεχής· τῷ γὰρ ἑνὶ ὡς δυσὶ χρῆται καὶ δὶς λέγει, οἷον ὡς ἡ τοῦ Α πρὸς τὴν τοῦ Β, οὕτως καὶ ἡ τοῦ Β πρὸς τὴν τοῦ Γ. δὶς οὖν ἡ τοῦ Β εἴρηται· ὥστ' ἐὰν ἡ τοῦ Β τεθῇ δίς, τέτταρα ἔσται τὰ ἀνάλογα. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τέτταρσιν ἐλαχίστοις, καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός· διῄρηνται γὰρ ὁμοίως, οἷς τε καὶ ἅ. ἔσται ἄρα ὡς ὁ Α ὅρος πρὸς τὸν Β, οὕτως ὁ Γ πρὸς τὸν Δ, καὶ ἐναλλὰξ ἄρα, ὡς ὁ Α πρὸς τὸν Γ, ὁ Β πρὸς τὸν Δ. ὥστε καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον· ὅπερ ἡ νομὴ συνδυάζει· κἂν οὕτως συντεθῇ, δικαίως συνδυάζει. ἡ ἄρα τοῦ Α ὅρου τῷ Γ καὶ 7

11. μοναδικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ] Of numbers which consist of units. Such as we use in Artthmetical calculations.

13. διῃρημένη—συνεχής] *Disjunctive—continuous.*

15. ἡ τοῦ Α] Sc. γραμμή. For instance,

α —
β ——
β ——
γ ————

21. ὡς ὁ Α ὅρος] See the Introduction to this Book. p. 165.

ἡ τοῦ Β τῷ Δ σύζευξις τὸ ἐν διανομῇ δίκαιόν ἐστι, καὶ μέσον τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ τοῦ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον· τὸ γὰρ ἀνάλογον μέσον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ἀνάλογον. καλοῦσι δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀναλογίαν γεωμετρικὴν οἱ μαθηματικοί· ἐν γὰρ τῇ γεωμετρικῇ συμβαίνει καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ὅπερ ἑκάτερον πρὸς ἑκάτερον. Ἔστι δ᾽ οὐ συνεχὴς αὕτη ἡ ἀναλογία· οὐ γὰρ γίνεται εἷς ἀριθμῷ ὅρος, ᾧ καὶ ὅ. τὸ μὲν οὖν δίκαιον τοῦτο τὸ ἀνάλογον, τὸ δ᾽ ἄδικον τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. γίνεται ἄρα τὸ μὲν πλέον τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον. ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων συμβαίνει· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικῶν πλέον ἔχει, ὁ δ᾽ ἀδικούμενος ἔλαττον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ ἀνάπαλιν· ἐν ἀγαθοῦ γὰρ λόγῳ γίνεται τὸ ἔλαττον κακὸν πρὸς τὸ μεῖζον κακόν· ἔστι γὰρ τὸ ἔλαττον κακὸν μᾶλλον αἱρετὸν τοῦ μείζονος, τὸ δ᾽ αἱρετὸν ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον μεῖζον. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἓν εἶδος τοῦ δικαίου τοῦτ᾽ ἐστίν.

Why such proportion must not be continuous.

CHAP. VI.

Of Corrective Justice. That it is according to Arithmetical Proportion.

ΤΟ δὲ λοιπὸν ἓν τὸ διορθωτικόν, ὃ γίνεται ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι καὶ τοῖς ἑκουσίοις καὶ τοῖς

The nature of the *Distributive* Justice briefly restated.

2. τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ τοῦ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον] *Justice is a mean of that which violates proportion*; that is, *of the unjust*. Compare, τὸ δ᾽ ἄδικον τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. line 10.

8. οὐ γὰρ γίνεται] *For one numerical term can not designate at once a person* (ᾧ), *and a thing* (ὅ). As it would do in continuous proportion. As thus,

Achilles : Ajax : : 12 : 6 } Disjunctive.
α : β : : γ : δ

α : β : : β : γ } Continuous.

Where β stands for Ajax and the number 12.

ἀκουσίοις. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ δίκαιον ἄλλο εἶδος ἔχει τοῦ προτέρου. τὸ μὲν γὰρ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον τῶν κοινῶν ἀεὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἐστὶ τὴν εἰρημένην· καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ χρημάτων κοινῶν ἐὰν γίγνηται ἡ διανομή, ἔσται κατὰ τὸν λόγον τὸν αὐτὸν ὅνπερ ἔχουσι πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ εἰσενεχθέντα· καὶ τὸ ἄδικον τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῷ δικαίῳ τούτῳ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν.

Corrective Justice regards merely one ratio since it considers only the act and not the persons, and is consequently according to Arithmetical Proportion.

Τὸ δ' ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι δίκαιον ἐστὶ μὲν ἴσον τι, καὶ τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἐκείνην ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικήν. οὐθὲν γὰρ διαφέρει, εἰ ἐπιεικὴς φαῦλον ἀπεστέρησεν ἢ φαῦλος ἐπιεικῆ, οὐδ' εἰ ἐμοίχευσεν ἐπιεικὴς ἢ φαῦλος· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῦ βλάβους τὴν διαφορὰν μόνον βλέπει ὁ νόμος, καὶ χρῆται ὡς ἴσοις, εἰ ὁ μὲν ἀδικεῖ ὁ δ' ἀδικεῖται, καὶ εἰ ἔβλαψεν ὁ δὲ βέβλαπται. ὥστε τὸ ἄδικον τοῦτο ἄνισον ὂν ἰσάζειν πειρᾶται ὁ δικαστής· καὶ γὰρ ὅταν ὁ μὲν πληγῇ ὁ δὲ πατάξῃ, ἢ καὶ κτείνῃ ὁ δ' ἀποθάνῃ, διῄρηται τὸ πάθος καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις εἰς ἄνισα· ἀλλὰ πειρᾶται τῇ ζημίᾳ ἰσάζειν, ἀφαιρῶν τοῦ κέρδους.

The excess (τὸ πλέον) of the injurer, and deficiency (τὸ ἔλαττον) of the injured, respectively expressed by the terms

Λέγεται γὰρ ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, κἂν εἰ μή τισιν οἰκεῖον ὄνομα εἴη, τὸ κέρδος, οἷον τῷ πατάξαντι, καὶ ἡ ζημία τῷ παθόντι· ἀλλ' ὅταν γε μετρηθῇ τὸ πάθος, καλεῖται τὸ μὲν ζημία τὸ δὲ κέρδος. ὥστε τοῦ μὲν πλείονος καὶ ἐλάττονος τὸ ἴσον

9. *ἴσον τι*] That is, *an equality*; but different from that of distributive justice.

11. *κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικήν*] Arithmetical proportion consists merely in one ratio. Thus the numbers 2 : 4 : 6 are in arithmetical proportion; their ratio is the number 2.

13. *ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῦ βλάβους διαφοράν— εἰ ὁ μὲν ἀδικεῖ*] *ἰστέον ὅτι τὴν ἀδικίαν καὶ βλάβην ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης λέγει· κἂν οἱ Πλατωνικοὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι μὲν λέγουσι τὸν τὴν ψυχὴν κακυνόμενον, βλάπτεσθαι δὲ τὸν εἰς σῶμα ἢ χρήματα.* Scholiast.

κέρδος and ζημία: of which Corrective Justice seeks the mean.

μέσον, τὸ δὲ κέρδος καὶ ἡ ζημία τὸ μὲν πλέον τὸ δ' ἔλαττον ἐναντίως, τὸ μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πλέον τοῦ κακοῦ δ' ἔλαττον κέρδος, τὸ δ' ἐναντίον ζημία· ὧν ἦν μέσον τὸ ἴσον, ὃ λέγομεν εἶναι δίκαιον· ὥστε τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν δίκαιον ἂν εἴη τὸ μέσον ζημίας καὶ κέρδους. διὸ καὶ ὅταν ἀμφισβητῶσιν, ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν καταφεύγουσιν· τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν ἰέναι ἰέναι ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον· ὁ γὰρ δικαστὴς βούλεται εἶναι οἷον δίκαιον ἔμψυχον· καὶ ζητοῦσι δικαστὴν μέσον, καὶ καλοῦσιν ἔνιοι μεσιδίους, ὡς ἐὰν τοῦ μέσου τύχωσι, τοῦ δικαίου τευξόμενοι. μέσον ἄρα τι τὸ δίκαιον, εἴπερ καὶ ὁ δικαστής. Ὁ δὲ δικαστὴς ἐπανισοῖ, καὶ ὥσπερ γραμμῆς εἰς ἄνισα τετμημένης, ᾧ τὸ μεῖζον τμῆμα τῆς ἡμισείας ὑπερέχει, τοῦτ' ἀφεῖλε καὶ τῷ ἐλάττονι τμήματι προσέθηκεν. ὅταν δὲ δίχα διαιρεθῇ τὸ ὅλον, τότε φασὶν ἔχειν τὰ αὑτῶν, ὅταν λάβωσι τὸ ἴσον. τὸ δ' ἴσον μέσον ἐστὶ τῆς μείζονος καὶ ἐλάττονος κατὰ τὴν ἀριθ-

How the mean is discovered.

5. τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν] Since considered in reference to their dealings with each other, the law contemplates all the citizens of the state as equal; when an act of injustice has been committed, the only object of the law is to bring the parties, the injurer and the injured, to their original equality. Their original state then is the μέσον and ἴσον to which they are required to be brought: for at present they are in extremes; one on the side of excess the other of defect. As much therefore as the injurer, that is the gainer, exceeds the mean, or his original state, so much does the Judge take from him and add to the loser, the injured. In many instances, this is impossible, as in murder: and then the judge reduces the injurer to the state of the injured. But in Greece, as in the earlier ages of our own and other nations, when reparation for offences and ill-deeds, even of blood, could be made by money, justice could take place according to the very letter of these rules to a much greater degree of perfection, than in civilized countries, where, as Thucydides expresses it, men have continually gone on adding to punishment, with a hope to deter offenders, until the most have ended in death, the furthest limit of it. ἐς τὸν θάνατον αἱ πολλαὶ ἀνήκουσι. iii. 45.

The etymological meaning of the word, δίκαιον.

μητικὴν ἀναλογίαν. Διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὀνομάζεται δίκαιον, ὅτι δίχα ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις εἴποι δίχαιον, καὶ ὁ δικαστὴς διχαστής. ἐπὰν γὰρ δύο ἴσων ἀφαιρεθῇ ἀπὸ θατέρου, πρὸς θάτερον δὲ προστεθῇ, δυσὶ τούτοις ὑπερέχει θάτερον· εἰ γὰρ ἀφῃρέθη μέν, μὴ προσετέθη δέ, ἑνὶ ἂν μόνον ὑπερεῖχεν. τοῦ μέσου ἄρα ἑνί, καὶ τὸ μέσον, ἀφ' οὗ ἀφῃρέθη, ἑνί. τούτῳ ἄρα γνωριοῦμεν τι τε ἀφελεῖν δεῖ ἀπὸ τοῦ πλέον ἔχοντος, καὶ τί προσθεῖναι τῷ ἔλαττον ἔχοντι· ᾧ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μέσον ὑπερέχει, τοῦτο προσθεῖναι δεῖ τῷ ἔλαττον ἔχοντι, ᾧ δ' ὑπερέχεται, ἀφελεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ μεγίστου. ἴσαι αἱ ἐφ' ὧν ΑΑ ΒΒ·ΓΓ ἀλλήλαις· ἀπὸ τῆς ΑΑ ἀφῃρήσθω τὸ ΑΕ, καὶ προσκείσθω τῇ ΓΓ τὸ ἐφ' ὧν ΓΔ, ὥστε ὅλη ἡ ΔΓΓ τῆς ΕΑ ὑπερέχει τῷ ΓΔ καὶ τῷ ΓΖ· τῆς ἄρα ΒΒ τῷ ΓΔ.

The same proportion in the arts.

Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν τοῦτο· ἀνῃροῦντο γὰρ ἄν, εἰ μὴ ἐποίει τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ ὅσον καὶ οἷον, καὶ τὸ πάσχον ἔπασχε τοῦτο καὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον.

The origin of the terms ζημία and κέρδος.

Ἐλήλυθε δὲ τὰ ὀνόματα ταῦτα, ἥ τε ζημία καὶ τὸ κέρδος, ἐκ τῆς

13. ἴσαι αἱ] This will be better understood by the following lines.

Α ——— Ε . . . . . . Α
Β ———   ——— Β
Γ ——— Ζ ——— Γ . . . . . . Δ.

The dotted line ΕΑ is the same as the line ΓΔ.

17. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν] And this takes place likewise in the arts and commerce. For they would be destroyed (as no one would care to exercise them), unless the production of the agent, that is, the seller, was of a certain quantity and quality, and the loss or equivalent given by the patient, that is, the buyer, was likewise of a corresponding quantity or quality. The word τεχνῶν appears to me to mean in this place, rather the production of the arts, and when used by Aristotle in a strict sense implies production as well as the mere arts themselves. But here Aristotle expresses two ideas. That the exchange of the production of the arts is according to these rules, otherwise the arts themselves would be destroyed, and consequently their productions.

ἑκουσίου ἀλλαγῆς· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλέον ἔχειν ἢ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ κερδαίνειν λέγεται, τὸ δ' ἔλαττον τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ζημιοῦσθαι, οἷον ἐν τῷ ὠνεῖσθαι καὶ πωλεῖν καὶ ἐν ὅσοις ἄλλοις ἄδειαν ἔδωκεν ὁ νόμος. ὅταν δὲ μήτε πλέον μήτ' ἔλαττον ἀλλ' αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν γένηται, τὰ αὐτῶν φασὶν ἔχειν καὶ οὔτε ζημιοῦσθαι οὔτε κερδαίνειν· ὥστε κέρδους τινὸς καὶ ζημίας μέσον τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἑκούσιον, τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν καὶ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον.

CHAP. VII.

That simple retaliation is not Justice: neither can it exist in States.

Simple retaliation is not Justice.

8 ΔΟΚΕΙ δέ τισι καὶ τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς εἶναι ἁπλῶς δίκαιον, ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι ἔφασαν· ὡρίζοντο γὰρ ἁπλῶς τὸ δίκαιον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς ἄλλῳ. τὸ δ' ἀντιπεπονθὸς οὐκ ἐφαρμόττει οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ διορθωτικόν· καίτοι βούλονταί γε τοῦτο λέγειν καὶ τὸ Ῥαδαμάνθυος δίκαιον·

εἴ κε πάθοι τά κ' ἔρεξε, δίκη κ' ἰθεῖα γένοιτο.

πολλαχοῦ γὰρ διαφωνεῖ· οἷον εἰ ἀρχὴν ἔχων ἐπάταξεν, οὐ δεῖ ἀντιπληγῆναι, καὶ εἰ ἄρχοντα ἐπάταξεν, οὐ πληγῆναι μόνον δεῖ ἀλλὰ καὶ κολασθῆναι. ἔτι τὸ ἑκούσιον καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον διαφέρει πολύ. Ἀλλ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς κοινωνίαις

Retaliation according to

9. τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν] *The having what is just and equal, the same afterwards as before.* After the act of correction as before.

proportion necessary for states.

ταῖς ἀλλακτικαῖς συνέχει τὸ τοιοῦτον δίκαιον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός, κατ' ἀναλογίαν καὶ μὴ κατ' ἰσότητα· τῷ ἀντιποιεῖν γὰρ ἀνάλογον συμμένει ἡ πόλις. ἢ γὰρ τὸ κακῶς ζητοῦσιν· εἰ δὲ μή, δουλεία δοκεῖ εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἀντιποιήσει· ἢ τὸ εὖ· εἰ δὲ μή, μετάδοσις οὐ γίνεται, τῇ μεταδόσει δὲ συμμένουσιν. διὸ καὶ Χαρίτων ἱερὸν ἐμποδὼν ποιοῦνται, ἵν' ἀνταπόδοσις ᾖ· τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον χάριτος· ἀνθυπηρετῆσαί τε γὰρ δεῖ τῷ χαρισαμένῳ, καὶ πάλιν αὐτὸν ἄρξαι χαριζόμενον.

The rule and method of it.


Ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἀντίδοσιν τὴν κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἡ κατὰ διάμετρον σύζευξις, οἷον οἰκοδόμος ἐφ' ᾧ Α,

2. κατ' ἀναλογίαν] ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Πλάτων τῇ ἀναλογίᾳ ταύτῃ τοῦ δικαίου χρῆσθαι ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ. &c. Mag. Mor. p. 37.

3. τῷ ἀντιποιεῖν] Compare the Politics, ii. 1. (p. 29. ed. Goet.)

4. ἢ γὰρ τὸ κακῶς ζητοῦσιν] For either men when they have received an injury seek to retaliate, otherwise they consider themselves in a worse condition than slaves, or when they have conferred a favour expect a return; otherwise there would be no interchange of good offices, and society could not hold together. For this reason the Temple of Gratitude, that is, of the Graces, was built in the most frequented parts of the City, that all might constantly be reminded, that if they have received good they ought to return it. Διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τριῶν οὐσῶν ἐν τῷ ναῷ χαρίτων, ἡ μέση οὖσα τῶν ἄκρων ἔμπαλιν ἐστραπται πρὸς τὸν χαρισάμενον καὶ δεξιοῦται καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐπιστράφθαι πρὸς τὸν εὖ πεποιηκότα ἦν σύμβολον ὑπηρεσίας. τὸ δὲ δεξιοῦσθαι τοῦ πάλιν αὐτὴν ἀρχὴν ποιεῖσθαι τοῦ ἀντευεργετεῖν. Schol. See also Seneca de Beneficiis, i. 3. (p. 316. Ed. Vogel.)

11. ἡ κατὰ διάμετρον σύζευξις] This will be better understood by the following figure.



Suppose A = Builder, B = Shoemaker, C = House, D = pair of Shoes.

Since then the Builder A, is to receive from the Shoemaker B, a certain quantity of his production D, for which he is to give an equivalent of his own work C, if C equals D, then the exchange (ἡ κατὰ διάμετρον σύζευξις) at once takes place: if not, their respective productions, C, D, must be equalized. The production then of each artificer must be commensurable.

But since C is so totally different from D and both from the many productions of the various classes of society all of whom are desirous of

σκυτοτόμος ἐφ' ᾧ Β, οἰκία ἐφ' ᾧ Γ, ὑπόδημα ἐφ' ᾧ Δ. δεῖ οὖν λαμβάνειν τὸν οἰκοδόμον παρὰ τοῦ σκυτοτόμου τοῦ ἐκείνου ἔργου, καὶ αὐτὸν ἐκείνῳ μεταδιδόναι τὸ αὑτοῦ. ἐὰν οὖν πρῶτον ᾖ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἴσον, εἶτα τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς γένηται, ἔσται τὸ λεγόμενον. εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἴσον, οὐδὲ συμμένει· οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει κρεῖττον εἶναι τὸ θατέρου ἔργον ἢ τὸ θατέρου, δεῖ οὖν ταῦτα ἰσασθῆναι. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν· ἀνῃροῦντο γὰρ ἄν, εἰ μὴ ἐποίει τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ ὅσον καὶ οἷον, καὶ τὸ πάσχον ἔπασχε τοῦτο καὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον. οὐ γὰρ ἐκ δύο ἰατρῶν γίνεται κοινωνία, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἰατροῦ καὶ γεωργοῦ, καὶ ὅλως ἑτέρων καὶ οὐκ ἴσων· ἀλλὰ τούτους δεῖ ἰσασθῆναι. διὸ πάντα συμβλητὰ δεῖ πως εἶναι, ὧν ἐστὶν ἀλλαγή. ἐφ' ὃ τὸ νόμισμ' ἐλήλυθε, καὶ γίνεταί πως μέσον· πάντα γὰρ μετρεῖ, ὥστε καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν, πόσα ἄττα δὴ ὑποδήματ' ἴσον οἰκίᾳ ἢ τροφῇ. δεῖ τοίνυν ὅπερ οἰκοδόμος πρὸς σκυτοτόμον, τοσαδὶ ὑποδήματα πρὸς οἰκίαν ἢ τροφήν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἔσται ἀλλαγὴ οὐδὲ κοινωνία. τοῦτο δ', εἰ μὴ ἴσα εἴη πως, οὐκ ἔσται. Δεῖ ἄρα ἑνί τινι πάντα μετρεῖσθαι, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τῇ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ ἡ χρεία, ἣ πάντα

Need the common measure of produce, the exchange of which money is the symbol.

interchanging one with another, the question arises, what common measure can be found by which we may ascertain the different values of these various productions. That common measure, says Aristotle, is *need*; of which money is the symbol. See the Politics, i. 3. See note p. 188.

14. *καὶ οὐκ ἴσων*] That is, not equal in reference to their different productions. This must be carefully borne in mind, or the passage which follows is wholly unintelligible.

συνέχει· εἰ γὰρ μηθὲν δέοιντο ἢ μὴ ὁμοίως, ἢ οὐκ ἔσται ἀλλαγὴ ἢ οὐχ ἡ αὐτή. οἷον δ' ὑπάλλαγμα τῆς χρείας τὸ νόμισμα γέγονε κατὰ συνθήκην· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοὔνομα ἔχει νόμισμα, ὅτι οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ ἐστί, καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν μεταβαλεῖν καὶ ποιῆσαι ἄχρηστον. ἔσται δὴ ἀντιπεπονθός, ὅταν ἰσασθῇ, ὥστε ὅπερ γεωργὸς πρὸς σκυτοτόμον, τὸ ἔργον τὸ τοῦ σκυτοτόμου πρὸς τὸ τοῦ γεωργοῦ. εἰς σχῆμα δ' ἀναλογίας οὐ δεῖ

9. **εἰς σχῆμα δ' ἀναλογίας**] *We must not bring them into the figure of proportion when they exchange.* Suppose A = Builder, B = Cobbler, 500 = House, 2 = pair of Shoes. This then is the original state of the parties;

$$A : 500 :: B : 2; \text{ or } \frac{A}{500} = \frac{B}{2}.$$

But the result we wish to arrive at is, that $\frac{A}{2} = \frac{B}{500}$; in other words, that the following ratios should be equivalent;

$$A : 500 :: B : 2$$
$$A : 2 :: B : 500$$

which can never be according to the rules of Geometrical proportion. And is that very error of which Aristotle says, **ἀμφοτέρας ἕξει τὰς ὑπεροχὰς τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον**. sc. B. and 500. This then appears to be the meaning of the whole chapter.

Simple retaliation is not justice, neither can it take place in the dealings of man with man. For states do not consist of one class merely whose productions are all alike; not of physicians, for instance, who might exchange one bottle of physic for another of equal value, and thus simple retaliation take place, but of various classes, all of whose productions are different. If these then are to make exchanges with each other, it cannot be according to simple retaliation. Yet one must exchange his production with the other, or society could not hold together; the husbandman with the shoemaker, and so on; that is, the husbandman with his corn is to make an exchange with the shoemaker with his shoes, so that the parties shall be, the husbandman with the shoes and the shoemaker with the corn, (**ἡ κατὰ διάμετρον σύζευξις**.) p. 186. n. But as the corn is of superior value to the shoes, the shoes must be equalized to the value of the corn. The shoemaker must give either as many shoes, or the symbol of the value of as many shoes, as is the value of the corn, and thus both objects of exchange being equalized, the exchange takes place. But this exchange is not according to the rules of Geometrical proportion: neither can it be. For though in their original state the parties may be in the same ratio as their productions, yet when their productions are equalized that proportion is destroyed. The parties are to be linked together according to what


ἄγειν, ὅταν ἀλλάξωνται· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀμφοτέρας ἕξει τὰς ὑπεροχὰς τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον. ἀλλ' ὅταν ἔχωσι τὰ αὑτῶν, οὕτως ἴσοι καὶ κοινωνοί, ὅτι αὕτη ἡ ἰσότης δύναται ἐπ' αὐτῶν γίνεσθαι. γεωργὸς Α, τροφὴ Γ, σκυτοτόμος Β, τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ τὸ ἰσασμένον Δ. εἰ δ' οὕτω μὴ ἦν ἀντιπεπονθέναι, οὐκ ἂν ἦν κοινωνία.

Of need and money.

Ὅτι δ' ἡ χρεία συνέχει ὥσπερ ἕν τι ὄν, δηλοῖ ὅτι ὅταν μὴ ἐν χρείᾳ ὦσιν ἀλλήλων, ἢ ἀμφότεροι ἢ ἅτερος, οὐκ ἀλλάττονται, ὥσπερ ὅταν οὗ ἔχει αὐτὸς δέηταί τις, οἷον οἴνου, διδόντες σίτου ἐξαγωγῆς. δεῖ ἄρα τοῦτο ἰσασθῆναι. ὑπὲρ δὲ τῆς μελλούσης ἀλλαγῆς, εἰ νῦν μηδὲν δεῖται, ὅτι ἔσται ἐὰν δεηθῇ, τὸ νόμισμα οἷον ἐγγυητής ἐσθ' ἡμῖν· δεῖ γὰρ τοῦτο φέροντι εἶναι λαβεῖν. πάσχει μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ αὐτό· οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ ἴσον δύναται· ὅμως δὲ βούλεται μένειν μᾶλλον. διὸ δεῖ πάντα τετιμῆσθαι· οὕτω γὰρ ἀεὶ ἔσται ἀλλαγή, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, κοινωνία. τὸ δὴ νόμισμα ὥσπερ μέτρον σύμμετρα ποιῆσαν ἰσάζει· οὔτε γὰρ ἂν μὴ οὔσης ἀλλαγῆς κοινωνία ἦν, οὔτ' ἀλλαγὴ ἰσότητος μὴ οὔσης, οὔτ' ἰσότης μὴ οὔσης συμμετρίας. τῇ μὲν

would be diametrical conjunction in Geometrical proportion, but not to exchange according to the rules of Geometrical proportion.

Husbandman A — B Shoemaker



Food Γ — Δ + (Γ—Δ) Shoes equalized to Γ.

That is, $\frac{A}{\Gamma} = \frac{A}{\Delta + (\Gamma - \Delta)}$

That is, A is in the same proportion after his exchange as before.

7. ὅτι δ' ἡ χρεία] The best comment on this subject is the Politics i. 3.

οὖν ἀληθείᾳ ἀδύνατον τὰ τοσοῦτον διαφέροντα σύμμετρα γενέσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν χρείαν ἐνδέχεται ἱκανῶς. ἓν δή τι δεῖ εἶναι, τοῦτο δ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως· διὸ νόμισμα καλεῖται· τοῦτο γὰρ πάντα ποιεῖ σύμμετρα· μετρεῖται γὰρ πάντα νομίσματι. οἰκία Α, μναῖ δέκα Β, κλίνη Γ. τὸ δὴ Α τοῦ Β ἥμισυ, εἰ πέντε μνῶν ἀξία ἡ οἰκία, ἢ ἴσον· ἡ δὲ κλίνη δέκατον μέρος τὸ Γ τοῦ Β· δῆλον τοίνυν πόσαι κλῖναι ἴσον οἰκίᾳ, ὅτι πέντε. ὅτι δ' οὕτως ἡ ἀλλαγὴ ἦν πρὶν τὸ νόμισμα εἶναι, δῆλον· διαφέρει γὰρ οὐδὲν ἢ κλῖναι πέντε ἀντὶ οἰκίας, ἢ ὅσου αἱ πέντε κλῖναι.

Conclusion of the subject.

Τί μὲν οὖν τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστιν, 9
εἴρηται. διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων δῆλον ὅτι ἡ δικαιοπραγία μέσον ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλέον ἔχειν τὸ δ' ἔλαττόν ἐστιν. Ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη μεσότης ἐστὶν οὐ τὸν

In what sense Justice is ἕξις

13. τί μὲν οὖν τὸ ἄδικον] In the concluding part of this chapter Aristotle explains some ambiguities connected with his definition of Justice. He has already shown that the just thing (τὸ δίκαιον) is a mean between more and less; he now shows how justice itself is a habit in a mean, (ἕξις ἐν μεσότητι), first showing that its acts (δικαιοπραγία) are a mean between inflicting and suffering injustice, (μέσον τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι.)

17. ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη μεσότης] Justice is a habit ἐν μεσότητι, not because it stands in the mean between two vicious habits, but because its actions (δικαιοπραγία) are in a mean between committing and suffering injustice, between too much and too little. Thus,

The habit.	The habit.	No habit.
ἀδικία.	δικαιοσύνη.	
ἀδικεῖν, or τὸ πλέον.	δικαιοπραγεῖν, or τὸ μέσον	ἀδικεῖσθαι, or τὸ ἔλαττον.
The act.	The act.	

Thus, because δικαιοπραγεῖν is a mean between the more and the less, δικαιοσύνη is said to be a habit ἐν μεσότητι, and not because it is in a mean between two other habits, as is the case with the other moral virtues.

ἐν μεσότητι, and its definition.

αὐτὸν τρόπον ταῖς πρότερον ἀρεταῖς, ἀλλ' ὅτι μέσου ἐστίν· ἡ δ' ἀδικία τῶν ἄκρων. καὶ ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν ὁ δίκαιος λέγεται πρακτικὸς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ διανεμητικὸς καὶ αὐτῷ πρὸς ἄλλον καὶ ἑτέρῳ πρὸς ἕτερον, οὐχ οὕτως ὥστε τοῦ μὲν αἱρετοῦ πλέον αὑτῷ ἔλαττον δὲ τῷ πλησίον, τοῦ βλαβεροῦ δ' ἀνάπαλιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἴσου τοῦ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλῳ πρὸς ἄλλον.

Definition of Injustice.

Ἡ δ' ἀδικία τοὐναντίον τοῦ ἀδίκου. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις τοῦ ὠφελίμου ἢ βλαβεροῦ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. διὸ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἡ ἀδικία, ὅτι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεώς ἐστιν, ἐφ' αὑτοῦ μὲν ὑπερβολῆς μὲν τοῦ ἁπλῶς ὠφελίμου, ἐλλείψεως δὲ τοῦ βλαβεροῦ· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων τὸ μὲν ὅλον ὁμοίως, τὸ δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον, ὁποτέρως ἔτυχεν. τοῦ δὲ ἀδικήματος τὸ μὲν ἔλαττον τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαί ἐστι, τὸ δὲ μεῖζον τὸ ἀδικεῖν. περὶ μὲν οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας, τίς ἑκατέρας ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις, εἰρήσθω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καθόλου.

15. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων] The unjust man always acts contrary to proportion. Taking either too much of what is good, or too little of what is evil; and this rule he always observes in respect to himself. And in the case of others, in short, he adopts the same; but is not always consistent in awarding that which is disproportionate to the same persons, for at one time he gives the more to one, at another time to another. And the man whom he has favored to-day, he will injure tomorrow.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the Social or Political Justice, and its two parts: the Natural and Arbitrary.

That an *unjust* act is not necessarily an act of *injustice*.

ΕΠΕΙ δ' ἔστιν ἀδικοῦντα μήπω ἄδικον εἶναι, ὁ ποῖα ἀδικήματα ἀδικῶν ἤδη ἄδικός ἐστιν ἑκάστην ἀδικίαν, οἷον κλέπτης ἢ μοιχὸς ἢ λῃστής; ἢ οὕτω μὲν οὐδὲν διοίσει; καὶ γὰρ ἂν συγγένοιτο γυναικὶ εἰδὼς τὸ ᾗ, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ προαιρέσεως ἀρχὴν ἀλλὰ διὰ πάθος, ἀδικεῖ μὲν οὖν, ἄδικος δ' οὐκ ἔστιν. οἷον οὐδὲ κλέπτης, ἔκλεψε δέ, οὐδὲ μοιχός, ἐμοίχευσε δέ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. Πῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον, εἴρηται πρότερον· δεῖ δὲ μὴ

10. *δεῖ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν*] Having completed his definition, Aristotle proceeds to examine certain divisions of Justice, both proper and improper, common in his time. As, the political (*πολιτική*), the œconomic (*οἰκονομική*), the magisterial (*δεσποτική*), and the like. The question then is, under what head are we to class that Justice of which we have been speaking? To which he answers, under the Social (*πολιτική*); which is the only division absolutely and properly (*ἁπλῶς*, not *κατὰ μεταφοράν*, see p. 210.) *δίκαιον*. This he divides into two, Natural and Arbitrary; which are included under the Social as species under a genus. For Social Justice is the bond and union, the order and arrangement of the social condition of mankind; (*πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας τάξις*, Pol. i. p. 5.) which was considered by Aristotle as his natural state, (*ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῶον* Pol. i. 1. p. 4.); the Social being the only condition in which his natural tendencies are developed, and in which he answers the final ends of his being. *οἷον γὰρ ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθείσης ταύτην φαμὲν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἑκάστου* Pol. ib. p. 3. See also Cic. Acad. i. 5.

The existence of the moral sense or natural justice (*φυσικὴ δικαιοσύνη*) is not therefore to be sought (as often has been done) in savages, in creatures, who, as far as the purposes of their being are concerned, are not men, much less the Arbitrary, but in those who are in a social and civilized condition. And hence it is that Social Justice is of much wider extent than the other divisions of Justice, including Natural Justice, since the Social is the only natural condition of man; and the Arbitrary since certain enactments are necessary for the very condition of the existence of society. For all society is formed with a view to mutual defence and sufficiency immediately, for hap-

λανθάνειν ὅτι τὸ ζητούμενόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ ἁπλῶς δίκαιον καὶ το πολιτικὸν δίκαιον. τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ἐπὶ κοινωνῶν βίου πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτάρκειαν, ἐλευθέρων καὶ ἴσων ἢ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἢ κατ' ἀριθμόν· ὥστε ὅσοις μή ἐστι τοῦτο, οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, ἀλλά τι δίκαιον καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητα. ἔστι γὰρ δίκαιον, οἷς καὶ νόμος πρὸς αὐτούς· νόμος δ', ἐν οἷς ἀδικία· ἡ γὰρ δίκη κρίσις τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου. ἐν οἷς δ' ἀδικία, καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἐν τούτοις, ἐν οἷς δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, οὐ πᾶσιν ἀδικία· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ πλέον αὑτῷ νέμειν τῶν ἁπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ἔλαττον δὲ τῶν ἁπλῶς κακῶν. διὸ οὐκ ἐῶμεν ἄρχειν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸν λόγον, ὅτι ἑαυτῷ τοῦτο ποιεῖ καὶ γίνεται τύραννος. ἔστι δ' ὁ ἄρχων

piness prospectively, (πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτάρκειαν; or, as he expresses it in the Pol. p. 3. γινομένη οὖν τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν, οὖσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν. See also ibid. iii. 4. and 5. p. 81. 85. Plato's Repub. 359. 372.) and all κοινωνία implies an absolute or relative equality, (ἢ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἢ κατ' ἀριθμόν, an ἰσότης τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι. Compare Pol. ib.) If, therefore, Social Justice cannot exist elsewhere than with men in a social condition, it is clear that where there is no equality, there can be no justice. But there can be no equality in unity, consequently, as there can be no equality between a man and his wife, or his child, or his servant, all being part of himself, it is equally clear that the conjugal, or œconomic Justice are different from the Social, and are only called divisions of Justice metaphorically and not properly. In the same way as a man is said to be just to himself. See p. 210, 15.

1. τὸ ἁπλῶς δίκαιον] ἀντὶ τοῦ κυρίως καὶ ἀληθῶς δίκαιον. Schol. See the Politics iii. 5. (p. 86, 7. ed. Goetl.)

2. τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν] Compare the Politics I. 1. (p. 3.) ἡ δ' ἐκ πλειόνων κωμῶν κοινωνία τέλειος, πόλις, ἤδη πάσης ἔχουσα πέρας τῆς αὐταρκείας — ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος κοινωνεῖν ἢ μηδὲν δεόμενος δι' αὐτάρκειαν οὐδὲν μέρος πόλεως.

4. καὶ ἴσων ἢ κατ' ἀναλογίαν] See the Politics iii. 4. p. 82.

9. δίκη κρίσις] The same definition occurs again in the Politics i. 1. p. 5.

14. ἀλλὰ τὸν λόγον] But reason or the law, which is not subject to be warped by human passions. Compare the Politics: ἀλλ' ἴσως φαίη τις ἂν τὸ κύριον ὅλως ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μὴ νόμον, φαῦλον, ἔχοντά γε τὰ συμβαίνοντα πάθη περὶ τὴν ψυχήν. iii. 6. p. 89. See also cap. xi. p. 107.

φύλαξ τοῦ δικαίου, εἰ δὲ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ τοῦ ἴσου. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ οὐθὲν αὐτῷ πλέον εἶναι δοκεῖ, εἴπερ δίκαιος· οὐ γὰρ νέμει πλέον τοῦ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθοῦ αὑτῷ, εἰ μὴ πρὸς αὑτὸν ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν· διὸ ἑτέρῳ ποιεῖ· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀλλότριον εἶναί φασιν ἀγαθὸν τὴν δικαιοσύνην, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρότερον. μισθὸς ἄρα τις δοτέος, τοῦτο δὲ τιμὴ καὶ γέρας· ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ ἱκανὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα, οὗτοι γίνονται τύραννοι.

The δεσποτικὸν and πατρικὸν different from the πολιτικὸν δίκαιον.

Τὸ δὲ δεσποτικὸν δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πατρικὸν οὐ ταὐτὸν τούτοις ἀλλ᾽ ὅμοιον· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἀδικία πρὸς τὰ αὑτοῦ ἁπλῶς, τὸ δὲ κτῆμα καὶ τὸ τέκνον, ἕως ἂν ᾖ πηλίκον καὶ μὴ χωρισθῇ, ὥσπερ μέρος αὑτοῦ, αὑτὸν δ᾽ οὐθεὶς προαιρεῖται βλάπτειν· διὸ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδικία πρὸς αὑτόν. οὐδ᾽ ἄρα ἄδικον οὐδὲ δίκαιον τὸ πολιτικόν· κατὰ νόμον γὰρ ἦν, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἐπεφύκει εἶναι νόμος· οὗτοι δ᾽ ἦσαν οἷς ὑπάρχει ἰσότης τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι. διὸ μᾶλλον πρὸς γυναῖκά ἐστι δίκαιον ἢ πρὸς τέκνα καὶ κτήματα· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον· ἕτερον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ πολιτικοῦ.

Social Justice divided into 1. Natural. 2. Arbitrary.

Τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ δικαίου τὸ μὲν φυσικόν ἐστι τὸ δὲ νομικόν, φυσικὸν μὲν τὸ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον δύναμιν, καὶ οὐ τῷ δοκεῖν ἢ μή, νομικὸν δὲ ὃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν οὐθὲν διαφέρει οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως, ὅταν δὲ θῶνται, διαφέρει, οἷον τὸ μνᾶς λυτροῦσθαι, ἢ τὸ αἶγα θύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ δύο πρόβατα, ἔτι ὅσα ἐπὶ τῶν καθ᾽

5. διὰ τοῦτο ἀλλότριον] See p. 174, 12. note. Justice is the good of another, and not of him who dispenses it, otherwise rewards would not be given him for dispensing it.

12. κτῆμα] *His slave.* See the Politics i. 2. p. 6.

13. μέρος αὐτοῦ] See the Politics ib. p. 11.

ἕκαστα νομοθετοῦσιν, οἷον τὸ θύειν Βρασίδᾳ, καὶ τὰ ψηφισματώδη. Δοκεῖ δ' ἐνίοις εἶναι πάντα τοιαῦτα, ὅτι τὸ μὲν φύσει ἀκίνητον καὶ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, ὥσπερ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις καίει, τὰ δὲ δίκαια κινούμενα ὁρῶσιν. τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἔστιν

The opinion that there is no such thing as Natural Justice refuted.

4. ὥσπερ τὸ πῦρ] Compare Cic. de Repub. iii. "Jus enim de quo quærimur, civile est aliquod naturale nullum; nam si esset, ut calida et frigida ut amare et dulcia, sic essent justa et injusta eadem omnibus." This was the opinion of the Pyrrhonists and was afterwards supported by Carneades, the founder of the New Academy. The examination and refutation of it occupies the third book of this Dialogue of Cicero.

The opinions of the Sophists, who were the great supporters of this doctrine, is thus stated by Plato, de Legibus p. 889. θεοὺς εἶναι πρῶτόν φασιν οὗτοι τέχνῃ, οὐ φύσει ἀλλά τισι νόμοις καὶ τούτους ἄλλους ἄλλοις, ὅπῃ ἕκαστοι ἑαυτοῖσι συνωμολόγησαν νομοθετούμενοι· καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ καλὰ φύσει μὲν ἄλλα εἶναι, νόμῳ δὲ ἕτερα· τὰ δὲ δὴ δίκαια οὐδ' εἶναι τὸ παράπαν φύσει, ἀλλ' ἀμφισβητοῦντας διατελεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ μετατιθεμένους ἀεὶ ταῦτα. ἃ δ' ἂν μετάθωνται καὶ ὅταν, τότε κύρια ἕκαστα εἶναι, γιγνόμενα τέχνῃ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις ἀλλ' οὐ δή τινι φύσει. See particularly the Gorgias, p. 482. sq. comparing with it the Repub. 338. sq. Protag. p. 337. Theæt. p. 172.

5. ἐν Πέρσαις] The same simile is used in the Platonic Dialogue, Minos, p. 316, which is partly devoted to the consideration of this subject.

6. τοῦτο δ' οὐκ] De hac autem quæstione, an jus aliquod sit natura (quod tamen negabat Archelaus præceptor Socratis, teste Laertio: [ii. 16. Menag. ibid.] et Callicles Sophista apud Platonem in Gorgia, p. 482. et posterius Epicurei omnes) videatur Plato in Gorgia et Minoe et libro primo et decimo de Legibus. Cicero, lib. i. de Legibus. Alexander Aphrodisiensis pulcherrime in Lib. ii. de Anima, apud quæstionem hanc, an jus aliquod sit natura. Et Simplicius in præfatione Physicæ ἀκροάσεως. GIPH. See Cudworth's Im. Mor. p. 2. and Plato there quoted.

— τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως ἔχον] It is not true absolutely, that all justice is variable. For among those who are in a natural state who are not perverted or depraved, it ever has the same immutability; not every where absolutely, but every where among those who are in a state of nature. Thus that which is naturally pleasant, is so, notwithstanding there may be some to whose appetites as being depraved, as being unnatural, it is not so. And thus naturally the right hand is better than the left, though there are some who are left-handed, and naturally men have five fingers on each hand; and if some are not so born, it does not follow that the being born with five fingers on each hand is not natural. And thus, if we can conceive that Justice exists among the gods, as Plato thinks, Justice would be altogether the same and every where invariable amongst them, as being in

οὕτως ἔχον, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὥς. καίτοι παρά γε τοῖς θεοῖς ἴσως οὐδαμῶς· παρ' ἡμῖν δ' ἐστὶ μέν τι καὶ φύσει, κινητὸν μέντοι πᾶν. ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν φύσει τὸ δ' οὐ φύσει. ποῖον δὲ φύσει τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, καὶ ποῖον οὒ ἀλλὰ νομικὸν καὶ συνθήκῃ, εἴπερ ἄμφω κινητὰ ὁμοίως, δῆλον. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ αὐτὸς ἁρμόσει διορισμός· φύσει γὰρ ἡ δεξιὰ κρείττων, καίτοι ἐνδέχεταί τινας ἀμφιδεξίους γενέσθαι. τὰ δὲ κατὰ συνθήκην καὶ τὸ συμφέρον τῶν δικαίων ὅμοιά ἐστι τοῖς μέτροις· οὐ γὰρ πανταχοῦ ἴσα τὰ οἰνηρὰ καὶ σιτηρὰ μέτρα, ἀλλ' οὗ μὲν ὠνοῦνται, μείζω, οὗ δὲ πωλοῦσιν, ἐλάττω. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μὴ φυσικὰ ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπινα δίκαια οὐ ταὐτὰ πανταχοῦ, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' αἱ πολιτεῖαι, ἀλλὰ μία μόνον πανταχοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἡ ἀρίστη.

Difference of ἄδικον from ἀδίκημα, δίκαιον from δικαίωμα.

Τῶν δὲ δικαίων καὶ νομίμων ἕκαστον ὡς τὰ καθόλου πρὸς τὰ καθ'

the perfect state of nature. Wherefore we are not to form our opinions as to the non-existence of Natural Justice from considering those who are in an unnatural and corrupt state; any more than seeing some men are left-handed, ought we to say that the being right-handed is not natural. But among men, although this Natural Justice exists, fainter or stronger according to their condition, it is every where mutable; for all men are more or less depraved. Just as men may by employing the left hand more than the right, become eventually left-handed, all of them if they will.

1. *καίτοι παρά γε τοῖς θεοῖς*] τὸ δὲ καίτοι παρά γε τοῖς θεοῖς οὐδαμῶς ἴσως ἔχον. πρὸς τὴν τοῦ Πλάτωνος δόξαν ἀπιδὼν εἶπε. λέγοντος εἶναι καὶ ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς δίκαιον καὶ πρὸ αὐτοῦ τὴν αὐτοδικαιοσύνην. Schol. See x. 6.

4. *ποῖον δὲ φύσει*] It may be asked then, since all justice is variable, the natural as well as the arbitrary or juridical, how shall we distinguish the one from the other? This is easily done, says Aristotle, who illustrates this observation by an example. For as the right hand is generally stronger than the left, and few men only are left-handed, so in determining what is naturally just and what is not so, we must consider whether it exists the same among the generality of nations; and if so, it is natural. But that which is not generally the same, but varies daily and in almost all places, such as measures of food, liquids, &c. this is merely juridical and arbitrary.

17. *ὡς τὰ καθόλου πρὸς τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα*] The ἄδικον bears the same

ἕκαστα ἔχει· τὰ μὲν γὰρ πραττόμενα πολλά, ἐκείνων δ᾽ ἕκαστον ἕν· καθόλου γάρ. διαφέρει δὲ τὸ ἀδίκημα καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τὸ δικαίωμα καὶ τὸ δίκαιον· ἄδικον μὲν γάρ ἐστι τῇ φύσει ἢ τάξει· τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ὅταν πραχθῇ, ἀδίκημά ἐστι, πρὶν δὲ πραχθῆναι, οὔπω, ἀλλ᾽ ἄδικον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δικαίωμα. καλεῖται δὲ μᾶλλον δικαιοπράγημα τὸ κοινόν, δικαίωμα δὲ τὸ ἐπανόρθωμα τοῦ ἀδικήματος. καθ᾽ ἕκαστον δὲ αὐτῶν, ποῖά τε εἴδη καὶ πόσα καὶ περὶ ποῖα τυγχάνει ὄντα, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον.

The question started at the beginning of this chapter discussed.

Ὄντων δὲ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων τῶν εἰρημένων, ἀδικεῖ μὲν καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖ, ὅταν ἑκών τις αὐτὰ πράττῃ· ὅταν δ᾽ ἄκων, οὔτ᾽ ἀδικεῖ οὔτε δικαιοπραγεῖ ἀλλ᾽ ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οἷς γὰρ συμβέβηκε δικαίοις εἶναι ἢ ἀδίκοις, πράττουσιν. ἀδίκημα δὲ καὶ δικαιοπράγημα ὥρισται τῷ ἑκουσίῳ καὶ ἀκουσίῳ· ὅταν γὰρ ἑκούσιον ᾖ, ψέγεται, ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἀδίκημα τότ᾽ ἐστίν· ὥστ᾽ ἔσται τι ἄδικον μέν, ἀδίκημα δ᾽ οὔπω, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ ἑκούσιον προσῇ. λέγω δ᾽ ἑκούσιον μέν, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται, ὃ ἄν τις τῶν ἐφ᾽ αὐτῷ ὄντων εἰδὼς καὶ μὴ ἀγνοῶν πράττῃ μήτε ὃν μήτε ᾧ μήτε οὗ ἕνεκα, οἷον τίνα τύπτει καὶ τίνι καὶ τίνος ἕνεκα, κἀκείνων ἕκαστον μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μηδὲ βίᾳ, ὥσπερ

relation to ἀδίκημα as a common noun to a particular. The precept of the law is general, "*Thou shalt not steal,*" the particular instances of transgressions of the law are innumerable.

11. ὄντων δὲ τῶν δικαίων] The conclusion of this chapter, in which Aristotle distinguishes between acts which are and are not done from habit, and distributes them under their different heads, will be better understood by consulting the Table in the Introduction to this Book, p. 167.

21. πρότερον] See the earlier chapters of the Third Book.

εἴ τις λαβὼν τὴν χεῖρα αὐτοῦ τύπτοι ἕτερον, οὐχ ἑκών· οὐ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ. ἐνδέχεται δὲ τὸν τυπτόμενον πατέρα εἶναι, τὸν δ' ὅτι μὲν ἄνθρωπος ἢ τῶν παρόντων τις γινώσκειν, ὅτι δὲ πατὴρ ἀγνοεῖν. ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον διωρίσθω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ οὗ ἕνεκα, καὶ περὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν ὅλην. τὸ δὴ ἀγνοούμενον, ἢ μὴ ἀγνοούμενον μὲν μὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ δ' ὄν, ἢ βίᾳ, ἀκούσιον· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν φύσει ὑπαρχόντων εἰδότες καὶ πράττομεν καὶ πάσχομεν, ὧν οὐθὲν οὔθ' ἑκούσιον οὔτ' ἀκούσιόν ἐστιν, οἷον τὸ γηρᾶν ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν. ἔστι δ' ὁμοίως ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων καὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· καὶ γὰρ ἂν τὴν παρακαταθήκην ἀποδοίη τις ἄκων καὶ διὰ φόβον, ὃν οὔτε δίκαια πράττειν οὔτε δικαιοπραγεῖν φατέον ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀναγκαζόμενον καὶ ἄκοντα τὴν παρακαταθήκην μὴ ἀποδιδόντα κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς φατέον ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὰ ἄδικα πράττειν. τῶν δὲ ἑκουσίων τὰ μὲν προελόμενοι πράττομεν τὰ δ' οὐ προελόμενοι, προελόμενοι μὲν ὅσα προβουλευσάμενοι, ἀπροαίρετα δὲ ὅσα ἀπροβούλευτα. τριῶν δὴ οὐσῶν βλαβῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς κοινωνίαις, τὰ μὲν μετ' ἀγνοίας ἁμαρτήματά ἐστιν, ὅταν μήτε ὃν μήτε ὃ μήτε ᾧ μήτε οὗ ἕνεκα ὑπέλαβε πράξῃ· ἢ γὰρ οὐ βαλεῖν ἢ οὐ τούτῳ ἢ οὐ τοῦτον ἢ οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα ᾠήθη, ἀλλὰ συνέβη οὐχ οὗ ἕνεκα ᾠήθη, οἷον οὐχ ἵνα τρώσῃ ἀλλ' ἵνα κεντήσῃ, ἢ οὐχ ὅν, ἢ οὐχ ὥς. ὅταν μὲν οὖν παραλόγως ἡ βλάβη γένηται,

22. τριῶν δή] See the Introduction to this Book, p. 167.

23. ἁμαρτήματα] See the Rhetoric i. 13.

ἀτύχημα, ὅταν δὲ μὴ παραλόγως, ἄνευ δὲ κακίας, ἁμάρτημα· ἁμαρτάνει μὲν γὰρ ὅταν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ ᾖ τῆς αἰτίας, ἀτυχεῖ δ' ὅταν ἔξωθεν. ὅταν δὲ εἰδὼς μὲν μὴ προβουλεύσας δέ, ἀδίκημα, οἷον ὅσα τε διὰ θυμὸν καὶ ἄλλα πάθη, ὅσα ἀναγκαῖα ἢ φυσικά, συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ταῦτα γὰρ βλάπτοντες καὶ ἁμαρτάνοντες ἀδικοῦσι μέν, καὶ ἀδικήματά ἐστιν, οὐ μέντοι πω ἄδικοι διὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲ πονηροί· οὐ γὰρ διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἡ βλάβη· ὅταν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἄδικος καὶ μοχθηρός. διὸ καλῶς τὰ ἐκ θυμοῦ οὐκ ἐκ προνοίας κρίνεται· οὐ γὰρ ἄρχει ὁ θυμῷ ποιῶν, ἀλλ' ὁ ὀργίσας. ἔτι δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἢ μὴ ἀμφισβητεῖται, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου· ἐπὶ φαινομένῃ γὰρ ἀδικίᾳ ἡ ὀργή ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ὧν ἀνάγκη τὸν ἕτερον εἶναι μοχθηρόν, ἂν μὴ διὰ λήθην αὐτὸ δρῶσιν· ἀλλ' ὁμολογοῦντες περὶ τοῦ πράγματος, περὶ τοῦ ποτέρως δίκαιον ἀμφισβητοῦσιν. ὁ δ' ἐπιβουλεύσας οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ, ὥστε ὁ μὲν οἴεται ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὁ δ' οὔ. ἂν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως βλάψῃ, ἀδικεῖ. Καὶ κατὰ ταῦτ' ἤδη τὰ ἀδικήματα ὁ ἀδικῶν ἄδικος, ὅταν παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον ᾖ ἢ παρὰ τὸ ἴσον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δίκαιος, ὅταν προελόμενος δικαιοπραγῇ. δικαιοπραγεῖ δέ, ἂν μόνον ἑκὼν πράττῃ. τῶν δ' ἀκουσίων τὰ μέν ἐστι συγγνωμονικὰ τὰ δ' οὐ συγ- Recapitulation.

5. ἀναγκαῖα ἢ φυσικά] εἰσὶ δὲ πάθη φυσικά, ἔρωτες, λῦπαι, φόβος· ἀναγκαῖα δέ, πεῖνα, δίψα. Schol.

15. ἀδικίᾳ ἡ ὀργή] On which account Plato placed anger midway between the rational and appetitive parts of the soul: οὕτω καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ τρίτον τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ θυμοειδές, ἐπίκουρον ὂν τῷ λογιστικῷ φύσει ἐὰν μὴ ὑπὸ κακῆς τροφῆς διαφθαρῇ. Repub. p. 440.

γνωμονικά· ὅσα μὲν γὰρ μὴ μόνον ἀγνοοῦντες ἀλλὰ καὶ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἁμαρτάνουσι, συγγνωμονικά, ὅσα δὲ μὴ δι' ἄγνοιαν, ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦντες μὲν διὰ πάθος δὲ μήτε φυσικὸν μήτ' ἀνθρώπινον, οὐ συγγνωμονικά.

CHAP. IX.

Several questions considered in reference to committing and suffering acts of Injustice and of Injury.

i. Question considered.

ΑΠΟΡΗΣΕΙΕ δ' ἄν τις, εἰ ἱκανῶς διώρισται 11 περὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ ἀδικεῖν, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἔστιν ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης εἴρηκε, λέγων ἀτόπως

μητέρα κατέκτα τὴν ἐμήν, βραχὺς λόγος,
ἑκὼν ἑκοῦσαν, ἢ θέλουσαν οὐχ ἑκών·

πότερον γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔστιν ἑκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἢ οὔ, ἀλλ' ἀκούσιον ἅπαν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν πᾶν ἑκούσιον.

ii. Question.

Καὶ ἆρα πᾶν οὕτως ἢ ἐκείνως,

2. δι' ἄγνοιαν] See p. 92, 12.

CHAP. IX.

Having observed in the previous chapter, that he who inflicts and he who suffers injustice is respectively voluntary and involuntary, he is now led to examine the accuracy of this sentiment of Euripides, which is opposed to the above assertion: and which gives rise to the examination of five questions.

I. Whether a person can suffer an act of injustice, and be at the same time a voluntary patient?

II. Whether every suffering of injustice must not be involuntary as the inflicting of it is voluntary?

III. Whether every one who suffers from an *unjust act* suffers from *an act of injustice?*

IV. Whether the person who gives or he who receives more than he ought commits an act of injustice?

V. Whether any one can do injustice to himself?

8. Εὐριπίδης] See Euripides, vol. ii. p. 980. Ed. Oxon. 1833. Michaelis Ephesius and a Scholiast quoted by Zell, attribute these lines to the Bellerophon, but it is much more probable that they are derived from the Alcmæon. See Euripid. ib. p. 849.

ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν πᾶν ἑκούσιον, ἢ τὸ μὲν ἑκούσιον τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοῦσθαι· τὸ γὰρ δικαιοπραγεῖν πᾶν ἑκούσιον, ὥστ' εὔλογον ἀντικεῖσθαι ὁμοίως καθ' ἑκάτερον τό τ' ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ δικαιοῦσθαι ἢ ἑκούσιον ἢ ἀκούσιον εἶναι. ἄτοπον δ' ἂν δόξειε καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοῦσθαι, εἰ πᾶν ἑκούσιον· ἔνιοι γὰρ δικαιοῦνται οὐχ ἑκόντες. *Ἐπεὶ καὶ τόδε διαπορήσειεν ἄν τις, πότερον ὁ τὸ ἄδικον πεπονθὼς ἀδικεῖται πᾶς ἢ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πράττειν, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν ἐστίν· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρων μεταλαμβάνειν τῶν δικαίων. ὁμοίως δὲ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν τὸ τἄδικα πράττειν τῷ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲ τὸ ἄδικα πάσχειν τῷ ἀδικεῖσθαι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ δικαιοῦσθαι· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι μὴ ἀδικοῦντος ἢ δικαιοῦσθαι μὴ δικαιοπραγοῦντος.* *Εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἁπλῶς τὸ ἀδικεῖν τὸ βλάπτειν ἑκόντα τινά, τὸ δ' ἑκόντα εἰδότα καὶ ὃν καὶ ᾧ καὶ ὥς, ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς ἑκὼν βλάπτει αὐτὸς αὑτόν, ἑκών τ' ἂν ἀδικοῖτο καὶ ἐνδέχοιτο αὐτὸν αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἕν τι τῶν ἀπορουμένων, εἰ ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν. ἔτι ἑκὼν ἄν τις δι' ἀκρασίαν ὑπ' ἄλλου βλάπτοιτο ἑκόντος, ὥστ'*

iii. Question.

No one can do an *act of injustice* to himself.

19. τὸ ἀδικεῖν τὸ βλάπτειν ἑκόντα] *If injustice consists merely in voluntarily injuring another:* then what Euripides says is correct; but if this definition is not correct, but we must add to it another particular, viz. *that the patient must be involuntary*, then it is not possible to *do an act of injustice* (ἀδικεῖν) to one's self: though it is possible to *do injury* to one's self (βλάπτειν). This will be more clearly understood by referring to the Table in the Introduction. Compare p. 199, 21. ἂν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως βλάψῃ, ἀδικεῖ.

εἴη ἂν ἑκόντ' ἀδικεῖσθαι. ἢ οὐκ ὀρθὸς ὁ διορισμός, ἀλλὰ προσθετέον τῷ βλάπτειν εἰδότα καὶ ὃν καὶ ᾧ καὶ ὡς τὸ παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου βούλησιν; βλάπτεται μὲν οὖν τις ἑκὼν καὶ τἄδικα πάσχει, ἀδικεῖται δ' οὐθεὶς ἑκών· οὐθεὶς γὰρ βούλεται, οὐδ' ὁ ἀκρατής, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν πράττει· οὔτε γὰρ βούλεται οὐθεὶς ὃ μὴ οἴεται εἶναι σπουδαῖον, ὅ τε ἀκρατὴς οὐχ ἃ οἴεται δεῖν πράττειν πράττει. ὁ δὲ τὰ αὑτοῦ διδούς, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρός φησι δοῦναι τὸν Γλαῦκον τῷ Διομήδει "χρύσεα χαλκείων, ἑκατόμβοι' ἐννεαβοίων," οὐκ ἀδικεῖται· ἐπ' αὐτῷ γάρ ἐστι τὸ διδόναι, τὸ δ' ἀδικεῖσθαι οὐκ ἐπ' αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα δεῖ ὑπάρχειν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὅτι οὐχ ἑκούσιον, δῆλον.

iv. and v. Questions considered.

12 Ἔτι δ' ὧν προειλόμεθα δύ' ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, πότερόν ποτ' ἀδικεῖ ὁ νείμας παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τὸ πλεῖον ἢ ὁ ἔχων, καὶ εἰ ἔστιν αὐτὸν αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν· εἰ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πρότερον λεχθὲν καὶ ὁ διανέμων ἀδικεῖ ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ ἔχων τὸ πλέον, εἴ τις πλέον ἑτέρῳ ἢ αὑτῷ νέμει εἰδὼς καὶ ἑκών, οὗτος αὐτὸς αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖ. ὅπερ δοκοῦσιν οἱ μέτριοι ποιεῖν· ὁ γὰρ ἐπιεικὴς ἐλαττωτικός ἐστιν. ἢ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἁπλοῦν; ἑτέρου γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ, εἰ ἔτυχεν, ἐπλεονέκτει, οἷον δόξης ἢ τοῦ ἁπλῶς καλοῦ. ἔτι

10. Ὅμηρος] Hom. Il. Z. 235.

23. ἢ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἁπλοῦν] It is never absolutely the case, says Aristotle, that any man who distributes, *does* distribute less to himself than he ought. He may give less of that which he is distributing to himself than he has a right to take, but in so doing he takes something else as an equivalent to it, either the gratification of his own benevolent feelings, or the friendship of him to whom he surrenders his right, or reputation, or such like.

λύεται καὶ κατὰ τὸν διορισμὸν τοῦ ἀδικεῖν· οὐθὲν γὰρ παρὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ πάσχει βούλησιν, ὥστε οὐκ ἀδικεῖται διά γε τοῦτο, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, βλάπτεται μόνον. Φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι ὁ διανέμων ἀδικεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ τὸ πλέον ἔχων ἀεί· οὐ γὰρ ᾧ τὸ ἄδικον ὑπάρχει ἀδικεῖ, ἀλλ' ᾧ τὸ ἑκόντα τοῦτο ποιεῖν· τοῦτο δ' ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως, ἥ ἐστιν ἐν τῷ διανέμοντι ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τῷ λαμβάνοντι. ἔτι ἐπεὶ πολλαχῶς τὸ ποιεῖν λέγεται, καὶ ἔστιν ὡς τὰ ἄψυχα κτείνει καὶ ἡ χεὶρ καὶ ὁ οἰκέτης ἐπιτάξαντος, οὐκ ἀδικεῖ μέν, ποιεῖ δὲ τὰ ἄδικα. ἔτι εἰ μὲν ἀγνοῶν ἔκρινεν, οὐκ ἀδικεῖ κατὰ τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον οὐδ' ἄδικος ἡ κρίσις ἐστίν, ἔστι δ' ὡς ἄδικος· ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πρῶτον· εἰ δὲ γινώσκων ἔκρινεν ἀδίκως, πλε-

That the distributor, and not the receiver, is unjust, (πλεονέκτης.)

9. ἔτι ἐπεὶ πολλαχῶς] ὁ ἄρα διανέμων τὸ πλέον ἀδικεῖ καθ' αὑτό, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ δεχόμενος· οὐ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἐστιν ἡ ἀρχή, καθὼς εἴρηται. οὐ γὰρ ὁ ποιῶν τὰ ἄδικα ἀδικεῖν λέγεται, εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὥσπερ λέγεται καὶ ἡ χεὶρ φονεύειν ἢ μάχαιρα ἢ λίθος, παρ' οἷς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρχὴ τοῦ φόνου οὐδὲ ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν πράττουσιν· ἄδικα μὲν γὰρ ποιοῦσιν, ἀδικοῦσι δὲ οὐδαμῶς. Paraphr.

12. ἀγνοῶν ἔκρινεν] He who distributes, acts either wittingly or unwittingly. If the latter, it is from ignorance of Natural or of Positive Justice, or of both. If from an ignorance of both, though he may have done an unjust act, he has not done an act of injustice. Neither if he has made a wrong distribution, knowing the Positive but ignorant of the Natural Justice: for in so doing he has acted according to the Laws. Neither if he has made a wrong distribution, following Natural but ignorant of Positive Justice; for then he obeys the Moral Law. But he who makes an unjust distribution contrary to the dictates of both, knowing both, or of one or the other knowing one or the other, commits an act of injustice.

15. τὸ πρῶτον] Natural Justice.

— εἰ δὲ γινώσκων] *But if, knowing both species of Justice, a person hath made an unfair decision from motives of popularity or revenge, he is unjust, taking more than his due in the shape of popularity or revenge. Just the same then as if a person were a partner in an unjust act, so he by giving an undue decision from such motives has more than his due, and is partner in an unjust act, although he may have no share, or less than he ought, in that which he distributes. As in other instances, he who adjudges a field to a man who has no right to it is a partaker in the in-*

ονεκτεῖ καὶ αὐτὸς ἢ χάριτος ἢ τιμωρίας. ὥσπερ
οὖν κἂν εἴ τις μερίσαιτο τοῦ ἀδικήματος, καὶ ὁ
διὰ ταῦτα κρίνας ἀδίκως πλέον ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ ἐπ'
ἐκείνων ὁ τὸν ἀγρὸν κρίνας οὐκ ἀγρὸν ἀλλ'
ἀργύριον ἔλαβεν. Οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς 13
οἴονται εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν, διὸ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι
ῥᾴδιον. τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· συγγενέσθαι μὲν γὰρ
τῇ τοῦ γείτονος καὶ πατάξαι τὸν πλησίον καὶ
δοῦναι τῇ χειρὶ τὸ ἀργύριον ῥᾴδιον καὶ ἐπ'
αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡδὶ ἔχοντας ταῦτα ποιεῖν οὔτε
ii. ῥᾴδιον οὔτ' ἐπ' αὐτοῖς. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ
γνῶναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα οὐδὲν οἴονται
σοφὸν εἶναι, ὅτι περὶ ὧν οἱ νόμοι λέγουσιν οὐ

Three vulgar errors touching justice and injustice stated;

justice, though he has not the field but money to bias his judgment. And so, not he that receives more than he ought, but he who distributes to another more than he ought from improper motives, if the receiver have no part in bribing the distributors, is unjust.

5. οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι] Aristotle here refutes those vulgar errors originating in men's incorrect notions of justice and injustice.

I. That any one can at any time do an *act of injustice*, and consequently an *act of justice*, and therefore be a just man.

II. That any one can determine whether an act be one of *justice* or *injustice*.

III. That a just man can do an *act of injustice*.

To which it is sufficient to answer, that as all actions both of justice and injustice can only result from habit, and habits can neither be acquired speedily nor lost directly, so neither can he who has not the habit of justice perform an act of justice when he will, nor he who has not the habit of injustice the act of injustice. The just man cannot have at the same time within him the habit of justice and injustice, and consequently cannot perform an act of injustice. Neither is it easy to determine whether an act be one of justice or injustice, though it be done according or contrary to the strict letter of the law. A man may obey the law from fraudulent motives or transgress accidentally, but the first is not necessarily an act of justice, or the second of injustice. And in all judgment concerning acts of this kind, many circumstances must be considered to determine the quality of the act, which is not easy nor in the power of every one, and requires not only a knowledge of positive but moral justice; which brings us to the subject of the next chapter. What is Equity?

χαλεπὸν ξυνιέναι. ἀλλ' οὐ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ δίκαια ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ πῶς πραττόμενα καὶ πῶς νεμόμενα δίκαια· τοῦτο δὲ πλέον ἔργον ἢ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ εἰδέναι, ἐπεὶ κἀκεῖ μέλι καὶ οἶνον καὶ ἐλλέβορον καὶ καῦσιν καὶ τομὴν εἰδέναι ῥᾴδιον, ἀλλὰ πῶς δεῖ νεῖμαι πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ τίνι καὶ πότε, τοσοῦτον ἔργον ὅσον ἰατρὸν εἶναι. Δι' iii.
αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τοῦ δικαίου οἴονται εἶναι οὐθὲν ἧττον τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ὅτι οὐθὲν ἧττον ὁ δίκαιος ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον δύναιτ' ἂν ἕκαστον πρᾶξαι τούτων· καὶ γὰρ συγγενέσθαι γυναικὶ καὶ πατάξαι, καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος τὴν ἀσπίδα ἀφεῖναι καὶ στραφεὶς ἐφ' ὁποτεραοῦν τρέχειν. Ἀλλὰ τὸ δειλαίνειν καὶ and refuted.
τὸ ἀδικεῖν οὐ τὸ ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἐστί, πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡδὶ ἔχοντα ταῦτα ποιεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἰατρεύειν καὶ τὸ ὑγιάζειν οὐ τὸ τέμνειν ἢ μὴ τέμνειν ἢ φαρμακεύειν ἢ μὴ φαρμακεύειν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡδί. ἔστι δὲ τὰ δίκαια ἐν τούτοις οἷς μέτεστι τῶν ἁπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ἔχουσι δ' ὑπερβολὴν ἐν τούτοις καὶ ἔλλειψιν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ αὐτῶν, οἷον ἴσως τοῖς θεοῖς, τοῖς δ' οὐθὲν μόριον ὠφέλιμον, τοῖς ἀνιάτως κακοῖς, ἀλλὰ πάντα βλάπτει, τοῖς δὲ μέχρι τοῦ· διὰ τοῦτ' ἀνθρώπινόν ἐστιν.

4. τὸ ἀδικεῖν] So asserted the Sophists.

19. ἁπλῶς ἀγαθῶν] See p. 171, 17.

CHAP. X.

Of Equity.

Justice and Equity not opposed.

ΠΕΡΙ δὲ ἐπιεικείας καὶ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, πῶς ἔχει 14 ἡ μὲν ἐπιείκεια πρὸς δικαιοσύνην τὸ δ' ἐπιεικὲς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον, ἐχόμενόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν· οὔτε γὰρ ὡς ταὐτὸν ἁπλῶς οὔθ' ὡς ἕτερον τῷ γένει φαίνεται σκοπουμένοις, καὶ ὁτὲ μὲν τὸ ἐπιεικὲς ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν τοιοῦτον, ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐπαινοῦντες μεταφέρομεν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς ὅτι βέλτιον δηλοῦντες· ὁτὲ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ ἀκολουθοῦσι φαίνεται ἄτοπον εἰ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς παρὰ τὸ δίκαιόν τι ὂν ἐπαινετόν ἐστιν· ἢ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον οὐ σπουδαῖον, ἢ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς οὐ δίκαιον, εἰ ἄλλο· ἢ εἰ ἄμφω σπουδαῖα, ταὐτόν ἐστιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀπορία σχεδὸν συμβαίνει διὰ ταῦτα περὶ τὸ ἐπιεικές, ἔχει δ' ἅπαντα τρόπον τινὰ ὀρθῶς καὶ οὐθὲν ὑπεναντίον ἑαυτοῖς· τό τε γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς δικαίου

CHAP. X.

On the subject of this chapter, see also the Rhetoric i. 13.

6. ὥστε καὶ ἐπί] *So that we transfer the term from its original meaning to other acts besides those of equity; instead of using the term good, using that of equitable, when desirous to use a higher term of praise to a thing: indicating thereby that equity is better.*

— ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα] To the acts of the other virtues.

7. τὸ ἐπιεικές] τὸ ἐπιεικέστερον Bekker. If this reading be retained the sense will be, *shewing that when a thing is more equitable it is better.* For instance, if we say, temperance is more equitable (ἐπιεικέστερον) than courage, we indicate thereby that it is better.

9. εἰ τὸ ἐπιεικές] Since equity is commendable, nothing which is contrary to equity is commendable; justice is contrary to equity; therefore justice is not commendable. The fallacy in this syllogism is in the word justice, used in a partial sense in the premise, distributively in the conclusion. Some justice is contrary to equity, viz. that of which equity is the correction, and that particular justice is not commendable.

τινὸς ὂν βέλτιόν ἐστι δίκαιον, καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἄλλο τι γένος ὂν βέλτιόν ἐστι τοῦ δικαίου. ταὐτὸν ἄρα δίκαιον καὶ ἐπιεικές, καὶ ἀμφοῖν σπουδαίοιν ὄντοιν κρεῖττον τὸ ἐπιεικές. ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἀπορίαν ὅτι τὸ ἐπιεικὲς δίκαιον μέν ἐστιν, οὐ τὸ κατὰ νόμον δέ, ἀλλ' ἐπανόρθωμα νομίμου δικαίου. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ὁ μὲν νόμος καθόλου πᾶς, περὶ ἐνίων δ' οὐχ οἷόν τε ὀρθῶς εἰπεῖν καθόλου.

In what cases Equity is better than Justice.

'Εν οἷς οὖν ἀνάγκη μὲν εἰπεῖν καθόλου, μὴ οἷόν τε δὲ ὀρθῶς, τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλέον λαμβάνει ὁ νόμος, οὐκ ἀγνοῶν τὸ ἁμαρτανόμενον. καὶ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἧττον ὀρθῶς· τὸ γὰρ ἁμάρτημα οὐκ ἐν τῷ νόμῳ οὐδ' ἐν τῷ νομοθέτῃ ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν· εὐθὺς γὰρ τοιαύτη ἡ τῶν πρακτῶν ὕλη ἐστίν. ὅταν οὖν λέγῃ μὲν ὁ νόμος καθόλου, συμβῇ δ' ἐπὶ τούτου παρὰ τὸ καθόλου, τότε ὀρθῶς ἔχει, ᾗ παραλείπει ὁ νομοθέτης καὶ ἥμαρτεν ἁπλῶς εἰπών, ἐπανορθοῦν τὸ ἐλλειφθέν, ὃ κἂν ὁ νομοθέτης αὐτὸς οὕτως ἂν εἴποι ἐκεῖ παρών, καὶ εἰ ᾔδει, ἐνομοθέτησεν ἄν. διὸ δίκαιον μέν ἐστι, καὶ βέλτιόν τινος δικαίου, οὐ τοῦ ἁπλῶς δὲ ἀλλὰ τοῦ διὰ τὸ ἁπλῶς ἁμαρτήματος.

Equity defined.

Καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ φύσις ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, ἐπανόρθωμα νόμου, ᾗ ἐλλείπει διὰ τὸ καθόλου. τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιον καὶ τοῦ μὴ πάντα κατὰ νόμον εἶναι, ὅτι περὶ ἐνίων ἀδύνατον θέσθαι νόμον, ὥστε ψηφίσματος δεῖ. τοῦ γὰρ ἀορίστου ἀόριστος καὶ ὁ κανών ἐστιν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῆς Λεσβίας οἰκοδομῆς ὁ μολίβδινος κανών· πρὸς γὰρ τὺ σχῆμα τοῦ λίθου

14. ὕλη] See p. 7.

28. μολίβδινος κανών] Compare the expression in the Rhetoric i. 1. p. 2, 2. (Ed. Bekk.)

μετακινεῖται καὶ οὐ μένει ὁ κανών, καὶ τὸ ψήφισμα πρὸς τὰ πράγματα. τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιεικές, καὶ ὅτι δίκαιον, καὶ τίνος βέλτιον δικαίου, δῆλον. φανερὸν δ' ἐκ τούτου καὶ ὁ ἐπιεικὴς τίς ἐστιν· ὁ γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων προαιρετικὸς καὶ πρακτικός, καὶ ὁ μὴ ἀκριβοδίκαιος ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἀλλ' ἐλαττωτικός, καίπερ ἔχων τὸν νόμον βοηθόν, ἐπιεικής ἐστι, καὶ ἡ ἕξις αὕτη ἐπιείκεια, δικαιοσύνη τις οὖσα καὶ οὐχ ἑτέρα τις ἕξις.

CHAP. XI.

A person cannot commit against himself an act of Universal injustice.

ΠΟΤΕΡΟΝ δ' ἐνδέχεται ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖν ἢ οὔ, φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων· τὰ μὲν γάρ ἐστι τῶν

6. μὴ ἀκριβοδίκαιος] For according to the proverb: *Summum jus summa injuria.*

CHAP. XI.

Aristotle resumes the consideration of the question proposed in the previous chapter; *whether a man can do an act of injustice to himself*; which question is copiously discussed in the Gorgias of Plato.

12. τὰ μὲν γάρ ἐστι] Aristotle repeats the distinction already stated in the early part of this Book, between acts done contrary to universal and particular justice: and infers that consequently all acts of injustice suffered, must be those contrary to one or the other justice. Aristotle shows, that a man can inflict neither the one nor the other class of actions upon himself.

A case is supposed. "When a man commits deliberately an injury, not from a spirit of retaliation, which act is forbidden by the law, does he not commit an act of injustice?" We grant it. "He then who commits suicide, commits such an act of injustice: does he not?" This we grant. "And upon himself." This Aristotle denies: affirming that he injures the state of which he is a member. And this is evident, for the state shows its sense of such an injustice by punishing the person who has committed it. Thus a person cannot commit an act contrary to universal justice upon himself. Suicide is said to be an act contrary to universal justice, since a man who commits it disregards all

δικαίων τὰ κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου τεταγμένα, οἷον οὐ κελεύει ἀποκτιννύναι ἑαυτὸν ὁ νόμος, ἃ δὲ μὴ κελεύει, ἀπαγορεύει· ἔτι ὅταν παρὰ τὸν νόμον βλάπτῃ μὴ ἀντιβλάπτων, ἑκών, ἀδικεῖ, ἑκὼν δὲ ὁ εἰδὼς καὶ ὃν καὶ ᾧ. ὁ δὲ δι' ὀργὴν ἑαυτὸν σφάττων ἑκὼν τοῦτο δρᾷ παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ὃ οὐκ ἐᾷ ὁ νόμος· ἀδικεῖ ἄρα. ἀλλὰ τίνα; ἢ τὴν πόλιν, αὐτὸν δ' οὔ; ἑκὼν γὰρ πάσχει, ἀδικεῖται δ' οὐθεὶς ἑκών. διὸ καὶ ἡ πόλις ζημιοῖ, καί τις ἀτιμία πρόσεστι τῷ ἑαυτὸν διαφθείραντι ὡς τὴν πόλιν ἀδικοῦντι. Ἔτι καθ' ὃ ἄδικος ὁ μόνον ἀδικῶν καὶ μὴ ὅλως φαῦλος, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδικῆσαι ἑαυτόν. τοῦτο γὰρ ἄλλο ἐκείνου. ἔστι γάρ πως ὁ ἄδικος οὕτω πονηρὸς ὥσπερ ὁ δειλός, οὐχ ὡς ὅλην ἔχων τὴν πονηρίαν, ὥστ' οὐδὲ κατὰ ταύτην ἀδικεῖ· ἅμα γὰρ ἂν τῷ αὐτῷ εἴη ἀφῃρῆσθαι καὶ προσκεῖσθαι τὸ αὐτό· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ἐν πλείοσιν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον. ἔτι δὲ ἑκούσιόν τε καὶ ἐκ προαιρέσεως καὶ πρότερον. ὁ γὰρ διότι ἔπαθε, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀντιποιῶν οὐ δοκεῖ ἀδικεῖν· αὐτὸς δ' ἑαυτόν, τὰ αὐτὰ ἅμα καὶ πάσχει καὶ ποιεῖ. ἔτι εἴη ἂν ἑκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ἄνευ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀδικημάτων οὐθεὶς ἀδικεῖ, μοιχεύει δ' οὐδεὶς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ οὐδὲ τοιχωρυχεῖ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ τοῖχον οὐδὲ κλέπτει τὰ ἑαυτοῦ. ὅλως δὲ λύεται τὸ ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖν κατὰ τὸν διορισμὸν τὸν περὶ τοῦ ἑκουσίως ἀδικεῖσθαι.

or Particular Injustice.

positive duties, (προστάττει ὁ νόμος τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρείου ἔργα ποιεῖν—καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώφρονος – ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς. p. 77, 10.). All of which, of course, by such an act he neglects. He is, in fact, a traitor to his country.

To do is worse than to suffer injustice.

Φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι ἄμφω μὲν φαῦλα, καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔλαττον τὸ δὲ πλέον ἔχειν ἐστὶ τοῦ μέσου καὶ ὥσπερ ὑγιεινὸν μὲν ἐν ἰατρικῇ, εὐεκτικὸν δὲ ἐν γυμναστικῇ. ἀλλ' ὅμως χεῖρον τὸ ἀδικεῖν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικεῖν μετὰ κακίας καὶ ψεκτόν, καὶ κακίας ἢ τῆς τελείας καὶ ἁπλῶς ἢ ἐγγύς (οὐ γὰρ ἅπαν τὸ ἑκούσιον μετὰ ἀδικίας), τὸ δ' ἀδικεῖσθαι ἄνευ κακίας καὶ ἀδικίας. καθ' αὑτὸ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἧττον φαῦλον, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δ' οὐθὲν κωλύει μεῖζον εἶναι κακόν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν μέλει τῇ τέχνῃ, ἀλλὰ πλευρῖτιν λέγει μείζω νόσον προσπταίσματος· καίτοι γένοιτ' ἄν ποτε θάτερον κατὰ συμβεβηκός, εἰ προσπταίσαντα διὰ τὸ πεσεῖν συμβαίη ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ληφθῆναι καὶ ἀποθανεῖν.

Metaphorically a man may do an act of justice and injustice to himself.

Κατὰ μεταφορὰν δὲ καὶ ὁμοιότητά ἐστιν οὐκ αὐτῷ πρὸς αὑτὸν δίκαιον ἀλλὰ τῶν αὐτοῦ τισίν, οὐ πᾶν δὲ δίκαιον ἀλλὰ τὸ δεσποτικὸν ἢ τὸ οἰκονομικόν· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τοῖς λόγοις διέστηκε τὸ λόγον ἔχον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἄλογον. εἰς ἃ δὴ βλέπουσι καὶ δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀδικία πρὸς αὑτόν, ὅτι ἐν τούτοις ἔστι πάσχειν τι παρὰ τὰς ἑαυτῶν ὀρέξεις· ὥσπερ οὖν ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ εἶναι πρὸς ἄλληλα δίκαιόν τι καὶ τούτοις. περὶ μὲν οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.

5. χεῖρον τὸ ἀδικεῖν] Of this one would have thought there never could have been any question. Yet so it was. See Plato's Gorgias, p. 469. 473. sq. Plat. Rep. 579. Apolog. 30. Leg. 728.

16. κατὰ μεταφοράν] Breviter copiosam Platonis disputationem attingit qui lib. iv. de Repub. in fin. duo facit justitiæ genera, interioris et exterioris. GIPH.

24. ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ] See the Pol. i. 2. p. 7, 8.

INTRODUCTION TO BOOK VI.

Aristotle now proceeds to complete the analysis of his definition of Moral Virtue, and at the same time to discuss the Intellectual Virtues, the division of which was spoken of at the close of the First Book, p. 48.

Now Aristotle had defined Moral Virtue to be ἕξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὡρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν (p. 69.); in which definition three things remain yet to be explained:

1. What is λόγος?
2. Who is φρόνιμος?
3. What is προαίρεσις? the consideration of which was left unfinished in iii. 3. p. 100. see n.

The nature of these then we now proceed to examine. And our enquiry is; What is that λόγος which always directs us to the *true* mean in all Moral Actions, since there are many kinds of λόγοι: and what is that Virtue of the φρόνιμος by which he is enabled exactly to discover this true mean? But to ascertain these, we must examine in what part of the soul they exist, and what λόγοι or Virtues there are whose object is truth. If then there be two parts of the soul, as there would appear to be from there being two kinds of matter only, Contingent and Necessary, upon which the soul can operate, one of these will take cognizance of the Truth in Moral, the other in Scientific Matter. The first of these then will be the Deliberative, the other the Scientific part of the soul. And in whichever of these the λόγος is employed in finding and determining the truth in moral subjects, that will be λόγος, and that the virtue

of the φρονιμος which we are endeavouring to discover. Now since necessary matter is that upon which the Scientific part operates, it cannot take cognizance of Moral Truth which is not Scientific, consequently cannot be that λόγος and that Virtue which directs the Moral Habits to the truth. If, therefore, we can discover how many Habits there are in both parts of the soul which take cognizance of Truth, we shall discover which direct our Moral Habits, and what are our Intellectual Virtues. Now the matter upon which they can operate are two; necessary and contingent: the ends which they can have in view are only three; truth purely, moral truth, truth in production, consequently these habits can be only,

(1.) One which has Moral Truth for its object (φρόνησις).
(2.) The other which has Truth in production (τεχνή).
(3.) Which has Scientific Truth.

But the matter of the latter subdivides itself into either pure demonstration, or the principles of demonstration. And consequently there will be, following the same analogy, a distinct habit for each, the first being science (ἐπιστήμη), the other apprehension (νοῦς), or the union of both which is wisdom (σοφία).

Accordingly we obtain five divisions of Habits, all having Truth for their object.

Abstract Truth.		Practical or Moral Truth.	Truth with production.
1. ἀρχαί.	2. ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν.	3. This habit will be,	4. This habit will be,
This habit will be, ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν.	This habit will be, ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς περὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῶν, (sc. ἀποδεικτική).	ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς πρακτική.	ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική.
1. sc. νοῦς.	2. ἐπιστήμη.	3. sc. φρόνησις.	4. sc. τεχνή.

United they make up
5. σοφία.

The examination therefore of these five Habits, ἐπιστήμη, τέχνη, νοῦς, φρόνησις, and σοφία, occupies the following book; together with a consideration of their utility for promoting the happiness of man.

Aristotle then has not thought it necessary in this Book to investigate all the Intellectual Habits, reserving the consideration of them for another treatise[a]. His principal attention is directed to those which form the intermediate link between the rational and irrational soul, and which have unmixed truth either theoretical or practical for their object (ἔργον)[b]; and hence the consideration of σοφία bears but a small proportion to that of φρόνησις, and one of them (νοῦς) is left so obscure, that, without recurring to his other writings, it is by no means easy to understand several portions of the ensuing chapters. It may be therefore useful to consider briefly such of the intellectual faculties of the soul as are not explicitly defined in the following Book.

The faculties of the soul may be divided then as follows:

The Faculties of the Soul are divided into

- Rational.
  - γνωστικαί.
    - νοῦς.
    - διάνοια.
    - δόξα.
  - πρακτικαί.
    - βούλησις, always of good.
    - προαίρεσις, of good and evil, connecting the Irrational with the Rational soul, being a compound of λόγος and ὄρεξις.
- Irrational.
  - γνωστικαί.
    - φαντασία.
    - αἴσθησις.
  - ὀρεκτικαί.
    - θυμός.
    - ἐπιθυμία.
    - &c.
  - ζωτικαί. See p. 45, 15.

Of these, as has been already shown, Aristotle divides

[a] The third book of the Treatise De Anima.

[b] See p. 47. and the note.

the purely rational according to their object-matter, confining ἐπιστήμη to necessary matter with demonstration, and φρόνησις to contingent matter. See the division, p. 212. Of such faculties then as are concerned with knowledge (γνωστικαί), the lowest is αἴσθησις, that of the five senses. These when employed, each upon its peculiar object-matter, seldom err [c]. But they have a common object-matter upon which they frequently are at fault [d], such as motion, rest, number, figure, and magnitude, (κίνησις, ἠρεμία, ἀριθμός, σχῆμα, μέγεθος [e]). But besides this αἴσθησις which Aristotle designates by the name of ἴδια αἴσθησις, there is another which is called κοινὴ αἴσθησις, of which he speaks in the 6th chapter of this Book, p. 240. For as every sense is confined to its own peculiar object-matter, there must be some other sense which compares the differences of things sensible with each other. Not νοῦς, although somewhat resembling it [f], for νοῦς cannot judge of things sensible. Not that νοῦς is ignorant of their differences, but it uses this organ for the discovery of those differences; for without sense it is impossible to judge (γνῶναι) of things sensible; and which, because it judges of all the energies of the senses, is called common (κοινή). Contrary to the other senses this faculty is both incorporeal (ἀσώματος), and acts at any time (ἀχρόνως). For it does not at one time know that a thing is bitter and another time white, but at the same time (ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νῦν) that it is both bitter and white [g].

[c] ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις τῶν ἰδίων ἀεὶ ἀληθής. De Anima, iii. 3. §. 3. Compare also ii. 6. §. 2. and iii. 3. §. 12.

[d] See De Anima, iii. 3. §. 12.

[e] These are called the common matter of the senses, not because they are common to all the senses at once, but because they are subject to more than one; for instance, sight and touch can both judge of magnitude. See De An. ii. 6.

[f] See Chap. ix.

[g] Compare De Anima, iii. 2. §. 10. ἑκάστη μὲν οὖν αἴσθησις τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ ἐστίν, ὑπάρχουσα ἐν τῷ αἰσθητηρίῳ ᾗ αἰσθητήριον, καὶ κρίνει τὰς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ διαφοράς, οἷον λευκὸν μὲν καὶ μέλαν ὄψις, γλυκὺ δὲ καὶ πικρὸν γεῦσις. ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν αἰσθητῶν πρὸς ἕκαστον κρίνομεν, τίνι καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι διαφέρει; ἀνάγκη δὴ αἰσθήσει· αἰσθητὰ γάρ ἐστιν. ᾗ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἡ

Neither of these faculties are concerned with action (πρᾶξις [h]) except accidentally.

The next in order is imagination (φαντασία), the power of presenting visions to the mind [i], a motion proceeding indeed from the senses, not of the senses but of the soul, being necessary to διάνοια, and itself requiring αἴσθησις, yet differing from both. Differing from sense (αἴσθησις), because sense cannot energize without the presence of the sensible object, and we have power over our senses but not of our imagination [k]. Differing from ἐπιστήμη and νοῦς, because they are always of the truth (ἀληθευτικαί), whereas imagination is more frequently false. Differing from opinion, because upon opinion follows belief or persuasion (πίστις [l]), but not upon φαντασία; our feelings and affections also immediately sympathize with δόξα but not with φαντασία [m]. And, further, δόξα does not exist in brutes, but φαντασία does; the former is a rational the other an irrational faculty. By φαντασία they are guided in their actions either who have not reason, or whose reason is clouded by passion or disease [n].

The next of these faculties is δόξα, which is employed either upon conclusions in contingent or in scientific matter, but without knowing the process by which such conclusions were deduced. And in this respect also it differs from science (ἐπιστήμη), for science knows both the conclusions and the process by which it arrived at

σὰρξ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἔσχατον αἰσθητήριον· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἦν ἁπτόμενον αὐτοῦ κρίνειν τὸ κρῖνον. οὔτε δὴ κεχωρισμένοις ἐνδέχεται κρίνειν ὅτι ἕτερον τὸ γλυκὺ τοῦ λευκοῦ, ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἑνί τινι ἄμφω δῆλα εἶναι. κ. τ. λ.

[h] See Chap. i. p. 220.

[i] πρὸ ὀμμάτων γάρ ἐστι ποιήσασθαι. De Anima, iii. 3. §. 4.

[k] O, who can hold a fire in his hand
By thinking on the frosty Caucasus?
Or cloy the hungry edge of appetite,
By bare imagination of a feast?
Or wallow naked in December's snow
By thinking on phantastic summer's heat?
Richard II. Act i. Sc. 3.

[l] δόξῃ μὲν ἕπεται πίστις, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται γὰρ δοξάζοντα οἷς δοκεῖ μὴ πιστεύειν. De Anima iii. 3. §. 8.

[m] ὅταν μὲν δοξάσωμεν δεινόν τι ἢ φοβερόν, εὐθὺς συμπάσχομεν, ὁμοίως δὲ κἂν θαρραλέον· κατὰ δὲ τὴν φαντασίαν ὡσαύτως ἔχομεν ὥσπερ ἂν οἱ θεώμενοι ἐν γραφῇ τὰ δεινὰ ἢ θαρραλέα. De Anima iii. 3. §. 4.

[n] καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐμμένειν καὶ ὁμοίας εἶναι ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι, πολλὰ κατ' αὐτὰς πράττει τὰ ζῷα, τὰ μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν

such conclusion [o]. To use the expression of Aristotle (see p. 11, 11.) it knows the ὅτι, but is ignorant of the διότι, in which it resembles the αἴσθησις of the irrational soul [p]. They, therefore, who have not science may yet act superior to irrational animals, by holding the conclusions derived by others, and by being guided by their opinions.

The last faculty then of which it is necessary to speak is νοῦς, which differs from αἴσθησις in operating alike on all object-matter, from φαντασία in always being true, and for the same reason from δόξα. From ἐπιστήμη and διάνοια, because it apprehends by intuition without having need of a process of reasoning [q]. This faculty is possessed to a degree by all mankind, for the first principles of morals and science exist to a degree in all mankind, otherwise they would be unable to comprehend the self-evident truths of the one, the axioms and definitions of the other. But as it is the most noble faculty of the soul, so it is possessed in an eminent degree by few; growing to perfection only by experience [r], in those who keep their appetites and passions in subjection. It is that faculty which in morals does at once what is right, without the process of an argument, not because it is any wise allied to shrewdness or conjecture, but because it is the eye of the soul disciplined and accustomed to the contemplation of the truth, which by its very nature recoils from falsehood.

The following are the remarks of Philoponus upon this faculty in his Commentary on Aristotle's Treatise de Anima: τοῦ δὲ νοῦ ἔργον τὸ ἁπλαῖς προσβολαῖς καὶ κρεῖττον ἢ κατὰ ἀπόδειξιν ἐπιβάλλειν τοῖς πράγμασιν. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ αἴσθησις προσβάλλουσα τυχὸν τῷ λευκῷ, ἢ τῷδε τῷ σχήματι, κρεῖττον ἢ κατὰ ἀπόδειξιν αὐτοῦ τὴν γνῶσιν ἔσχεν· οὐ γὰρ δεῖται πρὸς ταῦτα συλλογισμοῦ, ὅτι τόδε ἐστὶ λευκόν, ἀλλὰ ἁπλῇ ἐπιβολῇ τοῦτο γινώσκει· οὕτω καὶ ὁ νοῦς ἁπλῇ ἐπιβολῇ γινώσκει τὰ νοητὰ κρεῖττον ἢ κατὰ ἀπόδειξιν. ἡ δέ γε τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ἐκείνοις μόνοις

νοῦν, οἷον τὰ θηρία, τὰ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἐπικαλύπτεσθαι τὸν νοῦν ἐνίοτε πάθει ἢ νόσοις ἢ ὕπνῳ, οἷον οἱ ἄνθρωποι. De Anima iii. 3. §. 15.

[o] See p. 227.
[p] See Metaph. i. 1. p. 3.
[q] See p. 239.
[r] See p. 249.

παραγίνεται, οἷς εἰς ἄκρον καθαρέως καὶ ἐπιστήμης γέγονεν ἀφικέσθαι, καὶ διὰ τῶν καθαρτικῶν ἀρετῶν ἀφαντάστως καὶ δίχα αἰσθήσεως ἐνεργεῖν συνειθισμένοις. ἔστι γὰρ ὁ νοῦς οἷον ἕξις τῆς ψυχῆς τελειοτάτη.——τούτου τοίνυν τοῦ νοῦ εἰ καὶ μὴ μετέχομεν οἱ πολλοί, ἀλλ' ἴχνη τινὰ καὶ ἰνδάλματα διαβέβηκεν εἰς ἡμᾶς. ταῦτα δέ ἐστιν αἱ κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι, ἃς ἀναποδείκτως, μᾶλλον δὲ κρεῖττον ἢ κατὰ ἀπόδειξιν, πάντες γινώσκομεν. οἷον ὅτι τὰ τῷ αὐτῷ ἴσα καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἴσα, ὅτι ἐὰν ἀπὸ ἴσων ἴσα ἀφαιρεθῇ τὰ καταλειπόμενα ἴσα γίνεται, ὅτι ἐπὶ παντὸς ἢ ἡ κατάφασις ἢ ἡ ἀπόφασις, ὅτι πάντα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐφίεται, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα. πρὸς γὰρ τὴν τούτων πίστιν κατασκευῆς οὐ δεόμεθα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ πρώτην ἐπιβολὴν κρεῖττον ἢ κατὰ ἀπόδειξιν ταῦτα γινώσκομεν. αὗται οὖν ὡς εἴπομεν αἱ κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι διὰ πάντων χωροῦσαι ἰνδάλματα τοῦ νοῦ εἰσιν ἐναργῶς. διὸ καὶ ἀρχὴν ἐπιστήμης τὸν νοῦν καλοῦσιν[r], ᾧτινι τὰ νοήτα γινώσκομεν. περὶ τούτου καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀποδεικτικοῖς[s] ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης πρὸς τοὺς νομίζοντας μὴ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην ἔλεγεν, ὅτι οὐ μόνον ἐπιστήμην εἶναι λέγομεν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀρχὴν ἐπιστήμης, ᾗ τοὺς ὅρους γινώσκομεν, ὅρους λέγων ἤτοι τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας, καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς ὅρους, δεῖ γὰρ πάντα συλλογισμὸν ἀπὸ κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν ἔχειν τὴν ἀρχήν, αἵτινες ὡς εἴπομεν ἀπὸ τοῦ νοῦ [καὶ] πρὸς ἡμᾶς φοιτῶσιν. ἀναποδείκτως γὰρ ἴσμεν ὅτι τόδε τι ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, ἢ ψυχή, ἤ τι τοιοῦτον. ἢ τὰ νοητὰ ὅρους φησι, ὡς πέρατα τῶν ὄντων, ὅρος γάρ ἐστιν, ὥς φησιν ὁ γεωμέτρης, ὅ τινός ἐστι πέρας: ἀρχὴν οὖν ἐπιστήμης φησι τὸν νοῦν εἶναι, δι' αὐτοῦ γὰρ ἔχομεν τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας, ὅθεν ἡ διάνοια ὡς ἀπὸ ἀρχῶν τὰς ἐπιστημονικὰς ἀποδείξεις ποιεῖται[t].

[r] See p. 234.

[s] Perhaps for ἀναλυτικοῖς. See note p. 232.

[t] This writer also, in another passage of his commentary, gives the following account of the different cognoscent faculties.

The *gnostic* energy (γνῶσις) is employed either upon external objects and causes sensation (αἴσθησις), or upon internal and causes perception, in the more general use of the term (κοινοτέραν νόησιν). I say more *general*, because imagination (φαντασία) also operates on things internal, and is called νοῦς παθητικός. But an operation on things internal is either upon the Universal or Particular. If upon the Particular it causes Imagination, if upon the Universal it causes νοῦς, in the proper use of that term (τὸν κυρίως νοῦν). But this knowledge of the Universal is either above and without, or with the use of the syllogism; in the former instance producing the theoretical νοῦς, (see p. 239. n.) both as to the habit and the energy, (τὸν θεωρητικὸν νοῦν τὸν καθ' ἕξιν καὶ ἐνέργειαν);

in the latter, διάνοια properly, (κυρίως διάνοια καὶ κοινοτέρα ὑπόληψις[a]). For ὑπόληψις is applied both to διάνοια and to δόξα. (See p. 230, 11.) But if it energize in the inferior way or according to syllogism, (εἰ δὲ χειρόνως ἢ κατὰ συλλογισμὸν ἐνεργήσει) it produces δόξα and ὑπόληψις κυρίως. The διάνοια which is employed on theoretical or scientific matter (θεωρητικά), produces science; but when employed upon contingent matter (πρακτά), if they require deliberation, φρόνησις, for φρόνησις requires deliberation. But if this contingent matter do not require deliberation, it produces the arts. For the artist or artizan does not deliberate as far as he is an artist, but as far as he is a man. Philopon. in Arist. de An. P. iii. b.

[a] διάνοια and ὑπόληψις seem frequently used in common both by Aristotle and his commentators, (see De Anima iii. 3. §. 4. and 4. §. 3); but they differ, in that διάνοια is the progression of the mind in the discovery of truth, ὑπόληψις is the determination or supposition of that truth, or what is supposed to be true, in the mind. The one is in motion, the other at rest.

ARISTOTELIS

ETHICA NICOMACHEA.

LIB. VI.

CHAP. I.

The connection of the Intellectual with the Moral Virtues. The object of the Intellectual Virtues generally investigated.

Introduction to the subject of this book.

ΕΠΕΙ δὲ τυγχάνομεν πρότερον εἰρηκότες ὅτι δεῖ τὸ μέσον αἱρεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μηδὲ τὴν ἔλλειψιν, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐστὶν ὡς ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς λέγει, τοῦτο διέλωμεν. ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἕξεσι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἐστί τις σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ἀποβλέπων ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων ἐπιτείνει καὶ ἀνίησιν, καί τις ἐστὶν ὅρος τῶν μεσοτήτων, ἅς μεταξύ φαμεν εἶναι τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως, οὔσας κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον. ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν εἰπεῖν οὕτως ἀληθὲς μέν, οὐθὲν δὲ σαφές· καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιμελείαις, περὶ ὅσας ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτ' ἀληθὲς μὲν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι οὔτε πλείω οὔτε ἐλάττω δεῖ πονεῖν οὐδὲ ῥαθυμεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέσα καὶ ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος· τοῦτο δὲ μόνον

2. τὸ μέσον] See ii. 2.

5. καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων] ὅτι οὐ μόνον τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἕξεων τὰς ὑπερβολὰς καὶ ἐλλείψεις ἐκκλίνομεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν. Schol.

ἔχων ἄν τις οὐθὲν ἂν εἰδείη πλέον, οἷον ποῖα δεῖ προσφέρεσθαι πρὸς τὸ σῶμα, εἴ τις εἴπειεν ὅτι ὅσα ἡ ἰατρικὴ κελεύει καὶ ὡς ὁ ταύτην ἔχων. διὸ δεῖ καὶ περὶ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἕξεις μὴ μόνον ἀληθὲς εἶναι τοῦτ' εἰρημένον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διωρισμένον τίς τ' ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος καὶ τούτου τίς ὅρος.

The subject commenced.

Τὰς δὴ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετὰς διελόμενοι τὰς μὲν 2 εἶναι τοῦ ἤθους ἔφαμεν τὰς δὲ τῆς διανοίας. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἠθικῶν διεληλύθαμεν, περὶ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν, περὶ ψυχῆς πρῶτον εἰπόντες, λέγωμεν οὕτως.

The rational part of the soul divided according to its object-matter. Into,

Πρότερον μὲν οὖν ἐλέχθη δύ' εἶναι μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, τό τε λόγον ἔχον καὶ τὸ ἄλογον· νῦν δὲ περὶ τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον διαιρετέον. καὶ ὑποκείσθω δύο τὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ἓν μὲν ᾧ θεωροῦμεν τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ὅσων αἱ ἀρχαὶ μὴ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἓν δὲ ᾧ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα· πρὸς γὰρ τὰ τῷ γένει ἕτερα καὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων ἕτερον τῷ γένει τὸ πρὸς ἑκάτερον πεφυκός, εἴπερ καθ' ὁμοι-

11. πρότερον] See p. 48.

17. τῷ γένει ἕτερα] If the object-matters upon which the soul may be employed be specifically different, it is probable that there will be different faculties of the soul corresponding to the differences of this matter, which will be employed upon it. And this may be inferred generally from analogy.

For as colour differs from flavour, and noise from smell, so are there different senses which are respectively employed upon them. We distinguish noise by hearing, flavour by taste, colour by sight, and so on in all other instances.' Since, therefore, the object-matter of the soul is different, it is probable that there are corresponding parts of the soul to energize upon the different matters.

But the object-matter of the soul is either necessary or contingent, and therefore we may conceive a division of the soul generally into two parts, corresponding to them. The first of which will be deliberative, λογιστικὸν or βουλευτικόν, or δοξαστικόν, see p. 231. (for deliberation is only employed upon contingent matter,) over which we have control, (see iii. 3.); the other into scientific (ἐπιστημονικόν.)

ότητά τινα καὶ οἰκειότητα ἡ γνῶσις ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς. Λεγέσθω δὲ τούτων τὸ μὲν ἐπιστημονικὸν τὸ δὲ λογιστικόν· τὸ γὰρ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ λογίζεσθαι ταὐτόν, οὐθεὶς δὲ βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων ἄλλως ἔχειν. ὥστε τὸ λογιστικόν ἐστιν ἕν τι μέρος τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος. Ληπτέον ἄρ' ἑκατέρου τούτων τίς ἡ βελτίστη ἕξις· αὕτη γὰρ ἀρετὴ ἑκατέρου, ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ οἰκεῖον. τρία δ' ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τὰ κύρια πράξεως καὶ ἀληθείας, αἴσθησις νοῦς ὄρεξις.

1. The *Deliberative* or contingent. 2. *The Scientific* or Necessary.

The virtue of each investigated, by examining the ἔργον of each.

3. λογιστικόν] Compare de Anima, iii. 9. §. 3. ἔν τε τῷ λογιστικῷ γὰρ ἡ βούλησις γίνεται, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ ἡ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ θυμός.

6. ληπτέον] The *genus* of every art, science, habit, &c. is discovered by considering the matter upon which they are respectively employed; and this was termed by the Schoolmen, the *subjectum materiale*, (ὕλη). The *differentia* is found, by considering the end and object which each has in view; which they also called the *subjectum formale*. Now truth is the *subjectum formale* of the virtues or habits both of the deliberative and intellectual parts of the soul; but of the former, the *subjectum materiale* is necessary-matter; of the other, contingent. The definition, then, of the respective habits of the scientific and deliberative parts of the soul will be, of the one, those habits which have the aptitude of discovering the truth (ἀληθεύσει) in necessary matter; of the other, those habits which have an aptitude at arriving at the truth in moral and contingent. Aristotle then proceeds to investigate the difference between these two kinds of truths, by first explaining what is meant by truth in morals.

Now though Aristotle has said that truth is the ἔργον of the intellectual virtues, he has given no direct proof of it; for this is nearly self-evident. For if beasts cannot share in πρᾶξις much less can they in truth. These, therefore, action (πρᾶξις) and truth, are peculiar to man, and must consequently be peculiar to that part of him by which he is distinguished from brutes. The ἔργα therefore of the intellectual part of man must be either πρᾶξις, or ἀλήθεια, or ἀλήθεια μετὰ πράξεως.

9. τρία δ' ἐστίν] Since the best habits of the soul are to be discovered by its operations (ἔργα), Aristotle therefore proceeds to examine the principles and first causes of all operations, and thence to show what is the peculiar operation (οἰκεῖον ἔργον) of each part of the rational soul.

10. νοῦς ὄρεξις] ἄμφω ἄρα ταῦτα κινητικὰ κατὰ τόπον, νοῦς καὶ ὄρεξις. νοῦς δὲ ὁ ἕνεκά του λογιζόμενος καὶ ὁ πρακτικός· διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ τῷ τέλει. καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις ἕνεκά του πᾶσα· οὗ γὰρ ἡ ὄρεξις, αὕτη ἀρχὴ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ νοῦ· τὸ δὲ ἔσχατον ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως. ὥστε εὐλόγως ταῦτα δύο φαίνεται τὰ κινοῦντα, ὄρεξις καὶ διάνοια πρακ-

The ἔργον of the Deliberative part of the soul.

τούτων δ' ἡ αἴσθησις οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχὴ πράξεως· δῆλον δὲ τῷ τὰ θηρία αἴσθησιν μὲν ἔχειν, πράξεως δὲ μὴ κοινωνεῖν. Ἔστι δ' ὅπερ ἐν διανοίᾳ κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις, τοῦτ' ἐν ὀρέξει δίωξις καὶ φυγή· ὥστ' ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ὄρεξις βουλευτική, δεῖ διὰ ταῦτα τόν τε λόγον ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὄρεξιν ὀρθήν, εἴπερ ἡ προαίρεσις σπουδαία, καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τὸν μὲν φάναι τὴν δὲ διώκειν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ διανοία καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια πρακτική.

Of the Scientific part.

Τῆς δὲ θεωρητικῆς διανοίας καὶ μὴ πρακτικῆς

τική. τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν γὰρ κινεῖ· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ διάνοια κινεῖ, ὅτι ἀρχὴ αὐτῆς ἐστι τὸ ὀρεκτόν. De Anim. iii. 10.

Compare generally the whole of the third book of this treatise, and also De Anim. Motione, with the sixth and seventh books of the Ethics.

1. οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχὴ πράξεως] The reason of this he himself explains in his treatise De Anim. Motione, cap. vi. ὁρῶμεν μὲν δὴ καὶ τὰ κινοῦντα τὸ ζῶον, διάνοιαν [καὶ αἴσθησιν] καὶ φαντασίαν καὶ προαίρεσιν καὶ βούλησιν καὶ θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν· ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ἀνάγεται εἰς νοῦν καὶ ὄρεξιν. καὶ γὰρ ἡ φαντασία καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις τὴν αὐτὴν τῷ νῷ χώραν ἔχουσι· κριτικὰ γὰρ πάντα· διαφέρουσι δὲ κατὰ τὰς εἰρημένας ἐν ἄλλοις διαφοράς. (See De Anim. iii. 3. sq.) βούλησις δὲ καὶ θυμὸς καὶ ἐπιθυμία πάντα ὀρέξεις· ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις κοινὸν διανοίας καὶ ὀρέξεως ὥστε καὶ τὸ προαιρετόν. οὐ πᾶν δὲ τὸ διανοητόν, προαιρετόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῶν πρακτῶν τέλος. Compare also De Anim. iii. 7. §. 2.

— πράξεως] For all πρᾶξις is the subject of deliberation. ἡ γὰρ πρᾶξις ἐν οἷς τὸ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ οὕτως τὸ αἱρετὸν συμπεραίνεσθαι. Schol.

10. ἀλήθεια πρακτική] The deliberative part of the soul is employed upon contingent matter, and the scientific upon necessary matter; it follows therefore that action (πρᾶξις) is the ἔργον of the deliberative part of the soul. For all deliberation is for action and in contingent matter; but all πρᾶξις depends upon προαίρεσις, all προαίρεσις is νοῦς and ὄρεξις, consequently νοῦς and ὄρεξις are the principles of all moral action. But all good moral action, (for we are seeking the peculiar excellence (τὸ εὖ) of this part of the soul, in order to discover its ἀρετή), is not without correct reason (λόγος ἀληθής), and correct ὄρεξις. That is, the reason must call good that which is really good, and ὄρεξις pursue it, according to the dictates of reason. The pursuit or avoidance of the ὄρεξις must harmonize and correspond with the affirmation or negation of the reason. For if either reason call good evil or evil good, and the ὄρεξις act accordingly; or if the reason be correct, but the ὄρεξις be rebellious, no good moral action can be produced.

11. τῆς δὲ θεωρητικῆς] Compare

μηδὲ ποιητικῆς τὸ εὖ καὶ κακῶς τἀληθές ἐστι καὶ ψεῦδος· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι παντὸς διανοητικοῦ ἔργον, τοῦ δὲ πρακτικοῦ καὶ διανοητικοῦ ἡ ἀλήθεια ὁμολόγως ἔχουσα τῇ ὀρέξει τῇ ὀρθῇ. Πράξεως μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ προαίρεσις, ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις ἀλλ' οὐχ οὗ ἕνεκα, προαιρέσεως δὲ, ὄρεξις καὶ λόγος ὁ ἕνεκά τινος· διὸ οὔτ' ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ διανοίας οὔτ' ἄνευ ἠθικῆς ἐστὶν ἕξεως ἡ προαίρεσις· εὐπραξία γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἐν πράξει ἄνευ διανοίας καὶ ἤθους οὐκ ἔστιν. διάνοια δ' αὐτὴ οὐθὲν κινεῖ, ἀλλ' ἡ ἕνεκά του καὶ πρακτική·

The relationship of διάνοια, προαίρεσις, and ὄρεξις, in human actions, explained.

Aristotle De Anima, iii. 9. §. 7. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ λογιστικὸν καὶ ὁ καλούμενος νοῦς ἐστιν ὁ κινῶν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ θεωρητικὸς οὐθὲν νοεῖ πρακτὸν, οὐδὲ λέγει περὶ φευκτοῦ καὶ διωκτοῦ οὐθέν.—ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὅταν θεωρῇ τι τοιοῦτον, ἤδη κελεύει φεύγειν ἢ διώκειν, οἷον πολλάκις διανοεῖται φοβερόν τι ἢ ἡδὺ, οὐ κελεύει δὲ φοβεῖσθαι, ἡ δὲ καρδία κινεῖται, ἂν δὲ ἡδὺ, ἕτερόν τι μόριον. ἔτι καὶ ἐπιτάττοντος τοῦ νοῦ καὶ λεγούσης τῆς διανοίας φεύγειν τι ἢ διώκειν οὐ κινεῖται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν πράττει, οἷον ὁ ἀκρατής.

4. πράξεως μὲν οὖν] εἰπὼν δὲ ὅτι προαιρέσεως ἀρχὴ ἡ ὄρεξις καὶ λόγος ἐστίν, ἐπάγει τὸ ὁ ἕνεκά τινος, ἵνα δηλώσῃ τὸν λόγον καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν τὴν ἐν τοῖς πρακτικοῖς ἁρμόζουσαν· ἡ γὰρ ἐπιστημονικὴ διάνοια οὐχ ἕνεκά τινος ἑτέρου τὸ παρ' ἑαυτῇ ἀληθὲς ἀποδείκνυσιν. ἀλλ' ἔχει τὸ αὔταρκες ἑαυτῇ μέχρι τοῦ εὑρεῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν, καθάπερ καὶ ἤδη εἴρηται. ἔστι τοίνυν συνιδεῖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι διττὴ ἡ ὄρεξις, ἡ πρὸ τῆς τοῦ λόγου κρίσεως καὶ τοῦ ἀποδεῖξαι εἰ ἄξιον τοῦ ὀρεχθῆναι τὸ προκείμενον, ἣ καὶ οὔπω λογικὴ λέγεται ὄρεξις, δευτέρα δὲ ὄρεξις ἡ μετὰ λόγου, ἣ καὶ προαίρεσις ὀνομάζεται, καὶ μετὰ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ ἄξιον εἶναι ὀρέξεως τὸ προκείμενον ἐπιγίνεται. λόγος δὲ πρῶτος μὲν ὁ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι συλλογιζόμενος τὸ κατ' ὄρεξιν γεγονός, ὃς καὶ προηγεῖται τῆς προαιρέσεως, δεύτερος δὲ ὃς τὸν τρόπον εὑρίσκει δι' οὗ τοῦ ἐν προαιρέσει γεγονότος ἐπιτυγχάνει ὁ προαιρούμενος. Schol.

5. ἀρχή] προαίρεσις is the *motive* but not the *objective* ἀρχὴ of πράξις: that which puts it in motion, but not the object for which it is put in motion. But the motive ἀρχὴ of προαίρεσις is ὄρεξις and the objective ἀρχή, the object to be obtained, (τὸ οὗ ἕνεκεν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν): wherefore προαίρεσις is not without moral virtue and διάνοια. Not without moral virtue, since the ὄρεξις must be in proper subjection; not without διάνοια, since the λόγος ὁ ἕνεκά τινος must be employed.

10. διάνοια δ' αὐτή] διάνοια of itself moves nothing, but the objective and practical διάνοια does; and this same is also the principle of the productive διάνοια: for every producer (ποιῶν) produces for some end, and the thing produced is not an absolute end but relative, and for something

αὕτη γὰρ καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἄρχει· ἕνεκα γάρ του ποιεῖ πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν, καὶ οὐ τέλος ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρός τι καὶ τινὸς τὸ ποιητόν. ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτόν· ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξία τέλος, ἡ δ' ὄρεξις τούτου· διὸ ἢ ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς ἡ προαίρεσις ἢ ὄρεξις διανοητική, καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρχὴ ἄνθρωπος. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ προαιρετὸν οὐθὲν γεγονός, οἷον οὐθεὶς προαιρεῖται Ἴλιον πεπορθηκέναι· οὐδὲ γὰρ βουλεύεται περὶ τοῦ γεγονότος ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἐσομένου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου, τὸ δὲ γεγονὸς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μὴ γενέσθαι· διὸ ὀρθῶς Ἀγάθων

μόνου γὰρ αὐτοῦ καὶ θεὸς στερίσκεται,
ἀγένητα ποιεῖν ἅσσ' ἂν ᾖ πεπραγμένα.

ἀμφοτέρων δὴ τῶν νοητικῶν μορίων ἀλήθεια τὸ

ulterior. But the end of the practical διάνοια (τὸ πρακτόν), is some thing complete and absolute, for εὐπραξία is the end, which is the object of ὄρεξις. See p. 230, 3.

5. διὸ ἢ ὀρεκτικός] Since ὄρεξις is the motive principle of προαίρεσις, and ὄρεξις must be directed and governed by the practical διάνοια, προαίρεσις may be called either ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς or ὄρεξις διανοητική. And such a principle is man; for beasts cannot possess intellect, nor perfect beings be swayed by appetite and deliberation.

The following is the paraphrase, generally attributed to Andronicus, upon the whole of this obscure passage.

Καθὸ δὲ θεωρητικὴ ἡ διάνοια οὐδενός ἐστιν ἀρχή, οὐδὲν γὰρ κινεῖ, ἀλλὰ μόνον καθὸ πρακτικὴ τῶν εἰρημένων ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ τῆς τε ὀρέξεως καὶ τῆς προαιρέσεως καὶ τῆς πράξεως. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἀρχή ἐστιν ἡ πρακτικὴ αὕτη διάνοια, διαφέρει γὰρ ποιητικὴ πρακτικῆς· ἡ μὲν γὰρ πρακτικὴ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τέλος ἔχει αὐτὸ τὸ εὖ πράττειν τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ μέχρι τούτου σκοπεῖ, ὅπως εὖ πράξῃ τὰ τῇ ὀρέξει δοκοῦντα· ἡ δὲ ποιητικὴ αὐτό ἐστι τὸ πράττειν εὖ τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ τέλος ἔχει τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην εὐδαιμονίαν. καὶ τὸ μὲν τέλος τῆς πρακτικῆς καθ' αὑτό ἐστι, τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς ποιητικῆς πρός τι. καὶ γὰρ πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀναφέρεται. τὴν γὰρ ὠφέλειαν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ζητεῖ. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ὅπερ ἔχει τέλος ἡ πρακτικὴ διάνοια καὶ οὗ ἐστιν ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτία, τὴν πρᾶξιν λέγω τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τοῦτο ἀρχὴν ἔχει τοῦ ἰδίου τέλους ἡ ποιητική· ἀπὸ γὰρ τῆς ἀγαθῆς πράξεως ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη εὐδαιμονία· διὰ τοῦτο καὶ αὐτῆς ἀρχὴ λέγεται. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀρχή ἐστιν ἡ διάνοια τῆς ὀρέξεως, ἡ δὲ ὄρεξις τῆς προαιρέσεως. εἴη ἂν ἡ προαίρεσις ἢ ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς ἢ ὄρεξις διανοητική. ταῦτα δ' ἂν εἴη ἐν μόνῳ τῷ λογικῷ ζώῳ, ὅς ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος.

ἔργον. καθ' ἃς οὖν μάλιστα ἕξεις ἀληθεύσει ἑκάτερον, αὗται ἀρεταὶ ἀμφοῖν.

CHAP. II.

Of Science.

The intellectual habits are five.

3 ΑΡΞΑΜΕΝΟΙ οὖν ἄνωθεν περὶ αὐτῶν πάλιν λέγωμεν. ἔστω δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύει ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ καταφάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι, πέντε τὸν ἀριθμόν· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη, φρόνησις, σοφία, νοῦς· ὑπολήψει γὰρ καὶ δόξῃ ἐνδέχεται διαψεύδεσθαι. ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὖν τί ἐστιν, ἐντεῦθεν φανερόν, εἰ δεῖ ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν ταῖς ὁμοιότησιν. Πάντες γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὃ ἐπιστάμεθα, μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄλλως ἔχειν· τὰ δ' ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως, ὅταν ἔξω τοῦ θεωρεῖν γένηται, λανθάνει εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μή. ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιστητόν. ἀΐδιον ἄρα· τὰ γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντα ἁπλῶς πάντα ἀΐδια, τὰ δ' ἀΐδια ἀγένητα

The object-matter of science.

5. καταφάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι] *In affirmative or negative propositions:* περὶ γὰρ σύνθεσιν καὶ διαίρεσίν ἐστι τὸ ψεῦδός τε καὶ τὸ ἀληθές. De Interp. cap. 1. See also de Anim. iii. 6.

10. ὁμοιότησιν] Tangit proculdubio Platonem in Theæteto ubi imprimis ejusmodo similitudinibus scientiæ ratio explicatur, p. 197. ZELL.

11. τὰ δ' ἐνδεχόμενα] Compare the Topics v. 3. (p. 186. ed. Tauch.) ἅπαν γὰρ τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἔξω γινόμενον τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἄδηλον γίνεται, ἀφανὲς γάρ ἐστιν εἰ ἔτι ὑπάρχει, διὰ τὸ τῇ αἰσθήσει μόνον γνωρίζεται. See also Analyt. Prior. ii. 23. p. 134. and Post. i. 33. p. 199.

15. ἁπλῶς] Aristotle divides *necessity* (τὸ ἀναγκαῖον or ἐξ ἀνάγκης) into two kinds, ἁπλῶς and ἐξ ὑποθέσεως. The first is that which is simply and in its own nature, eternal and immutable; the second, only conditionally so; as, for instance, to use the illustration of Eustratius, a man is of necessity sitting whilst he is sitting, (οἷον τὸ καθῆσθαι τινὰ ἔστ' ἂν κάθηται ὁ καθήμενος ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι λέγομεν τὸ καθῆσθαι αὐτόν, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ἁπλῶς.) Under this head may be reduced the divisions of *Necessity* enumerated in Metaph. iv. 5. p. 92. In his treatise De Part.

The origin and cause of it.

καὶ ἄφθαρτα. Ἔτι διδακτὴ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν μαθητόν. ἐκ προγινωσκομένων δὲ πᾶσα διδασκαλία, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς λέγομεν· (ἡ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς, ἡ δὲ συλλογισμῷ. ἡ μὲν δὴ ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχή ἐστι καὶ τοῦ καθόλου, ὁ δὲ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν καθόλου. εἰσὶν ἄρα ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμός, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι συλλογισμός· ἐπαγωγὴ

Anim. i. 1. p. 10, Aristotle thus briefly describes the two: ἡ δ' ἀνάγκη ἐστὶ μὲν σημαίνει, ὅτι εἰ ἐκεῖνο ἔσται τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ταῦτα ἀνάγκη ἐστὶν ἔχειν, ἐστὶ δέ, ὅτι ἐστὶν οὕτως ἔχοντα καὶ πεφυκότα. See also p. 3. Anal. Post. ii. 10. §. 9. And for a more philosophical dissertation on this intricate subject, Phys. Ausc. ii. 9, with the commentary of Simplicius.

1. ἔτι διδακτή] ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ διδασκαλική γε ἡ τῶν αἰτιῶν θεωρητικὴ μᾶλλον. οὗτοι γὰρ διδάσκουσιν οἱ τὰς αἰτίας λέγοντες περὶ ἑκάστου. Metaph. i. 3. p. 5.

— διδακτὴ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη] All science is teachable, but all teaching must proceed either by induction or syllogism, (μανθάνομεν ἢ ἐπαγωγῇ ἢ ἀποδείξει.) Induction is one principle of science, viz. of the universal, (ἀρχή ἐστι καὶ τοῦ καθόλου,– ἀδύνατον δὲ τὰ καθόλου θεωρῆσαι εἰ μὴ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς), inferring the truth of the universal from the truth of each particular, inferring the whole from the whole parts contained, (δεικνύντες τὸ καθόλου διὰ τοῦ δῆλον εἶναι τὸ καθέκαστον). The universals, so arrived at, are the ἀρχαὶ of the syllogism. For both, therefore, there must be a certain prognosis; for induction, of the particulars which are known by αἴσθησις, (ἐπαχθῆναι δὲ μὴ ἔχοντας αἴσθησιν ἀδύνατον); for the syllogism, of the premises which are arrived at by induction; and consequently all science must proceed from a certain prognosis; consequently there are certain principles of science, of which science itself cannot take cognizance. See the Analyt. Post. i. 18. p. 177.

4. ἀναλυτικοῖς] Analyt. Post. i. cap. 1—6.

5. ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχή] Compare Anal. ib. p. 145. πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ ἐκ προϋπαρχούσης γίνεται γνώσεως.—ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοὺς λόγους, οἵ τε διὰ συλλογισμῶν καὶ οἱ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς, ἀμφότεροι γὰρ διὰ προγιγνωσκομένων ποιοῦνται τὴν διδασκαλίαν· οἱ μὲν (the Syllogism) λαμβάνοντες ὡς παρὰ ξυνιέντων, οἱ δὲ (the Induction) δεικνύντες τὸ καθόλου διὰ τοῦ δῆλον εἶναι τὸ καθέκαστον For the difference of the Syllogism and the Induction, see Analyt. Prior. ii. 25, and an excellent paper in the Edinburgh Review, Vol. lvii.

7. ἀρχαὶ—συλλογισμός] Such are axioms, postulates, definitions in mathematics, first principles, self-evident truisms in other sciences. Compare Anal. Post. ii. 3. §. 9. αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων ὁρισμοί, ὧν ὅτι οὐκ ἔσονται ἀποδείξεις δέδεικται πρότερον, ἢ ἔσονται αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἀποδεικταὶ καὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἀρχαί, καὶ τοῦτ' εἰς ἄπειρον βαδιεῖται.

ἄρα.) Ἡ μὲν ἄρα ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἕξις ἀποδεικτική, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προσδιοριζόμεθα ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς· ὅταν γάρ πως πιστεύῃ καὶ γνώριμοι αὐτῷ ὦσιν αἱ ἀρχαί, ἐπίσταται· εἰ γὰρ μὴ μᾶλλον τοῦ συμπεράσματος, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἕξει τὴν ἐπιστήμην. περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐπιστήμης διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον. Its definition.

CHAP. III.

Of Art.

4 Τοῦ δ' ἐνδεχομένου ἄλλως ἔχειν ἔστι τι καὶ ποιητὸν καὶ πρακτόν, ἕτερον δ' ἐστὶ ποίησις καὶ πρᾶξις· πιστεύομεν δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις. ὥστε καὶ ἡ μετὰ λόγου ἕξις πρακτικὴ ἕτερόν ἐστι τῆς μετὰ λόγου ποιητικῆς ἕξεως· διὸ οὐδὲ περιέχονται ὑπ' ἀλλήλων· οὔτε γὰρ ἡ πρᾶξις ποίησις, οὔτε ποίησις πρᾶξίς ἐστιν. The object-matter of Art.

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ οἰκοδομικὴ τέχνη τίς ἐστι, καὶ ὅπερ ἕξις τις μετὰ λόγου ποιητική, καὶ οὐδεμία οὔτε τέχνη ἐστὶν ἥτις οὐ μετὰ λόγου ποιητικὴ ἕξις Art defined by one of its species, and generally.

4. ἀρχαί] ἐπίστασθαι δὲ οἰόμεθα ἕκαστον ἁπλῶς—ὅταν τήν τ' αἰτίαν οἰώμεθα γινώσκειν δι' ἣν τὸ πρᾶγμά ἐστιν, ὅτι ἐκείνου αἰτία ἐστί, καὶ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι τοῦτ' ἄλλως ἔχειν. Analyt. Post. i. 2. p. 147.

5. κατὰ συμβεβηκός] In other words, he will possess merely opinion (δόξα). τῆς γὰρ διανοίας συλλογισαμένης ὅτι ἀθάνατος ἡ ψυχή, λαβοῦσα ἡ δόξα τὸ συμπέρασμα τοῦτο μόνον οἶδεν ὅτι ἀθάνατος. See Philopon. in Arist. de An. ad initium.

CHAP. III.

The affinity of Art to Science (see p. 228, 4. note) is perhaps the reason why Aristotle treats of it next to Science.

13. περιέχονται] That is, they are not included one in the other as species under genus; they differ from each other as species from species.

16. οὐδεμία] Aristotle here exemplifies his own rules: converting his definition with the thing defined, in order to ascertain its correctness.

ἐστίν, οὔτε τοιαύτη ἣ οὐ τέχνη, ταὐτὸν ἂν εἴη τέχνη καὶ ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική.

How art is employed on its own matter.

Ἔστι δὲ τέχνη πᾶσα περὶ γένεσιν, καὶ τὸ τεχνάζειν, καὶ θεωρεῖν ὅπως ἂν γένηταί τι τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ· οὔτε γὰρ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων ἢ γινομένων ἡ τέχνη ἐστίν, οὔτε τῶν κατὰ φύσιν· ἐν αὐτοῖς γὰρ ἔχουσι ταῦτα τὴν ἀρχήν. ἐπεὶ δὲ ποίησις καὶ πρᾶξις ἕτερον, ἀνάγκη τὴν τέχνην ποιήσεως ἀλλ' οὐ πράξεως εἶναι.

An affinity between act and chance.

Καὶ τρόπον τινὰ περὶ τὰ αὐτά ἐστιν ἡ τύχη καὶ ἡ τέχνη, καθάπερ καὶ Ἀγάθων φησὶ "τέχνη τύχην ἔστερξε καὶ τύχη τέχνην." Ἡ μὲν

4. θεωρεῖν] Art is employed in three things, in generating (περὶ γένεσιν), in inventing (τεχνάζειν), and in contemplating (θεωρεῖν). In their natural order these operations are inverted. For the artist is first employed in contemplating the thing he wishes to produce, considering not merely whether the matter, proposed to be operated on, is contingent, but also whether the principle of operation is within himself.

— θεωρεῖν] For art deals with universals equally as science. Science also equally as art is derived from experience. The one differing from the other in this, that art is about generation (γένεσις), science about essence (ὄν). And this perhaps is the reason, why Aristotle, instead of considering νοῦς, has placed the consideration of Art next to Science. Compare Post. Analyt. ii. 15. ἐκ δ' ἐμπειρίας ἢ ἐκ παντὸς ἠρεμήσαντος τοῦ καθόλου ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τοῦ ἑνὸς παρὰ τὰ πολλά, ὃ ἂν ἐν ἅπασιν ἓν ἐνῇ ἐκείνοις τὸ αὐτό, τέχνης ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμης· ἐὰν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, τέχνης· ἐὰν δὲ περὶ τὸ ὄν, ἐπιστήμης.

12. τύχη] γίνεται δ' ἐκ τῆς μνήμης ἐμπειρία τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. αἱ γὰρ πολλαὶ μνῆμαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος μιᾶς ἐμπειρίας δύναμιν ἀποτελοῦσι, καὶ δοκεῖ σχεδὸν ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τέχνῃ ὅμοιον εἶναι ἐμπειρία. ἀποβαίνει δ' ἐπιστήμη καὶ τέχνη διὰ τῆς ἐμπειρίας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐμπειρία τέχνην ἐποίησεν, ὥς φησι Πῶλος ὀρθῶς λέγων, ἡ δ' ἀπειρία τύχην. γίνεται δὲ τέχνη, ὅταν ἐκ πολλῶν τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἐννοημάτων καθόλου μία γένηται περὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ὑπόληψις. Metaphys. i. 1. p. 2. Compare also the Post. Anal. ii. cap. 15. p. 231. (Ed. Tauch.)

— τύχη] A certain degree of affinity exists between art and chance, because both of them operate as it were upon the same matter, and both are causes external to their matter. See Phys. Aus. ii. 5.

13. τέχνη τύχην] See the Schol. on Plat. Gorg. p. 338. Bekk. and Pflugk in Eurip. Med. p. xxiv.

οὖν τέχνη, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἕξις τις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική ἐστιν, ἡ δ' ἀτεχνία τοὐναντίον μετὰ λόγου ψευδοῦς ποιητικὴ ἕξις, περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν. Definition of Art.

CHAP. IV.

Of Prudence or φρόνησις.

The object-matter of φρόνησις.

ΠΕΡΙ δὲ φρονήσεως οὕτως ἂν λάβοιμεν, θεωρήσαντες τίνας λέγομεν τοὺς φρονίμους. δοκεῖ δὴ φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τὰ αὑτῷ ἀγαθὰ καὶ συμφέροντα, οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ποῖα πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἢ ἰσχύν, ἀλλὰ ποῖα πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι καὶ τοὺς περί τι φρονίμους λέγομεν, ὅταν πρὸς τέλος τι σπουδαῖον εὖ λογίσωνται, ὧν μή ἐστι τέχνη. ὥστε καὶ ὅλως ἂν εἴη φρόνιμος ὁ βουλευτικός. βουλεύεται δ' οὐθεὶς περὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐδὲ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων αὐτῷ πρᾶξαι· ὥστ' εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη μὲν μετ' ἀποδείξεως, ὧν δ' αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν, τούτων μή ἐστιν ἀπόδειξις, πάντα γὰρ ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ φρόνησις ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲ τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη μὲν ὅτι ἐνδέχεται τὸ πρακτὸν ἄλλως ἔχειν, τέχνη δ' ὅτι ἄλλο τὸ γένος πρά-

CHAP. IV.

14. βουλεύεται] See iii. 3.

16. ὥστ' εἴπερ] The apodosis is at οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ φρόνησις.

17. τούτων μή ἐστιν] For if the premises be contingent, the conclusions must be contingent likewise; πάντα γὰρ ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, *for all the conclusions drawn from such premises are contingent likewise*; but the conclusions of demonstration are necessary. See chap. ii.

Its definition.

ξεως καὶ ποιήσεως. Λείπεται ἄρα αὐτὴν εἶναι ἕξιν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου πρακτικὴν περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά· τῆς μὲν γὰρ ποιήσεως ἕτερον τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ πράξεως οὐκ ἂν εἴη· ἔστι γὰρ αὐτὴ ἡ εὐπραξία τέλος.

Confirmed by general opinion.

Διὰ τοῦτο Περικλέα καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους φρονίμους οἰόμεθα εἶναι, ὅτι τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δύνανται θεωρεῖν· εἶναι δὲ τοιούτους ἡγούμεθα τοὺς οἰκονομικοὺς καὶ τοὺς πολιτικούς.

And a nominal definition.

Ἔνθεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην τούτῳ προσαγορεύομεν τῷ ὀνόματι, ὡς σώζουσαν τὴν φρόνησιν. σώζει δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην

2. τὰ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀγαθά] Compare Archytas de viro bono: στρατεύματος μὲν γὰρ ἁγεῖται στραταγός, πλωτήρων δὲ κυβερνάτης, τῶ δὲ κόσμω θεός, τᾶς ψυχᾶς δὲ νόος. τᾶς δὲ περὶ τὸν βίον εὐδαιμοσύνας φρονάσις. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄτερόν ἐστι φρόνασις, εἰ μὴ ἐπιστάμα τᾶς περὶ τὸν βίον εὐδαιμοσύνας, ἢ ἐπιστάμα τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἀνθρώπω ἀγαθῶν. Frag. Pythag. p. 18.

3. ἕτερον τὸ τέλος] Production differs from action: for the end of production is different from the act of production, but the end of action (πρᾶξις) is not different from action, being action (εὐπραξία).

11. σώζουσαν τὴν φρόνησιν] This etymology is derived from Plato's Cratylus, 411. E.

— σώζει] It preserves a right apprehension of moral good and evil: for pleasure and pain do not pervert our apprehension on all subjects; for instance, of mathematical truths; for the drunkard or debauched has frequently as clear an apprehension of those as the temperate and sober. Pleasure and pain pervert our right apprehension of *moral* truths, when from pleasure we choose the evil, or from pain avoid the good. In other words, vice prevents us from seeing and pursuing the end and the good which we ought to pursue, and this end is the principle of moral actions, (αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα τὰ πρακτά), and consequently pleasure and pain pervert our apprehension of the right principles of moral action, (ἡ κακία φθαρτικὴ ἀρχῆς).

In the vicious man, therefore, the light of nature and revelation has become darkness; he calls evil good, and good evil, and acts accordingly.

Since then φρόνησις must select the *right* means to a *good* end, (πρὸς τέλος τι σπουδαῖον εὖ λογίζεται), it must possess not only what we call prudence, but also a correct apprehension of what is a *good* end, must possess a certain degree of moral virtue, for moral vice is destructive of this apprehension.

The terms τέλος. τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, and ἀρχή, are synonymous throughout this passage.

11. τὴν τοιαύτην ὑπόληψιν] *As preserving such a* ὑπόληψις *as* φρόνησις, that is, the faculty of judging correctly of our own good and evil, and acting accordingly, (πρακτικὴν περὶ τὰ ἀν-

ὑπόληψιν· οὐ γὰρ ἅπασαν ὑπόληψιν διαφθείρει οὐδὲ διαστρέφει τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ λυπηρόν, οἷον ὅτι τὸ τρίγωνον δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τὰς περὶ τὸ πρακτόν. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα τὰ πρακτά· τῷ δὲ διεφθαρμένῳ δι' ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην εὐθὺς οὐ φαίνεται ἡ ἀρχή, οὐδὲ δεῖν τούτου ἕνεκεν οὐδὲ διὰ τοῦθ' αἱρεῖσθαι πάντα καὶ πράττειν· ἔστι γὰρ ἡ κακία φθαρτικὴ ἀρχῆς· ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τὴν φρόνησιν ἕξιν εἶναι μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ, περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ πρακτικήν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τέχνης μὲν ἐστὶν ἀρετή, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· καὶ ἐν μὲν τέχνῃ ὁ ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνων αἱρετώτερος, περὶ δὲ φρόνησιν ἧττον, ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ἀρετή τίς ἐστι καὶ οὐ τέχνη. δυοῖν δ' ὄντοιν μεροῖν τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν λόγον ἐχόντων, θατέρου ἂν εἴη ἀρετή, τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ· ἥ τε γὰρ δόξα περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν καὶ ἡ φρόνησις. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἕξις μετὰ λόγου μόνον· σημεῖον δ' ὅτι λήθη τῆς μὲν τοιαύτης ἕξεώς ἐστι, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν.

Art different from φρόνησις.

θρώπῳ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά.) The term ὑπόληψις is variously applied, as Aristotle teaches us in his own words: εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς ὑπολήψεως διαφοραί, ἐπιστήμη καὶ δόξα καὶ φρόνησις καὶ τἀναντία τούτων. De Anima iii. 3. §. 5. It is already in this place applied to two very different faculties, ἐπιστήμη and φρόνησις. See the Introduction to this Book, p. 218.

12. ἀρετή] τῆς μὲν τέχνης ἐστὶ καὶ κακία καὶ ἀρετή· καὶ γὰρ δυνατὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τεχνίτην καὶ πονηρόν. φρονήσεως δὲ οὔτε κακία ἐστίν, ἀδύνατον γὰρ φρόνιμόν τινα φαῦλον εἶναι, οὔτε ἀρετή. αὐτὴ γάρ ἐστιν ἀρετή· ἀρετὴ δὲ ἀρετῆς οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐ γὰρ μεσότης μεσότητος. Paraph.

13. αἱρετώτερος] See p. 62.

18. δόξα] See vi. 1. p. 220.

20. λήθη] See i. 8. p. 38.

CHAP. V.

Of Apprehension, or νοῦς.

The object-matter of νοῦς.

ΕΠΕΙ δ' ἡ ἐπιστήμη περὶ τῶν καθόλου ἐστὶν 6 ὑπόληψις καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων, εἰσὶ δ' ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδεικτῶν καὶ πάσης ἐπιστήμης (μετὰ λόγου γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη), τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ ἐπιστητοῦ οὔτ' ἂν ἐπιστήμη εἴη οὔτε τέχνη οὔτε φρόνησις· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν ἀποδεικτόν, αἱ δὲ τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν. οὐδὲ δὴ σοφία τούτων ἐστίν· τοῦ γὰρ σοφοῦ περὶ ἐνίων ἔχειν ἀπόδειξίν ἐστιν. εἰ δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύομεν καὶ μηδέποτε διαψευδόμεθα περὶ τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἢ καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἐπιστήμη καὶ φρόνησίς ἐστι καὶ σοφία καὶ νοῦς, τούτων δὲ τῶν τριῶν μηθὲν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι (λέγω δὲ τρία, φρόνησιν ἐπιστήμην σοφίαν), λείπεται νοῦν εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν.

CHAP. V.

Concerning this habit, see the Introduction to this book, p. 216. and p. 234, and p. 239. Aristotle in this chapter describes merely one office of νοῦς.

1. ἡ ἐπιστήμη] ἐπεὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἕξεων αἷς ἀληθεύομεν, αἱ μὲν ἀεὶ ἀληθεῖς εἰσιν αἱ δὲ ἐπιδέχονται τὸ ψεῦδος, οἷον δόξα καὶ λογισμός, ἀληθῆ δ' ἀεὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπιστήμης ἀκριβέστερον ἄλλο γένος ἢ νοῦς. αἱ δ' ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων γνωριμώτεραι, ἐπιστήμη δ' ἅπασα μετὰ λόγου ἐστί, τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη. ἐπεὶ δ' οὐδὲν ἀληθέστερον ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἐπιστήμης ἢ νοῦν, νοῦς ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀρχῶν· ἔκ τε τούτων σκοποῦσι καὶ ὅτι ἀποδείξεως ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἀπόδειξις, ὥστ' οὐδ' ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμη. εἰ οὖν μηδὲν ἄλλο παρὰ ἐπιστήμην ἔχομεν γένος ἀληθές, νοῦς ἂν εἴη ἐπιστήμης ἀρχή. Analyt. Post. ii. 15. p. 232.

4. λόγου] See chap. ii.

9. περὶ ἐνίων] See p. 234, 5.

CHAP. VI.

Of Wisdom, or σοφία, how it differs from φρόνησις; and of the several kinds of φρόνησις.

7 ΤΗΝ δὲ σοφίαν ἔν τε ταῖς τέχναις τοῖς ἀκριβεστάτοις τὰς τέχνας ἀποδίδομεν, οἷον Φειδίαν λιθουργὸν σοφὸν καὶ Πολύκλειτον ἀνδριαντοποιόν, ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν οὐθὲν ἄλλο σημαίνοντες τὴν σοφίαν ἢ ὅτι ἀρετὴ τέχνης ἐστίν· εἶναι δέ τινας σοφοὺς οἰόμεθα ὅλως οὐ κατὰ μέρος οὐδ'

The proper and improper use of the word σοφία.

CHAP. VI.

The following passage from Metaph. i. 1. p. 2—3, clears up many difficulties connected with these habits. ἡ μὲν ἐμπειρία τῶν καθέκαστά ἐστι γνῶσις, ἡ δὲ τέχνη τῶν καθόλου· αἱ δὲ πράξεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις πᾶσαι περὶ τὸ καθέκαστόν εἰσιν.—ἐὰν οὖν ἄνευ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἔχῃ τις τὸν λόγον καὶ τὸ καθόλου μὲν γνωρίζῃ, τὸ δ' ἐν αὐτῷ καθέκαστον ἀγνοῇ, πολλάκις διαμαρτήσεται.—ἀλλ' ὅμως τό γε εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ ἐπαΐειν τῇ τεχνῇ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὑπάρχειν οἰόμεθα μᾶλλον, καὶ σοφωτέρους τοὺς τεχνίτας τῶν ἐμπείρων ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὡς κατὰ τὸ εἰδέναι μᾶλλον ἀκολουθοῦσαν τὴν σοφίαν πᾶσι. τοῦτο δέ, ὅτι οἱ μὲν τὴν αἰτίαν ἴσασιν, οἱ δ' οὔ. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔμπειροι τὸ ὅτι μὲν ἴσασι διότι δ' οὐκ ἴσασιν, οἱ δὲ τὸ διότι καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν γνωρίζουσι. διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἀρχιτέκτονας περὶ ἕκαστον τιμιωτέρους καὶ μᾶλλον εἰδέναι νομίζομεν τῶν χειροτεχνῶν, καὶ σοφωτέρους ὅτι τὰς αἰτίας τῶν ποιουμένων ἴσασιν.

On the use of the term σοφία, as applied in its translation *sapientia* exclusively to the knowledge and study of causation, "divinarum humanarumque rerum tum initiorum caussarumque cujusque rei cognitio," see Cic. Tusc. Disp. v. 3. and Arist. Met. i. 1. p. 3, 4.

5. εἶναι δέ τινας] *We conceive some are wise absolutely, universally and not partially, not wise in one particular subject and upon nothing else.*

Aristotle explains the particular use of the term wisdom (σοφία) when applied to the arts, and then infers the nature of it generally (σοφία ὅλως); assuming that there is such a general wisdom from the opinions of mankind, and the quotation respecting Margites. By wisdom in any particular art, he says, we understand the perfection of that art, and those are called wise, who are most exact in their art: consequently wisdom must be the most excellent of the sciences; of the *sciences*, because none other habits than science admit of exactness and perfection.

But he who is *entirely* wise must of course know the principles and axioms of science as well as the deductions from them, and consequently wisdom is composed of simple apprehension and science (νοῦς and ἐπιστήμη); or, in other words, an ἐπιστήμη with νοῦς for its head.

ἄλλο τι σοφούς, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρός φησιν ἐν τῷ Μαργίτῃ "τὸν δ' οὔτ' ἄρ σκαπτῆρα θεοὶ θέσαν οὔτ' ἀροτῆρα οὔτ' ἄλλως τι σοφόν." ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη ἂν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἴη ἡ

Its component parts.

σοφία. Δεῖ ἄρα τὸν σοφὸν μὴ μόνον τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀληθεύειν. ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἡ σοφία νοῦς καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἔχουσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν

Its difference from φρόνησις.

τιμιωτάτων. Ἄτοπον γὰρ εἴ τις τὴν πολιτικὴν ἢ τὴν φρόνησιν σπουδαιοτάτην οἴεται εἶναι, εἰ

3. σοφόν] On the earlier and various uses of this word, see Diog. Laertius in V. P. procem. §. 12, and the notes of Menage, ibid. Some remarks upon it will also be found in Clemens Alex. Strom. i. §. 25, and a more complete dissertation in the notes of Muretus on this passage.

8. ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν] *A science of things the most honorable, as possessing a head* (νοῦς); being complete and perfect. ὁ μὲν νοῦς τὴν γνῶσιν ἔχει τῆς ἀληθείας τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη χορηγουμένας αὐτὰς λαμβάνουσα ἐκ τοῦ νοῦ ἀποδείκνυσι τὰ οἰκεῖα προβλήματα. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ ἡ σοφία καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἔχει ὡς ὁ νοῦς, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν ὡς ἡ ἐπιστήμη, εἴη ἂν νοῦς ἅμα καὶ ἐπιστήμη. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ κεφαλῆς λόγον ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις ἐπέχει, ὅτι ἐπιστήμη τῶν τιμιωτάτων ἐστί. τιμιώταται δὲ αἱ ἀρχαί.—ἡ δὲ σοφία ἐπεὶ αὐτοτελὴς καὶ ἐξ ἑαυτῆς ἔχει τὰς ἀρχὰς διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπιστήμη λέγεται μετὰ κεφαλῆς, ὡς ἔχουσα κεφαλήν, ἥτις ἐστὶν αἱ ἀρχαί. Schol. See a somewhat similar use of the word κεφάλαιον by Plato in the Philebus, p. 48. Gorgias, p. 505. D. and the passages cited in both places by Stallbaum.

9. τιμιωτάτων] *Of things eternal and immutable*: τῶν ὄντων τὰ τιμιώτερα. See p. 43. 10. and particularly the Metaph. x. 1. p. 211, sq. See the Index s. v. τίμια.

Aristotle has purposely left the discussion of this and the previous habit incomplete, as pertaining rather to other subjects than Ethics.

10. φρόνησιν] Aristotle is very careful in distinguishing φρόνησις from σοφία, for many philosophers, and among the rest Xenocrates the Chalcedonian, evidently confounded them. ἐπεὶ καὶ Ξενοκράτης ἐν τῷ περὶ φρονήσεως τὴν σοφίαν ἐπιστήμην τῶν πρώτων αἰτίων καὶ τῆς νοητῆς οὐσίας εἶναί φησι. τὴν φρόνησιν ἡγούμενος διττήν, τὴν μὲν πρακτικὴν τὴν δὲ θεωρητικὴν ἣν δὴ σοφίαν ὑπάρχειν ἀνθρωπίνην. διόπερ ἡ μὲν σοφία φρόνησις, οὐ μὴν πᾶσα φρόνησις σοφία. Clem. Alex. Strom. ii. 5. §. 24. p. 441. ed. Potter. See Wynpersse de X. C. p. 181. This tenet he apparently derived from Socrates and Plato; from the former, who thought all the virtues were sciences, (see vi. 10. ad fin. and vii. 2.); from the latter, who asserted that φρόνησις was the soul's contemplation of the eternal ideas: ὅταν δέ γε αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν σκοπῇ, ἐκεῖσε οἴχεται εἰς τὸ καθαρόν τε καὶ ἀεὶ ὄν,—καὶ ὡς συγγενὴς οὖσα αὐτοῦ ἀεὶ μετ' ἐκείνου τε γίγνεται—καὶ πέπαυταί τε

μὴ τὸ ἄριστον τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν. εἰ δὴ ὑγιεινὸν μὲν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἕτερον ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἰχθύσι, τὸ δὲ λευκὸν καὶ εὐθὺ ταὐτὸν ἀεί, καὶ τὸ σοφὸν ταὐτὸν πάντες ἂν εἴποιεν, φρόνιμον δὲ ἕτερον· τὸ γὰρ περὶ αὑτὸ ἕκαστα εὖ θεωροῦν φαῖεν ἂν εἶναι φρόνιμον, καὶ τούτῳ ἐπιτρέψειαν αὐτά. διὸ καὶ τῶν θηρίων ἔνια φρόνιμά φασιν εἶναι, ὅσα περὶ τὸν αὑτῶν βίον ἔχοντα φαίνεται δύναμιν προνοητικήν. Φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ σοφία καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ ἡ αὐτή· εἰ γὰρ τὴν περὶ τὰ ὠφέλιμα τὰ αὑτοῖς ἐροῦσι σοφίαν, πολλαὶ ἔσονται σοφίαι· οὐ γὰρ μία περὶ τὸ ἁπάντων ἀγαθὸν τῶν ζῴων, ἀλλ' ἑτέρα περὶ ἕκαστον, εἰ μὴ καὶ ἰατρικὴ μία περὶ πάντων τῶν ὄντων. εἰ δ' ὅτι βέλτιστον ἄνθρωπος τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· καὶ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου ἄλλα πολὺ θειότερα τὴν φύσιν, οἷον φανερώτατά γε ἐξ ὧν ὁ κόσμος συνέστηκεν. Ἐκ δὴ τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλον ὅτι ἡ σοφία ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς τῶν τιμιωτάτων τῇ φύσει. διὸ Ἀναξαγόραν καὶ Θαλῆν καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους σοφοὺς μέν, φρονίμους δ' οὔ φασιν εἶναι, ὅταν ἴδωσιν

And from the political φρόνησις.

Confirmed by the general opinion of mankind.

τοῦ πλάνου, καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχει, ἅτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη.—καὶ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ πάθημα φρόνησις κέκληται. Phædo, p. 79. D. See also the dialogue of Lysis and the Philebus, p. 59. While these three exalted φρόνησις into σοφία, the earlier philosophers, such as Democritus and Empedocles, degraded it into mere αἴσθησις, (see Metaph. iii. 5. p. 76. sq. De Anima, iii. 2. p. 64.); and in this they were followed by many of the sophists. With Aristotle φρόνησις holds, as it were, a middle station, being the connecting link between the irrational and purely scientific parts of the soul. See note p. 47.

15. βέλτιστον] Wisdom is superior to φρόνησις, because its object-matter is superior to the other, and the habit operating upon the better matter is always the better.

22. φρονίμους δ' οὔ] See Plato's Gorg. p. 486. C. and Aristot. Pol. i. 4. p. 21. ed. Goettling.

By considering the difference of the object-matter.

ἀγνοοῦντας τὰ συμφέρονθ' ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ περιττὰ μὲν καὶ θαυμαστὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ καὶ δαιμόνια εἰδέναι αὐτούς φασιν, ἄχρηστα δ', ὅτι οὐ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ ζητοῦσιν. Ἡ δὲ φρόνησις 8 περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα καὶ περὶ ὧν ἔστι βουλεύσασθαι· τοῦ γὰρ φρονίμου μάλιστα τοῦτ' ἔργον εἶναί φαμεν, τὸ εὖ βουλεύεσθαι, βουλεύεται δ' οὐθεὶς περὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐδ' ὅσων μὴ τέλος τί ἐστι, καὶ τοῦτο πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν. ὁ δ' ἁπλῶς εὔβουλος ὁ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνθρώπῳ τῶν πρακτῶν στοχαστικὸς κατὰ τὸν

5. βουλεύσασθαι] See p. 229. Aristotle here recapitulates what he had said concerning φρόνησις, in order more clearly to distinguish it from σοφία. They differ, he says, in their object-matter, they also differ in the ends which they have in view, practical good being the end of φρόνησις, contemplation or θεωρία the end of σοφία. If we appeal to the sense of mankind, so far are they from considering practical good as the end of σοφία, that they have derided philosophers (οἱ σοφοί) for despising it.


2dly. Wisdom is always employed on universals (τὰ καθόλου); whereas φρόνησις being practical, must be employed upon particulars. For all moral action turns upon particulars. For in all moral action, we do in fact go through, however imperceptibly, a syllogistic process; of which the principle is the universal, the application to practice the particular premise. Thus, to use the illustration here employed by Aristotle, he who is truly φρόνιμος, and would apply his φρόνησις to practice, must know not only that all light meats are easy of digestion (which is the universal premise), but also the particular fact, that this or that meat, such as bird's flesh, is of this description, and this is gained by experience. Without this particular premise, there is no acting at all. For he who knows the general principle, that all light flesh is easy of digestion, and yet knows not the particulars under that universal when presented to his senses, cannot act at all; and consequently, he who knows the particular fact, that all birds' flesh is easy of digestion, and yet knows not the principle upon which it rests, viz. because it is light food, and all light food is easy of digestion, appears rather to possess φρόνησις, than he who knows the principle only. (In the same sense, indeed, as the sagacious animals who appear to exercise in some degree this sense in providing for their own good, are said to possess φρόνησις). The relation which the former bears to the latter, may be compared to that of a master workman and his man, the former giving the rules and directions, the latter applying them to practice.

λογισμόν. Οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις τῶν καθόλου μόνον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα γνωρίζειν· πρακτικὴ γάρ, ἡ δὲ πρᾶξις περὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. διὸ καὶ ἔνιοι οὐκ εἰδότες ἑτέρων εἰδότων πρακτικώτεροι, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις οἱ ἔμπειροι· εἰ γὰρ εἰδείη ὅτι τὰ κοῦφα εὔπεπτα κρέα καὶ ὑγιεινά, ποῖα δὲ κοῦφα ἀγνοοῖ, οὐ ποιήσει ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ' ὁ εἰδὼς ὅτι τὰ ὀρνίθεια κοῦφα καὶ ὑγιεινὰ ποιήσει μᾶλλον. ἡ δὲ φρόνησις πρακτική· ὥστε δεῖ ἄμφω ἔχειν, ἢ ταύτην μᾶλλον. εἴη δ' ἄν τις καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀρχιτεκτονική. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις ἡ αὐτὴ μὲν ἕξις, τὸ μέντοι εἶναι οὐ ταὐτὸν αὐταῖς. τῆς δὲ περὶ πόλιν ἡ μὲν ὡς ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ φρόνησις νομοθετική, ἡ δὲ ὡς τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα τὸ κοινὸν ἔχει ὄνομα πολιτική· αὕτη δὲ πρακτικὴ καὶ βουλευτική· τὸ γὰρ ψήφισμα πρακτὸν ὡς τὸ ἔσχατον· διὸ πολιτεύεσθαι τούτους μόνους λέγουσιν, μόνοι γὰρ πράττουσιν οὗτοι ὥσπερ οἱ χειροτέχναι. δοκεῖ

φρόνησις of the particular as well as of the universals.

The three different kinds of φρόνησις.

11. καὶ ἡ πολιτική] This will be more clearly understood by the following scheme.



The οἰκονομικὴ may easily be filled up in the same way.

13. εἶναι] See note on p. 174, 23. 17. ἔσχατον] See note p. 239, 11.

δὲ καὶ φρόνησις μάλιστ' εἶναι ἡ περὶ αὑτὸν καὶ ἕνα, καὶ ἔχει αὕτη τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα φρόνησις. ἐκείνων δὲ ἡ μὲν οἰκονομία, ἡ δὲ νομοθεσία, ἡ δὲ πολιτική, καὶ ταύτης ἡ μὲν βουλευτικὴ ἡ δὲ δικαστική. Εἶδος μὲν οὖν τι ἂν εἴη γνώσεως 9 τὸ αὑτῷ εἰδέναι, ἀλλ' ἔχει διαφορὰν πολλήν· καὶ δοκεῖ ὁ τὰ περὶ αὑτὸν εἰδὼς καὶ διατρίβων φρόνιμος εἶναι, οἱ δὲ πολιτικοὶ πολυπράγμονες· διὸ Εὐριπίδης

Individual φρόνησις cannot exist isolated from the rest.

πῶς δ' ἂν φρονοίην, ᾧ παρῆν ἀπραγμόνως
ἐν τοῖσι πολλοῖς ἠριθμημένῳ στρατοῦ
ἴσον μετασχεῖν;
τοὺς γὰρ περισσοὺς καί τι πράσσοντας πλέον . . .

ζητοῦσι γὰρ τὸ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθόν, καὶ οἴονται τοῦτο δεῖν πράττειν. ἐκ ταύτης οὖν τῆς δόξης ἐλήλυθε τὸ τούτους φρονίμους εἶναι· καίτοι ἴσως οὐκ ἔστι τὸ αὑτοῦ εὖ ἄνευ οἰκονομίας οὐδ' ἄνευ πολιτείας. ἔτι δὲ τὰ αὑτοῦ πῶς δεῖ διοικεῖν, ἄδηλον καὶ σκεπτέον. Σημεῖον δ' ἐστὶ τοῦ εἰρημένου καὶ διότι γεωμετρικοὶ μὲν νέοι καὶ μαθηματικοὶ γίνονται καὶ σοφοὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, φρόνιμος δ' οὐ δοκεῖ γίνεσθαι. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι τῶν καθ' ἕκαστά ἐστιν ἡ φρόνησις, ἃ γίνεται γνώριμα ἐξ ἐμπειρίας, νέος δ' ἔμπειρος οὐκ ἔστιν· πλῆθος γὰρ χρόνου

Consequently as φρόνησις depends so much on experience, young men cannot possess it.

5. γνώσεως] Some books read φρονήσεως, which is evidently a gloss. And some translate ἔχει διαφορὰν πολλήν, by the words "sed multum in re discriminis est." Whereas I rather think we should understand them as used p. 8, 3. τὰ καλὰ τοσαύτην ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ πλάνην. And as Aristotle afterwards subjoins, τὰ αὑτοῦ πῶς δεῖ διοικεῖν ἄδηλον. After αὑτῷ supply ἀγαθόν.

9. Εὐριπίδης] See Euripides, vol. ii. p. 962. ed. Oxon. 1833.

21. σοφοί] That is σοφοὶ on the subjects here mentioned, not σοφοὶ in the proper and restricted use of the term.

ποιεῖ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτ' ἄν τις σκέψαιτο, διὰ τί δὴ μαθηματικὸς μὲν παῖς γένοιτ' ἄν, σοφὸς δ' ἢ φυσικὸς οὔ. ἢ ὅτι τὰ μὲν δι' ἀφαιρέσεώς ἐστιν, τῶν δ' αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ἐμπειρίας· καὶ τὰ μὲν οὐ πιστεύουσιν οἱ νέοι ἀλλὰ λέγουσιν, τῶν δὲ τὸ τί ἐστιν οὐκ ἄδηλον. ἔτι ἡ ἁμαρτία ἢ περὶ τὸ καθόλου ἐν τῷ βουλεύσασθαι ἢ περὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον· ἢ γὰρ ὅτι πάντα τὰ βαρύσταθμα ὕδατα φαῦλα, ἢ ὅτι τοδὶ βαρύσταθμον. Ὅτι δ' ἡ φρόνησις οὐκ ἐπιστήμη, φανερόν· τοῦ γὰρ ἐσχάτου ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται· τὸ γὰρ πρακτὸν

The difference of φρόνησις from ἐπιστήμη and νοῦς.

3. σοφὸς ἢ φυσικός] In metaphysics and physics.

9. ὅτι δ' ἡ φρόνησις] Aristotle proceeds to state the difference between φρόνησις and ἐπιστήμη, and φρόνησις and νοῦς. Science (ἐπιστήμη) is employed merely about universals, φρόνησις upon particulars as well as universals.

Φρόνησις differs from νοῦς, because their object-matter is different. Both, indeed, are upon extremes, but opposite extremes; φρόνησις of extremes below, νοῦς of extremes beyond the reach of science; φρόνησις of particulars, of which αἴσθησις takes cognizance; νοῦς of the first terms (πρῶτοι ὅροι), the definitions and axioms of science. Φρόνησις, consequently, is of the extremes which are the first to us, the last to nature; νοῦς of extremes the first to nature, the last to us.

The real sense of νοῦς must be carefully borne in mind, and distinguished from that division of it of which he treats in chap. ix. For Aristotle divides νοῦς into two, the *theoretical*, that employed upon the principles of science, and the *practical*, that employed upon the particulars of human actions: διττὸς ὁ νοῦς, ὁ μὲν περὶ τὰ καθόλου καταγινόμενος, ὁ δὲ περὶ τὰ καθέκαστα. καὶ ὁ μὲν περὶ τὰ καθόλου ἐστι καθ' ὃν αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι ἡμῖν παραγίνονται, ὃς καὶ θεωρητικὸς ὀνομάζεται, ὁ δὲ περὶ τὰ καθέκαστα καὶ πρακτά, ὃς καὶ πρακτικὸς λέγεται. Eustrat. f. 109, b. The former is used here.

11. ἐσχάτου] This term Aristotle himself explains in chap. ix. ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ' ἀμφότερα· καὶ γὰρ τῶν πρώτων ὅρων καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων,—ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις τῶν ἀκινήτων ὅρων καὶ πρώτων, ὁ δ' ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς τοῦ ἐσχάτου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου καὶ τῆς ἑτέρας προτάσεως (*the minor premise.*) If we proceed from particulars and sensible objects, we arrive at the universal, (the *inductive* method): if we commence with universals we end with particulars, (the *deductive* or *syllogistic* method): the result is in both instances expressed by the term τὸ ἔσχατον. So that this term may express, a *universal* or a *particular*, in *necessary* or *contingent* matter.

τοιοῦτον. ἀντίκειται μὲν δὴ τῷ νῷ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς τῶν ὅρων ὧν οὐκ ἔστι λόγος, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἐσχάτου οὗ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ' αἴσθησις, οὐχ ἡ τῶν ἰδίων, ἀλλ' οἵᾳ αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι τὸ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς ἔσχατον τρίγωνον· στήσεται γὰρ κἀκεῖ. ἀλλ' αὕτη μᾶλλον αἴσθησις ἢ φρόνησις, ἐκείνης δ' ἄλλο εἶδος.

2. ὧν οὐκ ἔστι λόγος] *Of which there is no demonstration.*

3. αἴσθησις] *I do not mean that* αἴσθησις *which is any of the five senses, but that by which a mathematician perceives that a triangle is the last and the simplest of all rectilinear figures; (for there he rests, and seeks no further). This faculty is however rather* αἴσθησις *than* φρόνησις, *but yet a different species from that, because* φρόνησις *is a rational,* αἴσθησις *an irrational faculty.*

Aristotle distinguishes αἴσθησις into two kinds: the mere external sense which is conversant only with external objects, and an internal one which operates without them, and independently of sensible objects; to which he compares this φρόνησις. For not only on particulars φρόνησις is exercised, which are cognizable by the senses; but also in weighing and scrutinizing particulars, and examining and comparing them, and in this resembles a faculty, which is called *common sense* (κοινὴ αἴσθησις). See the Introduction to this book, p. 214.

5. στήσεται γάρ] Compare Phys. Aus. vii. 3. τὸ γὰρ ἠρεμῆσαι καὶ στῆναι τὴν διάνοιαν ἐπίστασθαι καὶ φρονεῖν λεγόμεθα.

6. ἀλλ' αὕτη μᾶλλον] ἐπεὶ περὶ τῶν πρακτῶν καὶ βουλευτῶν εἴρηκε, καὶ ταῦτα εἶναι καθέκαστα καὶ αἰσθητά, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν φρόνησιν καταγίνεσθαι, ὡς εἶναι τὸ λογιζόμενον προσεχῶς αὐτῶν ἐφαπτόμενον, ὥσπερ σύγκρισιν ποιεῖται τοῦ μετὰ φρονήσεως αἰσθάνεσθαι τῶν καθέκαστα, καὶ τοῦ ἁπλῶς, ἤτοι κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν αἴσθησιν· τὸ γάρ, οἷα αἰσθανόμεθα, τοῦτο δηλοῖ ἤτοι τῇ κοινῇ αἰσθήσει καθ' ἣν ἡμῖν προσγίνεται τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἥτις μία τέ ἐστι καὶ κοινὴ πρὸς πάντα ἐνεργοῦσα τὰ αἰσθητά. ἡ γὰρ εἰς πέντε διαίρεσις κατὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ γίνεται, ὧν δεῖ τῇ κοινῇ αἰσθήσει, ἵν' ὡς ὀργάνοις χρωμένη αὐτοῖς τοῖς διαφόροις κατὰ γένος προσβάλλῃ δι' αὐτῶν αἰσθητοῖς. ἐκείνη δὲ μία καὶ ἡ αὐτή ἐστι, καὶ ὥσπερ ποιότητα τινὰ ταυτὴν τὴν κοινότητα τῇ ἁπλῶς προσάπτων αἰσθήσει. οὐ λέγομεν, φησίν, αἴσθησιν τὴν τῶν ἰδίων αἰσθητῶν, τῇ ἢ τῇ, ἢ δι' αἰσθητηρίου τινὸς ἐνεργεῖται, ἀλλὰ τοιαύτην λέγομεν ὁποίᾳ αἰσθήσει ἁπλῶς καὶ κοινῶς αἰσθανόμεθα. φησὶ δὲ ταύτην μᾶλλον εἶναι αἴσθησιν τὴν μετὰ φρονήσεως, ὅτι σὺν λόγῳ καὶ ἐπιστασίᾳ, ἐκείνη δὲ ἄλογός τε καὶ ἀνεπίστατος. ὅσον οὖν τὸ μετὰ λόγου κρεῖττον τοῦ ἄνευ λόγου, τοσοῦτον κρείττων αἰσθήσεως ἡ φρόνησις τῆς τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἰδίας αἰσθήσεως. διὸ καὶ ἄλλο εἶδος ἐκείνη ἡ αἴσθησις ταύτης τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ὡς καὶ τὸ λογικὸν τοῦ ἀλόγου ἕτερον. Eustrat.

CHAP. VII.

Of Good Counsel, or εὐβουλία.

10 ΤΟ ζητεῖν δὲ καὶ τὸ βουλεύεσθαι διαφέρει· τὸ γὰρ βουλεύεσθαι ζητεῖν τι ἐστίν. δεῖ δὲ λαβεῖν καὶ περὶ εὐβουλίας τί ἐστι, πότερον ἐπιστήμη τις ἢ δόξα ἢ εὐστοχία ἢ ἄλλο τι γένος. ἐπιστήμη μὲν δὴ οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐ γὰρ ζητοῦσι περὶ ὧν ἴσασιν, ἡ δ᾽ εὐβουλία βουλή τις, ὁ δὲ βουλευόμενος ζητεῖ καὶ λογίζεται. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ᾽ εὐστοχία· ἄνευ τε γὰρ λόγου καὶ ταχύ τι ἡ εὐστοχία, βουλεύονται δὲ πολὺν χρόνον, καὶ φασὶ πράττειν μὲν δεῖν ταχὺ τὰ βουλευθέντα, βουλεύεσθαι δὲ βραδέως. ἔτι ἡ ἀγχίνοια ἕτερον καὶ ἡ εὐβουλία· ἔστι δ᾽ εὐστοχία τις ἡ ἀγχίνοια.

What εὐβουλία is not.

CHAP. VII.

Having thus far investigated the nature of those habits which have truth for their object, (οἷς ἀληθεύει ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ καταφάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι. vi. 1.) Aristotle now proceeds to consider certain others which are intimately connected with φρόνησις, and which naturally arise from the remarks which have been made upon that habit. For respecting φρόνησις it was said, that it required and indeed partly consisted of good deliberation, (τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τὰ αὑτῷ ἀγαθά, p. 229, 7; and again, τοῦ φρονίμου μάλιστα τοῦτ᾽ ἔργον εἶναί φαμεν, τὸ εὖ βουλεύεσθαι, p. 236, 5.); there immediately then starts forth a question, what is εὐβουλία, does it consist in the fitness of the means proposed for the end, and may that end be any end; or does it consist of the two united, good means and good ends? For we have already seen that a degree of moral virtue must reside in φρόνησις, p. 230, 11. sq. These doubts Aristotle now proceeds to resolve, by considering at greater length the nature of εὐβουλία, and subsequently proceeding to explain how far judgment and candour are connected with φρόνησις.

12. εὐστοχία τις ἡ ἀγχίνοια] Compare Anal. Post. i. 34. p. 201. ἡ δ᾽ ἀγχίνοιά ἐστιν εὐστοχία τις ἐν ἀσκέπτῳ χρόνῳ τοῦ μέσου. οἷον εἴ τις ἰδὼν ὅτι ἡ σελήνη τὸ λαμπρὸν ἀεὶ ἔχει πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον, ταχὺ ἐνενόησε διὰ τί τοῦτο, ὅτι διὰ τὸ λάμπειν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου· ἢ διαλεγόμενον πλουσίῳ ἔγνω διότι δανείζεται· ἢ διότι φίλοι ὅτι ἐχθροὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ. πάντα γὰρ τὰ αἴτια τὰ μέσα, ὁ ἰδὼν τὰ ἄκρα, ἐγνώρισε. Therefore ἀγχίνοια

εὐβουλία is not an ὀρθότης either of science or opinion.

οὐδὲ δὴ δόξα ἡ εὐβουλία οὐδεμία. Ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ὁ μὲν κακῶς βουλευόμενος ἁμαρτάνει, ὁ δ' εὖ ὀρθῶς βουλεύεται, δῆλον ὅτι ὀρθότης τις ἡ εὐβουλία ἐστίν, οὔτ' ἐπιστήμης δὲ οὔτε δόξης· ἐπιστήμης μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρθότης (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἁμαρτία), δόξης δ' ὀρθότης ἀλήθεια· ἅμα δὲ καὶ ὥρισται ἤδη πᾶν οὗ δόξα ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἄνευ λόγου ἡ εὐβουλία. διανοίας ἄρα λείπεται· αὕτη γὰρ οὔπω φάσις· καὶ γὰρ ἡ δόξα οὐ ζήτησις ἀλλὰ φάσις τις ἤδη, ὁ δὲ βουλευόμενος, ἐάν τε εὖ ἐάν τε κακῶς βουλεύηται, ζητεῖ τι καὶ λογίζεται.

In what ὀρθότης it consists;

Ἀλλ' ὀρθότης τίς ἐστιν ἡ εὐβουλία βουλῆς· διὸ ἡ βουλὴ ζη-

is an unpremeditated assumption of the middle term, that is, of the cause why the major term is predicated of the minor term in the conclusion: in this, therefore, it differs from εὐβουλία, which does nothing without time and meditation.

6. ὥρισται ἤδη] See p. 94, 24. sq.

8. διανοίας—λείπεται] *εὐβουλία is a species of correctness (ὀρθότης), but not a correctness either of science or of opinion. Not of science, because correctly speaking there is no correctness of science, since there is no incorrectness of it; not of opinion, because the correctness of opinion is mere truth without action,* (see p. 95); *and further, opinion is not search but assertion,* (φάσις, the generic term of the negative and affirmative judgment of the Logicians); *whereas εὐβουλία has not yet arrived at this state,* (αὕτη γὰρ οὔπω φάσις,) *but searches and deliberates. But yet, though εὐβουλία is neither science nor opinion, it must still belong somehow to the διάνοια, because it is not without reason,* (ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἄνευ λόγου ἡ εὐβουλία, διανοίας ἄρα λείπεται). It cannot be excluded from it (διανοία), as it must be if we followed Plato's division of the soul. *What ὀρθότης then is it? an ὀρθότης βουλῆς: and before we can discover what εὐβουλία is, we must examine into the meaning of the term ὀρθότης, that of βουλὴ having been already determined.* See p. 96. Such appears to me to be the meaning of this intricate and involved passage; many other interpretations have been suggested, for which the reader must consult the different commentators.

But Aristotle may mean to say, that εὐβουλία is a species of διάνοια, since διάνοια is that exercise of the mind which has not yet arrived at decision (φάσις), but is in a state of progression to it. Compare Philoponus in Arist. de Anima: διάνοιά δέ ἐστι, τὸ οἷον ὁδόν τινα διανύειν μεταβαίνουσαν ἀπὸ προτάσεων ἐπὶ συμπεράσματα, ἐξ οὗ καὶ τὴν κλῆσιν εἴληχεν. This I think the more probable interpretation.

τητέα πρῶτον τί καὶ περὶ τί.

1. Good end.

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ὀρθότης πλεοναχῶς, δῆλον ὅτι οὐ πᾶσα· ὁ γὰρ ἀκρατὴς καὶ ὁ φαῦλος ὃ προτίθεται ἰδεῖν ἐκ τοῦ λογισμοῦ τεύξεται, ὥστε ὀρθῶς ἔσται βεβουλευμένος, κακὸν δὲ μέγα εἰληφώς. δοκεῖ δ' ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι τὸ εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι· ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη ὀρθότης βουλῆς εὐβουλία, ἡ ἀγαθοῦ τευκτική.

2. Good means.

Ἀλλ' ἔστι καὶ τούτου ψευδεῖ συλλογισμῷ τυχεῖν, καὶ ὃ μὲν δεῖ ποιῆσαι τυχεῖν, δι' οὗ δ' οὔ, ἀλλὰ ψευδῆ τὸν μέσον ὅρον εἶναι· ὥστ' οὐδ' αὕτη πω εὐβουλία, καθ' ἣν οὗ δεῖ μὲν τυγχάνει, οὐ μέντοι δι' οὗ ἔδει.

3. Sufficient time.

Ἔτι ἔστι πολὺν χρόνον βουλευόμενον τυχεῖν τὸν δὲ ταχύ. οὔκουν οὐδ' ἐκείνη πω εὐβουλία, ἀλλ' ὀρθότης ἡ κατὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον, καὶ οὗ δεῖ καὶ ὡς καὶ ὅτε. ἔτι ἔστι καὶ ἁπλῶς εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι καὶ πρός τι τέλος. ἡ μὲν δὴ ἁπλῶς ἡ πρὸς τὸ τέλος τὸ ἁπλῶς κατορθοῦσα, ἡ δέ τις ἡ πρός τι τέλος.

Complete definition of εὐβουλία.

Εἰ δὴ τῶν φρονίμων τὸ εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι, ἡ εὐβουλία εἴη ἂν ὀρθότης ἡ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον πρός τι τέλος, οὗ ἡ φρόνησις ἀληθὴς ὑπόληψίς ἐστιν.

17. τὸ τέλος] τὸ τέλος τὸ ἁπλῶς Happiness; πρός τι τέλος means tending to Happiness. When εὐβουλία aims at the first, then εὐβουλία is absolutely perfect, when it aims at any of the others only partially, upon one particular object.

19. ὀρθότης ἡ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον] *A correctness as to the means to an end, of which end φρόνησις forms the right conception.* It has been already stated that a *good* end is necessary for εὐβουλία, but of this εὐβουλία itself cannot take cognizance, because it does not commence till the end is fixed and proposed, and then only deliberates upon the means to that end. See p. 94, 18. The forming of a right conception then of the end must be the part of some other habit, and that is φρόνησις. See p. 230, 10. and the note.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Judgment, or σύνεσις; and Candor, or γνώμη.

Of Judgment and its object-matter.

ΕΣΤΙ δὲ καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ ἀσυνεσία, καθ' 11
ἃς λέγομεν συνετοὺς καὶ ἀσυνέτους, οὔθ' ὅλως τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπιστήμῃ ἢ δόξῃ (πάντες γὰρ ἂν ἦσαν συνετοί) οὔτε τις μία τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐπιστημῶν, οἷον ἰατρικὴ περὶ ὑγιεινῶν ἢ γεωμετρία περὶ μεγέθους· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἀεὶ ὄντων καὶ ἀκινήτων ἡ σύνεσίς ἐστιν οὔτε περὶ τῶν γιγνομένων ὁτουοῦν, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὧν ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις καὶ βουλεύσαιτο.

Difference of Judgment from φρόνησις.

Διὸ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μὲν τῇ φρονήσει ἐστίν, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ταὐτὸν σύνεσις καὶ φρόνησις· ἡ μὲν γὰρ φρόνησις ἐπιτακτική ἐστιν· τί γὰρ δεῖ πράττειν ἢ μή, τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς ἐστίν· ἡ δὲ σύνεσις κριτικὴ μόνον· ταὐτὸν γὰρ σύνεσις καὶ εὐσυνεσία καὶ συνετοὶ καὶ εὐσύνετοι.

Judgment defined.

Ἔστι δ' οὔτε τὸ ἔχειν τὴν φρόνησιν οὔτε τὸ λαμβάνειν

CHAP. VIII.

1. σύνεσις] Both σύνεσις and γνώμη mean judgment. But σύνεσις is a mere judgment as to measures: γνώμη to persons. In the first there is no moral virtue, there is in the second.

15. οὔτε τὸ λαμβάνειν] τὸ γὰρ λαμβάνειν φρόνησιν. ἐστὶ τὸ μανθάνειν ἅπερ ὁ φρόνιμος γινώσκει. Paraph. σύνεσις and φρόνησις have the same object-matter, but differ in species. The latter seeks and discovers what ought to be done, and gives directions for it, but the former merely forms an opinion concerning these operations of φρόνησις. Consequently they are also distinguished in point of time, σύνεσις being subsequent to φρόνησις. It follows therefore, that σύνεσις cannot be the same as the possessing or acquiring φρόνησις (οὔτε τὸ ἔχειν τὴν φρόνησιν οὔτε τὸ λαμβάνειν). In order to point out more clearly the difference between them, Aristotle introduces the illustration of a master and his pupil. For as the pupil apprehends and forms a correct judgment of the precepts of his master, so does σύνεσις of the dictates and directions of φρόνησις.

ἡ σύνεσις· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τὸ μανθάνειν λέγεται ξυνιέναι, ὅταν χρῆται τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, οὕτως ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι τῇ δόξῃ ἐπὶ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τούτων περὶ ὧν ἡ φρόνησίς ἐστιν, ἄλλου λέγοντος, καὶ κρίνειν καλῶς· τὸ γὰρ εὖ τῷ καλῶς ταὐτόν. καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἐλήλυθε τοὔνομα ἡ σύνεσις, καθ' ἣν εὐσύνετοι, ἐκ τῆς ἐν τῷ μανθάνειν· λέγομεν γὰρ τὸ μανθάνειν συνιέναι πολλάκις.

Ἡ δὲ καλουμένη γνώμη, καθ' ἣν εὐγνώμονας καὶ ἔχειν φαμὲν γνώμην, ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ἐστὶ κρίσις ὀρθή. σημεῖον δέ· τὸν γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ μάλιστά φαμεν εἶναι συγγνωμονικόν, καὶ ἐπιεικὲς τὸ ἔχειν περὶ ἔνια συγγνώμην. ἡ δὲ συγγνώμη γνώμη ἐστὶ κριτικὴ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ὀρθή. ὀρθὴ δ' ἡ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. Of γνώμη.

CHAP. IX.

Some general remarks upon the foregoing habits.

12 ΕΙΣΙ δὲ πᾶσαι αἱ ἕξεις εὐλόγως εἰς ταὐτὸ τείνουσαι· λέγομεν γὰρ γνώμην καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ σύνεσις, γνώμη, φρόνησις, and νοῦς,

9. *γνώμη*] Etiamsi prior illa facultas *ἡ σύνεσις perspicientia*, etiam sit facultas judicandi de rebus, tamen non est eadem cum præsenti facultate. Nam *σύνεσις* ita simpliciter de rebus judicat et pronuntiat, quales sua sunt natura; si sunt bonæ vel malæ, tales quoque pronuntiat: *γνώμη* autem in judicando adhibet æquitatem et moderationem, et mavult in benigniorem quam in deteriorem partem quandam accipere. Habet ergo *γνώμη* se ad *σύνεσιν*, quemadmodum se habet æquitas ad justitiam. MAGIRUS.

Chap. IX.

In this Chapter Aristotle proceeds to explain the affinity of the three last-mentioned habits with *φρόνησις*, to which they are so inseparably united that it cannot be perfect without them. That affinity consists in three things; I. all are in the same subject-matter, the deliberative part of the soul; II. all are

are all upon the same object-matter, human actions.

φρόνησιν καὶ νοῦν ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐπιφέροντες γνώμην ἔχειν καὶ νοῦν ἤδη καὶ φρονίμους καὶ συνετούς· πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ δυνάμεις αὗται τῶν ἐσχάτων εἰσὶ καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον, καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ κριτικὸς εἶναι περὶ ὧν ὁ φρόνιμος, συνετὸς καὶ εὐγνώμων ἢ συγγνώμων· τὰ γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ κοινὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἁπάντων ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἄλλον. ἔστι δὲ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων

employed upon the same object-matter, human actions; III. and all are produced by the same efficient cause. For although some men appear naturally to possess a greater degree of σύνεσις and γνώμη than others, yet these faculties can only be perfected by use and habit.

They differ from φρόνησις in the following respects. φρόνησις first exerts the proper means and aim, at the ends proposed. Upon these proceedings of φρόνησις is σύνεσις or γνώμη exerted accordingly as the occasion requires. The first perceives and apprehends those things which φρόνησις commands and passes a correct judgment upon them: the second, also judges of the commands of φρόνησις, chiefly considering the persons, their opportunities, wishes, times, and such like; correcting, when need may be, any error, which may arise from following strictly a general law or precept, and when a fault would be committed were the commands of φρόνησις, (using φρόνησις in a loose sense,) in that particular instance obeyed.

1. νοῦν — ἔχειν] νοῦν δὲ λέγει ἐνταῦθα τὸν πρακτικόν· ὁ γὰρ περὶ τὰ καθέκαστα νοῦς ὁ πρακτικός ἐστιν, ὃς καὶ λογισμὸς λέγεται, ὡς λογίζων καὶ μετρῶν τῶν πραττομένων ἕκαστον. ὁ γοῦν φρόνιμος ὡς διαθετῶν καὶ ἀπευθύνων πρὸς τὸ τέλος αὐτὰ φρόνιμος λέγεται, ὡς δὲ κρίνων ὅτι καλῶς ἀπευθύνθη, καὶ ὡς ἔδει τοῦ τέλους ἐφίκοιτο συνετὸς καὶ εὐσύνετος ὀνομάζεται, ὡς δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἁρμόδιον τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις προσώποις καὶ πράγμασιν, αἰτίαις τε καὶ τρόποις τὰς κρίσεις ποιούμενος εὐγνώμων ῥηθήσεται. διὰ τοῦτο τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ φρόνησιν ἔχειν ἤτοι νοῦν πρακτικὸν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ γνώμην λέγομεν, ὡς κατ' αὐτὰς ἐνεργοῦντα περὶ τὰ πραττόμενα. Schol.

2. νοῦν ἤδη] τὸ δὲ ἤδη προσέθηκε τῷ νοῦν ἔχειν, νοῦν ἔχειν ἤδη εἰπών, δηλονότι μετὰ τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων πολυπειρίαν ὁ περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ νοῦς τῇ ψυχῇ περιγίνεται, καὶ ἤδη νοῦν ἔχειν λέγεται ὁ πολλὰ ἰδὼν καὶ παθὼν καὶ διὰ μακροῦ χρόνου τοῦτον δεξάμενος. Schol.

6. συγγνώμων] εὐγνώμων, συγγνώμων, and ἐπιεικὴς, are here used synonymously; as are ἐπιείκεια and γνώμη

— τὰ γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ] κοινὴ ἡ ἐπιείκεια, καὶ τὰ παρὰ τῆς ἐπιεικείας κρινόμενα πάντων ἐστὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τῶν παρὰ τοῦ φρονίμου κατορθουμένων, πρὸς ἄλλον τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς τὴν οἰκείαν ἐνδεικνυμένου ἐνέργειαν. ἃ γὰρ ἕτερος ἐκ φρονήσεως κατορθοῖ ταῦτ' ἐπιεικὴς κρίνει ὀρθῶς γνώμῃ χρώμενος καὶ συγγνώμῃ· τὰ γὰρ αὐτά εἰσιν ὑποκείμενα, ὡς προείρηται, τῷ τε φρονίμῳ καὶ ἐπιεικεῖ· ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν φρόνιμος ὡς αὐτὰ ἐνεργῶν καὶ κατορθῶν ἔχει πρὸς αὐτά, ὁ δὲ ἐπιεικὴς ὡς ἄλλου ἐνεργήσαντος αὐτὸς κρίνων μετὰ γνώμης τε καὶ συγγνώμης. Schol.

πάντα τὰ πρακτά· καὶ γὰρ τὸν φρόνιμον δεῖ γινώσκειν αὐτά, καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ γνώμη περὶ τὰ πρακτά, ταῦτα δ᾽ ἔσχατα. Καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα· καὶ γὰρ τῶν πρώτων ὅρων καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων νοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ λόγος, καὶ ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις τῶν ἀκινήτων ὅρων καὶ πρώτων, ὁ δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς τοῦ ἐσχάτου

The object-matter of νοῦς more fully explained.

3. ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων] Since νοῦς, as it has been already observed, (see p. 232. n.) is of two kinds, both active and speculative, the one employed upon particulars, the other upon universals, by which science is acquired, and since there are certain principles of human actions, the knowledge of which is of the utmost importance for the proper understanding and performing of the actions themselves, Aristotle here proceeds to explain at greater length what faculty it is which apprehends those principles, and how the apprehension of them is effected. These principles he calls by other terms, extremes and particulars (τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστα καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων). For commencing with universals, and progressing from these, we arrive at particulars, which are therefore called extremes, because we are able to proceed no farther. But νοῦς is not merely of these extremes, but also of extremes both ways (τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα), of speculative as well as active principles: for since those things which are by nature prior, are in the knowledge of man posterior, and, on the other hand, those things which are prior to us are in nature posterior (see p. 11), it must of course happen, that if we commence with those things which are prior to us, we shall arrive at last at what is prior to nature, at universals, the principles of science, (the extremes in one way); but if we commence with those things which are prior to nature, we shall arrive at length at what is prior to us, at particulars, the principles of actions, (the extremes the other way). So that νοῦς is consequently of those things which are both first and last (ἀρχαὶ καὶ ἔσχατα), to nature and to us, and the same things are at once both principles and extremes.

5. καὶ οὐ λόγος] *And not reasoning* or *syllogism*. Here λόγος corresponds to ἐπιστήμη as used in the second chapter of this book. And by this remark, Aristotle still further distinguishes the nature of apprehension (νοῦς), from science.

Although apprehension is divided into two, it is not actually so divided, but only in reference to its energies. It is the same faculty, whether employed upon the first principles of science or of morals. νοῦν δέ φησι τὸν αὐτὸν μὲν τῇ οὐσίᾳ, ἕτερον δὲ καὶ ἕτερον τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ. ὁ γὰρ ἐν ἡμῖν νοῦς ἑαυτὸν μὲν θεωρῶν καὶ τὰ κατ᾽ αὐτὸν καὶ τὰ κρείττω θεωρητικός ἐστι, τὰ δ᾽ αὐτῷ συνηρτημένα καὶ χείρονα μέτρῳ διδοὺς καὶ ῥυθμίζων καὶ πράττων πρακτικός ἐστι καὶ ὀνομάζεται. ἐκείνως μὲν οὖν τὰς ἐπιστήμας συνίστησιν, οὕτως δὲ περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ καταγίνεται. κἀκείνως μὲν τὸ ἀληθὲς ἀνευρίσκει, ὧδε δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν κατορθοῖ. Schol.

καὶ ἐνδεχομένου καὶ τῆς ἑτέρας προτάσεως· ἀρχαὶ γὰρ τοῦ οὗ ἕνεκα αὗται· ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα γὰρ τὸ καθόλου. τούτων οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ αἴσθησιν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ νοῦς. Διὸ καὶ φυσικὰ δοκεῖ εἶναι ταῦτα, καὶ φύσει σοφὸς μὲν οὐδείς, γνώμην δ' ἔχειν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ νοῦν. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις οἰόμεθα ἀκολουθεῖν, καὶ ἥδε ἡ ἡλικία νοῦν ἔχει καὶ γνώμην, ὡς τῆς φύσεως αἰτίας οὔσης. διὸ καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος νοῦς· ἐκ τούτων γὰρ αἱ

These habits acquired only by experience.

1. ἑτέρας προτάσεως] Minor premise or particular proposition. See vii. 3.

— ἀρχαὶ γάρ] οἱ μὲν ἄμεσοι[a] λόγοι τῇ φύσει πρῶτοι, ἔσχατοι δὲ ἡμῖν. τὰ δὲ καθ' ἕκαστα πρῶτα μὲν ἡμῖν, ἔσχατα δὲ τῇ φύσει· ταῦτα δὲ τὰ ἔσχατα τῇ φύσει ἀρχαί εἰσι καὶ αἴτια τοῦ τέλους τοῦ πρακτοῦ· καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει καθ' ἕκαστα διδασκόμενοι πράττειν τὰ συμφέροντα ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, καὶ δι' ὧν πρὸς τὸ ζητούμενον ἀφιξόμεθα τέλος· καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν μερικῶν καθολικούς τινας συνάγοντες λόγους φρόνιμοι γινόμεθα πρὸς τὰς ἐν τῷ βίῳ πράξεις. διὰ τοῦτο δεῖ τὸν πολιτικὸν γνῶσιν ἔχειν τῶν μερικῶν· ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ γνῶσις ἄνευ μέσου γινομένη νοῦς ἐστι· νοῦς γάρ ἐστιν ἡ γνῶσις τῶν ἀμέσων καὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν. Paraph.

3. αἴσθησιν—νοῦς] The knowledge which is derived from particulars may in one sense be termed αἴσθησις, and also νοῦς. Sense (αἴσθησις) inasmuch as by means of this faculty we take cognizance of particulars; apprehension (νοῦς), inasmuch as we refer those particulars so acquired from αἴσθησις (see p. 214.) to certain general heads, by which we deduce rules for our guidance upon other and similar occasions, clearing and strengthening this eye of the soul. Sense and apprehension have this in common; both energize without the use of middle terms, without syllogizing, the one upon the objects of apprehension, the other upon objects of sense. In this they also have a similarity: all demonstration proceeds upon principles and universals first gained by apprehension. In actions, on the contrary, setting out with the principles derived from the senses, we refer each particular to the νοῦς πρακτικὸς, and thence form certain deductions. Consequently, he who has had the greatest experience, will have this faculty in the greatest perfection.

4. φυσικὰ δοκεῖ] For since these habits turn chiefly upon particular acts, which can only be known by experience, and experience is only gained by age, and nature is the cause of age, therefore nature may in some sense be said to be the cause and author of these habits.

9. ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος] ὁ γὰρ νοῦς, καθὼς εἴρηται, καὶ θεωρητικός ἐστι καὶ πρακτικός, καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος. ἀρχὴ

[a] Propositions not obtained by the use of a middle term, not the conclusions of previous syllogisms. Such of course are all *summa genera*.

ἀποδείξεις καὶ περὶ τούτων. ὥστε δεῖ προσέχειν τῶν ἐμπείρων καὶ πρεσβυτέρων ἢ φρονίμων ταῖς ἀναποδείκτοις φάσεσι καὶ δόξαις οὐχ ἧττον τῶν ἀποδείξεων· διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχειν ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὄμμα ὁρῶσιν ὀρθῶς. τί μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡ φρόνησις καὶ ἡ σοφία, καὶ περὶ τίνα ἑκατέρα τυγχάνει οὖσα, καὶ ὅτι ἄλλου τῆς ψυχῆς μορίου ἀρετὴ ἑκατέρα, εἴρηται.

CHAP. X.

Of the utility of σοφία and φρόνησις, and which is superior to the other.

13 ΔΙΑΠΟΡΗΣΕΙΕ δ' ἄν τις περὶ αὐτῶν τί χρήσιμοί εἰσιν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ σοφία οὐδὲν θεωρεῖ

First and Second Objection.

μὲν καθ' ὅσον τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν ἐστι γνῶσις καὶ θεωρητικὸς λέγεται, ἀρχὴ γάρ ἐστιν ἀποδείξεως· τέλος δὲ καθ' ὅσον γνῶσίς ἐστι τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ ἐν αἰσθήσει καὶ πρακτικὸς λέγεται. περὶ τούτων γὰρ αἱ ἀποδείξεις, καὶ ταῦτά εἰσι τὰ ἀποδεικτὰ καὶ εἰς ταῦτα τελευταῖον ὁ ἀποδεικνὺς ἔρχεται ἀπὸ τῶν καθόλου καταβαίνων. Paraph.

Chap. X.

Aristotle having explained the nature of wisdom and φρόνησις, now proceeds to consider two objections which he supposes may be raised; I, as to the utility of these habits, and II, as to their comparative dignity.

The 1st objection, that wisdom contributes nothing to happiness, may be stated in the following form.

The happiness of man is the good of man, which is both contingent and generated,

But wisdom theorizes upon nothing which is generated, (οὐδεμιᾶς ἐστι γενέσεως. See also p. 235.); and consequently contributes nothing to happiness.

The 2nd objection, that φρόνησις contributes nothing to happiness.

If φρόνησις be useful and necessary, it is so either to him who has acquired virtue, or to him who has not yet acquired it.

It is not useful either to one or the other, and therefore φρόνησις is not useful to happiness.

The minor of this syllogism is thus proved.

First, It is not useful to him who has virtue; because virtue is of itself an active habit, and will produce acts accordingly. For so he who has a healthy habit of body will perform his energies accordingly, to which the mere knowledge of what is healthy contributes nothing: so likewise the

Neither wisdom nor φρόνησις contribute to happiness, and are consequently useless.

ἐξ ὧν ἔσται εὐδαίμων ἄνθρωπος, οὐδεμιᾶς γάρ ἐστι γενέσεως. ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τοῦτο μὲν ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τίνος ἕνεκα δεῖ αὐτῆς, εἴπερ ἡ μὲν φρόνησίς ἐστιν ἡ περὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἀνθρώπῳ, ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ἃ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς πράττειν, οὐδὲν δὲ πρακτικώτεροι τῷ εἰδέναι αὐτά ἐσμεν, εἴπερ ἕξεις αἱ ἀρεταί εἰσιν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ οὐδὲ τὰ εὐεκτικά, ὅσα μὴ τῷ ποιεῖν ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξεως εἶναι λέγεται· οὐθὲν γὰρ πρακτικώτεροι τῷ ἔχειν τὴν ἰατρικὴν καὶ γυμναστικήν ἐσμεν. εἰ δὲ μὴ τούτων χάριν φρόνιμον θετέον ἀλλὰ τοῦ γίνεσθαι, τοῖς οὖσι σπουδαίοις οὐθὲν ἂν εἴη χρήσιμος, ἔτι δ' οὐδὲ τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσιν· οὐθὲν γὰρ διοίσει αὐτοὺς ἔχειν ἢ ἄλλοις ἔχουσι πείθεσθαι, ἱκανῶς τ' ἔχοι ἂν ἡμῖν ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν· βουλόμενοι γὰρ ὑγιαίνειν ὅμως οὐ μανθάνομεν ἰατρικήν.

Objection as to the relative dignity of wisdom and φρόνησις.

Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄτοπον ἂν εἶναι δόξειεν, εἰ χείρων τῆς σοφίας οὖσα κυριωτέρα αὐτῆς ἔσται· ἡ γὰρ ποιοῦσα ἄρχει καὶ ἐπιτάττει περὶ ἕκαστον. περὶ δὴ τούτων λεκτέον· νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἠπόρηται περὶ αὐτῶν μόνον.

1. Reply. They are eligible for their own sakes.

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν λέγομεν ὅτι καθ' αὑτὰς ἀναγκαῖον αἱρετὰς αὐτὰς εἶναι, ἀρετάς γ' οὔσας ἑκατέραν ἑκατέρου τοῦ μορίου, καὶ εἰ μὴ

mere knowledge (φρόνησις) of what is good, just, and temperate, tends nothing to the production of such acts.

Secondly, It is not useful to him who has not yet acquired virtue. For if he who has not yet acquired virtuous habits, is desirous of performing virtuous acts, he has only to imitate the actions of the good man. For, to continue the illustration above, he who wishes to acquire a healthy habit, and perform the energies accordingly, would never think of learning the science of medicine for that purpose, but would be satisfied with following the directions of him who did possess it, of his physician.

ποιοῦσι μηδὲν μηδετέρα αὐτῶν. Ἔπειτα καὶ ποιοῦσι μέν, οὐχ ὡς ἰατρικὴ δὲ ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἡ ὑγίεια, οὕτως ἡ σοφία εὐδαιμονίαν· μέρος γὰρ οὖσα τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς τῷ ἔχεσθαι ποιεῖ καὶ τῷ ἐνεργεῖν εὐδαίμονα. Ἔτι τὸ ἔργον ἀποτελεῖται κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετήν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τὸν σκοπὸν ποιεῖ ὀρθόν, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τὰ πρὸς τοῦτον. (τοῦ δὲ τετάρτου μορίου τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετὴ τοιαύτη, τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ πράττειν ἢ μὴ πράττειν). Περὶ δὲ τοῦ μηθὲν εἶναι πρακ-

2. They are eligible as parts of happiness.

3. φρόνησις indispensable to virtuous actions.

φρόνησις inseparable from moral virtue.

2. ὡς ἰατρική] Not as efficient causes, as the objector has supposed, but as parts of happiness.

5. ἔτι τὸ ἔργον] Aristotle here refutes the proofs of the minor of the second objection. He observes, that φρόνησις is useful for happiness, because moral virtue cannot operate without it. For to every virtuous action a good end as well as good means are required. But moral virtue only forms and directs the appetite, which being irrational cannot reason upon the end, but only fix upon it when presented to it, and further also requires φρόνησις to discover the proper and sufficient means for the attainment of that end. φρόνησις then selects and orders the right means for the attainment of that end which moral virtue has sought out and selected; and consequently φρόνησις is indispensable to virtuous actions and to happiness.

11. περὶ δὲ τοῦ] Aristotle here refutes the allegation of the objector, that a person can perform the energies of virtue, without possessing φρόνησις, merely by imitating the actions of others and following their directions, as the sick man can attain to health without learning the art of medicine. To this Aristotle replies, by saying, that imitation alone is not sufficient for the performance of virtuous actions, for which four properties are required as already has been stated, ii. c. 3. First, that the agent should know what he does; secondly, that he should act from deliberate choice (ἐκ προαιρέσεως); thirdly, that he should act from the love of virtue itself; and fourthly, with consistency and perseverance. Moral virtue then makes the προαίρεσις correct, causes it to fix upon the good and to avoid the bad. This however is not sufficient, but the means for attaining that end when so found ought to be good likewise; but the discovery and determination of the means which are to be put in action for obtaining the object of our choice (ὅσα ἐκείνης ἕνεκα πέφυκε πράττεσθαι) belong not to moral virtue, but to some other faculty. What that faculty is, Aristotle now proceeds to examine.

τικωτέρους διὰ τὴν φρόνησιν τῶν καλῶν καὶ δικαίων, μικρὸν ἄνωθεν ἀρκτέον, λαβόντας ἀρχὴν ταύτην. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὰ δίκαια λέγομεν πράττοντάς τινας οὔπω δικαίους εἶναι, οἷον τοὺς τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων τεταγμένα ποιοῦντας ἢ ἄκοντας ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἢ δι' ἕτερόν τι καὶ μὴ δι' αὐτά (καίτοι πράττουσί γε ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα χρὴ τὸν σπουδαῖον), οὕτως, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἔστι τὸ πῶς ἔχοντα πράττειν ἕκαστα ὥστ' εἶναι ἀγαθόν, λέγω δ' οἷον διὰ προαίρεσιν καὶ αὐτῶν ἕνεκα τῶν πραττομένων. τὴν μὲν οὖν προαίρεσιν ὀρθὴν ποιεῖ ἡ ἀρετή, τὸ δ' ὅσα ἐκείνης ἕνεκα πέφυκε πράττεσθαι οὐκ ἔστι τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀλλ' ἑτέρας δυνάμεως. Λεκτέον δ' ἐπιστήσασι σαφέστερον περὶ αὐτῶν. ἔστι δή τις δύναμις ἣν καλοῦσι δεινότητα· αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ τοιαύτη ὥστε τὰ πρὸς τὸν ὑποτεθέντα σκοπὸν συντείνοντα δύνασθαι ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ τυγχάνειν αὐτῶν. ἂν μὲν οὖν ὁ σκοπὸς ᾖ καλός,

(δεινότης, the same as φρόνησις stripped of moral virtue).

3. δίκαια λέγομεν] See p. 197.

15. δεινότητα] A technical word applied to this particular use even by the Pythagoreans. Compare Clinias: ὅσοι μὲν οὖν ἔχοντι τὸ νοατικὸν καὶ γνωστικὸν μέρος αὐτᾶς [sc. ἀρετᾶς], δεινοί τε καὶ συνετοὶ ὀνυμαίνονται. ὅσοι δὲ τὸ ἠθικόν τε καὶ προαιρετικόν, χρησιμοί τε καὶ ἐπιεικέες. Frag. Pyth. Ed. Gale, p. 29.

18. σκοπός] Every one who wishes to act fixes upon some end, but requires a certain aptitude or faculty, by which he may fix upon and perform those things which tend to the end proposed. This faculty, as given us by nature, is called δεινότης, but is not sufficient of itself to constitute a virtuous action, otherwise all who possessed it would be virtuous, which is not the case. Something else then is required. Then only is it virtuous, when the end it has in view is good and praiseworthy. But the faculty which determines and fixes on the good end is correct ὄρεξις, that is, moral virtue, therefore to constitute perfect δεινότης moral virtue must be united with it, but δεινότης so united is the same as φρόνησις, which always has a good end (see p. 230, 11. n.) therefore φρόνησις is not without moral virtue. τοῦτο γὰρ διαφέρει δεινότης φρονήσεως. ὅτι ἡ μὲν τῶν πρὸς τὸν ἁπλῶς σκοπὸν συντελούντων ἐφευρετική ἐστι δύναμις, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τῶν πρὸς τὸν ὑγιῆ σκοπόν, καὶ ὅτι ἡ μὲν φρόνησις ἕξις ἐκ

ἐπαινετή ἐστιν, ἂν δὲ φαῦλος, πανουργία· διὸ καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους δεινοὺς καὶ πανούργους φαμὲν εἶναι. ἔστι δ' ἡ φρόνησις οὐχ ἡ δεινότης, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄνευ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης. ἡ δ' ἕξις τῷ ὄμματι τούτῳ γίνεται τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς, ὡς εἴρηταί τε καὶ ἔστι δῆλον· οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντές εἰσιν, ἐπειδὴ τοιόνδε τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, ὁτιδήποτε ὄν· ἔστω γὰρ λόγου χάριν τὸ τυχόν. τοῦτο δ' εἰ μὴ τῷ ἀγαθῷ, οὐ φαίνεται· διαστρέφει γὰρ ἡ μοχθηρία καὶ διαψεύδεσθαι ποιεῖ περὶ τὰς πρακτικὰς ἀρχάς. ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἀδύνατον φρόνιμον εἶναι μὴ ὄντα ἀγαθόν. Σκεπτέον δὴ πάλιν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ παραπλησίως ἔχει ὡς ἡ φρόνησις πρὸς τὴν δεινότητα·

And moral virtue is inseparable from φρόνησις. (Natural virtue bear-

πολυπειρίας προσγινομένη τῇ ψυχῇ, δεῖται δὲ τῆς δεινότητος, δυνάμεως οὔσης καὶ εὐφυΐας, καὶ ἐκ φύσεως προσούσης τῷ ἐν ἡμῖν λόγῳ. ἵν' ἐν αὐτῇ ἐπιγίνηται. Schol.

4. ἡ δ' ἕξις] *This habit* (φρόνησις) *is generated in this eye of the soul,* (that is, νοῦς πρακτικός. See p. 239, 9. n. 246, 1. n. and 247, 3. n. *not without moral virtue*). τῷ ὄμματι τούτῳ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἤτοι τῷ εἰρημένῳ καὶ παραδεδομένῳ πρὸ μικροῦ, ὅ ἐστιν ὁ πρακτικὸς νοῦς. Schol.

7. ἐπειδὴ τοιόνδε] Docet prudentiam (φρόνησιν) absque virtute esse non posse hunc in modum. Dictum est supra syllogismos partim esse theoreticos, partim practicos, utrique notum est sua esse principia. Practici principium finis est, non secus atque theoretici hypothesis, inquit Aristot. vii. 8. Finis igitur nisi viro bono bonus constitui non potest. Vir improbus malum semper et improbum finem sibi deligit: nam hæc improbitatis est vis, ut in scopo et fine deligendo aberrare nos faciat. Virtus, inquit Aristoteles, scopum et finem tuetur, vitium perdit et corrumpit. vi. 4. quod rectum solus vir bonus recte judicat, improbus non item ut supra dictum iii. 4. de voluntate. Jam vero quia prudentis potissimum est syllogismum practicum concludere, ut cujus est proprium ratiocinari quid agendum quid non agendum sit, hinc efficitur ut si recte concludere velit, quia principia ad hoc recta sint oportet, id est finis quod absque virtute fieri non posse diximus, virum quoque bonum esse debere ut rectum prius constituat finem. Ad summum virtus et prudentia mutuam tradunt operam. GIPH.

10. διαστρέφει γάρ] See p. 231.

ing the same relation to moral virtue, as δεινότης to φρόνησις).

οὐ ταὐτὸν μέν, ὅμοιον δέ· οὕτω καὶ ἡ φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὴν κυρίαν. πᾶσι γὰρ δοκεῖ ἕκαστα τῶν ἠθῶν ὑπάρχειν φύσει πως· καὶ γὰρ δίκαιοι καὶ σωφρονικοὶ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ τἆλλα ἔχομεν εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς· ἀλλ' ὅμως ζητοῦμεν ἕτερόν τι τὸ κυρίως ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄλλον τρόπον ὑπάρχειν· καὶ γὰρ παισὶ καὶ θηρίοις αἱ φυσικαὶ ὑπάρχουσιν ἕξεις, ἀλλ' ἄνευ νοῦ βλαβεραὶ φαίνονται οὖσαι. πλὴν τοσοῦτον ἔοικεν ὁρᾶσθαι, ὅτι ὥσπερ σώματι ἰσχυρῷ ἄνευ ὄψεως κινουμένῳ συμβαίνει σφάλλεσθαι ἰσχυρῶς διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ὄψιν, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα· ἐὰν δὲ λάβῃ νοῦν, ἐν τῷ πράττειν διαφέρει. ἡ δ' ἕξις ὁμοία οὖσα τότ' ἔσται κυρίως ἀρετή. ὥστε καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ δύο ἐστὶν εἴδη, δεινότης καὶ φρόνησις, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ δύο ἐστί, τὸ μὲν ἀρετὴ φυσικὴ τὸ δ' ἡ κυρία, καὶ τούτων ἡ κυρία οὐ

1. ἡ φυσικὴ ἀρετή] Virtus autem hæc naturæ Aristoteli nihil est aliud, quam ὁρμὴ seu *appetitio* (sic vertitur a Cicerone) et impetus quidam ratione vacans seu ἄλογος ut ibidem Aristoteles in Mag. Mor. i. cap. ult. Quare et hoc loco eam in pueris et beluis reperiri ait. Diximus et supra iii. c. 5. p. 108. de εὐφυΐᾳ seu naturæ bonitate, ubi dictum alios ad alia natura esse aptiores: cujus εὐφυΐας pars quædam est hæc virtus natura insita, nam et hic infra εὐφυέστατος dicitur, de virtutibus natura insitis agens. GIPH.

3. φύσει πως] As a certain natural aptitude which we call δεινότης preexists and predisposes the mind to the reception of φρόνησις, so a certain natural virtue precedes and renders it fit and apt for the acquisition of virtue properly so called (κυρία ἀρετή.) The same relation which δεινότης bears to φρόνησις, does natural to acquired virtue. φρόνησις is a habit, δεινότης is not: φρόνησις contributes the means only to those ends which are recommended by moral virtue, δεινότης to any end. So acquired virtue is a habit, the natural is not. Acquired virtue, fixing on the good end, only admits those means which φρόνησις has determined; natural virtue regards not the character of any of the means to the end it proposes. φρόνησις and moral virtue are inseparable; he who possesses one must possess both, he who loses one must lose both. If moral virtue be added to δεινότης, then it becomes φρόνησις: if φρόνησις be added to natural virtue, it becomes moral virtue.

γίνεται ἄνευ φρονήσεως. Διόπερ τινές φασι πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς φρονήσεις εἶναι, καὶ Σωκράτης τῇ μὲν ὀρθῶς ἐζήτει τῇ δ' ἡμάρτανεν· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ φρονήσεις ᾤετο εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ἡμάρτανεν, ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἄνευ φρονήσεως, καλῶς

Whence some inferred that virtue was φρόνησις.

2. Σωκράτης] See Xenophon's Mem. iii. 9. §. 4. and Plato's Charmides and Laches. See the Introduction to the Seventh book of the Ethics.

5. ἄνευ φρονήσεως] To constitute a good action, a good end and good means are requisite. But to constitute good means, they must not only be sufficient for effecting their purpose, but likewise morally good, and consequently require moral virtue in the person who is to choose them. But it is not sufficient merely for moral virtue to fix upon a good end, but it must cause good means for attainment of that end, good actions to be put in motion. Therefore neither can φρόνησις be acquired without moral virtue, nor moral virtue without φρόνησις. This seems like arguing in a circle; to explain which Aristotle says, we are possessed by nature of two faculties corresponding to moral virtue and φρόνησις, without the moral goodness and perfection of either. Natural virtue and cleverness (φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ καὶ δεινότης). Natural virtue fixes upon a good end *generally*, δεινότης *generally* chooses the right means to that end: and the exercise of these natural faculties causes them to ripen into the perfect virtue and perfect δεινότης. that is, φρόνησις. The one reciprocally operating on the other, and both ripening and reaching their perfection in the soul at once. But though such is Aristotle's account of the progress of man to moral perfection, he does not appear to think that to such a perfection, though mankind may almost infinitely approximate, they can ever reach. It is a perfection of his being not reserved for him here.

For if moral virtue cannot be formed without φρόνησις, certainly it cannot be by δεινότης; and if φρόνησις cannot be formed without moral virtue, then it cannot be formed by natural virtue; neither does it appear therefore how the two together, δεινότης and natural virtue, should ever ripen into φρόνησις and moral virtue, which are perfect and unerring habits, although they may infinitely approximate towards them. For let it be supposed that such a perfection is attainable by man, he could never be a sinning or an erring creature; moral virtue would ever guard him from fixing on or even wishing a bad end, from the possibility of any germination of evil habits from inward acts, and his φρόνησις would entirely preclude him from any error as to the means, from the influence of bad external acts. Φρόνησις would ever keep him alive to the calls of moral virtue, moral virtue would always enforce upon him the right impressions as to φρόνησις. Such a man could never have the wish or morally the power to do wrong. Suppose either one or the other, then at once he loses both these habits. So that Aristotle, in reference to these habits, only considers man transcendently not what he ever is or can be in this world, but what he supposed he might be, virtue

ἔλεγεν. σημεῖον δέ· καὶ γὰρ νῦν πάντες, ὅταν ὁρίζωνται τὴν ἀρετήν, προστιθέασι τὴν ἕξιν, εἰπόντες καὶ πρὸς ἅ ἐστι, τὴν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον· ὀρθὸς δ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. ἐοίκασι δὴ μαντεύεσθαί πως ἅπαντες ὅτι ἡ τοιαύτη ἕξις ἀρετή ἐστιν ἡ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. δεῖ δὲ μικρὸν μεταβῆναι· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἡ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' ἡ μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου ἕξις ἀρετή ἐστιν. ὀρθὸς δὲ λόγος περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ φρόνησίς ἐστιν. Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν λόγους τὰς ἀρετὰς ᾤετο εἶναι (ἐπιστήμας γὰρ εἶναι πάσας), ἡμεῖς δὲ μετὰ λόγου.

Conclusion of the subject; and the inference to be drawn from it.

Δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι κυρίως ἄνευ φρονήσεως, οὐδὲ φρόνιμον ἄνευ τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ λόγος ταύτῃ λύοιτ' ἄν, ᾧ διαλεχθείη τις ἂν ὅτι χωρίζονται ἀλλήλων αἱ ἀρεταί· οὐ γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς εὐφυέστατος πρὸς ἁπάσας, ὥστε τὴν μὲν ἤδη τὴν δ' οὔπω εἰληφὼς ἔσται· τοῦτο γὰρ κατὰ μὲν τὰς φυσικὰς ἀρετὰς ἐνδέχεται, καθ' ἃς δὲ ἁπλῶς λέγεται ἀγαθός, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται· ἅμα γὰρ τῇ φρονήσει μιᾷ οὔσῃ πᾶσαι ὑπάρξουσιν. δῆλον δέ, κἂν εἰ μὴ πρακτικὴ ἦν, ὅτι ἔδει ἂν

itself and his capacities for it having an unlimited tendency to perfection. But a perfection never to be developed in this world. To such a perfect state, we may apply the words which Aristotle uses on another occasion: ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη βίος κρείττων ἢ κατ' ἄνθρωπον· οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν οὕτω βιώσεται, ἀλλ' ᾗ θεῖόν τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει. x. 5. Can we suppose that a man holding such language did not believe in a future state?

10. λόγους τὰς ἀρετάς] See the Introduction to Book vii.

21. μιᾷ οὔσῃ] Sic Stoici quoque omnes virtutes unam esse putaverunt, quippe qui, ut Socrates, rationalem tantum in virtute partem reliquerint. Cf. Diog. Laert. vii. §. 125. τὰς δὲ ἀρετὰς λέγουσιν ἀντακολουθεῖν ἀλλήλαις, καὶ τὸν μίαν ἔχοντα πάσας ἔχειν. MICH.

αὐτῆς διὰ τὸ τοῦ μορίου ἀρετὴν εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔσται ἡ προαίρεσις ὀρθὴ ἄνευ φρονήσεως οὐδ' ἄνευ ἀρετῆς· ἡ μὲν γὰρ τὸ τέλος, ἡ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος ποιεῖ πράττειν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κυρία γ' ἐστὶ τῆς σοφίας οὐδὲ τοῦ βελτίονος μορίου, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῆς ὑγιείας ἡ ἰατρική· οὐ γὰρ χρῆται αὐτῇ, ἀλλ' ὁρᾷ ὅπως γένηται· ἐκείνης οὖν ἕνεκα ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνῃ. ἔτι ὅμοιον κἂν εἴ τις τὴν πολιτικὴν φαίη ἄρχειν τῶν θεῶν, ὅτι ἐπιτάττει περὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει.

σοφία is superior to φρόνησις.

3. ἡ μὲν—ἡ δὲ] Virtue—φρόνησις.

INTRODUCTION TO BOOK VII.

Aristotle having discussed the Moral and Intellectual Virtues, now proceeds to consider those which are employed on a particular class of pleasures, namely, such as are connected with those pleasures which admit of excess, the pleasures of Touch and Taste. He has not included the consideration of these in that of the previous Moral Habits, because some of them, such as ἀκρασία and ἐγκράτεια, are not perfect Habits, and consequently the former cannot be properly considered in the light of perfect Vice, nor the latter in that of perfect Virtue. In the perfect Virtues there is a perfect and willing obedience of the appetitive to the rational part of the soul; thus the σώφρων has his appetite perfectly subservient to his reason, and has a pleasure in the very exercise of that obedience. But the continent man has not yet arrived at such a state, much less the καρτερικός. The former obeys his reason, but that obedience is attended with pain, which, as we have seen in the Second Book, p. 59. indicates that the Habit is imperfect.

Further, as there is a Virtue which approaches to divine (τὴν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ἀρετήν, ἡρωϊκήν τινα καὶ θείαν), and a Vice which approaches to brutality (θηριότης), one above, the other below human nature, these could not properly be included in the consideration of the Moral Habits of man as man, and are therefore reserved to this opportunity.

The principal part of this Book, then, is occupied in considering those Habits which have for their object-

matter the pleasures of Touch and Taste, which will be better understood by the following Table :

Habits employed upon the Pleasures of Touch and Taste.

	ἀκολασία, Perfect habit, or perfect vice. The λόγος and ὄρεξις incurably vitiated.	**σωφροσύνη,** Perfect habit, or perfect virtue. Pleasure attending the exercise of it; both the λόγος and ὄρεξις right.	Anon.
ἀκρασία κατά τι, Upon a different object-matter from the other. See p. 280.	2. **ἀκρασία ἁπλῶς,** Imperfect habit, not perfect vice. The λόγος right, but the ὄρεξις disobedient, and therefore causing pain even in the pursuit of pleasure. A continuance in this habit will bring it to the previous one, though at present less vicious than it.	2. **ἐγκράτεια,** Imperfect habit, not perfect virtue. The λόγος right, and the ὄρεξις obedient, but feeling pain in that obedience. The exercise of this habit, is consequently attended with pain. A continuance in this habit will bring it to the previous one, though at present less virtuous than it.	
	3. **μαλακία,** Rather upon the giving way to *small* pains. (ἐλλείπων πρὸς ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ ἀντιτείνουσιν καὶ δύνανται.) A continuance in this habit will bring it to the previous one, though at present less vicious than it.	3. **καρτερία,** Resisting or rather enduring pain: inferior to the one above, because ἐγκράτεια conquers in the end. (τὸ μὲν γὰρ καρτερεῖν ἐστιν ἐν τῷ ἀντέχειν ἡ δ' ἐγκράτεια ἐν τῷ κρατεῖν.) A continuance in this habit will bring it to the previous one, though at present less virtuous than it.	

The earlier chapters also are devoted to the consideration of a very important question in the theory of Morals; Whether he who is incontinent does act contrary to knowledge, or not; or whether, as Socrates supposed [a], there can be no such thing as Incontinence.

[a] Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ ὅλως ἐμάχετο πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὡς οὐκ οὔσης ἀκρασίας· οὐδένα γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνοντα πράττειν παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον, ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν. p. 266.

The peculiarities of his views of moral philosophy, and his desire, the very reverse one of his age, a phenomenon not unusual in the history of philosophy, of exalting the theory of Morals to the certainty and precision of unerring mathematical science, has been briefly noticed in the Introduction to the Third Book of this Treatise. The following one may be looked upon as a resumption of that argument, which it may be worth while briefly to consider.

According to Socrates[b], all men possessed a natural tendency towards goodness, and consequently it was the chief object of his philosophy to further this tendency by rendering man as much like the gods as possible, that is, to real and pure goodness[c]. But God was not the type merely of goodness but of pure reason, and consequently the study of goodness and pure reason, that is to say of virtue and wisdom, ἀρετὴ and σοφία, are the same[d], and consequently whatever is not of that character is worthless. And in this consists the intimate relationship of the Moral and Scientific energies, both being directed to and ending in the same object. From this view of the *general* tendency of man's nature, he considered that the man who fixed upon and pursued evil was an involuntary or an ignorant agent: for that it was impossible, if he knew what was really Good, not to prefer that Good. And consequently he who acted wickedly did so from an ignorance not merely of his own particular, but likewise of the Universal and Supreme Good, for the one is necessarily united to and involved in the other. It might indeed be said, as

[b] See Xen. Mem. iv. 3. §. 14. See the passages quoted in this treatise, p. 81, 82.

[c] πρῶτον μὲν δὴ περὶ θεοὺς ἐπειρᾶτο σώφρονας ποιεῖν τοὺς συνόντας. Xen. Mem. iv. 3. §. 2.

ἔοικας, ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἰομένῳ τρυφὴν καὶ πολυτέλειαν εἶναι, ἐγὼ δὲ νομίζω τὸ μὲν μηδενὸς δέεσθαι θεῖον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ὡς ἐλαχίστων, ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ θείου, καὶ τὸ μὲν θεῖον κράτιστον, τὸ δὲ ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ θείου ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ κρατίστου. Id. i. 6. §. 10.

[d] Σωκράτης—ᾤετ' εἶναι τέλος τὸ γινώσκειν τὴν ἀρετήν. Arist. Eud. Eth. i. 5.

ἔφη δὲ καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν σοφίαν εἶναι. Xen. Mem. iii. 9. §. 5.

Aristotle intimates, p. 266, that facts were contrary to his assertions. But if, as some have thought [*], Socrates took a transcendental view of human nature, on the outside of sensible representation, his doctrine would not be affected by mere experience and the observation of facts. We must take into consideration what he considered human agency and human choice *properly*, separating from the varied phenomena we observe in the conduct of men those which are his as a *rational* being, and those which he shares in common with brutes.

But by knowledge, also, Socrates understood another kind than what we term knowledge. According to him, true knowledge, which is the same as moral action, is a knowledge unknown to mortals, the perfect knowledge of the Good. And as, in his doctrine, the Scientific and the Moral are coextensive and reciprocal, the will must have a tendency to knowledge, for no one is ignorant of his own will; and knowledge, in its turn, must have a tendency to Good, for no one does wrong with his own option. The foundation of his doctrine upon this subject consists in considering the knowledge of the Good, not as a knowledge simply general, but as a knowledge which embraces at the same time the general and the particular. He thought that one could not know the Good without knowing his own particular good and his own interest, in the particular moments of his life; and that with this pure view of the real Good he could not act contrary to his interests, by the same reason that by the possession of it he would possess universal Virtue.

[*] See Ritter's Hist. of Philosophy in the account of the Socratic School.

ARISTOTELIS

ETHICA NICOMACHEA.

LIB. VII.

CHAP. I.

Of Intemperance—Incontinence—Brutality. And their opposites, Temperance—Continence—Heroism. The notions of mankind respecting them.

ΜΕΤΑ δὲ ταῦτα λεκτέον, ἄλλην ποιησαμένους ἀρχήν, ὅτι τῶν περὶ τὰ ἤθη φευκτῶν τρία ἐστὶν εἴδη, κακία, ἀκρασία, θηριότης. τὰ δ' ἐναντία τοῖς μὲν δυσὶ δῆλα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴν τὸ δ' ἐγκράτειαν καλοῦμεν· πρὸς δὲ τὴν θηριότητα μάλιστ' ἂν ἁρμόττοι λέγειν τὴν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ἀρετήν, ἡρωϊκήν τινα καὶ θείαν, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος περὶ Ἕκτορος πεποίηκε λέγοντα τὸν Πρίαμον ὅτι σφόδρα ἦν ἀγαθός, "οὐδὲ ἐῴκει ἀνδρός γε θνητοῦ πάϊς ἔμμεναι ἀλλὰ θεοῖο." ὥστ' εἰ, καθάπερ φασίν, ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γίνονται θεοὶ δι' ἀρετῆς ὑπερβολήν, τοιαύτη τις ἂν εἴη δῆλον ὅτι ἡ τῇ θηριώδει ἀντιτιθεμένη ἕξις· καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ θηρίου ἐστὶ κακία οὐδ' ἀρετή, οὕτως οὐδὲ θεοῦ, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν τιμιώτερον ἀρετῆς, ἡ δ' ἕτερόν τι

Of the three vices considered in this book, and their opposites.

8. Ἕκτορος] Il. Ω. v. 258.

γένος κακίας. ἐπεὶ δὲ σπάνιον καὶ τὸ θεῖον ἄνδρα εἶναι, καθάπερ οἱ Λάκωνες εἰώθασι προσαγορεύειν, ὅταν ἀγασθῶσι σφόδρα του (σεῖος ἀνήρ φασιν), οὕτω καὶ ὁ θηριώδης ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις σπάνιος. μάλιστα δ' ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις ἐστίν, γίνεται δ' ἔνια καὶ διὰ νόσους καὶ πηρώσεις· καὶ τοὺς διὰ κακίαν δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπερβάλλοντας οὕτως ἐπιδυσφημοῦμεν. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῆς τοιαύτης διαθέσεως ὕστερον ποιητέον τινὰ μνείαν, περὶ δὲ κακίας εἴρηται πρότερον· περὶ δὲ ἀκρασίας καὶ μαλακίας καὶ τρυφῆς λεκτέον, καὶ περὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ καρτερίας· οὔτε γὰρ ὡς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἕξεων τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ μοχθηρίᾳ ἑκατέραν αὐτῶν ὑποληπτέον, οὐθ' ὡς ἕτερον γένος.

The principal φαινόμενα of them ought to be considered.

Δεῖ δ', ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, τιθέντας τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πρῶτον διαπορήσαντας οὕτω δεικνύναι μάλιστα μὲν πάντα τὰ ἔνδοξα περὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη, εἰ δὲ μή, τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ κυριώτατα· ἐὰν γὰρ λύηταί τε τὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ καταλείπηται τὰ ἔνδοξα, δεδειγμένον ἂν εἴη ἱκανῶς.

Those phenomena stated.

Δοκεῖ δὴ ἥ τε ἐγκράτεια καὶ καρτερία τῶν 2
σπουδαίων καὶ τῶν ἐπαινετῶν εἶναι, ἡ δ' ἀκρασία
2. τε καὶ μαλακία τῶν φαύλων τε καὶ ψεκτῶν, καὶ
ὁ αὐτὸς ἐγκρατὴς καὶ ἐμμενετικὸς τῷ λογισμῷ,
3. καὶ ἀκρατὴς καὶ ἐκστατικὸς τοῦ λογισμοῦ. Καὶ
ὁ μὲν ἀκρατὴς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα πράττει διὰ
πάθος, ὁ δ' ἐγκρατὴς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλαι αἱ ἐπι-
4. θυμίαι οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ διὰ τὸν λόγον. Καὶ τὸν

9. ὕστερον] See chap. v. and vi.

11. μαλακίας καὶ τρυφῆς] These words are used to denote one and the same habit. See chap. vii. p. 287, 2.

σώφρονα μὲν ἐγκρατῆ καὶ καρτερικόν, τὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον οἱ μὲν πάντα σώφρονα οἱ δ᾽ οὔ, καὶ 5. τὸν ἀκόλαστον ἀκρατῆ καὶ τὸν ἀκρατῆ ἀκόλαστον συγκεχυμένως, οἱ δ᾽ ἑτέρους εἶναί φασιν. Τὸν 6. δὲ φρόνιμον ὁτὲ μὲν οὔ φασιν ἐνδέχεσθαι εἶναι ἀκρατῆ, ὁτὲ δ᾽ ἐνίους φρονίμους ὄντας καὶ δεινοὺς ἀκρατεῖς εἶναι. Ἔτι ἀκρατεῖς λέγονται καὶ θυμοῦ 7. καὶ τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα ταῦτ᾽ ἐστίν.

CHAP. II.

The Questions stated in the last Chapter briefly examined.

The 3rd notion considered; whether the incontinent acts contrary to knowledge; which Socrates denied.

3 ΑΠΟΡΗΣΕΙΕ δ᾽ ἄν τις πῶς ὑπολαμβάνων ὀρθῶς ἀκρατεύεταί τις. ἐπιστάμενον μὲν οὖν οὔ φασί τινες οἷόν τε εἶναι· δεινὸν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἐνούσης, ὡς ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἄλλο τι κρατεῖν καὶ

6. φρονίμους—ἀκρατεῖς] As Callicles in the Gorgias of Plato, p. 491. E. sq.

13. Σωκράτης] Compare Mag. Mor. p. 57. Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν ὁ πρεσβύτης ἀνῄρει ὅλως καὶ οὐκ ἔφη ἀκρασίαν εἶναι, λέγων ὅτι οὐθεὶς εἰδὼς τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακά εἰσιν ἕλοιτ᾽ ἄν· ὁ δὲ ἀκρατὴς δοκεῖ εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλά εἰσιν αἱρεῖσθαι ὅμως, ἀγόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους διὰ δὲ τὸν τοιοῦτον λόγον οὐκ ᾤετο εἶναι ἀκρασίαν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς. See also Xenophon's Mem. Soc. iii. 9, 4. Socrates thought that it was impossible, that a man who either knew or thought that to abstain from vicious pleasures was the best, should act contrary to what is best, and pursue vicious pleasures; but that if he did so, he must do it by reason of his ignorance. The argument, as given in the Protagoras, (p. 354. sq.) may be reduced to this syllogistic form.

He who pursues vicious pleasures pursues pain.
No man knowingly (ἐπιστάμενος) pursues pain.
No man *knowingly* pursues vicious pleasures.

To this it is replied, that the assertion of the minor is at variance with the fact, for we see many pursuing vicious pleasures, knowing them to be such. Yet nothing is stronger than ἐπιστήμη, for nothing could ever persuade a mathematician that 2 × 2 makes 3. In order therefore to remove the diffi-

περιέλκειν αὐτὸν ὥσπερ ἀνδράποδον. Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ ὅλως ἐμάχετο πρὸς τὸν λόγον, ὡς οὐκ οὔσης ἀκρασίας· οὐθένα γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνοντα πράττειν παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον, ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν. οὗτος μὲν οὖν ὁ λόγος ἀμφισβητεῖ τοῖς φαινομένοις ἐναργῶς, καὶ δέον ζητεῖν περὶ τὸ πάθος, εἰ δι' ἄγνοιαν, τίς ὁ τρόπος γίνεται τῆς ἀγνοίας. ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ οἴεταί γε ὁ ἀκρατευόμενος πρὶν ἐν τῷ πάθει γενέσθαι, φανερόν.

Or whether as others thought (in order to get clear of this difficulty) contrary to opinion. The absurdity which must follow such a supposition.

Εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ τὰ μὲν συγχωροῦσι τὰ δ' οὔ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης μηθὲν εἶναι κρεῖττον ὁμολογοῦσιν, τὸ δὲ μηθένα πράττειν παρὰ τὸ δόξαν βέλτιον οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσιν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸν ἀκρατῆ φασὶν οὐκ ἐπιστήμην ἔχοντα κρατεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀλλὰ δόξαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴγε δόξα καὶ μὴ ἐπιστήμη, μηδ' ἰσχυρὰ ὑπόληψις ἡ ἀντιτείνουσα

culty, and to reconcile truth with this assertion, they said that the incontinent man does not act contrary to knowledge, but δόξα. If it be so, then this δόξα must be either strong or weak; if strong and confirmed, a man cannot act contrary to this any more than ἐπιστήμη, for with many δόξα is as strong as ἐπιστήμη. (See p. 270, 19.) And if it be a weak opinion, then a person would not be subject to great censure for pursuing pleasures which he was not certain were vicious; whereas a man is condemned for incontinence, and therefore the incontinent does not act contrary to a *weak* opinion.

If, then, the incontinent man does not act contrary to ἐπιστήμη, nor δόξα, strong or weak, does he act contrary to his φρόνησις? This supposition is still more absurd than the others, for it supposes that the same person may at once be ἀκρατὴς and φρόνιμος, which is impossible. For even the ἐγκρατής, inasmuch as he has strong and violent desires, has not yet attained to the perfect ἕξις of σωφροσύνη, and therefore does not, like the φρόνιμος, possess σωφροσύνη; and in this not only does the temperate man differ from the continent, but it is also clear that the incontinent cannot be φρόνιμος. See p. 280, 9.

1. περιέλκειν] See note p. 275, 12.

7. οὐκ οἴεται] *For it is evident that before he is within the influence of temptation, he thinks he ought not to give way.* It is strange that this simple and common expression should have been so much misunderstood. See p. 270, 19. Michelet translates the words, "Non opinione distrahitur:" *he does not think, he is not distracted in opinion.*

ἀλλ' ἠρεμαία, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς διστάζουσι, συγγνώμη τῷ μὴ μένειν ἐν αὐταῖς πρὸς ἐπιθυμίας ἰσχυράς· τῇ δὲ μοχθηρίᾳ οὐ συγγνώμη, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδενὶ τῶν ψεκτῶν. Φρονήσεως ἄρα ἀντιτεινούσης· αὕτη γὰρ ἰσχυρότατον. ἀλλ' ἄτοπον· ἔσται γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς ἅμα φρόνιμος καὶ ἀκρατής, φήσειε δ' οὐδ' ἂν εἷς φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ πράττειν ἑκόντα τὰ φαυλότατα. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις δέδεικται πρότερον ὅτι πρακτικός γε ὁ φρόνιμος· τῶν γὰρ ἐσχάτων τις καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἔχων ἀρετάς.

Or, (which is the 6th notion,) contrary to φρόνησις. Which involves a still greater absurdity.

Ἔτι εἰ μὲν ἐν τῷ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχειν ἰσχυρὰς καὶ φαύλας ὁ ἐγκρατής, οὐκ ἔσται ὁ σώφρων ἐγκρατὴς οὐδ' ὁ ἐγκρατὴς σώφρων· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἄγαν σώφρονος οὔτε τὸ φαύλας ἔχειν. ἀλλὰ μὴν δεῖ γε· εἰ μὲν γὰρ χρησταὶ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι, φαύλη ἡ κωλύουσα ἕξις μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν, ὥσθ' ἡ ἐγκράτεια οὐ πᾶσα σπουδαία· εἰ δ' ἀσθενεῖς καὶ μὴ φαῦλαι, οὐθὲν σεμνόν, οὐδ' εἰ φαῦλαι καὶ ἀσθενεῖς, οὐθὲν μέγα.

The fourth notion, Whether temperance and continence are the same.

Ἔτι εἰ πάσῃ δόξῃ ἐμμενετικὸν ποιεῖ ἡ ἐγκράτεια, φαύλη, οἷον εἰ καὶ τῇ ψευδεῖ· καὶ εἰ πάσης δόξης ἡ ἀκρασία ἐκστατικόν, ἔσται τις σπουδαία ἀκρασία, οἷον ὁ Σοφοκλέους Νεοπτόλεμος ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτῃ· ἐπαινετὸς γὰρ οὐκ ἐμμένων οἷς ἐπείσθη ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως διὰ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ψευδόμενος. ἔτι ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος

The second notion, Whether the continent *absolutely* abides by his resolution, and the incontinent the reverse.

14. δεῖ γε] The continent man must have strong and bad desires; for if they be bad and not strong, there is no merit in resisting them; and if they were strong and not bad, it would be vicious to resist them.

25. σοφιστικὸς λόγος ψευδόμενος] *The sophistical syllogism called* mentiens *occasions a difficulty.* Est autem ψευδόμενος, sermo, cui quicquid respondeas, falsum reperietur. Habuit nomen a mentiente, quoniam exempli causa sumitur is qui mentitur. Hoc modo: an mentitur is qui mentiri se dicit?

ψευδόμενος ἀπορία· διὰ γὰρ τὸ παράδοξα βούλεσθαι ἐλέγχειν, ἵνα δεινοὶ ὦσιν ὅταν ἐπιτύχωσιν, ὁ γενόμενος συλλογισμὸς ἀπορία γίνεται· δέδεται γὰρ ἡ διάνοια, ὅταν μένειν μὲν μὴ βούληται διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀρέσκειν τὸ συμπερανθέν, προϊέναι δὲ μὴ δύνηται διὰ τὸ λῦσαι μὴ ἔχειν τὸν λόγον. συμβαίνει δ' ἔκ τινος λόγου ἡ ἀφροσύνη μετὰ ἀκρασίας ἀρετή· τἀναντία γὰρ πράττει ὧν ὑπολαμβάνει διὰ τὴν ἀκρασίαν, ὑπολαμβάνει δὲ τἀγαθὰ κακὰ εἶναι καὶ οὐ δεῖν πράττειν, ὥστε τἀγαθὰ καὶ οὐ τὰ κακὰ πράξει.

And whether it will not then follow, that the ἀκόλαστος is more curable than the ἀκρατής.

Ἔτι ὁ τῷ πεπεῖσθαι πράττων καὶ διώκων τὰ ἡδέα καὶ προαιρούμενος βελτίων ἂν δόξειεν τοῦ μὴ διὰ λογισμὸν ἀλλὰ δι' ἀκρασίαν· εὐϊατότερος γὰρ διὰ τὸ μεταπεισθῆναι ἄν. ὁ δ'

Cui si respondeas mentiri, colligitur statim non mentiri, quod vere dixerit se mentiri. Menag. in Diog. Laert. ii. §. 108. See Cicero's Acad. ii. 29. The author of this fallacy, which occasioned much controversy, and upon which Theophrastus is said to have written three books (Diog. L. v. 49.), and Chrysippus twelve (Diog. L. vii. 196), was Eubulides of Miletus, one of the Megaric school, who was also the inventor of several other captious questions of the same kind. See Ferd. Deycks de Megaricorum doctrina Bonnæ. 1827. p. 52. Hottinger ad Cic. de Divinat. ii. 4. p. 174. sq. Diog. Laert. ii. 108.

Ἀπορία, entangles us in a toil from which we have no means of escaping, can neither advance nor recede: δέδεται ἡ διάνοια προϊέναι δὲ μὴ δύνηται. corresponding to the words of Cicero, "inexplicabilia esse dicitis." Acad. ii. 29.

To explain then the argument. Aristotle is proving that continence cannot be the absolute adhering to any and every opinion. For the person who grants the premises in this sophistical syllogism, thinks that he grants what is true; but when the conclusion is drawn, he finds them to be false: if then he obstinately abides by his former opinion, he is guilty of a vice in so doing, and he is a more consistent and honest man who will change his former concessions and opinion. But by so doing he incurs the charge of incontinence, if continence be an absolute abiding to an opinion once formed, and his incontinence in forsaking a conclusion which he knows to be false, occasioned by a folly in granting the premises, is a virtue; that is, two vices constitute a virtue, which is absurd.

14. εὐϊατότερος] Hanc de incontinentia doctrinam, a sua mente plane abhorrentem, e Platonis Hippia de-

ἀκρατὴς ἔνοχος τῇ παροιμίᾳ ἐν ᾗ φαμὲν "ὅταν τὸ ὕδωρ πνίγῃ, τί δεῖ ἐπιπίνειν;" εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ ἐπέπειστο ἃ πράττει, μεταπεισθεὶς ἂν ἐπαύσατο· νῦν δὲ πεπεισμένος οὐδὲν ἧττον ἄλλα πράττει. Ἔτι εἰ περὶ πάντα ἀκρασία ἐστὶ καὶ ἐγκράτεια, τίς ὁ ἁπλῶς ἀκρατής; οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἁπάσας ἔχει τὰς ἀκρασίας, φαμὲν δ' εἶναί τινας ἁπλῶς.

Seventh notion, Whether incontinence and continence are on every object-matter.

CHAP. III.

In what way, and against what knowledge, the Incontinent acts.

4 AI μὲν οὖν ἀπορίαι τοιαῦταί τινες συμβαίνουσιν, τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀνελεῖν δεῖ τὰ δὲ κατα-

Three questions proposed.

duxisse videtur Aristoteles; atque ita ipsum videas docentem in Metaph. iv. 29. CARDWELL.

Although this opinion, that the ἀκόλαστος is more easily curable than the ἀκρατὴς is not here directly refuted, yet it is so, in the further discussion of the subject.

The ἀκόλαστος is one who has lost the faculty of distinguishing right from wrong, the light that is in him has become darkness; and he has lost all feeling, all perception of goodness, (p. 285, 15.) consequently he is incurable. Whereas the ἀκρατὴς has not yet arrived at this deplorable state, and is therefore curable, (p. 288, 12.) The supposition that if you could dissuade the ἀκόλαστος from his vicious course, he would more readily reform than the incontinent, may be true if you grant the hypothesis; but then it is true that he *cannot be dissuaded*. And this is a fearful warning when it is remembered, that equally as the ἐγκρατὴς may become σώφρων, so may the ἀκρατὴς become ἀκόλαστος, each by continuance in their several courses. This question is fully discussed in Chap. viii.

2. τὸ ὕδωρ] This passage is generally translated thus. "If water choke a man, why should he drink more?" The application of which to this argument is not very clear, nor does ἐπιπίνειν, as I conceive, warrant such an interpretation: ἐπιπίνειν means to "drink next," or "to drink afterwards." "If water chokes a man, what is he to drink then?" or as we should say, "If water chokes a man, what *is* he to drink?" He has the simplest beverage, and yet chokes at it; you can do no more; his case is hopeless. Just so the incontinent man. He knows what vice is, he knows he is doing wrong; he has all the advantages he possibly can have for obtaining virtue, and yet does not; what more can you do for him? what *is* to be done? you cannot improve his state; his case is hopeless.

Two as to the knowledge, and the third as to the object-matter, of continence and incontinence.

λιπεῖν· ἡ γὰρ λύσις τῆς ἀπορίας εὕρεσίς ἐστιν. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν σκεπτέον πότερον εἰδότες ἢ οὔ, καὶ πῶς εἰδότες, εἶτα περὶ ποῖα τὸν ἀκρατῆ καὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῆ θετέον, λέγω δὲ πότερον περὶ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ἢ περί τινας ἀφωρισμένας, καὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῆ καὶ τὸν καρτερικόν, πότερον ὁ αὐτὸς ἢ ἕτερός ἐστιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα συγγενῆ τῆς θεωρίας ἐστὶ ταύτης. ἔστι δ' ἀρχὴ τῆς σκέψεως, πότερον ὁ ἐγκρατὴς καὶ ὁ ἀκρατής εἰσι τῷ περὶ ἃ ἢ τῷ πῶς ἔχοντες τὴν διαφοράν, λέγω δὲ πότερον τῷ περὶ ταδὶ εἶναι μόνον ἀκρατὴς ὁ ἀκρατής, ἢ οὒ ἀλλὰ τῷ ὥς, ἢ οὒ ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀμφοῖν· ἔπειτ' εἰ περὶ πάντ' ἐστὶν ἡ ἀκρασία καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἢ οὔ· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ πάντ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἁπλῶς ἀκρατής, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἅπερ ὁ ἀκόλαστος, οὔτε τῷ πρὸς ταῦτα ἁπλῶς ἔχειν (ταὐτὸν γὰρ ἂν ἦν τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ), ἀλλὰ τῷ ὡδὶ ἔχειν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄγεται προαιρούμενος, νομίζων ἀεὶ δεῖν τὸ παρὸν ἡδὺ διώκειν· ὁ δ' οὐκ οἴεται μέν, διώκει δέ.

The incontinent does not act contrary to mere opinion, but to knowledge.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ δόξαν ἀληθῆ ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι παρ' ἣν ἀκρατεύονται, οὐθὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸν λόγον· ἔνιοι γὰρ τῶν δοξαζόντων, οὐ διστάζουσιν, ἀλλ' οἴονται ἀκριβῶς εἰδέναι. εἰ οὖν διὰ τὸ ἠρέμα

2. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν] The six questions proposed in the above Chapters are here reduced to the three, the consideration of which will embrace the whole subject.

I. Whether the ἀκρατὴς acts contrary to knowledge or not, and if contrary to knowledge, what kind of knowledge that is.

II. Upon what pleasures the ἀκρατὴς is employed.

III. Whether it differs from the other habits, of a similar nature, and from ἀκρασία in its object-matter, or the manner in which it is employed upon that matter, or in both, τῷ περὶ ἅ, ἢ τῷ πῶς, ἢ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν. Upon this chapter see De Animal. Mot. c. vii.

πιστεύειν οἱ δοξάζοντες μᾶλλον τῶν ἐπισταμένων παρὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν πράξουσιν, οὐθὲν διοίσει ἐπιστήμη δόξης· ἔνιοι γὰρ πιστεύουσιν οὐδὲν ἧττον οἷς δοξάζουσιν ἢ ἕτεροι οἷς ἐπίστανται· δηλοῖ δ' Ἡράκλειτος. Ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ διχῶς λέγομεν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι (καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἔχων μὲν οὐ χρώμενος δὲ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ ὁ χρώμενος λέγεται ἐπίστασθαι), διοίσει τὸ ἔχοντα μὲν μὴ θεωροῦντα δὲ ἃ μὴ δεῖ πράττειν τοῦ ἔχοντα καὶ θεωροῦντα· τοῦτο γὰρ δοκεῖ δεινόν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰ μὴ θεωρῶν.

In what way he acts contrary to ἐπιστήμη. 1. By possessing science, and not using it.

Ἔτι ἐπεὶ δύο τρόποι τῶν προτάσεων, ἔχοντα μὲν

2. By the disuse or

5. Ἡράκλειτος] This is another instance in which the Mag. Moral. is inconsistent with Aristotle, and furnishes an additional presumption that it was written some considerable time after the period of this treatise. See Mag. Mor. ii. 6.

— ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ διχῶς] A man who acts contrary to knowledge must act contrary either to ἐπιστήμη or δόξα. (See Plato's Repub. V. sub fin.) He does not act contrary to δόξα, (see p. 266, 9. and p. 270.) therefore he must act contrary to ἐπιστήμη.

If then he acts contrary to ἐπιστήμη, in what way is it, and what kind of ἐπιστήμη?

9. ἔχοντα καὶ θεωροῦντα] *Having knowledge, and not using it.*

10. δοκεῖ δεινόν] "*For this appears a strange thing, if we suppose a man possessing science and using it acts contrary to its dictates, but not if we suppose a man possessing science and not using it.*"

11. δύο τρόποι] Of the two premises one is universal the other particular; if therefore a man knows the universal he must either *actually* or *virtually* know the particular, since that is included in the universal. Now it is possible for a man having both these premises to err. In the first place then he may know the universal actually, and only the particular *virtually*, and as the particular is that upon which the entire action turns, he consequently falls into error when he comes to act. Thus if a person knows the universal premise, "All hellebore is deadly," but is ignorant of the particular, that this or that particular herb is hellebore, he may very easily fall into error: and this is the τὸ καθόλου ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγματος. But if the universal depend upon himself (τὸ καθόλου ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ), then of necessity he must *actually* know the particular. For instance, if he knows that "all dry food is good for man," he cannot help knowing the particular proposition, "I am a man," therefore it is good for me.

Aristotle has illustrated his argument by two syllogisms on the same subject.

actual ignorance of the minor.

ἀμφοτέρας οὐθὲν κωλύει πράττειν παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, χρώμενον μέντοι τῇ καθόλου ἀλλὰ μὴ τῇ κατὰ μέρος· πρακτὰ γὰρ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὸ καθόλου τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν· οἷον ὅτι παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ συμφέρει τὰ ξηρά, καὶ ὅτι οὗτος ἄνθρωπος, ἢ ὅτι ξηρὸν τὸ τοιόνδε· ἀλλ' εἰ τόδε τοιόνδε, ἢ οὐκ ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ. κατά τε δὴ τούτους διοίσει τοὺς τρόπους ἀμήχανον ὅσον, ὥστε δοκεῖν οὕτω μὲν εἰδέναι μηθὲν ἄτοπον, ἄλλως δὲ θαυμαστόν.

3. In possessing science, but being carried out of himself by violent desires.

Ἔτι τὸ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἄλλον τρόπον τῶν νῦν ῥηθέντων ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ἐν τῷ γὰρ ἔχειν μὲν μὴ χρῆσθαι δὲ διαφέρουσαν ὁρῶμεν τὴν ἕξιν, ὥστε καὶ ἔχειν πως καὶ μὴ ἔχειν, οἷον τὸν καθεύδοντα καὶ μαινόμενον καὶ οἰνωμένον. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὕτω διατίθενται οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες· θυμοὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι ἀφροδισίων καὶ ἔνια τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιδήλως καὶ τὸ σῶμα μεθιστᾶσιν, ἐνίοις δὲ καὶ μανίας ποιοῦσιν. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ὁμοίως ἔχειν λεκτέον

The first is the τὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ. sc.
All dry food is good for man;
I am a man, &c.
Where we can scarcely go wrong.
The second, τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγματός, sc.
All dry food is good for man;
This is dry food, &c.
In which it is not strange that a man should go wrong. See Metaph. i. 1. p. 2.

11. ἔτι τὸ ἔχειν] Though not apparently, this argument is really distinct from the first. In the first instance the man has knowledge, but *purposely* omits to use it; in this he has knowledge, but unintentionally omits to use it, being carried away from himself and overcome by some masterless passion. These produce the same effect upon the mind as violent commotions on the body. For as a man in great agony fixes his eyes upon various objects yet sees none of them, so great affections of the body may operate on the mental vision, producing the same effect. Though the visual faculty remains, its energies are rendered ineffectual. He undergoes a change as from waking to sleeping; his habits remain, but their energies are locked up.

τοὺς ἀκρατεῖς τούτοις. τὸ δὲ λέγειν τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης οὐδὲν σημεῖον· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι τούτοις ὄντες ἀποδείξεις καὶ ἔπη λέγουσιν Ἐμπεδοκλέους, καὶ οἱ πρῶτον μαθόντες συνείρουσι μὲν τοὺς λόγους, ἴσασι δ' οὔπω· δεῖ γὰρ συμφῦναι, τούτῳ δὲ χρόνου δεῖ· ὥστε καθάπερ τοὺς ὑποκρινομένους, οὕτως ὑποληπτέον λέγειν καὶ τοὺς ἀκρατευομένους. Ἔτι καὶ ὧδε φυσικῶς ἄν τις ἐπιβλέψειε τὴν αἰτίαν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ καθόλου δόξα, ἡ δ' ἑτέρα περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστά ἐστιν, ὧν αἴσθησις ἤδη κυρία·

4. By desire perverting the proper application of the minor to the major.

8. ἔτι καὶ ὧδε] Aristotle proceeds to show in a fourth way how the incontinent may be said to act contrary to knowledge. In all actions a syllogistic process first takes place in the mind, however sudden and imperceptible. The principle upon which we act is the major premiss or the universal, the particular application of it forms the minor (ἡ τελευταία πρότασις), the last proposition, the final step in the process, before we proceed to act. This particular proposition, in all active syllogisms, is a judgment exercised upon some particular object of sense, and the chief cause of action, for without it no action would take place at all. But there is not the same need of the major and universal, for we can act, though not rationally without it, as brutes who have no knowledge of the universal, but only of the particular, of which they retain a certain φαντασία and memory. As the monkey who has burnt its mouth by drinking brandy remembers again when it sees brandy that it has so burnt its mouth, though it forms no universal conclusion, has no knowledge of the principle, that all brandy burns.

To examine then how the incontinent man acts in this particular case contrary to knowledge. Let us suppose, then, that he is aware of this universal principle, that *no sweet thing ought to be tasted*, and also of another, that *every sweet thing is pleasant*, to whichever of these the particular premiss, *this is a sweet thing*, be applied, it will produce a different course of action. But desire or appetite shutting his eyes to the former, applies the particular only to the second of the two, so that he is led away by his knowledge of the universal, in a certain sense, and by this particular: and thus acts both knowingly and contrary to knowledge.

9. φυσικῶς] Hoc loco physice Platonis sententiam refutat. Physice inquam: nam animum hominis hoc loco pertractat penitus, ejusque partes, ratio et cupiditas, quemadmodum in impotente confligant luculenter ostendit. Sic accipiendum puto verbum φυσικῶς, quæ confirmat verbum infra in fin. cap. τὸν φυσιολόγον, quicquid dicant alii. GIPH.

11. ὧν αἴσθησις] Compare Metaph. p. 3. ἔτι δὲ τῶν αἰσθήσεων οὐδεμίαν

ὅταν δὲ μία γένηται ἐξ αὐτῶν, ἀνάγκη τὸ συμπερανθὲν ἔνθα μὲν φάναι τὴν ψυχήν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς πράττειν εὐθύς· οἷον, εἰ παντὸς γλυκέος γεύεσθαι δεῖ, τουτὶ δὲ γλυκὺ ὡς ἕν τι τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον, ἀνάγκη τὸν δυνάμενον καὶ μὴ κωλυόμενον ἅμα τοῦτο καὶ πράττειν. ὅταν οὖν ἡ μὲν καθόλου ἐνῇ κωλύουσα γεύεσθαι, ἡ δέ, ὅτι πᾶν τὸ γλυκὺ ἡδύ, τουτὶ δὲ γλυκύ (αὕτη δὲ ἐνεργεῖ), τύχῃ δ' ἐπιθυμία ἐνοῦσα, ἡ μὲν λέγει φεύγειν τοῦτο, ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία ἄγει· κινεῖν γὰρ ἕκαστον δύναται τῶν μορίων· ὥστε συμβαίνει ὑπὸ λόγου πως καὶ δόξης ἀκρατεύεσθαι, οὐκ ἐναντίας δὲ καθ' αὑτήν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ἐναντία, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ δόξα, τῷ ὀρθῷ λόγῳ· ὥστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὰ θηρία οὐκ ἀκρατῆ, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει τῶν καθόλου ὑπόληψιν, ἀλλὰ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα φαντασίαν καὶ μνήμην. Πῶς δὲ λύεται ἡ ἄγνοια καὶ πάλιν γίνεται ἐπιστήμων ὁ ἀκρατής,

But how this happens is the

ἡγούμεθα εἶναι σοφίαν· καίτοι κυριώταταί γε εἰσιν αὗται τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα γνώσεις, ἀλλ' οὐ λέγουσι τὸ διὰ τί περὶ οὐδενός. οἷον διὰ τί θερμὸν τὸ πῦρ ἀλλὰ μόνον ὅτι θερμόν. See also of this treatise, p. 222. 1.

11. ὑπὸ λόγου πως] εἶπε δὲ τὸ πῶς ἵνα δείξῃ, ὅτι οὐκ ἀμέσως ἀκρατεύεται ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ καθόλου καὶ τῆς μερικῆς δόξης, ἀλλὰ διὰ μέσης τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἡ ἐναντία ποιεῖ τὴν δόξαν τὴν καθόλου καὶ τὴν μερικήν. οὐκ ἐναντία δέ ἐστι καθ' αὑτὸ ἡ δόξα ἡ μερικὴ ἡ λέγουσα, ὅτι τόδε γλυκύ ἐστι, τῷ λόγῳ τῷ καθόλου τῷ λέγοντι, οὐδενὸς γλυκέος ἀπογεύεσθαι δεῖ. ποίαν γὰρ ἐναντιότητα ἔχουσι; γίνονται δὲ ἐναντία κατὰ συμβεβηκός. διότι γὰρ συμβέβηκε τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ συνελθεῖν τῇ μερικῇ δόξῃ καὶ καταναγκάσαι τὴν γεῦσιν γεύσασθαι τοῦδε τοῦ γλυκέος, τούτου χάριν εἰσὶν ἐναντίαι ἡ δόξα ἡ μερικὴ καὶ ἡ καθόλου. ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ἐστὶν ἡ ποιοῦσα ταύτας ἐναντίας. Schol.

17. λύεται ἡ ἄγνοια] Aristotle does not pretend to inquire, how it is that this ignorance is dispersed and the man regains knowledge, which is rather an enquiry for the physiologist than the moral philosopher. Yet that such is the fact is clear from the following instance. For as the musician so long as the vapors of wine affect his brain is unable to exercise his art, but after the dispersion of them energizes according to it; so is it with the

ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ οἰνωμένου καὶ καθεύδοντος καὶ οὐκ ἴδιος τούτου τοῦ πάθους, ὃν δεῖ παρὰ τῶν φυσιολόγων ἀκούειν. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ τελευταία πρότασις δόξα τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ κυρία τῶν πράξεων, ταύτην ἢ οὐκ ἔχει ὁ ἐν τῷ πάθει ὤν, ἢ οὕτως ἔχει ὡς οὐκ ἦν τὸ ἔχειν ἐπίστασθαι ἀλλὰ λέγειν ὥσπερ ὁ οἰνωμένος τὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέους, καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ καθόλου μηδ' ἐπιστημονικὸν ὁμοίως εἶναι δοκεῖν τῷ καθόλου τὸν ἔσχατον ὅρον. καὶ ἔοικεν ὃ ἐζήτει Σωκράτης συμβαίνειν· οὐ γὰρ τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης εἶναι δοκούσης παρούσης γίνεται τὸ πάθος, οὐδ' αὕτη περιέλκεται διὰ τὸ πάθος, ἀλλὰ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ

enquiry of another science.

The sum of the whole: and how we are to interpret the opinion of Socrates on this subject.

incontinent man. He knows that adultery is a vice, but being overcome by violent desires, his intellect is stupified, and he loses the use of his knowledge for the time, and does not regain it until his desires have subsided. But since the particular proposition (ἡ τελευταία πρότασις) is a knowledge of the object of sense, or of the individual (in the Logical use of the word), and this is the ἀρχὴ of actions, and is not scientific, (for individuals are not the subjects of science,) it is not surprising that the incontinent person should transgress by wanting or misusing the knowledge of the minor. For since science is of universals, and not of particulars, whereas actions turn upon particulars and not universals, the ἀκρατὴς does not act contrary to knowledge, properly so called. And in this sense Socrates was correct in saying, that a man cannot act contrary to ἐπιστήμη. And when he acts contrary to ἐπιστήμη, it is not ἐπιστήμη in the correct but the vulgar use of the term; namely, the knowledge of the particular, or that which has sensible things for its object.

9. τὸν ἔσχατον ὅρον] *The particular proposition:* ἡ τελευταία πρότασις.

10. Σωκράτης] See Introd. p. 261. and Plato's Protagoras, p. 352. B. sq. and the whole argument, which deserves to be well considered.

11. τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης] Here Aristotle briefly sums up the argument. If Plato meant to say that the ἀκρατὴς cannot act contrary to knowledge, *actually energizing*, then he is correct. And so also, when he says that the ἀκρατὴς cannot act contrary to knowledge, properly so called. But he may act contrary to knowledge, *not actually energizing*, and contrary to ἐπιστήμη on practical subjects.

12. περιέλκεται] ἀτεχνῶς διανοούμενοι περὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης, ὥσπερ περὶ ἀνδραπόδου, περιελκομένης ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων. Plato's Protag. ib.

εἰδότα καὶ μή, καὶ πῶς εἰδότα ἐνδέχεται ἀκρατεύεσθαι, τοσαῦτα εἰρήσθω.

CHAP. IV.

That the proper object-matter of Intemperance and Incontinence are the pleasures of Touch and Taste.

The second question considered. See p. 270, 3.

ΠΟΤΕΡΟΝ δ' ἐστί τις ἁπλῶς ἀκρατὴς ἢ 6
πάντες κατὰ μέρος, καὶ εἰ ἔστι, περὶ ποῖά ἐστι, λεκτέον ἐφεξῆς. ὅτι μὲν οὖν περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας εἰσὶν οἵ τ' ἐγκρατεῖς καὶ καρτερικοὶ καὶ οἱ ἀκρατεῖς καὶ μαλακοί, φανερόν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα τῶν ποιούντων ἡδονήν, τὰ δ' αἱρετὰ μὲν καθ' αὑτὰ ἔχοντα δ' ὑπερβολήν, ἀναγκαῖα μὲν τὰ σωματικά. λέγω δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τά τε περὶ τὴν τροφὴν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων χρείαν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν σωματικῶν περὶ ἃ τὴν ἀκολασίαν ἔθεμεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην. τὰ δ' ἀναγκαῖα μὲν οὔ, αἱρετὰ δὲ καθ' αὑτά. λέγω δ' οἷον νίκην, τιμήν, πλοῦτον, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων.

Those who are excessive in other than these corporeal pleasures, are called ἀκρατεῖς only from analogy.

Τοὺς μὲν οὖν πρὸς ταῦτα παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον ὑπερβάλλοντας τὸν ἐν αὑτοῖς ἁπλῶς μὲν οὐ λέγομεν ἀκρατεῖς, προστιθέντες δὲ τὸ χρημάτων ἀκρατεῖς καὶ κέρδους καὶ τιμῆς καὶ θυμοῦ, ἁπλῶς δ' οὔ, ὡς ἑτέρους καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητα λεγομένους, ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος ὁ τὰ Ὀλύμπια νενικηκώς· ἐκείνῳ γὰρ ὁ κοινὸς λόγος

22. ὁ κοινὸς λόγος] The common definition, or common noun, *man*. As the man who conquered at Olympia is distinguished from the common noun man by the addition of this epithet, so he who is incontinent on any other

τοῦ ἰδίου μικρῷ διέφερεν, ἀλλ' ὅμως ἕτερος ἦν. σημεῖον δέ· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρασία ψέγεται οὐχ ὡς ἁμαρτία μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς κακία τις, ἢ ἁπλῶς οὖσα ἢ κατά τι μέρος, τούτων δ' οὐθείς. Τῶν δὲ περὶ τὰς σωματικὰς ἀπολαύσεις, περὶ ἃς λέγομεν τὸν σώφρονα καὶ ἀκόλαστον, ὁ μὴ τῷ προαιρεῖσθαι τῶν τε ἡδέων διώκων τὰς ὑπερβολὰς καὶ τῶν λυπηρῶν φεύγων, πείνης καὶ δίψης καὶ ἀλέας καὶ ψύχους καὶ πάντων τῶν περὶ ἁφὴν καὶ γεῦσιν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, ἀκρατὴς λέγεται, οὐ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, ὅτι περὶ τάδε, καθάπερ ὀργῆς, ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς μόνον. σημεῖον δέ· καὶ γὰρ ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται περὶ ταύτας, περὶ ἐκείνων δ' οὐδεμίαν. καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' εἰς ταὐτὸν τὸν ἀκρατῆ καὶ τὸν ἀκόλαστον τίθεμεν καὶ ἐγκρατῆ καὶ σώφρονα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνων οὐδένα, διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς αὐτάς πως ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας εἶναι· οἱ δ' εἰσὶ μὲν περὶ ταὐτά, ἀλλ'

That the incontinent is he who pursues the excess of pleasures, but not from principle. The intemperate from principle.

pleasure is distinguished from the general term incontinent, by the addition of the particular thing in which he is incontinent. See p. 279. 12.

9. περὶ ἁφὴν καὶ γεῦσιν] These habits are conversant with the pleasures of touch more than the pleasures of taste, properly so called, as far as taste is concerned in the distinguishing of flavours. (See iii. 7.) And the fact that intemperance is thus engaged with the pleasures of that sense which is the most common of all others in man, with brutes, is the reason why this vice is of all others the most brutal and degrading. The touch, like the rest of the senses, is given to man and animals for self-preservation; but they contribute much more than this, if it can be said to contribute at all, to the intellectual capacities of man. See Aristot. de Anima iii. 12. §. 6. de Sensu cap. i. ὄσφρησις καὶ ἀκοὴ καὶ ὄψις πᾶσι μὲν τοῖς ἔχουσι, σωτηρίας ἕνεκα ὑπάρχουσιν, ὅπως διώκωσί τε προαισθανόμενα τὴν τροφὴν καὶ τὰ φαῦλα καὶ τὰ φθαρτικὰ φεύγωσι· τοῖς δὲ καὶ φρονήσεως τυγχάνουσι, τοῦ εὖ ἕνεκα, πολλὰς γὰρ εἰσαγγέλλουσι διαφορὰς ἐξ ὧν ἥ τε τῶν νοητῶν ἐγγίνεται φρόνησις καὶ ἡ τῶν πρακτῶν. αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων πρὸς μὲν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα κρείσσων ἡ ὄψις καὶ καθ' αὑτήν, πρὸς δὲ νοῦν καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἡ ἀκοή.

13. ἀκόλαστοι] μαλακοί. Cardwell and Bekker.

οὐχ ὡσαύτως εἰσίν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν προαιροῦνται οἱ δ' οὐ προαιροῦνται. διὸ μᾶλλον ἀκόλαστον ἂν εἴποιμεν, ὅστις μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν ἢ ἠρέμα διώκει τὰς ὑπερβολὰς καὶ φεύγει μετρίας λύπας, ἢ τοῦτον ὅστις διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν σφόδρα· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖνος ποιήσειεν, εἰ προσγένοιτο ἐπιθυμία νεανικὴ καὶ περὶ τὰς τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐνδείας λύπη ἰσχυρά;

They who pursue moderately pleasures, which are either naturally good or indifferent, are not blamed; but they who pursue them immoderately; for even in such pleasures there is a faulty excess.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι τῷ γένει καλῶν καὶ σπουδαίων· (τῶν γὰρ ἡδέων ἔνια φύσει αἱρετά, τὰ δ' ἐναντία τούτων, τὰ δὲ μεταξύ, καθάπερ διείλομεν πρότερον, οἷον χρήματα καὶ κέρδος καὶ νίκη καὶ τιμή)· πρὸς ἅπαντα δὴ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ οὐ τῷ πάσχειν καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ φιλεῖν ψέγονται, ἀλλὰ τῷ πως ὑπερβάλλειν. διὸ ὅσοι μὲν παρὰ τὸν λόγον ἢ κρατοῦνται ἢ διώκουσι τῶν φύσει τι καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν, οἷον οἱ περὶ τιμὴν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ σπουδάζοντες ἢ περὶ τέκνα καὶ γονεῖς· (καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ ἐπαινοῦνται οἱ περὶ

3. ἢ ἠρέμα] For if he pursues vicious pleasures, when those pleasures are but slight, or slight to him, then it is a clear proof that he pursues them not because he is overcome by temptation, but purely from vicious principle. Thus according to the principle which he lays down in his Rhetoric, i. 14: ἀδίκημα δὲ μεῖζον, ὅσῳ ἂν ἀπὸ μείζονος ᾖ ἀδικίας· διὸ καὶ τὰ ἐλάχιστα μέγιστα. Little things, or rather things in themselves of less value, show more distinctly the operation of the principle, the pure love of doing wrong. But when a person has stolen that which is considerable in value, it is impossible to tell whether he has done so from vicious principle, or from being overcome by the force of temptation; whether, in short, he is ἀκόλαστος, or only ἀκρατής. See also p. 286. 6.

13. δέ] δὴ Bekk. et ferri potest δὴ in apodosi. MICH.

15. διὸ ὅσοι] Aspasius subaudit ψέγονται. Alii Muretum secuti, non audacius quam verius, hanc enuntiationem, quum apodosi careat, per anacoluthiam cum §. 8. conjungunt, ita ut apodosis a μοχθηρία μὲν οὖν incipiat. Abit in hanc sententiam Paraphrastes, qui verbis transpositis ex his duabus enuntiationibus unam confecit. MICH.

ταῦτα σπουδάζοντες)· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἔστι τις ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐν τούτοις, εἴ τις ὥσπερ ἡ Νιόβη μάχοιτο καὶ πρὸς τοὺς θεούς, ἢ ὥσπερ Σάτυρος ὁ φιλοπάτωρ ἐπικαλούμενος περὶ τὸν πατέρα· λίαν γὰρ ἐδόκει μωραίνειν. Μοχθηρία μὲν οὖν οὐδεμία περὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ εἰρημένον, ὅτι φύσει τῶν αἱρετῶν ἕκαστόν ἐστι δι' αὑτό, φαῦλαι δὲ καὶ φευκταὶ αὐτῶν εἰσὶν αἱ ὑπερβολαί. ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ ἀκρασία· ἡ γὰρ ἀκρασία οὐ μόνον φευκτὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ψεκτῶν ἐστίν. δι' ὁμοιότητα δὲ τοῦ πάθους προσεπιτιθέντες τὴν ἀκρασίαν περὶ ἑκάστου λέγουσιν, οἷον κακὸν ἰατρὸν καὶ κακὸν ὑποκριτήν, ὃν ἁπλῶς οὐκ ἂν εἴποιεν κακόν. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα, διὰ τὸ μὴ κακίαν εἶναι ἑκάστην αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀνάλογον ὁμοίαν, οὕτω δῆλον ὅτι κἀκεῖ ὑποληπτέον μόνην ἀκρασίαν καὶ ἐγκράτειαν εἶναι ἥτις ἐστὶ περὶ ταὐτὰ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ καὶ τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ, περὶ δὲ θυμὸν καθ' ὁμοιότητα λέγομεν· διὸ καὶ προστιθέντες ἀκρατῆ θυμοῦ ὥσπερ τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους φαμέν.

Though not vice properly so called, and consequently not incontinence: but when this term is used to denote such excess, it has the name of the kind of excess added to it.

CHAP. V.

That brutal or unnatural pleasures are only the object-matter of Incontinence in the metaphorical use of that term.

9 ΕΠΕΙ δ' ἐστὶν ἔνια μὲν ἡδέα φύσει, καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν ἁπλῶς τὰ δὲ κατὰ γένη καὶ ζῴων

Desire of unnatural pleasures

CHAP. V.

Having explained in the last chapter the object-matter of incontinence, in the absolute use of the term (ἀκρασία ἁπλῶς), and in its metaphorical or analogous use (ἀκρασία πως), Aristotle

and its causes.

καὶ ἀνθρώπων, τὰ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν διὰ πηρώσεις τὰ δὲ δι' ἔθη γίνεται, τὰ δὲ διὰ μοχθηρὰς φύσεις, ἔστι καὶ περὶ τούτων ἕκαστα παραπλησίας ἰδεῖν ἕξεις. λέγω δὲ τὰς θηριώδεις, οἷον τὴν ἄνθρωπον ἣν λέγουσι τὰς κυούσας ἀνασχίζουσαν τὰ παιδία κατεσθίειν, ἢ οἵοις χαίρειν φασὶν ἐνίους τῶν ἀπηγριωμένων περὶ τὸν Πόντον, τοὺς μὲν ὠμοῖς τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπων κρέασιν, τοὺς δὲ τὰ παιδία δανείζειν ἀλλήλοις εἰς εὐωχίαν, ἢ τὸ περὶ Φάλαριν λεγόμενον. αὗται μὲν θηριώδεις. αἱ δὲ διά τε νόσους γίνονται καὶ μανίαν ἐνίοις, ὥσπερ ὁ τὴν μητέρα καθιερεύσας καὶ φαγών, καὶ ὁ τοῦ συνδούλου τὸ ἧπαρ. αἱ δὲ νοσημα-

now proceeds to show, that the latter is applicable to other pleasures besides those already mentioned. To this end he more distinctly considers the division of pleasures (mentioned in the last chapter) into natural and unnatural: under the unnatural fall the brutal, the object-matter of that habit (θηριότης) mentioned in the beginning of this book, which Aristotle now, for the first time, identifies with the present investigation. Of this there are three causes, natural depravity (μοχθηρία τῆς φύσεως), habit (ἔθος), disease or mutilation. In the pursuit of these pleasures there is no vice, and consequently no incontinence, inasmuch as he who pursues them is not a voluntary agent, and violates not his deliberate conviction, any more than a madman, or he who shakes under the influence of a palsy. Yet these habits are called incontinent, incontinent therefore from analogy, and under this division they are to be included. See the Table in the Introduction, p. 260.

Pleasures.

- Natural.
  - ἁπλῶς. κατὰ γένη.
  - The object-matter of continence and incontinence (ἁπλῶς), p. 285, 10.
- Unnatural diseased or brutal; i. e. below human nature.
  - 1. διὰ πηρώσεις. 2. δι' ἔθη. 3. διὰ μοχθηρίαν φύσεως.
  - The object-matter of incontinence (πῶς).

1. τὰ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν] sc. ἡδέα φύσει.

τώδεις ἢ ἐξ ἔθους, οἷον τριχῶν τίλσεις καὶ ὀνύχων τρώξεις, ἔτι δ' ἀνθράκων καὶ γῆς, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἡ τῶν ἀφροδισίων τοῖς ἄρρεσιν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ φύσει τοῖς δ' ἐξ ἔθους συμβαίνουσιν, οἷον τοῖς ὑβριζομένοις ἐκ παίδων. ὅσοις μὲν οὖν φύσις αἰτία, τούτους μὲν οὐδεὶς ἂν εἴπειεν ἀκρατεῖς, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰς γυναῖκας, ὅτι οὐκ ὀπυίουσιν ἀλλ' ὀπυίονται· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τοῖς νοσηματωδῶς ἔχουσι δι' ἔθος. Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ἕκαστα τούτων ἔξω τῶν ὅρων ἐστὶ τῆς κακίας, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ θηριότης· τὸ δ' ἔχοντα κρατεῖν ἢ κρατεῖσθαι οὐχ ἡ ἁπλῆ ἀκρασία ἀλλ' ἡ καθ' ὁμοιότητα, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν περὶ τοὺς θυμοὺς ἔχοντα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τοῦ πάθους, ἀκρατῆ δ' οὐ λεκτέον. πᾶσα γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσα καὶ ἀφροσύνη καὶ δειλία καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ χαλεπότης αἱ μὲν θηριώδεις αἱ δὲ νοσηματώδεις εἰσίν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φύσει τοιοῦτος οἷος δεδιέναι πάντα, κἂν ψοφήσῃ μῦς, θηριώδη δειλίαν δειλός, ὁ δὲ τὴν γαλῆν ἐδεδίει διὰ νόσον· καὶ τῶν ἀφρόνων οἱ μὲν ἐκ φύσεως ἀλόγιστοι καὶ μόνον τῇ αἰσθήσει ζῶντες θηριώδεις, ὥσπερ ἔνια γένη τῶν πόρρω βαρβάρων, οἱ δὲ διὰ νόσους, οἷον τὰς ἐπιληπτικάς, ἢ μανίας νοσηματώδεις. τούτων δ' ἔστι μὲν ἔχειν τινὰ ἐνίοτε μόνον, μὴ κρατεῖσθαι δέ, λέγω δὲ οἷον εἰ Φάλαρις κατεῖχεν ἐπιθυμῶν παιδίου φαγεῖν ἢ πρὸς ἀφροδισίων ἄτοπον ἡδονήν· ἔστι δὲ καὶ κρατεῖσθαι, μὴ μόνον

But these can be the object-matter only of incontinence (πῶς).

5. τοῖς ὑβριζομένοις] See p. 283, 6.

25. λέγω δὲ οἷον] *I mean, for instance, if Phalaris had repressed his desire for devouring his child or for extravagant pleasure from venery.* φαγεῖν (*the eating of his child*) is the accusative corresponding to ἡδονήν κατεῖχεν ἐπιθυμῶν φαγεῖν—κατεῖχεν ἐπιθυμῶν ἡδονήν. Unless it be considered a genitive after ἡδονήν in both places.

ἔχειν. ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ μοχθηρία ἡ μὲν κατ' ἄνθρωπον ἁπλῶς λέγεται μοχθηρία, ἡ δὲ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, ὅτι θηριώδης ἢ νοσηματώδης, ἁπλῶς δ' οὔ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἀκρασία ἐστὶν ἡ μὲν θηριώδης ἡ δὲ νοσηματώδης, ἁπλῶς δὲ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀκολασίαν μόνη.

CHAP. VI.

A comparison of Incontinence with Incontinence of anger.

Incontinence of desire worse than incontinence of anger; for anger listens to reason, though negligently, desire not at all.

ΟΤΙ μὲν οὖν ἀκρασία καὶ ἐγκράτειά ἐστι μόνον περὶ ἅπερ ἀκολασία καὶ σωφροσύνη, καὶ ὅτι περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐστὶν ἄλλο εἶδος ἀκρασίας, λεγόμενον κατὰ μεταφορὰν καὶ οὐχ ἁπλῶς, δῆλον· ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἧττον αἰσχρὰ ἀκρασία ἡ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἢ ἡ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, θεωρήσωμεν. ἔοικε γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς ἀκούειν μέν τι τοῦ λόγου, παρακούειν δέ, καθάπερ οἱ ταχεῖς τῶν διακόνων, οἳ πρὶν ἀκοῦσαι πᾶν τὸ λεγόμενον ἐκθέουσιν, εἶτα ἁμαρτάνουσι τῆς προστάξεως, καὶ οἱ κύνες, πρὶν σκέψασθαι εἰ φίλος, ἂν μόνον ψοφήσῃ, ὑλακτοῦσιν· οὕτως ὁ θυμὸς διὰ θερμότητα καὶ ταχυτῆτα τῆς φύσεως ἀκούσας μέν, οὐκ ἐπίταγμα δ' ἀκούσας, ὁρμᾷ πρὸς τὴν τιμωρίαν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ἢ ἡ φαντασία ὅτι ὕβρις ἢ ὀλιγωρία ἐδήλωσεν, ὁ δ' ὥσπερ συλλογισάμενος ὅτι δεῖ τῷ τοιούτῳ πολεμεῖν χαλεπαίνει δὴ εὐθύς· ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία, ἐὰν μόνον

CHAP. VI.

12. θυμὸς ἀκούειν] See Plato's Republic, p. 440. See also p. 199, 10.

εἴπῃ ὅτι ἡδὺ ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ αἴσθησις, ὁρμᾷ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν. ὥσθ' ὁ μὲν θυμὸς ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ λόγῳ πως, ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία οὔ. αἰσχίων οὖν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἀκρατὴς τοῦ λόγου πως ἡττᾶται, ὁ δὲ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ οὐ τοῦ λόγου.

Anger is more natural than desire.

Ἔτι ταῖς φυσικαῖς μᾶλλον συγγνώμη ἀκολουθεῖν ὀρέξεσιν. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαις ταῖς τοιαύταις μᾶλλον ὅσαι κοιναὶ πᾶσι, καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον κοιναί· ὁ δὲ θυμὸς φυσικώτερον καὶ ἡ χαλεπότης τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀπολογούμενος ὅτι τὸν πατέρα τύπτοι. "καὶ γὰρ οὗτος" ἔφη "τὸν ἑαυτοῦ κἀκεῖνος τὸν ἄνωθεν," καὶ τὸ παιδίον δείξας "καὶ οὗτος ἐμὲ" ἔφη, "ὅταν ἀνὴρ γένηται· συγγενὲς γὰρ ἡμῖν." καὶ ὁ ἑλκόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ υἱοῦ παύεσθαι ἐκέλευε πρὸς ταῖς θύραις· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἑλκύσαι τὸν πατέρα μέχρις ἐνταῦθα.

Is not insidious as is desire.

Ἔτι ἀδικώτεροι οἱ ἐπιβουλότεροι. ὁ μὲν οὖν θυμώδης οὐκ ἐπίβουλος, οὐδ' ὁ θυμός, ἀλλὰ φανερός· ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία, καθάπερ τὴν Ἀφροδίτην φασί· "δολοπλόκου γὰρ κυπρογενοῦς·" καὶ τὸν κεστὸν ἱμάντα Ὅμηρος· "πάρφασις, ἥ τ' ἔκλεψε νόον πύκα περ φρονέοντος." ὥστ' εἴπερ ἀδικωτέρα καὶ αἰσχίων ἡ ἀκρασία αὕτη τῆς περὶ τὸν θυμόν ἐστι, καὶ ἁπλῶς ἀκρασία καὶ κακία πως.

Desire is contumelious, anger is not.

Ἔτι οὐδεὶς

1. ὁ λόγος] See note p. 273, 8.

19. ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία] But desire is insidious. Compare Plato de Legibus, p. 863. καὶ μὴν ἡδονήν γε οὐ ταὐτὸν τῷ θυμῷ προσαγορεύομεν, ἐξ ἐναντίας δὲ αὐτῷ φαμὲν ῥώμης δυναστεύουσαν πειθοῖ μετὰ ἀπάτης βιαίου πράττειν ὅ τί περ ἂν αὐτῆς ἡ βούλησις ἐθελήσῃ.

21. Ὅμηρος] Iliad Ξ. 214. 217.

25. κακία πως] προστίθησι δὲ τὸ πῶς, ἵνα δείξῃ ὅτι ὅσον πρὸς τὴν ἀκρασίαν τὴν περὶ τὸν θυμὸν ἔστι τίς ἀκρασία τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἁπλῶς ἀκρασία καὶ κακία καὶ αἰσχροτέρα καὶ ἀδικωτέρα ὑπάρχουσα. ὅσον δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἁπλῶς ἀκρασίαν καὶ κακίαν συγκρινομένη ἡ περὶ τὴν ἐπιθυ-

ὑβρίζει λυπούμενος, ὁ δ' ὀργῇ ποιῶν πᾶς ποιεῖ λυπούμενος, ὁ δ' ὑβρίζων μεθ' ἡδονῆς. εἰ οὖν οἷς ὀργίζεσθαι μάλιστα δίκαιον, ταῦτα ἀδικώτερα, καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία ἡ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐν θυμῷ ὕβρις. ὡς μὲν τοίνυν αἰσχίων ἡ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἀκρασία τῆς περὶ τὸν θυμόν, καὶ ὅτι ἔστιν ἡ ἐγκράτεια καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία περὶ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ἡδονὰς σωματικάς, δῆλον.

The difference of the intemperance from incontinence.

Αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τὰς διαφορὰς ληπτέον. ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴρηται κατ' ἀρχάς, αἱ μὲν ἀνθρωπικαί εἰσι καὶ φυσικαί, καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῷ μεγέθει, αἱ δὲ θηριώδεις, αἱ δὲ διὰ πηρώσεις καὶ νοσήματα. τούτων δὲ περὶ τὰς πρώτας σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀκολασία μόνον ἐστίν· διὸ καὶ τὰ θηρία οὔτε σώφρονα οὔτ' ἀκόλαστα λέγομεν ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ μεταφορὰν καὶ εἴ τινι ὅλως ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο διαφέρει γένος τῶν ζῴων ὕβρει καὶ σιναμωρίᾳ καὶ τῷ παμφάλον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει προαίρεσιν οὐδὲ λογισμόν, ἀλλ' ἐξέστηκε τῆς φύσεως, ὥσπερ οἱ μαινόμενοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἔλαττον δὲ θηριότης κακίας, φοβερώτερον δέ· οὐ γὰρ διέφθαρται τὸ βέλτιστον, ὥσπερ ἐν τῳ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχει. ὅμοιον οὖν ὥσπερ ἄψυχον συμβάλλειν πρὸς ἔμψυχον, πότερον κάκιον· ἀσινεστέρα γὰρ ἡ φαυλότης ἀεὶ ἡ τοῦ μὴ ἔχοντος ἀρχήν, ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἀρχή. παραπλήσιον οὖν τὸ συμβάλλειν ἀδικίαν πρὸς ἄνθρωπον ἄδικον· ἔστι γὰρ ὡς ἑκάτερον κάκιον· μυριοπλάσια γὰρ ἂν κακὰ ποιήσειεν ἄνθρωπος κακὸς θηρίου.

μίαν ἀκρασία μερικὴ ᾖ καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητα λεγομένη οὐδὲ ἁπλῶς κακία ᾖ.

1. ὑβρίζει] ἤτοι μοιχεύει. Schol. See however the Rhetoric, ii. 2.

25. ἀρχή] See p. 232, 248, 9.

CHAP. VII.

Of the difference of Intemperance, Incontinence, Effeminacy, Temperance, Continence, Patience.

Of the difference of these several dispositions from each other.

8 ΠΕΡΙ δὲ τὰς δι' ἀφῆς καὶ γεύσεως ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας καὶ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ φυγάς, περὶ ἃς ἥ τε ἀκολασία καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη διωρίσθη πρότερον, ἔστι μὲν οὕτως ἔχειν ὥστε ἡττᾶσθαι καὶ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ κρείττους, ἔστι δὲ κρατεῖν καὶ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ ἥττους· τούτων δ' ὁ μὲν περὶ ἡδονὰς ἀκρατὴς ὁ δ' ἐγκρατής, ὁ δὲ περὶ λύπας μαλακὸς ὁ δὲ καρτερικός. μεταξὺ δ' ἡ τῶν πλείστων ἕξις, κἂν εἰ ῥέπουσι μᾶλλον πρὸς τὰς χείρους.

The Intemperate;

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἔνιαι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀναγκαῖαί εἰσιν αἱ δ' οὒ καὶ μέχρι τινός, αἱ δ' ὑπερβολαὶ οὔ, οὐδ' αἱ ἐλλείψεις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει καὶ λύπας, ὁ μὲν τὰς ὑπερβολὰς διώκων τῶν ἡδέων ἢ καθ' ὑπερβολὰς ἢ διὰ προαίρεσιν, δι' αὐτὰς καὶ μηδὲν δι' ἕτερον ἀποβαῖνον, ἀκόλαστος· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τοῦτον μὴ εἶναι μεταμελητικόν, ὥστ' ἀνίατος· ὁ γὰρ ἀμεταμέλητος ἀνίατος. ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ὁ ἀντικείμενος, ὁ δὲ μέσος σώφρων. ὁμοίως δὲ

Chap. VII.

1. περὶ δὲ τάς] See the table in the Introduction to this Book.

7. περὶ λύπας μαλακός] Aristotle says that effeminacy rather has pain for its object-matter, not because continence and incontinence are not employed upon the same, but because their nature and effect is more clearly seen in reference to pleasure. Compare Theages de Virtutibus; μαλακία μὲν ἐν τῷ φεύγειν τοὺς πόνους, ἀκρατία δὲ ἐν τῷ νικᾶσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδέων. p. 31. Frag. Pythag.

καὶ ὁ φεύγων τὰς σωματικὰς λύπας μὴ δι' ἧτταν ἀλλὰ διὰ προαίρεσιν. Τῶν δὲ μὴ προαιρουμένων ὁ μὲν ἄγεται διὰ τὴν ἡδονήν, ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ φεύγειν τὴν λύπην τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, ὥστε διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων. παντὶ δ' ἂν δόξειε χείρων εἶναι, εἴ τις μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν ἢ ἠρέμα πράττοι τι αἰσχρόν, ἢ εἰ σφόδρα ἐπιθυμῶν, καὶ εἰ μὴ ὀργιζόμενος τύπτοι ἢ εἰ ὀργιζόμενος· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐποίει ἐν πάθει ὤν; διὸ ὁ ἀκόλαστος χείρων τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς. τῶν δὴ λεχθέντων τὸ μὲν μαλακίας εἶδος μᾶλλον, ὁ δ' ἀκρατής. Ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ μὲν ἀκρατεῖ ὁ ἐγκρατής, τῷ δὲ μαλακῷ ὁ καρτερικός· τὸ μὲν γὰρ καρτερεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ἀντέχειν, ἡ δ' ἐγκράτεια ἐν τῷ κρατεῖν, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἀντέχειν καὶ κρατεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἡττᾶσθαι τοῦ νικᾶν· διὸ καὶ αἱρετώτερον ἐγκράτεια καρτερίας ἐστίν. Ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων πρὸς ἃ οἱ

That he is worse than the incontinent or effeminate.

The difference of the continent from the patient.

The effeminate.

1. ὁ φεύγων] *He who avoids bodily pains not by reason of his being too weak to overcome them, but from deliberate choice, is intemperate.*

2. μὴ προαιρουμένων] ἀπροαιρέτως ἐπὶ τὰ ἡδέα φερομένων. Paraph. ὁ μὲν διὰ τὴν ἡδονήν. sc. the incontinent (ἀκρατής). ὁ δὲ διὰ τὴν λύπην· the effeminate (μαλακός).

6. μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν ἢ ἠρέμα] See p. 278, 3. n.

11. ἀκρατής] ἀκολάστου Bekk. I have not hesitated to adopt in this place the reading of the Paraph. and Aspasius, authorities quite equal to many of Bekker's MSS. It is a great deficiency in Bekker's new edition of Aristotle, that he should have entirely omitted the readings of the early commentators and early printed copies of Aristotle.

13. ἐν τῷ ἀντέχειν] Compare Metopus de Virtute: ὅκκα μὲν τὸ λογιστικὸν μέρος τᾶς ψυχᾶς ἐγκρατῇ τῶ ἀλόγω γίνεται καρτερία καὶ ἐγκράτεια, ὅκκα δὲ τὸ μὲν ἡγῆται τὸ δ' ἕπηται καὶ ἀμφότερα συμφωνῇ ἀλλάλοις τὸ τηνικαῦτα ἀρετά. ἁ μὲν ὦν καρτερία καὶ ἐγκράτεια γίνεται μετὰ λύπας· ἀλλ' ἁ μὲν καρτερία ἐν τῷ ἀντέχειν πόνῳ, ἁ δ' ἐγκράτεια ἐν τῷ ἀντέχειν ἡδονᾷ. ἁ δ' ἀκρατία καὶ μαλακία ἐν τῷ μὴ ἀντέχειν μηδὲ κρατέν· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο συμβαίνει φεύγεν τἀγαθὰ τὼς ἀνθρώπως διὰ λύπαν, ἀποβάλλεν δ' αὐτὰ διὰ ἡδονάν. Frag. Pythag. Ed. Gale, p. 27. Compare also Theages de Virtutibus, p. 30. ibid.

πολλοὶ καὶ ἀντιτείνουσι καὶ δύνανται, οὗτος μαλακὸς καὶ τρυφῶν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ τρυφὴ μαλακία τις ἐστίν· ὃς ἕλκει τὸ ἱμάτιον, ἵνα μὴ πονήσῃ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ αἴρειν λύπην, καὶ μιμούμενος τὸν κάμνοντα οὐκ οἴεται ἄθλιος εἶναι, ἀθλίῳ ὅμοιος ὤν. ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει καὶ περὶ ἐγκράτειαν καὶ ἀκρασίαν· οὐ γὰρ εἴ τις ἰσχυρῶν καὶ ὑπερβαλλουσῶν ἡδονῶν ἡττᾶται ἢ λυπῶν, θαυμαστόν, ἀλλὰ συγγνωμονικόν, εἰ ἀντιτείνων, ὥσπερ ὁ Θεοδέκτου Φιλοκτήτης ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχεως πεπληγμένος ἢ ὁ Καρκίνου ἐν τῇ 'Αλόπῃ Κερκύων, καὶ ὥσπερ οἱ κατέχειν πειρώμενοι τὸν γέλωτα ἀθρόον ἐκκαγχάζουσιν, οἷον συνέπεσε Ξενοφάντῳ, ἀλλ' εἴ τις πρὸς ἃς οἱ πολλοὶ δύνανται ἀντέχειν, τούτων ἡττᾶται καὶ μὴ δύναται ἀντιτείνειν, μὴ διὰ φύσιν τοῦ γένους ἢ διὰ νόσον, οἷον ἐν τοῖς Σκυθῶν βασιλεῦσιν ἡ μαλακία διὰ τὸ γένος, καὶ ὡς τὸ θῆλυ πρὸς τὸ ἄρρεν διέστηκεν. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ παιδιώδης ἀκόλαστος εἶναι, ἔστι δὲ μαλακός· ἡ γὰρ παιδιὰ ἄνεσίς ἐστιν, εἴπερ ἀνάπαυσις· τῶν δὲ πρὸς ταύτην ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ παιδιώδης ἐστίν.

'Ακρασίας δὲ τὸ μὲν προπέτεια τὸ δ' ἀσθένεια· οἱ μὲν γὰρ βουλευσάμενοι οὐκ ἐμμένουσιν οἷς ἐβουλεύσαντο διὰ τὸ πάθος, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ βουλεύσασθαι ἄγονται ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους· ἔνιοι γάρ, ὥσπερ προγαργαλίσαντες οὐ γαργαλίζονται, οὕτω καὶ προαισθόμενοι καὶ προϊδόντες καὶ προε- Division of incontinence.

3. *ἵνα μὴ πονήσῃ*] *That he may not be troubled with the pain of holding it up.* The collocation of the words in this passage is remarkable.

7. *ὑπερβαλλουσῶν ἡδονῶν*] See p. 87, 11.

17. *μαλακία διὰ τὸ γένος*] See Herod. i. 105.

γείραντες ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν οὐχ ἡττῶνται ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους, οὔτ᾽ ἂν ἡδὺ ᾖ οὔτ᾽ ἂν λυπηρόν. μάλιστα δ᾽ οἱ ὀξεῖς καὶ μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν προπετῆ ἀκρασίαν εἰσὶν ἀκρατεῖς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὴν ταχυτῆτα, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὴν σφοδρότητα οὐκ ἀναμένουσι τὸν λόγον, διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθητικοὶ εἶναι τῇ φαντασίᾳ.

CHAP. VIII.

The difference of the Intemperate and Incontinent more explicitly stated.

The intemperate is incurable, the incontinent is not.

ΕΣΤΙ δ᾽ ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, οὐ μεταμελητικός· ἐμμένει γὰρ τῇ προαιρέσει· ὁ δ᾽ ἀκρατὴς μεταμελητικὸς πᾶς. διὸ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἠπορήσαμεν, οὕτω καὶ ἔχει, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μὲν ἀνίατος, ὁ δ᾽ ἰατός· ἔοικε γὰρ ἡ μὲν μοχθηρία τῶν νοσημάτων οἷον ὑδέρῳ καὶ φθίσει, ἡ δ᾽ ἀκρασία τοῖς ἐπιληπτικοῖς· ἡ μὲν γὰρ συνεχής, ἡ δ᾽ οὐ συνεχὴς πονηρία. καὶ ὅλως δ᾽ ἕτερον τὸ γένος ἀκρασίας καὶ κακίας· ἡ μὲν γὰρ κακία λανθάνει, ἡ δ᾽ ἀκρασία οὐ λανθάνει.

Of the incontinent, the hasty are less blameable.

Αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων βελτίους οἱ ἐκστατικοὶ ἢ οἱ τὸν λόγον ἔχοντες μέν, μὴ ἐμμένοντες δέ· ὑπ᾽ ἐλάττονος γὰρ πάθους

CHAP. VIII.

16. ἡ μὲν κακία] *For vice is hid from the view of the vicious, but incontinence is not.* The completely vicious has lived so long in an evil course, and neglected so long the voice of conscience, that it ceases to offer opposition, and he has no light within him to discover whether he is acting right or wrong. But not so the incontinent, who feels and acknowledges that he is doing wrong, and has not yet arrived at the same state of depravity with the former.

17. αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων] Sc. the incontinent.

18 ἐκστατικοί] *The hasty or precipitate.*

ἡττῶνται, καὶ οὐκ ἀπροβούλευτοι ὥσπερ ἄτεροι· ὅμοιος γὰρ ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἐστι τοῖς ταχὺ μεθυσκομένοις καὶ ὑπ' ὀλίγου οἴνου καὶ ἐλάττονος ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοί.

Incontinence is not a vice absolutely but partially.

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν κακία ἡ ἀκρασία οὐκ ἔστι, φανερόν. ἀλλά πῃ ἴσως· τὸ μὲν γὰρ παρὰ προαίρεσιν τὸ δὲ κατὰ προαίρεσίν ἐστιν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὅμοιόν γε κατὰ τὰς πράξεις ὥσπερ τὸ Δημοδόκου εἰς Μιλησίους "Μιλήσιοι ἀξύνετοι μὲν οὐκ εἰσίν, δρῶσι δ' οἷάπερ οἱ ἀξύνετοι." καὶ οἱ ἀκρατεῖς ἄδικοι μὲν οὐκ εἰσίν, ἀδικοῦσι δέ.

Why the intemperate is incurable, the incontinent not.

Ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ διὰ τὸ πεπεῖσθαι διώκειν τὰς καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον σωματικὰς ἡδονάς, ὁ δὲ πέπεισται διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷος διώκειν αὐτάς, ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὖν εὐμετάπειστος, ὁ δ' οὔ· ἡ γὰρ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ μοχθηρία τὴν ἀρχὴν ἡ μὲν φθείρει ἡ δὲ σώζει, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἀρχή, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις· οὔτε δὴ ἐκεῖ ὁ λόγος διδασκαλικὸς τῶν ἀρχῶν οὔτε ἐνταῦθα, ἀλλ' ἀρετὴ ἢ φυσικὴ ἢ ἐθιστὴ τοῦ ὀρθοδοξεῖν περὶ τὴν ἀρχήν.

13. ὁ δὲ] sc. The intemperate.

15. ἡ γὰρ ἀρετή] The intemperate having lost all moral and natural virtue, has with them also lost the power of presenting to himself a good end as the object of pursuit. For as the mathematician does not undertake to prove the first and necessary axioms of his science, and to one who cannot intuitively perceive them, all attempts of proving them would be fruitless and inconsistent; so the incontinent man, who has lost this first principle of morals, can never be recovered by human means. No one can restore to him this moral vision which he has destroyed by his folly and depravity, or enable him to enter into a new course of life, by representing to him (who cannot understand the very first principles of such reasoning) the vice and folly of his conduct.

— μοχθηρία] See p. 231, 5.

18. αἱ ὑποθέσεις] *The axioms and postulates.*

20. ἢ φυσικὴ ἢ ἐθιστή] See p. 254, 15.

σώφρων μὲν οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος, ἀκόλαστος δ' ὁ ἐναντίος. *Recapitulation.* Ἔστι δέ τις διὰ πάθος ἐκστατικὸς παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ὃν ὥστε μὲν μὴ πράττειν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κρατεῖ τὸ πάθος, ὥστε δ' εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἷον πεπεῖσθαι διώκειν ἀνέδην δεῖν τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς οὐ κρατεῖ· οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἀκρατής, βελτίων τοῦ ἀκολάστου, οὐδὲ φαῦλος ἁπλῶς· σώζεται γὰρ τὸ βέλτιστον, ἡ ἀρχή. ἄλλος δ' ἐναντίος, ὁ ἐμμενετικὸς καὶ οὐκ ἐκστατικὸς διά γε τὸ πάθος. φανερὸν δὴ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι ἡ μὲν σπουδαία ἕξις, ἡ δὲ φαύλη.

CHAP. IX.

Whether the Continent is the same as he who adheres to his opinion.

Three ways of viewing this question.

ΠΟΤΕΡΟΝ οὖν ἐγκρατής ἐστιν ὁ ὁποιῳοῦν λόγῳ καὶ ὁποιᾳοῦν προαιρέσει ἐμμένων ἢ ὁ τῇ

Chap. IX.

Aristotle proceeds to discuss the second question proposed, p. 264, 24. whether the incontinent is the same as he who perseveres in his purpose, and the incontinent the same as he who departs from it.

This question he observes may be considered in three ways:

I. Whether you consider the continent to be one who adheres to his purpose whether good or bad, and the incontinent who forsakes it whether good or bad:

II. Whether you consider the continent to be one who persists in a good purpose, and the incontinent to be one who departs from a bad purpose: and III. Whether the absolutely continent be he who persists in a good purpose, the accidentally, he who persists in any; and the incontinent the reverse.

From the first two views of the question an absurdity must obviously result; for if the forsaking of a bad purpose be a virtue, as it evidently is, then from these it would follow that incontinence would in some instances be a virtue, which is ridiculous. According to the third way no such absurdity results; and we infer from it another distinction respecting continence and incontinence, which has not yet been noticed, that there are two kinds of it; one proper the absolute persisting, the other improper the

ὀρθῇ, καὶ ἀκρατὴς δὲ ὁ ὁποιᾳοῦν μὴ ἐμμένων προαιρέσει καὶ ὁποιῳοῦν λόγῳ ἢ ὁ τῷ ψευδεῖ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ προαιρέσει τῇ μὴ ὀρθῇ, ὥσπερ ἠπορήθη πρότερον; ἢ κατὰ μὲν συμβεβηκὸς ὁποιᾳοῦν, καθ' αὑτὸ δὲ τῷ ἀληθεῖ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ ὀρθῇ προαιρέσει ὁ μὲν ἐμμένει ὁ δ' οὐκ ἐμμένει; εἰ γάρ τις τοδὶ διὰ τοδὶ αἱρεῖται ἢ διώκει, καθ' αὑτὸ μὲν τοῦτο διώκει καὶ αἱρεῖται, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ τὸ πρότερον. ἁπλῶς δὲ λέγομεν τὸ καθ' αὑτό, ὥστε ἔστι μὲν ὡς ὁποιᾳοῦν δόξῃ ὁ μὲν ἐμμένει ὁ δ' ἐξίσταται, ἁπλῶς δὲ ὁ τῇ ἀληθεῖ.

Εἰσὶ δέ τινες καὶ ἐμμενετικοὶ τῇ δόξῃ, οὓς καλοῦσιν ἰσχυρογνώμονας, οἷον δύσπειστοι καὶ οὐκ εὐμετάπειστοι· οἳ ὅμοιον μέν τι ἔχουσι τῷ ἐγκρατεῖ, ὥσπερ ὁ ἄσωτος τῷ ἐλευθερίῳ καὶ ὁ θρασὺς τῷ θαρραλέῳ, εἰσὶ δ' ἕτεροι κατὰ πολλά. ὁ μὲν γὰρ διὰ πάθος καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν οὐ μεταβάλλει, ὁ ἐγκρατής, ἐπεὶ εὔπειστος, ὅταν τύχῃ, ἔσται ὁ ἐγκρατής· ὁ δὲ οὐχ ὑπὸ λόγου, ἐπεὶ ἐπιθυμίας γε λαμβάνουσι, καὶ ἄγονται πολλοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν. εἰσὶ δὲ ἰσχυρογνώμονες οἱ ἰδιογνώμονες καὶ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς καὶ οἱ ἄγροικοι, οἱ μὲν ἰδιογνώμονες δι' ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην· χαίρουσι γὰρ νικῶντες, ἐὰν μὴ μεταπείθωνται, καὶ λυποῦνται, ἐὰν ἄκυρα τὰ αὐτῶν ᾖ

The obstinate bear greater resemblance to the incontinent than the continent, both acting under the influence of pleasure.

accidentally persisting, in a good purpose: the first acting from principle, the second from accidental circumstances. The Paraph. has some judicious remarks upon this subject: ὁ μὲν γὰρ τῇ ἀγαθῇ δόξῃ ἐμμένων καὶ τῇ ὀρθῇ προαιρέσει αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αἱρεῖται διότι ἀγαθόν· ὥστε καθ' αὑτὸ ἐγκρατής ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ ἐμμένων τῇ μὴ ὀρθῇ προαιρέσει καὶ τῇ ψευδεῖ δόξῃ, ἐμμένει διὰ τὸ νομίζειν ὅτι ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ὃ αἱρεῖται· νομίζει δέ, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτῷ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τι ἀμυδρὸν ἴχνος, δι' ὃ ἔχεται τῆς μὴ ὀρθῆς προαιρέσεως καὶ τῆς ψευδοῦς δόξης ὡς ὀρθῆς καὶ ἀληθοῦς. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν οὐ δι' ἑαυτὰ αἱρεῖται ἃ αἱρεῖται καὶ οἷς ἐμμένει, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ἀγαθόν, οὐ καθ' αὑτὸ ἐγκρατής ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

ὥσπερ ψηφίσματα· ὥστε μᾶλλον τῷ ἀκρατεῖ ἐοίκασιν ἢ τῷ ἐγκρατεῖ. Εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ τοῖς δόξασιν οὐκ ἐμμένουσιν οὐ δι' ἀκρασίαν, οἷον ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτῃ τῷ Σοφοκλέους ὁ Νεοπτόλεμος. καίτοι δι' ἡδονὴν οὐκ ἐνέμεινεν, ἀλλὰ καλήν· τὸ γὰρ ἀληθεύειν αὐτῷ καλὸν ἦν, ἐπείσθη δ' ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως ψεύδεσθαι. οὐ γὰρ πᾶς ὁ δι' ἡδονήν τι πράττων οὔτ' ἀκόλαστος οὔτε φαῦλος οὔτ' ἀκρατής, ἀλλ' ὁ δι' αἰσχράν.

They who do not abide by a bad resolution are neither incontinent nor vicious.

CHAP. X.

Some concluding remarks for the better understanding of their Habits.

Of the nameless extreme of continence on the side of defect.

ΕΠΕΙ δ' ἐστί τις καὶ τοιοῦτος οἷος ἧττον ἢ δεῖ 11 τοῖς σωματικοῖς χαίρων, καὶ οὐκ ἐμμένων τῷ λόγῳ ἢ τοιοῦτος, τούτου καὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς μέσος ὁ ἐγκρατής· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρατὴς οὐκ ἐμμένει τῷ λόγῳ διὰ τὸ μᾶλλόν τι, οὗτος δὲ διὰ τὸ ἧττόν τι· ὁ δ' ἐγκρατὴς ἐμμένει καὶ οὐδὲ δι' ἕτερον μεταβάλλει. δεῖ δέ, εἴπερ ἡ ἐγκράτεια σπουδαῖον, ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ἐναντίας ἕξεις φαύλας εἶναι, ὥσπερ καὶ φαίνονται· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ τὴν ἑτέραν ἐν ὀλίγοις καὶ ὀλιγάκις εἶναι φανεράν, ὥσπερ ἡ σωφροσύνη τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ δοκεῖ ἐναντίον εἶναι μόνον, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια τῇ ἀκρασίᾳ. Ἐπεὶ δὲ καθ' ὁμοιότητα πολλὰ λέγεται, καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἡ τοῦ σώ-

The relation of continence to temper-

CHAP. X.

10. ἧττον ἢ δεῖ] See p. 124, 1.

15. οὐδὲ δι' ἕτερον] *Neither from one or the other.* Neither from being influenced too much by pleasure as the incontinent, nor too little as the one in the defective habit.

φρονος καθ' ὁμοιότητα ἠκολούθηκεν· ὅ τε γὰρ ἐγκρατὴς οἷος μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν λόγον διὰ τὰς σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς ποιεῖν καὶ ὁ σώφρων, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἔχων ὁ δ' οὐκ ἔχων φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ ἥδεσθαι παρὰ τὸν λόγον, ὁ δ' οἷος ἥδεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄγεσθαι. ὅμοιοι δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς καὶ ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ἕτεροι μὲν ὄντες, ἀμφότεροι δὲ τὰ σωματικὰ ἡδέα διώκουσιν, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν καὶ οἰόμενος δεῖν, ὁ δ' οὐκ οἰόμενος.

ance, and inconti-nence to in-temper-ance.

Οὐδ' ἅμα φρόνιμον καὶ ἀκρατῆ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν· ἅμα γὰρ φρόνιμος καὶ σπουδαῖος τὸ ἦθος δέδεικται ἄν. ἔτι οὐ τῷ εἰδέναι μόνον φρόνιμος ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ πρακτικός· ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς οὐ πρακτικός. τὸν δὲ δεινὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει ἀκρατῆ εἶναι· διὸ καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἐνίοτε φρόνιμοι μὲν εἶναί τινες ἀκρατεῖς δέ, διὰ τὸ τὴν δεινότητα διαφέρειν τῆς φρονήσεως τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸν λόγον ἐγγὺς εἶναι, διαφέρειν δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν. οὐδὲ δὴ ὡς ὁ εἰδὼς καὶ θεωρῶν, ἀλλ' ὡς ὁ καθεύδων ἢ οἰνωμένος. καὶ ἑκὼν μέν (τρόπον γάρ τινα εἰδὼς καὶ ὃ ποιεῖ καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα), πονηρὸς δ' οὔ· ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις ἐπιεικής· ὥσθ' ἡμιπόνηρος. καὶ

That he who is inconti-nent cannot possibly be φρόνιμος. Because the φρόνιμος is given to act (πρακτικός) according to his knowledge. Not so the incontinent.

11. φρόνιμος καὶ σπουδαῖος] See p. 251, 11.

16. διαφέρειν τῆς φρονήσεως] See p. 252, 13.

19. τὸν λόγον] *As to their definition.* Both are habits employed upon means to an end. But in the φρόνιμος the προαίρεσις is always good, proposing only those means which tend to a good end, but in the δεινὸς indifferently.

24. ἡμιπόνηρος] As has already been stated, p. 288. n. Incontinence and continence differ from intemperance and temperance, as imperfect from perfect habits; this will be seen by inspecting the table prefixed to this book. The following passage from the fragments of the Pythagoreans furnishes an excellent comment upon this subject. τὸ ἀξίωμα τοῦ ἤθεος ἁ προαίρεσις σημαίνει.

οὐκ ἄδικος· οὐ γὰρ ἐπίβουλος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐμμενετικὸς οἷς ἂν βουλεύσηται, ὁ δὲ μελαγχολικὸς οὐδὲ βουλευτικὸς ὅλως. καὶ ἔοικε δὴ ὁ ἀκρατὴς πόλει ἣ ψηφίζεται μὲν ἅπαντα τὰ δέοντα καὶ νόμους ἔχει σπουδαίους, χρῆται δὲ οὐδέν, ὥσπερ Ἀναξανδρίδης ἔσκωψεν

ἡ πόλις ἐβούλεθ', ᾗ νόμων οὐδὲν μέλει·

ὁ δὲ πονηρὸς χρωμένῃ μὲν τοῖς νόμοις, πονηροῖς δὲ χρωμένῃ. ἔστι δ' ἀκρασία καὶ ἐγκράτεια περὶ τὸ ὑπερβάλλον τῆς τῶν πολλῶν ἕξεως· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐμμένει μᾶλλον ὁ δ' ἧττον τῆς τῶν πλείστων δυνάμεως.

Some species of incontinence more curable than others.

Εὐϊατοτέρα δὲ τῶν ἀκρασιῶν, ἣν οἱ μελαγχολικοὶ ἀκρατεύονται, τῶν βουλευομένων μὲν μὴ ἐμμενόντων δέ, καὶ οἱ δι' ἐθισμοῦ ἀκρατεῖς τῶν φυσικῶν· ῥᾷον γὰρ ἔθος μετακινῆσαι φύσεως· διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ἔθος χαλεπόν, ὅτι τῇ φύσει ἔοικεν, ὥσπερ καὶ Εὔηνος λέγει

φημὶ πολυχρόνιον μελέτην ἔμεναι, φίλε, καὶ δή
ταύτην ἀνθρώποισι τελευτῶσαν φύσιν εἶναι.

τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἐγκράτεια καὶ τί ἀκρασία καὶ

διὸ καὶ μετὰ τῆς βίας μὲν ἐπικρατέων ὁ λογισμὸς θυμοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἐγκράτειαν καὶ καρτερίαν ἐμποιεῖ. μετὰ βίας δὲ πάλιν ἐκβιασθεὶς αὐτὸς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀλόγων, ἀκρατίαν καὶ μαλακίαν. αἱ δὲ τοιαῦται διαθέσιες τᾶς ψυχᾶς ἡμιτελέες μὲν ἀρεταὶ ἡμιτελέες δὲ κακίαι τυγχάνοντι. ὁ μὲν γὰρ λογισμὸς ὑγιαίνει, τὰ δ' ἄλογα μέρεα τᾶς ψυχᾶς νοσεῖ. καὶ καθὸ μὲν ἄρχεται καὶ ἄγεται ὁ θυμὸς καὶ ἐπιθυμία ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος μέρεος τᾶς ψυχᾶς, ἁ ἐγκράτεια καὶ ἁ καρτερία ἀρεταὶ τυγχάνοντι. καθὸ δὲ μετὰ βίας ἀλλ' οὐχ ἑκουσίως τοῦτο πράσσοντι, κακίαι τυγχάνοντι. δεῖ γὰρ τὰν ἀρετὰν μὴ μετὰ λύπας ἀλλὰ μετὰ ἡδονᾶς τὰ δέοντα πράσσειν. πάλιν δὲ καθὸ μὲν ἐπικρατεῖ ὁ θυμὸς καὶ ἐπιθυμία τῶ λογισμῶ μαλακίαν καὶ ἀκρατίαν ἐπιφέροντα, κακίαι τινὲς τυγχάνοντι· καθὸ δὲ μετὰ λύπας χαρίζονται τοῖς πάθεσιν, εἰδότες ὅτι ἁμαπλακίσκοντι, τῷ ὑγιὲς ἦμεν τὸ ὄμμα τᾶς ψυχᾶς, ταῦτα δὴ οὐ κακίαι. Theages de Virtut. in Fragm. Pythag. p. 33.

τί καρτερία καὶ τί μαλακία, καὶ πῶς ἔχουσιν αἱ ἕξεις αὗται πρὸς ἀλλήλας, εἴρηται.

CHAP. XI.

The different opinions concerning Pleasure, and the grounds upon which they were founded, briefly stated.

12 ΠΕΡΙ δὲ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης θεωρῆσαι τοῦ τὴν πολιτικὴν φιλοσοφοῦντος· οὗτος γὰρ τοῦ τέλους ἀρχιτέκτων, πρὸς ὃ βλέποντες ἕκαστον τὸ μὲν κακὸν τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ἁπλῶς λέγομεν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ αὐτῶν· τήν τε γὰρ ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν τὴν ἠθικὴν περὶ λύπας καὶ ἡδονὰς ἔθεμεν, καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἱ πλεῖστοι μεθ' ἡδονῆς εἶναί φασιν, διὸ καὶ τὸν μακάριον ὠνομάκασιν ἀπὸ τοῦ χαίρειν. Τοῖς μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ εἶναι ἀγαθόν, οὔτε καθ' αὑτὸ οὔτε κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ταὐτὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδονήν· τοῖς δ' ἔνιαι μὲν 2. εἶναι, αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ φαῦλαι. Ἔτι δὲ τούτων 3. τρίτον, εἰ καὶ πᾶσαι ἀγαθόν, ὅμως μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι εἶναι τὸ ἄριστον ἡδονήν. Ὅλως μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἀγαθόν, ὅτι πᾶσα ἡδονὴ γένεσίς ἐστιν εἰς φύσιν

Reasons why the consideration of pleasure is necessary.

Three opinions concerning it.

Reasons in support of the 1st opinion.

CHAP. XI.

5. ἀρχιτέκτων] Compare p. 6, 7.

9. λύπας καὶ ἡδονάς] Compare p. 59, 7.

18. εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή] In his Rhetoric (i. 11.) Aristotle has explained this at greater length: ὑποκείσθω δ' ἡμῖν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησίν τινα τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ κατάστασιν ἀθρόαν καὶ αἰσθητὴν εἰς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν. That is, *a rapid* (ἀθρόαν) *and sensible* (αἰσθητήν) *transition into a state of nature.* Rapid, since otherwise there is no sensible exercise of sensation. Which is the reason why starving people eat greedily, and those benumbed with cold thrust their fingers into the fire; feeling no pleasure if they be fed or warmed

αἰσθητή, οὐδεμία δὲ γένεσις συγγενὴς τοῖς τέλε-
2. σιν, οἷον οὐδεμία οἰκοδόμησις οἰκίᾳ. Ἔτι ὁ
3. σώφρων φεύγει τὰς ἡδονάς. Ἔτι ὁ φρόνιμος
4. τὸ ἄλυπον διώκει, οὐ τὸ ἡδύ. Ἔτι ἐμπόδιον
τῷ φρονεῖν αἱ ἡδοναί, καὶ ὅσῳ μᾶλλον χαίρει,
μᾶλλον, οἷον τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων· οὐδένα γὰρ
5. ἂν δύνασθαι νοῆσαί τι ἐν αὐτῇ. Ἔτι τέχνη
οὐδεμία ἡδονῆς· καίτοι πᾶν ἀγαθὸν τέχνης ἔργον.

slowly and by slight degrees. For the same reason there is no pleasure if the transit be too rapid to be sensible. This definition was apparently derived from the Timæus of Plato, p. 64. τὸ δὲ δὴ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ὧδε δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι. τὸ μὲν παρὰ φύσιν καὶ βίαιον γιγνόμενον ἀθρόον παρ' ἡμῖν πάθος ἀλγεινόν, τὸ δ' εἰς φύσιν ἀπιὸν πάλιν ἀθρόον ἡδύ, τὸ δὲ ἠρέμα καὶ κατὰ σμικρὸν ἀναίσθητον.

1. οὐδεμία γένεσις] This statement of the argument of those who endeavoured to prove that pleasure was not a good because it is a generation, and no generation is congenerous with its end, is somewhat different from that given in the latter part of this treatise, where the subject is more philosophically considered. There it is shown that pleasure is not a good because it is a generation, and every generation is imperfect; here, on the contrary, the reasoning is that all goods are ends, no pleasure is an end but a generation to an end, and therefore no pleasure is a good. See x. 2.

The best comment on this passage is the summary of Plato's reasoning upon this subject given by Olympiodorus in his Scholia to the Philebus: ed. Stallbaum, p. 278. ὅτι συλλογίζεται μὴ εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν οὕτω πως. ἡ ἡδονή, γένεσις· ἡ γένεσις, ἕνεκά του· τὸ ἕνεκά του, ἕτερον τοῦ οὗ ἕνεκα. τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, ἀγαθόν· ἡ ἡδονὴ ἄρα ἕτερον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

That this doctrine though generally attributed to Plato did not originate with him, seems to be indicated by himself in these words: ἆρα περὶ ἡδονῆς οὐκ ἀκηκόαμεν ὡς ἀεὶ γένεσίς ἐστιν, οὐσία δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ παράπαν ἡδονῆς; κομψοὶ γὰρ δή τινες αὖ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐπιχειροῦσι μηνύειν ἡμῖν, οἷς δεῖ χάριν ἔχειν. Philebus, p. 53. Now by the term κομψοὶ Plato means not only philosophers, as Stallbaum has observed, but also what has not been noticed, the Pythagoreans. (See Gorg. p. 493. with the notes of Heindorf and Buttmann.) At all events, it is certain that the notion that pleasure is an ἀναπλήρωσις, from which the other was derived, (see x. 2.) originated with the Pythagoreans. Compare Jamblichus in Vita Pythag. §. 205. περὶ δὲ τῆς ὀνομαζομένης ἐπιθυμίας τοιαῦτα λέγειν ἔφασαν τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐκείνους, τὴν μὲν ἐπιθυμίαν ἐπιφοράν τινα εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ὁρμὴν καὶ ὄρεξιν, ἤτοι πληρώσεώς τινος ἢ παρουσίας τινῶν αἰσθήσεως ἢ διαθέσεως αἰσθητικῆς. γίνεσθαι δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ κενώσεώς τε καὶ ἀπουσίας καὶ τοῦ μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι τινῶν. See Stallbaum's note on the Philebus, p. 34—101.

Ἔτι παιδία καὶ θηρία διώκει τὰς ἡδονάς. Τοῦ δὲ μὴ πάσας σπουδαίας, ὅτι εἰσὶ καὶ αἰσχραὶ καὶ ὀνειδιζόμεναι, καὶ ἔτι βλαβεραί· νοσώδη γὰρ ἔνια τῶν ἡδέων. Ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἄριστον ἡ ἡδονή, ὅτι οὐ τέλος ἀλλὰ γένεσις. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα σχεδὸν ταῦτ' ἐστίν.

In support of the second.

In support of the third.

CHAP. XII.

The inconclusiveness of the arguments, upon which these opinions were founded, exposed.

13 ΟΤΙ δ' οὐ συμβαίνει διὰ ταῦτα μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μηδὲ τὸ ἄριστον, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. πρῶτον μέν, ἐπεὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν διχῶς (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς τὸ δὲ τινί), καὶ αἱ φύσεις καὶ αἱ ἕξεις ἀκολουθήσουσιν, ὥστε καὶ αἱ κινήσεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις, καὶ αἱ φαῦλαι δοκοῦσαι εἶναι αἱ μὲν ἁπλῶς φαῦλαι τινὶ δ' οὒ ἀλλ' αἱρεταὶ τῷδε, ἔνιαι δ' οὐδὲ τῷδε ἀλλὰ ποτὲ καὶ ὀλίγον χρόνον, αἱρεταὶ δ' οὔ· αἱ δ' οὐδ' ἡδοναί, ἀλλὰ φαίνονται, ὅσαι μετὰ λύπης καὶ ἰατρείας ἕνεκεν, οἷον αἱ τῶν καμνόντων. Ἔτι

1. Argument in refutation of the first opinion. That goods are both absolute and relative.

2. Argument. That

Chap. XII.

Aristotle now proceeds to refute the first and third opinions stated in the previous chapter, as well as the arguments used in defence of the second, though not the opinion itself, which he himself adopted, as will be seen hereafter. x. 3.

9. τὸ ἀγαθὸν διχῶς] Aristotle now proceeds to refute the arguments of those who said that pleasure is not a good, because it is a motion and a generation. For as good, he observes, is of two kinds, absolute and relative, so are habits and generations either absolutely and relatively good, or absolutely and relatively evil. So that if generation be an absolute evil, it follows not that it is not a good, for it may be a relative good; or if it be a relative it follows not that it may not be an absolute good. Therefore the argument that pleasure is not a good, because it is a generation, is inconclusive.

pleasures arising from repletion are only accidentally pleasant.

ἐπεὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ μὲν ἐνέργεια τὸ δ' ἕξις, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἱ καθιστᾶσαι εἰς τὴν φυσικὴν ἕξιν ἡδεῖαί εἰσιν. ἔστι δ' ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τῆς ὑπολοίπου ἕξεως καὶ φύσεως, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄνευ λύπης καὶ ἐπιθυμίας εἰσὶν ἡδοναί, οἷον αἱ τοῦ θεωρεῖν ἐνέργειαι, τῆς φύσεως οὐκ ἐνδεοῦς οὔσης. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι οὐ τῷ αὐτῷ χαίρουσιν ἡδεῖ ἀναπληρουμένης τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ καθεστηκυίας, ἀλλὰ καθεστηκυίας μὲν τοῖς ἁπλῶς ἡδέσιν, ἀναπληρουμένης δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις· καὶ γὰρ ὀξέσι καὶ πικροῖς χαίρουσιν, ὧν οὐδὲν οὔτε φύσει ἡδὺ οὔθ' ἁπλῶς ἡδύ. ὥστ' οὐδ' ἡδοναί· ὡς γὰρ τὰ

1. ἐπεὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ] Good is either a habit or an energy: as in virtue or the energies of virtue. Which latter are only good accidentally, and accidentally pleasant as filling up a natural defect, not at all times. For unless pain or defect has preceded them, or when that pain is removed, they are no longer pleasant. Further there are many energies which cause pleasure, and yet cause no repletion, nor are consequent upon any deficiency, such as those of contemplation (αἱ τοῦ θεωρεῖν ἐνέργειαι). Consequently all pleasures are not generations; and therefore as far as this argument is concerned, it does not follow that pleasure is not a good.

Eadem partitione usus est infra, x. 2. καὶ λέγουσι δὲ τὴν λύπην ἔνδειαν εἶναι τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν, τὴν δὲ ἡδονὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν. ταῦτα δὲ σωματικά ἐστι πάθη, . . . ἡ δόξα δ' αὕτη δοκεῖ γεγενῆσθαι ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὴν τροφὴν λυπῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν· ἐνδεεῖς γὰρ γινομένους καὶ προλυπηθέντας ἥδεσθαι τῇ ἀναπληρώσει. τοῦτο δ' οὐ περὶ πάσας συμβαίνει τὰς ἡδονάς. ἄλυποι γάρ εἰσιν αἵ τε μαθηματικαὶ καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ διὰ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως καὶ ἀκροάματα δὲ καὶ ὁράματα· πολλαὶ δὲ καὶ μνῆμαι καὶ ἐλπίδες. Is autem locus, cujus causa hæc attulimus, aperto contra locum aliquem in Philebo dirigitur, ut omnino in tota hac disputatione auctor noster Platonicam rationem refutare sibi proposuit. Plato enim eo loco alterum voluptatum genus perfectum et absolutum, nulla molestia mixtum, agnoscere non videtur, sed voluptatum nomen tantum iis assignat, quæ ex imperfecto et quasi mutilato ad plenum integrum et perfectum habitum nos perducunt. Hæc ejus sunt ipsa verba (Phileb. p. 42.) vel potius Socratis quem loquentem inducit: εἴρηταί που πολλάκις, ὅτι τῆς φύσεως ἑκάστων διαφθειρομένης μὲν συγκρίσεσι καὶ διακρίσεσι καὶ πληρώσεσι καὶ κενώσεσι, καί τισιν αὔξεσι καὶ φθίσεσι, λῦπαί τε καὶ ἀλγηδόνες καὶ ὀδύναι καὶ πάνθ' ὁπόσα τοιαῦτ' ὀνόματ' ἔχει ξυμβαίνει γιγνόμενα . . . εἰς δέ γε τὴν αὑτῶν φύσιν ὅταν καθίστηται, ταύτην αὖ τὴν κατάστασιν ἡδονὴν ἀποδεξόμεθα παρ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν. ZELL.

ἡδέα πρὸς ἄλληλα συνέστηκεν, οὕτω καὶ αἱ ἡδοναὶ αἱ ἀπὸ τούτων. Ἔτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἕτερόν τι

That it does not follow

2. οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἕτερόν τι] This is a refutation of the argument which has been explained at length, p. 296, 1. that the end is different from and better than the generation to it: that good is an end, and pleasure a generation, and therefore pleasure is not a good. Now in many instances the end is the same as the operation (see p. 5, 8.); and secondly, pleasure is an end as well as an operation.

Nunc refutat eam sententiam jam supra propositam, qua voluptates generationes, ortus (γενέσεις) et quasi transitiones in perfectum habitum, adeoque ipsæ imperfectæ et summi boni expertes perhibebantur. Id autem, ut jam significatum est, Platonis erat decretum, quem etsi non nominatum h. l. Aristoteles impugnat. Quapropter non alienum erit, priusquam Aristotelem refellentem audiamus, Platonis de hoc re sententiam cognoscere quam tradidit in Philebo, p. 54. unde potiora transscribam: τὸ μὲν ἕνεκά του τῶν ὄντων ἔστ' ἀεί, τὸ δ' οὗ χάριν ἑκάστοτε τὸ τινὸς ἕνεκα γιγνόμενον ἀεὶ γίγνεται.... δύο δὴ τάδε ἕτερα λάβωμεν .... ἓν μέν τι γένεσιν πάντων, τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν (quod vocabulum respondet Aristotelico ἕξις), ἕτερον ἕν. . . . πότερον οὖν τούτων ἕνεκα ποτέρου; τὴν γένεσιν οὐσίας ἕνεκα φῶμεν, ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι γενέσεως ἕνεκα;—φημὶ δή, . . . ἑκάστην γένεσιν ἄλλην ἄλλης οὐσίας τινὸς ἑκάστης ἕνεκα γίγνεσθαι, ξύμπασαν δὲ γένεσιν οὐσίας ἕνεκα γίγνεσθαι ξυμπάσης.—οὐκοῦν ἡδονή γε, εἴπερ γένεσίς ἐστιν, ἕνεκα τινὸς οὐσίας ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνοιτ' ἄν—τό γε μὴν οὗ ἕνεκα τὸ ἕνεκά του γιγνόμενον ἀεὶ γίγνοιτ' ἂν ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοίρᾳ ἐκεῖνό ἐστι· τὸ δέ τινος ἕνεκα γιγνόμενον εἰς ἄλλην μοῖραν θετέον.—ἆρ' οὖν ἡδονή γε εἴπερ γένεσίς ἐστιν, εἰς ἄλλην ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν αὐτὴν τιθέντες, ὀρθῶς θήσομεν;—οὐκοῦν τῷ μηνύσαντι τῆς ἡδονῆς πέρι, τὸ γένεσιν μέν, οὐσίαν δὲ μηδ' ἡντινοῦν αὐτῆς εἶναι, χάριν δεῖ ἔχειν. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὗτος τῶν φασκόντων ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καταγελᾷ. Cf. etiam imprimis eundem Dialogum, p. 31. Eandem opinionem refutat Aristoteles etiam in Mag. Mor. ii. 7. hunc in modum, ut primum, quod nostro quoque loco fecit, ostendat, esse etiam tales voluptates, in quibus nulla sit ἐνδείας ἀναπληρώσεως, nullaque antecedens molestia, unde ad meliorem perfectumque habitum fiat transitio, adeoque non esse easdem κινήσεις et γενέσεις, ut voluptates e rebus cognoscendis (ἐκ τοῦ θεωρεῖν): deinde aliud novum argumentum addit, quo demonstret, ne illas quidem voluptates, quæ implendis cupiditatibus contineantur et præcedentes habeant molestias, vere γενέσεις dici posse. Hoc autem alterum argumentum his verbis tradit: τὸ δ' ὅλον οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ γένεσις. οὐδὲ γὰρ αὗται αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ φαγεῖν καὶ πιεῖν ἡδοναὶ οὐκ εἰσὶ γενέσεις· ἀλλὰ διαμαρτάνουσιν οἱ ταύτας φάσκοντες τὰς ἡδονὰς εἶναι γενέσεις. οἴονται γὰρ ἐπειδὴ τῆς προσφορᾶς γινομένης γίνεται ἡδονή, διὰ τοῦτο γένεσιν εἶναι· ἔστι δ' οὔ. ἐπειδὴ γάρ ἐστι τῆς ψυχῆς τι μέρος ᾧ ἡδόμεθα ἅμα τῇ προσφορᾷ ὧν ἐσμὲν ἐνδεεῖς, τοῦτο μόριον τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνεργεῖ καὶ κινεῖται· ἡ δὲ κίνησις αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐνέργεια ἐστὶν ἡδονή· διὰ δὲ τὸ ἅμα τῇ προσφορᾷ ἐκεῖνο τὸ μόριον τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνεργεῖν, ἢ διὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ ἐνέργειαν, οἴονται γένεσιν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν, τῷ τὴν προσφορὰν δήλην εἶναι, τὸ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς μόριον ἄδηλον. ὅμοιον οὖν εἴ τις τὸν ἄνθρωπον οἴοιτο εἶναι σῶμα, ὅτι τοῦτο μέν ἐστιν αἰσθητόν, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ οὔ. ZELL.

that pleasure is not an end.

εἶναι βέλτιον τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὥσπερ τινές φασι τὸ τέλος τῆς γενέσεως· οὐ γὰρ γενέσεις εἰσὶν οὐδὲ μετὰ γενέσεως πᾶσαι, ἀλλ' ἐνέργειαι καὶ τέλος· οὐδὲ γινομένων συμβαίνουσιν, ἀλλὰ χρωμένων· καὶ τέλος οὐ πασῶν ἕτερόν τι, ἀλλὰ τῶν εἰς τὴν τελέωσιν ἀγομένων τῆς φύσεως. διὸ καὶ οὐ καλῶς ἔχει τὸ αἰσθητὴν γένεσιν φάναι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λεκτέον ἐνέργειαν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως, ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον. δοκεῖ δὲ γένεσίς τις εἶναι, ὅτι κυρίως ἀγαθόν· τὴν γὰρ ἐνέργειαν γένεσιν οἴονται εἶναι, ἔστι δ' ἕτερον.

Refutation of the 2d opinion. From the accidental evils of pleasure, it does not follow that pleasure is in itself an evil.

Τὸ δ' εἶναι φαύλας ὅτι νοσώδη ἔνια ἡδέα, τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὅτι ὑγιεινὰ ἔνια φαῦλα πρὸς χρηματισμόν. ταύτῃ οὖν φαῦλα ἄμφω, ἀλλ' οὐ φαῦλα κατά γε τοῦτο, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν ποτὲ βλάπτει πρὸς ὑγίειαν, ἐμποδίζει δὲ οὔτε φρονήσει οὔθ' ἕξει οὐδεμιᾷ ἡ ἀφ' ἑκάστης ἡδονή, ἀλλ' αἱ ἀλλότριαι, ἐπεὶ αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ θεωρεῖν καὶ μανθάνειν μᾶλλον ποιήσουσι θεωρεῖν καὶ μανθάνειν.

Refutation of the 5th argument for the first opinion.

Τὸ δὲ τέχνης μὴ εἶναι ἔργον ἡδονὴν μηδεμίαν εὐλόγως

5. *τῶν εἰς τὴν τελέωσιν*] Because their end is the production of a state different from what existed before. Thus medicine produces in the diseased or defective a state of soundness and health which existed not before, and which is distinct from the operation which produces it.

10. *κυρίως ἀγαθόν*] *γένεσις δὲ ἔδοξέ τισιν εἶναι ἡ ἡδονή, ὅτι ᾤοντο τὴν ἡδονὴν εἶναι τὸ κυρίως ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, τὸ δὲ κυρίως ἀγαθὸν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι, ἐνέργειαν δὲ καὶ γένεσιν μηδὲν ἀλλήλων διαφέρειν. τὸ δὲ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτόν ἐστι γένεσις ἐνεργείᾳ· γένεσις μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἐπὶ τὸ εἶναι τῆς ἕξεως· ἐνέργεια δὲ ἥτις ἐστὶ τὸ ἄριστον, ἡ μετὰ τὴν ἀνάληψιν τῆς ἕξεως, κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν τελείαν ἕξιν ἐνέργεια.* Paraph.

17. *αἱ ἀλλότριαι*] See x.

19. *τὸ δὲ τέχνης*] The reason of this objection is given by Aristotle at the very commencement of this treatise. *καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἔργον τέχνης οὐδεμιᾶς διὰ τοῦτο φαῦλον· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν πᾶσα ἐνέργεια φαῦλον ἂν ἦν. οὐδεμία γὰρ ἐνέργεια τέχνης ἐστὶν ἀποτέλεσμα· ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν δύναμιν ἡ τέχνη, ἡ δὲ δύναμις προάγει τὴν ἐνέργειαν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὴν κυβερνητικὴν τέχνη αἰτία*

συμβέβηκεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλης ἐνεργείας οὐδεμιᾶς τέχνη ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τῆς δυνάμεως· καίτοι καὶ ἡ μυρεψικὴ τέχνη καὶ ἡ ὀψοποιητικὴ δοκεῖ ἡδονῆς εἶναι. Τὸ δὲ τὸν σώφρονα φεύγειν καὶ τὸν φρόνιμον διώκειν τὸν ἄλυπον βίον, καὶ τὸ τὰ παιδία καὶ τὰ θηρία διώκειν, τῷ αὐτῷ λύεται πάντα. ἐπεὶ γὰρ εἴρηται πῶς ἀγαθαὶ ἁπλῶς καὶ πῶς οὐκ ἀγαθαὶ πᾶσαι αἱ ἡδοναί, τὰς τοιαύτας τὰ θηρία καὶ τὰ παιδία διώκει, καὶ τὴν τούτων ἀλυπίαν ὁ φρόνιμος, τὰς μετ' ἐπιθυμίας καὶ λύπης καὶ τὰς σωματικάς (τοιαῦται γὰρ αὗται) καὶ τὰς τούτων ὑπερβολάς, καθ' ἃς ὁ ἀκόλαστος ἀκόλαστος. διὸ ὁ σώφρων φεύγει ταύτας, ἐπεὶ εἰσὶν ἡδοναὶ καὶ σώφρονος.

Refutation of the 2. 3. 6. arguments used in support of the same opinion.

CHAP. XIII.

Whether some Pleasure may not be the Chief Good.

14 ΑΛΛΑ μὴν ὅτι καὶ ἡ λύπη κακόν, ὁμολογεῖται, καὶ φευκτόν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς κακόν, ἡ δὲ τῷ πῇ ἐμποδιστική. τῷ δὲ φευκτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον ᾗ φευκτόν τε καὶ κακόν, ἀγαθόν. ἀνάγκη οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι. ὡς γὰρ Σπεύσιππος

That pleasure is a good as being opposed to pain.

ἔστι τοῦ δύνασθαι κυβερνᾶν· τὸ δὲ δύνασθαι κυβερνᾶν αἴτιόν ἐστι τῆς κατὰ τὴν κυβερνητικὴν ἐνεργείας. Schol. See vi. 3.

5. τὸν ἄλυπον βίον] See Plato's Philebus, p. 55.

CHAP. XIII.

17. ἐμποδιστική] Since happiness, as has been shown, is an exercise of the virtuous energies, whatever impedes those energies must be an evil, and whatever removes that impediment must be so far a good. If pleasure then is the opposite of pain and removes it, and pain is an hindrance to our energies, pleasure is in this sense a good.

19. Σπεύσιππος] See x. 2. n.

ἔλυεν, οὐ συμβαίνει ἡ λύσις, ὥσπερ τὸ μεῖζον τῷ ἐλάττονι καὶ τῷ ἴσῳ ἐναντίον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν φαίη ὅπερ κακόν τι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν. Ἄριστόν τ' οὐδὲν κωλύει ἡδονήν τινα εἶναι, εἰ ἔνιαι φαῦλαι ἡδοναί, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἐνίων φαύλων οὐσῶν. ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, εἴπερ ἑκάστης ἕξεώς εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι ἀνεμπόδιστοι, εἴθ' ἡ πασῶν ἐνέργειά ἐστιν εὐδαιμονία εἴτε ἡ τινὸς αὐτῶν, ἂν ᾖ ἀνεμπόδιστος, αἱρετωτάτην εἶναι· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἡδονή. ὥστε εἴη ἄν τις ἡδονὴ τὸ ἄριστον, τῶν πολλῶν ἡδονῶν φαύλων οὐσῶν, εἰ ἔτυχεν, ἁπλῶς. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντες τὸν εὐδαίμονα ἡδὺν οἴονται βίον εἶναι, καὶ ἐμπλέκουσι τὴν ἡδονὴν εἰς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, εὐλόγως· οὐδεμία γὰρ ἐνέργεια τέλειος ἐμποδιζομένη, ἡ δ' εὐδαιμονία τῶν

That since it is an unimpeded energy, it may be the best of all energies: consequently, Happiness.

where this passage is explained at length. Compare Gellius, N. A. ix. 5. Speusippus vetusque omnis Academia voluptatem et dolorem duo mala dicunt esse opposita inter sese, bonum tamen esse quod utriusque medium foret.

5. ἐπιστήμην τινά] ὥσπερ οὐδὲν κωλύει εἶναι τινὰ ἐπιστήμην ἀρίστην ἤτοι τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, ἐπεὶ εἰσὶ τινὲς ἐπιστῆμαι φαῦλαι. ἐπιστήμας ἐνταῦθα καταχρηστικῶς τὰς βαναύσους ἔλαβεν. Schol.

7. ἡ πασῶν ἐνέργεια] If happiness be an unimpeded energy of the soul according to every virtue or the best of them, and if pleasure be an unimpeded energy (ἐνέργεια ἀνεμπόδιστος), (as we have shown where it was said that for the term αἰσθητὴ we ought to use ἀνεμπόδιστος, and for γένεσις, ἐνέργεια, p. 300, 6.) then it follows that some pleasure must be happiness.

Aristotle, however, distinguishes pleasure from happiness, though the greatest pleasure must of necessity follow it. (See x. 3.) But here he seems to take the objector on his own ground, after having corrected his terms, arguing as though pleasure was an unimpeded energy. Whereas in fact, as he afterwards states, it differs from the energy, being necessarily consequent upon it, as the bloom upon the ripeness of the plum. οἰκειότεραι δὲ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αἱ ἐν αὐταῖς ἡδοναὶ τῶν ὀρέξεων· αἱ μὲν γὰρ διωρισμέναι εἰσὶ καὶ τοῖς χρόνοις καὶ τῇ φύσει. αἱ δὲ σύνεγγυς ταῖς ἐνεργείαις καὶ ἀδιόριστοι οὕτως ὥστ' ἔχειν ἀμφισβήτησιν εἰ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἡ ἐνέργεια τῇ ἡδονῇ. οὐ μὴν ἔοικέ γε ἡ ἡδονὴ διάνοια εἶναι οὐδ' αἴσθησις· ἄτοπον γάρ· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ χωρίζεσθαι φαίνεταί τισι ταὐτόν. x. 3.

This difference does not however materially affect the argument.

τελείων· διὸ προσδεῖται ὁ εὐδαίμων τῶν ἐν σώματι ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς καὶ τῆς τύχης, ὅπως μὴ ἐμποδίζηται ταῦτα. οἱ δὲ τὸν τροχιζόμενον καὶ τὸν δυστυχίαις μεγάλαις περιπίπτοντα εὐδαίμονα φάσκοντες εἶναι, ἐὰν ᾖ ἀγαθός, ἢ ἑκόντες ἢ ἄκοντες οὐδὲν λέγουσιν. διὰ δὲ τὸ προσδεῖσθαι τῆς τύχης δοκεῖ τισὶ ταὐτὸν εἶναι ἡ εὐτυχία τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, οὐκ οὖσα, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὴ ὑπερβάλλουσα ἐμπόδιός ἐστιν, καὶ ἴσως οὐκέτι εὐτυχίαν καλεῖν δίκαιον· πρὸς γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὁ ὅρος αὐτῆς. Καὶ τὸ διώκειν δ' ἅπαντα καὶ θηρία

That the fact of plea-

3. ἐμποδίζηται] See p. 39, 22. note.

— τὸν τροχιζόμενον] Falluntur magnopere qui putant hæc Aristotelem dixisse contra Stoicos qui ætate Aristotelis nondum erant; peccarunt igitur inscitia temporum; semina sane extabant earum opinionum quas postea amplexi sunt illi, eruta e variis dissentientibusque inter se disputationibus Socratis. Sæpe autem miratus sum quod M. Cicero dixit in Tuscul. V. §. 9. de Theophrasto: "Vexatur autem ab omnibus, primum in eo libro quem scripsit de Vita beata, in quo multa disputat, quamobrem is qui torqueatur, qui crucietur, beatus esse non possit. In eo etiam putatur dicere, in rotam beatam vitam non escendere." Plane igitur hinc cognoscitur M. Tullium non valde versatum fuisse in lectione horum de Moribus librorum; neque enim oportuisse purgare Theophrastum, quod judicium auctoritatemque sui doctoris et in sententiis ipsis et in verbis secutus esset. VICT.

11. καὶ τὸ διώκειν] See x. 2. n.

— καὶ τὸ διώκειν] Aristotle here observes, that the fact of all animals, both rational and irrational, pursuing pleasure, is to a certain extent an indication of pleasure being the greatest good. That some indeed, from a depraved nature and vicious habits, pursue improper pleasures argues nothing against this inference, nothing against the presumption that abstractedly pleasure is a good. It only shows that such persons follow the wrong means to the attainment of this end. The right perception of pleasure is infinitely influenced by the moral habits, and as these do not exist the same or to the same perfection in all, the perception of pleasure and consequently the pursuit of it will infinitely vary. Some will pursue virtuous some vicious pleasure, but both pursue it as a good, neither as an evil. And this desire for pleasure is divinely implanted in us, and consequently with an intent to be gratified. As much as the organ sight was given us to be exercised. Not that it is intended that we should gratify ourselves in every particular instance, any more than that eyes were given us to be exercised alike on every object to which they can be extended, to such indeed as are destructive of

sure being universally pursued, proves it, in some degree, to be the Chief Good.

καὶ ἀνθρώπους τὴν ἡδονὴν σημεῖόν τι τοῦ εἶναί πως τὸ ἄριστον αὐτήν.

> φήμη δ' οὔ τί γε πάμπαν ἀπόλλυται, ἥν τινα λαοί
> πολλοί . . .

ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ οὔτε φύσις οὔθ' ἕξις ἡ ἀρίστη οὔτ' ἔστιν οὔτε δοκεῖ, οὐδ' ἡδονὴν διώκουσι τὴν αὐτὴν πάντες, ἡδονὴν μέντοι πάντες. ἴσως δὲ καὶ διώκουσιν οὐχ ἣν οἴονται οὐδ' ἣν ἂν φαῖεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτήν· πάντα γὰρ φύσει ἔχει τι θεῖον. Ἀλλ' εἰλήφασι τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος κληρονομίαν αἱ σωματικαὶ ἡδοναὶ διὰ τὸ πλειστάκις τε παραβάλλειν εἰς αὐτὰς καὶ πάντας μετέχειν αὐτῶν· διὰ τὸ μόνας οὖν γνωρίμους εἶναι ταύτας μόνας οἴονται εἶναι.

That if pleasure be not a good, then pain is not an evil, and consequently the happy man might live a life of pain, which is absurd.

φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι, εἰ μὴ ἡδονὴ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια, οὐκ ἔσται ζῆν ἡδέως τὸν εὐδαίμονα· τίνος γὰρ ἕνεκα δέοι ἂν αὐτῆς, εἴπερ μὴ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ λυπηρῶς ἐνδέχεται ζῆν; οὔτε κακὸν γὰρ οὔτ' ἀγαθὸν ἡ λύπη, εἴπερ μηδ' ἡδονή· ὥστε διὰ τί ἂν φεύγοι; οὐδὲ δὴ ἡδίων ὁ βίος ὁ τοῦ σπουδαίου, εἰ μὴ καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι αὐτοῦ.

them. Since, therefore, in the pursuit of pleasure we follow a divine impulse, pleasure is a good. Compare Butler's Analogy, i. 2.

3. *φήμη*] Hesiod. Op. 761.

9. *πάντα γὰρ φύσει*] In eandem sententiam omnibus naturalibus divini quiddam inesse, luculentus locus est Aristotelis alius de Partib. Animal. i. §. 5. p. 481. C. *ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τοῖς φυσικοῖς ἔνεστί τι θαυμαστόν· καὶ καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτος λέγεται πρὸς τοὺς ξένους εἰπεῖν, τοὺς βουλομένους αὐτῷ ἐντυχεῖν, οἳ ἐπειδὴ προσιόντες εἶδον αὐτὸν θερόμενον πρὸς τῷ ἴπνῳ ἔστησαν· ἐκέλευε γὰρ αὐτοὺς εἰσιέναι θαρροῦντας· εἶναι γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα θεούς· οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὴν ζήτησιν περὶ ἑκάστου τῶν ζῴων προσιέναι δεῖ μὴ δυσωπούμενον, ὡς ἐν ἅπασιν ὄντος φυσικοῦ καὶ καλοῦ.* ZELL.

21. *αἱ ἐνέργειαι*] Either pleasure, being an energy, must be good, or the life of the happy man is not pleasant; the latter is false, therefore the former is true.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Bodily Pleasures.

Objection, and its answer.

ΠΕΡΙ δὲ δὴ τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν ἐπισκεπτέον τοῖς λέγουσιν ὅτι ἔνιαί γε ἡδοναὶ αἱρεταὶ σφόδρα, οἷον αἱ καλαί, ἀλλ' οὐχ αἱ σωματικαὶ καὶ περὶ ἃς ὁ ἀκόλαστος. διὰ τί οὖν αἱ ἐναντίαι λῦπαι μοχθηραί; κακῷ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον. ἢ οὕτως ἀγαθαὶ αἱ ἀναγκαῖαι, ὅτι καὶ τὸ μὴ κακὸν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν; ἢ μέχρι του ἀγαθαί; τῶν μὲν

CHAP. XIV.

After having examined and refuted objections respecting pleasure, and shewn in what way it may be considered the chief good, as necessarily emanating from the activity of the noblest energies, he now proceeds to speak concerning bodily pleasures, determining four questions about them.

I. Whether and how far the pleasures of the body may be said to be good.

II. Why the pleasures of the body are more generally desired than those of the mind.

III. Why the pleasures of the mind are superior to those of the body.

IV. Why the same pleasures do not always delight us.

In the beginning of this chapter he meets the following objection. If, as you assert, says the objector, some pleasures are good and eligible, such as those derived from the virtuous energies; but some are bad, such as excessive bodily pleasures, and those in which the intemperate delight; why are the pains, which are contrary to these pleasures, evil and to be avoided, for good is opposed to evil? If therefore, the pleasures of the body are an evil, it follows that those which are contrary to them, bodily pains, are a good.

To this Aristotle replies, that bodily pleasures are not evil, nor yet absolutely good, but good in so far as they are not evil and are necessary.

2dly, That they are good to a certain degree as far as mediocrity is observed in them. As in the case of the habits. Of those habits of which there can be no excess on the side of the good, (as in the case of the intellectual habits,) there can be no excess of the pleasures resulting from the exercise of those habits. The excess only of pleasure, therefore, is censurable; that is, these pleasures are only accidentally censurable and to be avoided. But it is not so with pain; for all pain is an evil and to be avoided, whether it be more or less. That is, pain is not accidentally and in certain circumstances, but absolutely, an evil.

γὰρ ἕξεων καὶ κινήσεων ὅσων μή ἐστι τοῦ βελτίονος ὑπερβολή, οὐδὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς· ὅσων δ' ἐστί, καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐστίν. τῶν δὲ σωματικῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστὶν ὑπερβολή, καὶ ὁ φαῦλος τῷ διώκειν τὴν ὑπερβολήν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰς ἀναγκαίας· πάντες γὰρ χαίρουσί πως καὶ ὄψοις καὶ οἴνοις καὶ ἀφροδισίοις, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς δεῖ. ἐναντίως δ' ἐπὶ τῆς λύπης· οὐ γὰρ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν φεύγει, ἀλλ' ὅλως· οὐ γάρ ἐστι τῇ ὑπερβολῇ λύπη ἐναντία ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ διώκοντι τὴν ὑπερβολήν.

The error in the objection more fully examined.

Ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ μόνον δεῖ τἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ ψεύδους· τοῦτο γὰρ συμβάλλεται πρὸς τὴν πίστιν· ὅταν γὰρ εὔλογον φανῇ τὸ διὰ τί φαίνεται ἀληθὲς οὐκ ὂν ἀληθές, πιστεύειν ποιεῖ τῷ ἀληθεῖ μᾶλλον· ὥστε λεκτέον διὰ τί φαίνονται αἱ σωματικαὶ ἡδοναὶ αἱρετώτεραι. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δὴ ὅτι ἐκκρούει τὴν λύπην· καὶ διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῆς λύπης, ὡς οὔσης ἰατρείας, τὴν ἡδονὴν διώκουσι τὴν ὑπερβάλλουσαν καὶ ὅλως τὴν σωματικήν. σφοδραὶ δὲ γίνονται αἱ ἰατρεῖαι, διὸ καὶ διώκονται, διὰ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίον φαίνεσθαι.

ii. Question. That such pleasures are not good, as having a necessary

Καὶ οὐ σπουδαῖον δὴ δοκεῖ ἡ ἡδονὴ διὰ δύο ταῦτα, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὅτι αἱ μὲν φαύλης φύσεώς εἰσι πράξεις, ἢ ἐκ γενετῆς, ὥσπερ θηρίου, ἢ δι' ἔθος, οἷον αἱ τῶν φαύλων

4. καὶ ὁ φαῦλος] Compare p. 60.

20. σφοδραί] Because the opposition to the previous state of pain is greater and more sensible. See the note p. 295, 18.

21. παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίον] Præpositio παρὰ hic valet *juxta, ad, in comparatione*, hoc sensu: voluptates medicinæ dolorum eo vehementius appetuntur, quia non solæ nec per se sentiuntur, sed compositæ cum ipsis doloribus sibi contrariis, quo fit, ut eo clarius appareant animosque vehementius moveant. ZELL.

23. εἴρηται] See p. 280.

ἀνθρώπων. αἱ δ' ἰατρεῖαι, ὅτι ἐνδεοῦς, καὶ ἔχειν βέλτιον ἢ γίνεσθαι. αἱ δὲ συμβαίνουσι τελεουμένων· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὖν σπουδαῖαι. ἔτι διώκονται διὰ τὸ σφοδραὶ εἶναι ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλαις μὴ δυναμένων χαίρειν· αὐτοὶ γοῦν αὑτοῖς δίψας τινας παρασκευάζουσιν. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἀβλαβεῖς, ἀνεπιτίμητον, ὅταν δὲ βλαβεράς, φαῦλον· οὔτε γὰρ ἔχουσιν ἕτερα ἐφ' οἷς χαίρουσιν, τό τε μηδέτερον πολλοῖς λυπηρὸν διὰ τὴν φύσιν· ἀεὶ γὰρ πονεῖ τὸ ζῷον, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ φυσικοὶ λόγοι μαρτυροῦσι, τὸ ὁρᾶν καὶ τὸ ἀκούειν φάσκοντες εἶναι λυπηρόν· ἀλλ' ἤδη συνήθεις ἐσμέν, ὥς φασίν. ὁμοίως δ' ἐν μὲν τῇ νεότητι διὰ τὴν αὔξησιν ὥσπερ οἱ οἰνωμένοι διάκεινται, καὶ ἡδὺ ἡ νεότης· οἱ δὲ μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν φύσιν ἀεὶ δέονται ἰατρείας· καὶ γὰρ τὸ σῶμα δακνόμενον διατελεῖ διὰ τὴν κρᾶσιν, καὶ ἀεὶ ἐν ὀρέξει σφοδρᾷ εἰσίν. ἐξελαύνει δὲ ἡδονὴ λύπην ἥ τ' ἐναντία καὶ ἡ τυχοῦσα, ἐὰν ᾖ ἰσχυρά· καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἀκόλαστοι καὶ φαῦλοι

admixture of pain. The more violent the pain, the more extravagant is the pleasure which is sought to remedy it.

1. ἔχειν βέλτιον] *It is better to have than to acquire*: it is better never to be hungry nor to want, than to be satisfied and filled.

8. τό τε μηδέτερον] *The state of neutrality.*

13. αὔξησιν] The αὔξησις of youth produces in them a natural ἐνδεία, which, besides their natural predisposition that way, makes them more intent on gratification. As the drunkard, the more he drinks the more he thirsts, the more does he lose the natural advantage of resisting drinking, nature cooperating, by producing an ἐνδεία, with his predilection, in causing him to drink more; the natural punishment of all self-indulgence.

18. τυχοῦσα] Thus our old proverb; "exceeding sorrow is exceeding dry." Men in great grief drown their sorrows by drinking, although drinking is not the opposite of their sorrow. And thus in other instances, anger or revenge is mitigated in their breasts, though they do not meet with the peculiar pleasure which they seek, but with the gratification of some other passion, such as malice, or the like. See the exquisite chapter in the Rhetoric, ii. 3.

Pleasures without pain do not admit of excess, and such are the natural pleasures, as those of contemplation.

γίνονται. Αἱ δ' ἄνευ λυπῶν οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὑπερβολήν. αὗται δὲ αἱ τῶν φύσει ἡδέων καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. λέγω δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἡδέα τὰ ἰατρεύοντα· ὅτι γὰρ συμβαίνει ἰατρεύεσθαι τοῦ ὑπομένοντος ὑγιοῦς πράττοντός τι, διὰ τοῦτο ἡδὺ δοκεῖ εἶναι· φύσει δ' ἡδέα, ἃ ποιεῖ πρᾶξιν τῆς τοιᾶσδε φύσεως. οὐκ ἀεὶ δ' οὐθὲν ἡδὺ τὸ αὐτὸ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἁπλῆν ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, ἀλλ' ἐνεῖναί τι καὶ ἕτερον, καθὸ φθαρτά, ὥστε ἄν, τι θάτερον πράττῃ, τοῦτο τῇ ἑτέρᾳ φύσει παρὰ φύσιν, ὅταν δ' ἰσάζῃ, οὔτε λυπηρὸν δοκεῖ οὔθ' ἡδὺ τὸ πραττόμενον· ἐπεὶ εἴ του ἡ φύσις ἁπλῆ εἴη, ἀεὶ ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις ἡδίστη ἔσται. διὸ ὁ θεὸς ἀεὶ μίαν καὶ ἁπλῆν χαίρει ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον

4. τοῦ ὑπομένοντος ὑγιοῦς] Non sine fructu medicus fuerat Aristoteles, cum dicat in ægro quidquid sanum atque integrum subest operari ut valetudo redeat; et moritur animal, si sanæ parti non satis virium est, ut ægritudinem atque adeo medicamentum superet. MICH.

8. ἁπλῆν] The energies of man are as various as there are different habits of the soul and of the body. But upon the exercise of these habits follows its own peculiar pleasure. Consequently our nature not being simple and uniform (ἁπλῆν, simplex dumtaxat et unum), neither can our pleasures be. And further, as the nature of the soul is so very different from that of the body, that which is naturally pleasant to the one will not be so to the other. But when equality takes place (see p. 222.) so that an undue influence be not given to either, then the energy of the soul (τὸ πραττόμενον) is neither pleasant nor painful to the body. Not pleasant, as not being *sensible*, not painful because the equality before mentioned is observed. ἐπόταν δὲ διὰ τῆς περὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν μελέτης τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ σῶμα ἀκολουθήσῃ, τηνικαῦτα εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἥδεται ἡ ψυχὴ οὐχ ἥδεται μὲν τὸ σῶμα καθότι οὐκ εἰσὶν αἰσθητά, οὐκ ἀλγεῖ δέ. Paraph.

13. θεὸς—ἁπλῆν] God having a single and uniform nature, has only a single and uniform energy, consequently a single and uniform pleasure. Not that God is in motion, or requires motion for his energies; ("Behold, I *sit* upon my throne, creating all things new"); for it is wrong to suppose there can be no energy without motion. (See Phys. Ausc. iii. 1. sq.) For there is energy without motion, for motion requires both time and space. And further, every energy proceeding from the perfect habit, and especially from the most perfect habits; (see x.

κινήσεώς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκινησίας, καὶ ἡδονὴ μᾶλλον ἐν ἠρεμίᾳ ἐστὶν ἢ ἐν κινήσει. μεταβολὴ δὲ πάντων γλυκύτατον, κατὰ τὸν ποιητήν, διὰ πονηρίαν τινά· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος εὐμετάβολος ὁ πονηρός, καὶ ἡ φύσις ἡ δεομένη μεταβολῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἁπλῆ οὐδ᾽ ἐπιεικής.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐγκρατείας καὶ ἀκρασίας καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης εἴρηται, καὶ τί ἕκαστον καὶ πῶς τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ αὐτῶν ἐστὶ τὰ δὲ κακά· λοιπὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ φιλίας ἐροῦμεν. Conclusion.

3.) more resemble rest than motion, and so consequently will the pleasure resulting from them. But it may be said, if change is the sweetest of all things, and God changes not, how can he enjoy the greatest pleasure? To which Aristotle replies, that change is only accidentally the most pleasant of all things, only inasmuch as we are imperfect beings.

3. ποιητήν] Euripid. Orest. 234.

5. ἡ φύσις ἡ δεομένη μεταβολῆς] Compare the Rhetoric i. 11. καὶ τὸ μεταβάλλειν ἡδύ· εἰς φύσιν γὰρ γίγνεται μεταβάλλειν· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ ὑπερβολὴν ποιεῖ τῆς καθεστώσης ἕξεως. ὅθεν εἴρηται, μεταβολὴ πάντων γλυκύ.

A state of excess is a state contrary to nature; for nature aims at the mean, the state of perfection, the natural being the perfect state. (See p. 68, 8.) But a continuance in the same thing produces an excess of it, and consequently a change from it, diminishing that excess, restores us to a state of nature; and therefore, change is pleasant.

I cannot help observing by the way, that if Aristotle's theory be correct, (εὐμετάβολος ὁ πονηρός,) and there can be no doubt that it is, this observation furnishes another solution, which I do not remember to have been observed, why the wicked man is upon inferior ground, ceteris paribus, with the good man, even for the mere acquisition of wisdom and literary eminence. This proneness to change in the immoral man is not merely the result of an uneasy conscience, but also of a physical deterioration produced by his evil habits; for over and above the natural uneasiness and restlessness of guilt, (see ix. 4.) it would seem that immorality itself, besides its influence on the moral feelings, not only increased our natural deficiencies, but produced certain deteriorating effects upon our other faculties not directly moral, of which (from experience) we clearly perceive the effect, but cannot trace the cause. As Eve's moral guilt produced a physical change in the universe.

So saying, her rash hand in evil hour
Forth reaching to the fruit, she plucked, she eat!
Earth felt the wound; and Nature from her seat,
Sighing through all her works, gave signs of woe.

Paradise Lost, ix.

INTRODUCTION TO BOOK VIII.

In the fourth chapter of the Tenth Book, Aristotle distinguishes the whole of this treatise into four principal divisions. First, into Happiness, which is the end of all Moral Philosophy; secondly, Virtue, which is the efficient cause of Happiness; thirdly, into Pleasure, which is inseparably united with it; fourthly, into Friendship, which, although not a virtue itself, is closely allied to Virtue, and is especially necessary to a life of Happiness. The first book is devoted to the consideration of the first division; the second, third, fourth, and fifth, to the investigation of Moral, as the sixth to that of Intellectual Virtue; the seventh to that of Pleasure. This, then, and the ninth book, are reserved for the discussion of the fourth division; and in pursuing this subject, Aristotle follows the same method which he has observed throughout this treatise; first, investigating the definition of Friendship, then dividing it into its separate species; thirdly, comparing those species with each other, and examining what are their peculiarities, and what are natural to different forms of government; and, lastly, the causes of its decay and destruction.

To us, indeed, who are not accustomed to regard Friendship as of so much weight in a system of Morals, Aristotle may seem to have given an undue importance to this part of his subject. Not so to the Greeks. They had been accustomed to see the friendships of individuals, and the ἑταιρεῖαι which existed in different forms among them, as the organs not only of great political changes and revulsions in the state, but as influencing the minds and morals of the people to an almost inconceivable

extent. The same influence which the press exerts among us, did these political and individual unions amongst them. To make them therefore serviceable to the state, and to promote its objects, seems early to have attracted the attention not only of politicians, but also of philosophers. Hence discussions upon this subject form a very prominent part in the Socratic dialogues and in the political investigations of Plato. We see Socrates eminently trusting to such an instrument for furthering those moral views of which he was the strenuous advocate; drawing around himself as a centre those congenial tempers, whose minds were framed not only for receiving the precepts he wished to convey, but also for uniting with himself and each other in the firmest bonds of friendship, and thus carrying his principles out into action with greater efficiency.

The political character of all moral philosophy among the Greeks, the subserviency of individual to public good, the direction of their energies to the one great end of the state, the desire of promoting this to the greatest extent by making the end of each identical with the end of all, the necessity of individual esteem to furnish motives for virtue and goodness which a diviner teaching supplies to us, indicate the reason, why so great a political engine as Friendship, arising, no doubt, originally from the defective education of the female classes amongst the Greeks, and supplying the deficiencies of domestic sympathies and domestic friendships, occupies so much the attention of philosophers.

Indeed, though so considerable a portion of this work is devoted to this subject, the reader must still have recourse to the Politics to see it entirely developed and applied in all its bearings.

ARISTOTELIS

ETHICA NICOMACHEA.

LIB. VII.

CHAP. I.

Of Friendship—its use both publicly and privately—and why the consideration of it is proper for a Moral Philosopher.

The connexion of Friendship with Virtue, and its necessity to different states and ages.

ΜΕΤΑ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ φιλίας ἕποιτ' ἂν διελθεῖν· ἔστι γὰρ ἀρετή τις ἢ μετ' ἀρετῆς, ἔτι δ' ἀναγκαιότατον εἰς τὸν βίον· ἄνευ γὰρ φίλων οὐδεὶς ἕλοιτ' ἂν ζῆν, ἔχων τὰ λοιπὰ ἀγαθὰ πάντα· καὶ γὰρ πλουτοῦσι καὶ ἀρχὰς καὶ δυναστείας κεκτημένοις δοκεῖ φίλων μάλιστ' εἶναι χρεία· τί γὰρ ὄφελος τῆς τοιαύτης εὐετηρίας ἀφαιρεθείσης εὐεργεσίας, ἣ γίγνεται μάλιστα καὶ ἐπαινετωτάτη πρὸς φίλους; ἢ πῶς ἂν τηρηθείη καὶ σῴζοιτ' ἄνευ φίλων; ὅσῳ γὰρ πλείων, τοσούτῳ ἐπισφαλεστέρα. ἐν πενίᾳ τε καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς δυστυχίαις μόνην οἴονται καταφυγὴν εἶναι τοὺς φίλους. καὶ νέοις δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἀναμάρτητον καὶ πρεσβυτέροις πρὸς θεραπείαν

2. ἀρετή τις] Amicitia autem est quædam virtus, in quantum scilicet est habitus electionis ut infra dicetur, et reducitur ad genus justitiæ in quantum exhibet proportionale ut infra dicetur; vel saltem est cum virtute in quantum scilicet virtus est causa veræ amicitiæ. Aquin.

καὶ τὸ ἐλλεῖπον τῆς πράξεως δι' ἀσθένειαν βοηθεῖ, τοῖς τ' ἐν ἀκμῇ πρὸς τὰς καλὰς πράξεις· "σύν τε δύ' ἐρχομένω·" καὶ γὰρ νοῆσαι καὶ πρᾶξαι δυνατώτεροι.

That it is to a degree implanted in us by nature.

Φύσει τ' ἐνυπάρχειν ἔοικε πρὸς τὸ γεγεννημένον τῷ γεννήσαντι καὶ πρὸς τὸ γεννῆσαν τῷ γεννηθέντι, οὐ μόνον ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ὄρνισι καὶ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν ζῴων, καὶ τοῖς ὁμοεθνέσι πρὸς ἄλληλα, καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὅθεν τοὺς φιλανθρώπους ἐπαινοῦμεν. ἴδοι δ' ἄν τις καὶ ἐν ταῖς πλάναις ὡς οἰκεῖον ἅπας ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ φίλον.

Preserving states, and doing away with the necessity of justice, and being otherwise commendable.

Ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὰς πόλεις συνέχειν ἡ φιλία, καὶ οἱ νομοθέται μᾶλλον περὶ αὐτὴν σπουδάζειν ἢ τὴν δικαιοσύνην· ἡ γὰρ ὁμόνοια ὅμοιόν τι τῇ φιλίᾳ ἔοικεν εἶναι, ταύτης δὲ μάλιστ' ἐφίενται καὶ τὴν στάσιν ἔχθραν οὖσαν μάλιστα ἐξελαύνουσιν. Καὶ φίλων μὲν ὄντων οὐδὲν δεῖ δικαιοσύνης, δίκαιοι δ' ὄντες προσδέονται φιλίας, καὶ τῶν δικαίων τὸ μάλιστα φιλικὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ. οὐ μόνον δ' ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν ἀλλὰ καὶ καλόν· τοὺς γὰρ φιλοφίλους ἐπαινοῦμεν, ἥ τε πολυφιλία δοκεῖ τῶν καλῶν ἕν τι εἶναι, καὶ ἔνιοι τοὺς αὐτοὺς οἴονται ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι καὶ φίλους.

2. *σύν τε δύ'*] See Homer's Il. K. 224.

12. *ἔοικε δὲ καί*] See Polit. ii. 1.

— *πόλεις συνέχειν*] Compare Plato's Gorgias, p. 507. E. *φασὶ δ' οἱ σοφοί, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, καὶ οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν καὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους τὴν κοινωνίαν συνέχειν καὶ φιλίαν καὶ κοσμιότητα καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιότητα.*

19. *τὸ μάλιστα*] *The highest of the δίκαια appear to belong to friendship.* See chap. vi. p. 327. sq.

23. *ἀγαθοὺς καὶ φίλους*] See ix. 4.

CHAP. II.

Some doubts stated respecting its nature and its origin.

2 ΔΙΑΜΦΙΣΒΗΤΕΙΤΑΙ δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐκ ὀλίγα. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὁμοιότητά τινα τιθέασιν αὐτὴν καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους φίλους, ὅθεν τὸν ὅμοιόν φασιν ὡς τὸν ὅμοιον, καὶ κολοιὸν ποτὶ κολοιόν, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· οἱ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας κεραμεῖς πάντας τοὺς τοιούτους ἀλλήλοις φασὶν εἶναι.

That some think it to be a similarity, others not.

Καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων ἀνώτερον ἐπιζητοῦσι καὶ φυσικώτερον, Εὐριπίδης μὲν φάσκων ἐρᾶν μὲν ὄμβρου γαῖαν ξηρανθεῖσαν, ἐρᾶν δὲ σεμνὸν οὐρανὸν πληρούμενον ὄμβρου πεσεῖν ἐς γαῖαν, καὶ Ἡράκλειτος τὸ ἀντίξουν συμφέρον καὶ ἐκ τῶν διαφερόντων καλλίστην ἁρμονίαν καὶ πάντα κατ' ἔριν γίνεσθαι· ἐξ ἐναντίας δὲ τούτοις ἄλλοι τε καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς· τὸ γὰρ ὅμοιον τοῦ ὁμοίου ἐφίεσθαι.

Some again sought for the reason of it in nature.

Τὰ μὲν οὖν φυσικὰ τῶν ἀπορημάτων ἀφείσθω (οὐ γὰρ οἰκεῖα τῆς παρούσης σκέψεως)· ὅσα δ' ἐστὶν ἀνθρωπικὰ καὶ ἀνήκει εἰς τὰ ἤθη καὶ τὰ πάθη, ταῦτ' ἐπισκεψώμεθα, οἷον πότερον ἐν πᾶσι γίνεται φιλία ἢ οὐχ οἷόν τε μοχθηροὺς ὄντας φίλους εἶναι, καὶ πότερον

But such a consideration is dismissed, as not being proper to this treatise.

CHAP. II.

2. οἱ μὲν γάρ] Platonem intelligere videtur in Lyside ita statuentem. Vid. ibid. §. 25. p. 30. ed. Heind. ZELL.

4. τὸν ὅμοιον] Cf. Hom. Odys. P. 218. ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὅμοιον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὅμοιον.

5. κεραμεῖς] See the Rhetoric, ii. 4.

8. Εὐριπίδης] See Euripides, vol. ii. p. 972. Ed. Oxon. 1833.

11. Ἡράκλειτος] Diog. Laert. ix. 7. Menag. See Plato's Sympos. p. 187.

ἓν εἶδος τῆς φιλίας ἐστὶν ἢ πλείω. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἓν οἰόμενοι, ὅτι ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον, οὐχ ἱκανῷ πεπιστεύκασι σημείῳ· δέχεται γὰρ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον καὶ τὰ ἕτερα τῷ εἴδει. εἴρηται δ' ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἔμπροσθεν.

CHAP. III.

The definition of Friendship investigated generally.

The object of friendship investigated, which is threefold;

ΤΑΧΑ δ' ἂν γένοιτο περὶ αὐτῶν φανερὸν γνωρισθέντος τοῦ φιλητοῦ· δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐ πᾶν φιλεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ τὸ φιλητόν, τοῦτο δ' εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδὺ ἢ χρήσιμον. δόξειε δ' ἂν χρήσιμον εἶναι δι' οὗ γίνεται ἀγαθόν τι ἢ ἡδονή, ὥστε φιλητὰ ἂν εἴη τἀγαθόν τε καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς τέλη. πότερον οὖν τἀγαθὸν φιλοῦσιν ἢ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθόν; διαφωνεῖ γὰρ ἐνίοτε ταῦτα. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ. δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ αὑτῷ ἀγαθὸν φιλεῖν ἕκαστος,

2. ἓν οἰόμενοι] Some considered it a sufficient proof that friendship was not equivocal from its admitting of more and less; for things which admit of more and less, are under the same genus and univocal. Aristotle replies that this proof is not valid; for things which differ in species admit of more and less; as substance (*οὐσία*) and accident (*συμβεβηκός*), differing in species, admit of more and less; for accident is less substantial (*ὄντα*) than substance. That is to say, some persons imagined that because friendship differed in quantity, as, for instance, the friendship of the bad is less than that of the good, that friendship therefore could not differ in quality or species: whereas Aristotle shows that difference in quantity will constitute different species, as in the instance above given.

4. τὰ ἕτερα τῷ εἴδει] *Things different in species.*

5. ἔμπροσθεν] *εἴρηται δέ φησι περὶ αὐτῶν ἔμπροσθεν, ἔοικε δὲ εἰρῆσθαι ἐν τοῖς ἐκπεπτωκόσι τῶν Νικομαχείων.* Schol.

CHAP. III.

12. τἀγαθὸν φιλοῦσιν] See iii. 4.

14. ἡδύ] See p. 308.

καὶ εἶναι ἁπλῶς μὲν τἀγαθὸν φιλητόν, ἑκάστῳ δὲ τὸ ἑκάστῳ. φιλεῖ δ' ἕκαστος οὐ τὸ ὂν αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον. διοίσει δ' οὐδέν· ἔσται γὰρ τὸ φιλητὸν φαινόμενον. Τριῶν δ' ὄντων δι' ἃ φιλοῦσιν, ἐπὶ μὲν τῇ τῶν ἀψύχων φιλήσει οὐ λέγεται φιλία· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἀντιφίλησις, οὐδὲ βούλησις ἐκείνων ἀγαθοῦ· γελοῖον γὰρ ἴσως τῷ οἴνῳ βούλεσθαι τἀγαθά· ἀλλ' εἴπερ, σώζεσθαι βούλεται αὐτόν, ἵνα αὐτὸς ἔχῃ. τῷ δὲ φίλῳ φασὶ δεῖν βούλεσθαι τἀγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα. τοὺς δὲ βουλομένους οὕτω τἀγαθὰ εὔνους λέγουσιν, ἐὰν μὴ ταὐτὸ καὶ παρ' ἐκείνου γίγνηται· εὔνοιαν γὰρ ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσι φιλίαν εἶναι. ἢ προσθετέον μὴ λανθάνουσαν· πολλοὶ γάρ εἰσιν εὖνοι οἷς οὐχ ἑωράκασιν, ὑπολαμβάνουσι δὲ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι ἢ χρησίμους· τοῦτο δὲ ταὐτὸν κἂν ἐκείνων τις πάθοι πρὸς τοῦτον. εὖνοι μὲν οὖν οὗτοι φαίνονται ἀλλήλοις· φίλους δὲ πῶς ἄν τις εἴποι λανθάνοντας ὡς ἔχουσιν ἑαυτοῖς; δεῖ ἄρα εὐνοεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ βούλεσθαι τἀγαθὰ μὴ λανθάνοντας δι' ἕν τι τῶν εἰρημένων.

whence it is inferred, that there are three kinds of friendship.

6. *ἀντιφίλησις*] For which reason the notion of there being a friendship on the part of man towards the gods, is repudiated in the Mag. Mor.

— *ἀντιφίλησις*] Compare the Rhetoric, ii. 4. *φίλος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ φιλῶν καὶ ἀντιφιλούμενος. οἴονται δὲ φίλοι εἶναι οἱ οὕτως ἔχειν οἰόμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους.*

11. *εὔνους*] See ix. 5.

CHAP. IV.

Of the three species of Friendship.

And these three differ in species.

ΔΙΑΦΕΡΕΙ δὲ ταῦτα ἀλλήλων εἴδει· καὶ αἱ 3 φιλήσεις ἄρα καὶ αἱ φιλίαι. τρία δὴ τὰ τῆς φιλίας εἴδη, ἰσάριθμα τοῖς φιλητοῖς· καθ' ἕκαστον γάρ ἐστιν ἀντιφίλησις οὐ λανθάνουσα. οἱ δὲ φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους βούλονται τἀγαθὰ ἀλλήλοις ταύτῃ ᾗ φιλοῦσιν.

But friendships formed for the sake of gain or pleasure, are only accidental;

Οἱ μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους οὐ καθ' αὑτοὺς φιλοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ᾗ γίγνεταί τι αὐτοῖς παρ' ἀλλήλων ἀγαθόν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ δι' ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ τῷ ποιούς τινας εἶναι ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς εὐτραπέλους, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἡδεῖς αὐτοῖς. οἵ τε δὴ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλοῦντες διὰ τὸ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθὸν στέργουσι, καὶ οἱ δι' ἡδονὴν διὰ τὸ αὑτοῖς ἡδύ, καὶ οὐχ ᾗ ὁ φιλούμενός ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ᾗ χρήσιμος ἢ ἡδύς. κατὰ συμβεβηκός τε δὴ αἱ φιλίαι αὗταί εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ἐστὶν ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ φιλούμενος, ταύτῃ φιλεῖται, ἀλλ' ᾗ πορίζουσιν οἱ μὲν ἀγαθόν τι οἱ δ' ἡδονήν.

and as such are easily destroyed.

Εὐδιάλυτοι δὴ αἱ τοιαῦταί εἰσι, μὴ διαμενόντων αὐτῶν ὁμοίων· ἐὰν γὰρ μηκέτι ἡδεῖς ἢ χρήσιμοι ὦσι, παύονται φιλοῦντες. τὸ

CHAP. IV.

1. ταῦτα] sc. τὰ φιλητά.

2. φιλήσεις—φιλίαι] Aristotle himself distinguishes these words afterwards, (see chap. vi. p. 325, 14.) the first being passions, the other habits.

15. κατὰ συμβεβηκός] Friendships which are formed for the sake of gain or pleasure are merely accidental, for the parties love each other merely accidentally, as far as they possess those accidentia of wealth or fortune, which are the objects desired.

δὲ χρήσιμον οὐ διαμένει, ἀλλ' ἄλλοτε ἄλλο γίγνεται. ἀπολυθέντος οὖν δι' ὃ φίλοι ἦσαν, διαλύεται καὶ ἡ φιλία, ὡς οὔσης τῆς φιλίας πρὸς ἐκεῖνα. Μάλιστα δ' ἐν τοῖς πρεσβύταις ἡ τοιαύτη δοκεῖ φιλία γίνεσθαι (οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ οἱ τηλικοῦτοι διώκουσιν ἀλλὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον), καὶ τῶν ἐν ἀκμῇ καὶ νέων ὅσοι τὸ συμφέρον διώκουσιν. οὐ πάνυ δ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι οὐδὲ συζῶσι μετ' ἀλλήλων· ἐνίοτε γὰρ οὐδ' εἰσὶν ἡδεῖς· οὐδὲ δὴ προσδέονται τῆς τοιαύτης ὁμιλίας, ἐὰν μὴ ὠφέλιμοι ὦσιν· ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον γάρ εἰσιν ἡδεῖς ἐφ' ὅσον ἐλπίδας ἔχουσιν ἀγαθοῦ. εἰς ταύτας δὲ καὶ τὴν ξενικὴν τιθέασιν. Ἡ δὲ τῶν νέων φιλία δι' ἡδονὴν εἶναι δοκεῖ· κατὰ πάθος γὰρ οὗτοι ζῶσι, καὶ μάλιστα διώκουσι τὸ ἡδὺ αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸ παρόν· τῆς ἡλικίας δὲ μεταπιπτούσης καὶ τὰ ἡδέα γίνεται ἕτερα. διὸ ταχέως γίγνονται φίλοι καὶ παύονται· ἅμα γὰρ τῷ ἡδεῖ ἡ φιλία μεταπίπτει, τῆς δὲ τοιαύτης ἡδονῆς ταχεῖα ἡ μεταβολή. καὶ ἐρωτικοὶ δ' οἱ νέοι· κατὰ πάθος γὰρ καὶ δι' ἡδονὴν τὸ πολὺ τῆς ἐρωτικῆς· διόπερ φιλοῦσι καὶ ταχέως παύονται, πολλάκις τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας μεταπίπτοντες. συνημερεύειν δὲ καὶ συζῆν οὗτοι βούλονται· γίνεται γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὸ κατὰ φιλίαν οὕτως.

Of these, that for the useful is most cultivated by old men.

That for pleasure, by young men.

4 Τελεία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φιλία καὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν ὁμοίων· οὗτοι γὰρ τἀγαθὰ ὁμοίως βού-

That for the sake of good or virtue

5. οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἡδύ] Compare the Rhetoric ii. 13.

11. ἡδεῖς—ἐλπίδας] And that of course is very little, as they are not given to hope.

14. κατὰ πάθος γάρ] Compare the Rhetoric, ii. 12.

(which is the only real friendship) is cultivated by the good. And possesses essentially in itself all that is desirable in the others.

λονται ἀλλήλοις, ᾗ ἀγαθοί· ἀγαθοὶ δ' εἰσὶ καθ' αὑτούς. οἱ δὲ βουλόμενοι τἀγαθὰ τοῖς φίλοις ἐκείνων ἕνεκα μάλιστα φίλοι· δι' αὑτοὺς γὰρ οὕτως ἔχουσι, καὶ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· διαμένει οὖν ἡ τούτων φιλία ἕως ἂν ἀγαθοὶ ὦσιν, ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ μόνιμον. καὶ ἔστιν ἑκάτερος ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ τῷ φίλῳ· οἱ γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἀλλήλοις ὠφέλιμοι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς· καὶ γὰρ ἁπλῶς οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἡδεῖς καὶ ἀλλήλοις· ἑκάστῳ γὰρ καθ' ἡδονήν εἰσιν αἱ οἰκεῖαι πράξεις καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται, τῶν ἀγαθῶν δὲ αἱ αὐταὶ ἢ ὅμοιαι. ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ φιλία μόνιμος εὐλόγως ἐστίν· συνάπτει γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ πάνθ' ὅσα τοῖς φίλοις δεῖ ὑπάρχειν. πᾶσα γὰρ φιλία δι' ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ἢ δι' ἡδονήν, ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ τῷ φιλοῦντι, καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητά τινα· ταύτῃ δὲ πάνθ' ὑπάρχει τὰ εἰρημένα καθ' αὑτούς· ταύτῃ γὰρ ὅμοια καὶ τὰ λοιπά,

4. κατὰ συμβεβηκός] The friendship of the good only is perfect, for it possesses every thing which is included in the definition of friendship. And the good love each other, and wish good to each other as far as they are in themselves good. Others indeed wish good for their friends, but not for the sake of their friends but their own sakes. Others also love each other, not as far as they are lovely in themselves, but merely accidentally. For not even as far as a person is pleasant or rich is he loved, but as far only as his pleasantness and riches are pleasant or useful to the person by whom he is beloved. These friendships are therefore merely accidental, and consequently differ essentially from the friendship of the good, as much as accident differs from essence.

10. αἱ οἰκεῖαι πράξεις] See p. 316, 12.

11. αἱ αὐταί] Michelet reads τοιαῦται. Cum omnium bonorum actiones sint tales (certæ cujusdam, i. e. ejusdem naturæ) aut omnium maxime similes inter se (τῶν ἀγαθῶν δὲ τοιαῦται ἢ ὅμοιαι) unicuique autem actiones suæ similes aut pares sint jucundæ (ἑκάστῳ γὰρ καθ' ἡδονήν εἰσιν αἱ οἰκεῖαι πράξεις καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται): bonis bonorum actiones sunt jucundæ (οἱ ἀγαθοὶ γὰρ καὶ ἁπλῶς ἡδεῖς καὶ ἀλλήλοις).

17. ταύτῃ γάρ] *For the other friendships resemble this, and the absolutely good is also absolutely pleasant.* Resemble merely, are not friendships in the proper sense of the term.

τό τε ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδὺ ἁπλῶς ἐστίν. μάλιστα δὲ ταῦτα φιλητά, καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν δὲ καὶ ἡ φιλία ἐν τούτοις μάλιστα καὶ ἀρίστη. Σπανίας δ' εἰκὸς τὰς τοιαύτας εἶναι· ὀλίγοι γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι. ἔτι δὲ προσδεῖται χρόνου καὶ συνηθείας· κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν εἰδῆσαι ἀλλήλους πρὶν τοὺς λεγομένους ἅλας συναναλῶσαι· οὐδ' ἀποδέξασθαι δὴ πρότερον οὐδ' εἶναι φίλους, πρὶν ἂν ἑκάτερος ἑκατέρῳ φανῇ φιλητὸς καὶ πιστευθῇ. οἱ δὲ ταχέως τὰ φιλικὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ποιοῦντες βούλονται μὲν φίλοι εἶναι, οὐκ εἰσὶ δέ, εἰ μὴ καὶ φιλητοί, καὶ τοῦτ' ἴσασιν· βούλησις μὲν γὰρ ταχεῖα φιλίας γίνεται, φιλία δ' οὔ.

But such friendship is rare and requires time.

CHAP. V.

Of their resemblance to each other, and which only can be considered as real Friendship.

5 ΑΥΤΗ μὲν οὖν καὶ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον καὶ κατὰ τὰ λοιπὰ τελεία ἐστί, καὶ κατὰ πάντα ταὐτὰ γίνεται καὶ ὅμοια ἑκατέρῳ παρ' ἑκατέρου, ὅπερ δεῖ τοῖς φίλοις ὑπάρχειν· ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ ὁμοίωμα ταύτης ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἡδεῖς ἀλλήλοις. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον· καὶ γὰρ τοιοῦτοι ἀλλήλοις οἱ ἀγαθοί. μάλιστα δὲ καὶ ἐν τού-

The points of resemblance between the friendships formed for pleasure or interest with real friendship.

7. ἅλας] Verumque illud est quod dicitur multos modios salis simul edendos esse ut amicitiæ munus expletum sit. Cic in Læl. c. 19. See Eth. Eud. vii. 2.

10. τὰ φιλικά] The interchange of friendly offices is not sufficient to constitute friendship. Which being a habit requires time and a corresponding disposition in both parties.

15. καὶ κατὰ πάντα] *And in all respects, the same and similar favours and kindnesses are reciprocated from one to the other.*

τοις αἱ φιλίαι διαμένουσιν, ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ γίγνηται παρ' ἀλλήλων, οἷον ἡδονή, καὶ μὴ μόνον οὕτως ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, οἷον τοῖς εὐτραπέλοις, καὶ μὴ ὡς ἐραστῇ καὶ ἐρωμένῳ· οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἥδονται οὗτοι, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ὁρῶν ἐκεῖνον, ὁ δὲ θεραπευόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐραστοῦ· ληγούσης δὲ τῆς ὥρας ἐνίοτε καὶ ἡ φιλία λήγει· τῷ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδεῖα ἡ ὄψις, τῷ δ' οὐ γίνεται ἡ θεραπεία. πολλοὶ δ' αὖ διαμένουσιν, ἐὰν ἐκ τῆς συνηθείας τὰ ἤθη στέρξωσιν, ὁμοήθεις ὄντες. οἱ δὲ μὴ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀντικαταλλαττόμενοι ἀλλὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς καὶ εἰσὶν ἧττον φίλοι καὶ διαμένουσιν. οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ὄντες φίλοι ἅμα τῷ συμφέροντι διαλύονται· οὐ γὰρ ἀλλήλων ἦσαν φίλοι ἀλλὰ τοῦ λυσιτελοῦς.

In what points the friendship of the good differs from those above mentioned.

Δι' ἡδονὴν μὲν οὖν καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ φαύλους ἐνδέχεται φίλους εἶναι ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς φαύλοις καὶ μηδέτερον ὁποιῳοῦν, δι' αὑτοὺς δὲ δῆλον ὅτι μόνους τοὺς ἀγαθούς· οἱ γὰρ κακοὶ οὐ χαίρουσιν ἑαυτοῖς, εἰ μή τις ὠφέλεια γίγνοιτο. καὶ μόνη δὲ ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φιλία ἀδιάβλητός ἐστιν· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον οὐδενὶ πιστεῦσαι περὶ τοῦ

3. ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ] *From the same kind of pleasure.*

9. διαμένουσιν] Sc. ἧττον.

18. μηδέτερον] φιλεῖ γὰρ καὶ φαῦλος φαύλῳ διὰ ταῦτα, καὶ φαῦλος ἐπιεικῆ, καὶ ἐπιεικὴς φαῦλον, καὶ μέσος τις ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ τοῦ φαύλου χρεία πολλάκις· δυνατὸν γὰρ ναύαρχόν τινα ἀγαθὸν ἢ στρατηγὸν ἄριστον μὴ πάνυ τοὺς τρόπους ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, ὧν χρείαν ἔχειν τὸν σπουδαῖον οὐδὲν κωλύει. καὶ ἥδεσθαι δὲ σπουδαῖον φαύλοις οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδύνατον· εἰσὶ γὰρ οἳ τοὺς μὲν τρόπους ἀπᾴδουσι· διαλεγόμενοι δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφοῦντες καὶ τῷ δεινοί τινες εἶναι τῆς ἀληθείας καταστοχαζόμενοι καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τοῖς σπουδαίοις ἡδεῖς γίνονται· οἱ μὲν οὖν οὕτω φιλούμενοι οὐ δι' ἑαυτοὺς φιλοῦνται, ἀλλὰ ἢ διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἢ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον. Paraph.

22. οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον] *For they cannot readily credit the report of any one against a friend, who has been long tried and approved by them.*

ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ὑπ' αὐτῶν δεδοκιμασμένου. καὶ τὸ πιστεύειν ἐν τούτοις, καὶ τὸ μηδέποτ' ἂν ἀδικῆσαι, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἐν τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλίᾳ ἀξιοῦται. ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἑτέραις οὐδὲν κωλύει τὰ τοιαῦτα γίνεσθαι. ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι λέγουσι φίλους καὶ τοὺς διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, ὥσπερ αἱ πόλεις (δοκοῦσι γὰρ αἱ συμμαχίαι ταῖς πόλεσι γίνεσθαι ἕνεκα τοῦ συμφέροντος), καὶ τοὺς δι' ἡδονὴν ἀλλήλους στέργοντας, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες, ἴσως λέγειν μὲν δεῖ καὶ ἡμᾶς φίλους τοὺς τοιούτους, εἴδη δὲ τῆς φιλίας πλείω, καὶ πρώτως μὲν καὶ κυρίως τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ᾗ ἀγαθοί, τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς καθ' ὁμοιότητα· ᾗ γὰρ ἀγαθόν τι καὶ ὅμοιον, ταύτῃ φίλοι· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαθὸν τοῖς φιληδέσιν. οὐ πάνυ δ' αὗται συνάπτουσιν, οὐδὲ γίνονται οἱ αὐτοὶ φίλοι διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ διὰ τὸ ἡδύ· οὐ γὰρ πάνυ συνδυάζεται τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

5. ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι] According to Giphanius Aristotle alludes to Plato's Clitopho, p. 409. See also Eud. Eth. vii. 2.

8. ἕνεκα τοῦ συμφέροντος] See the Rhetoric, i. 3.

15. οὐ πάνυ δ' αὗται] *But these are not frequently united, nor do the same persons become friends both for the useful and agreeable, for things which are accidental are not generally united.* The friendship formed for pleasure is not generally united with that which is formed for interest, for accidents do not unite. δόξει δὲ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀληθές, ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς εἴη ἂν καὶ λευκὸς καὶ μουσικὸς καὶ ἀμφότερα κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ἀλλ' ἔοικεν οὐ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγειν, ἀλλ' ὅταν πρώτως μέν τι λέγηται καὶ κυρίως, ἀπ' ἐκείνου δὲ ἄλλα. πρῶτος μὲν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἰατρικός, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ τὸ ὄργανον καὶ τὸ φάρμακον. οὐ γὰρ συνδυάζεται τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν συμβεβηκότων. καὶ ἐνταῦθα φίλοι μὲν κυρίως οἱ ἀγαθοί, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης φιλίας αἱ λοιπαί. ὅθεν οὐ ῥαδίως συνάπτονται. Schol.

CHAP. VI.

That Friendship is a habit, and, as such, cannot exist long without the exertion of its proper energies of different kinds of Friendship.

Of the necessity of conversation (συζῆν) to friendship.

ΕΙΣ ταῦτα δὲ τὰ εἴδη τῆς φιλίας νενεμημένης 6 οἱ μὲν φαῦλοι ἔσονται φίλοι δι' ἡδονὴν ἢ τὸ χρήσιμον, ταύτῃ ὅμοιοι ὄντες, οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ δι' αὐτοὺς φίλοι· ᾗ γὰρ ἀγαθοί. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ἁπλῶς φίλοι, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ τῷ ὡμοιῶσθαι τούτοις. ὥσπερ δ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν οἱ μὲν καθ' ἕξιν οἱ δὲ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἀγαθοὶ λέγονται, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας· οἱ μὲν γὰρ συζῶντες χαίρουσιν ἀλλήλοις καὶ πορίζουσι τἀγαθά, οἱ δὲ καθεύδοντες ἢ κεχωρισμένοι τοῖς τόποις οὐκ ἐνεργοῦσι μέν, οὕτω δ' ἔχουσιν ὥστ' ἐνεργεῖν φιλικῶς· οἱ γὰρ τόποι οὐ διαλύουσι τὴν φιλίαν ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. ἐὰν δὲ χρόνιος ἡ ἀπουσία γίνηται, καὶ τῆς φιλίας δοκεῖ λήθην ποιεῖν· ὅθεν εἴρηται "πολλὰς δὴ φιλίας ἀπροσηγορία διέλυσεν."

But this is not possible without mutual pleasure.

Οὐ φαίνονται δ' οὔθ' οἱ πρεσβῦται οὔθ' οἱ στρυφνοὶ φιλικοὶ εἶναι· βραχὺ γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς, οὐδεὶς δὲ δύναται συνημερεύειν τῷ λυπηρῷ οὐδὲ τῷ μὴ ἡδεῖ· μά-

3. ταύτῃ ὅμοιοι ὄντες] Although men may be in themselves dissimilar, nothing prevents them from forming a degree of friendship, so long as an accidental similarity exist between them; for as far as they mutually contribute to each other's pleasure or advantage, so far do they bear a similarity, and so far and so long does their friendship exist.

14. δοκεῖ] εὖ δὲ προστέθηκεν ἐνταῦθα τὸ δοκεῖν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἱ δι' ἡδονὴν φίλοι, ἢ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, λήθην λαμβάνουσι τῆς φιλίας, ἂν χρόνιος ἡ ἀπουσία γίγνηται, δοκεῖ τοῖς πολλοῖς τοιοῦτον ἡ φιλία εἶναι εὐδιάλυτον καὶ ἀμαυρούμενον ὑπὸ τῆς ἀπουσίας, ὅταν χρόνιος ᾖ. οὐ μὴν ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τοιαύτη. Schol.

λιστα γὰρ ἡ φύσις φαίνεται τὸ μὲν λυπηρὸν φεύγειν, ἐφίεσθαι δὲ τοῦ ἡδέος. οἱ δ᾽ ἀποδεχόμενοι ἀλλήλους, μὴ συζῶντες δέ, εὔνοις ἐοίκασι μᾶλλον ἢ φίλοις. οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἐστὶ φίλων ὡς τὸ συζῆν· ὠφελείας μὲν γὰρ οἱ ἐνδεεῖς ὀρέγονται, συνημερεύειν δὲ καὶ οἱ μακάριοι· μονώταις μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τούτοις ἥκιστα προσήκει. συνδιάγειν δὲ μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων οὐκ ἔστι μὴ ἡδεῖς ὄντας μηδὲ χαίροντας τοῖς αὐτοῖς, ὅπερ ἡ ἑταιρικὴ δοκεῖ ἔχειν. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ φιλία ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καθάπερ πολλάκις εἴρηται· δοκεῖ γὰρ φιλητὸν μὲν καὶ αἱρετὸν τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδύ, ἑκάστῳ δὲ τὸ αὑτῷ τοιοῦτον· ὁ δ᾽ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ δι᾽ ἄμφω ταῦτα. Ἔοικε δ᾽ ἡ μὲν φίλησις πάθει, ἡ δὲ φιλία ἕξει· ἡ γὰρ φίλησις οὐχ ἧττον πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχά ἐστιν, ἀντιφιλοῦσι δὲ μετὰ προαιρέσεως, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ἀφ᾽ ἕξεως. καὶ τἀγαθὰ βούλονται τοῖς φιλουμένοις ἐκείνων ἕνεκα, οὐ κατὰ πάθος ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ ἕξιν. καὶ φιλοῦντες τὸν φίλον τὸ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθὸν φιλοῦσιν· ὁ γὰρ ἀγαθὸς φίλος γινόμενος ἀγαθὸν γίνεται ᾧ φίλος. ἑκάτερος οὖν φιλεῖ τε τὸ αὑτῷ ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ ἴσον ἀνταποδί-

The difference of φιλήσις from φιλία.

15. ἡ δὲ φιλία ἕξει] Cum supra, ii. 4. p. 64. φιλίαν inter πάθη numeraverit, et iv. 6. p. 153. virtutem mediam inter ἀρέσκους et δυσκόλους nominatam φιλίαν ab amicitia ita distinxerit, ut sit ἄνευ πάθους καὶ τοῦ στέργειν οἷς ὁμιλεῖ: hoc loco amicitiam ducit habitum cum affectu conjunctum; nam etsi amicitia affectu non definiatur, tamen sine affectu (πάθος) et amore (στέργειν) et amatione (φίλησις) esse nullo modo potest. Propter hanc duplicem amicitiæ naturam Zellius etiam ἕξιν dictum putat. Præclare Aspasius: "Amicitia in animæ parte rationis participe, et in ea quæ caret ratione existit; cum enim judicarit quispiam et elegerit amicum aliquem sibi conciliare, quod est rationis, erga ipsum afficitur, quod irrationalis partis est. Atque ita habitus in utrisque animæ partibus consistit." MICH.

δωσι τῇ βουλήσει καὶ τῷ ἠδεῖ· λέγεται γὰρ φιλότης ἡ ἰσότης. μάλιστα δὴ τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταῦθ' ὑπάρχει. ἐν δὲ τοῖς στρυφνοῖς καὶ πρεσβυτικοῖς ἧττον γίνεται ἡ φιλία, ὅσῳ δυσκολώτεροί εἰσι καὶ ἧττον ταῖς ὁμιλίαις χαίρουσιν· ταῦτα γὰρ δοκεῖ μάλιστ' εἶναι φιλικὰ καὶ ποιητικὰ φιλίας. διὸ νέοι μὲν γίνονται φίλοι ταχύ, πρεσβῦται δ' οὔ· οὐ γὰρ γίγνονται φίλοι οἷς ἂν μὴ χαίρωσιν· ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' οἱ στρυφνοί. ἀλλ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι εὖνοι μέν εἰσιν ἀλλήλοις· βούλονται γὰρ τἀγαθὰ καὶ ἀπαντῶσιν εἰς τὰς χρείας· φίλοι δ' οὐ πάνυ εἰσὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ συνημερεύειν μηδὲ χαίρειν ἀλλήλοις, ἃ δὴ μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ φιλικά.

That the friendship of the good is generally single. Not so that of others.

Πολλοῖς δ' εἶναι φίλον κατὰ τὴν τελείαν φιλίαν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐρᾶν πολλῶν ἅμα· ἔοικε γὰρ ὑπερβολῇ, τὸ τοιοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ἕνα πέφυκε γίνεσθαι, πολλοὺς δ' ἅμα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀρέσκειν σφόδρα οὐ ῥᾴδιον, ἴσως δ' οὐδ' ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐμπειρίαν λαβεῖν καὶ ἐν συνηθείᾳ γενέσθαι, ὃ παγχάλεπον. διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν ἐνδέχεται· πολλοὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι, καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ αἱ ὑπηρεσίαι.

Of the others, the friendship formed for pleasure has a greater similarity to true friendship.

Τούτων δὲ μᾶλλον ἔοικε φιλία ἡ διὰ τὸ ἡδύ, ὅταν ταὐτὰ ὑπ' ἀμφοῖν γίγνηται καὶ χαίρωσιν ἀλλήλοις ἢ τοῖς αὐτοῖς, οἷαι τῶν νέων εἰσὶν αἱ φιλίαι· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἐν ταύταις τὸ ἐλευθέριον. ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἀγοραίων. καὶ οἱ μακάριοι δὲ χρησίμων μὲν οὐδὲν δέονται, ἡδέων δέ· συζῆν μὲν γὰρ

16. πέφυκε] It is not natural for one person to be superlatively eminent in many things.

22. ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ] In contradistinction to that of the good.

βούλονταί τισι, τὸ δὲ λυπηρὸν ὀλίγον μὲν χρόνον φέρουσιν, συνεχῶς δ' οὐθεὶς ἂν ὑπομείναι, οὐδ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν, εἰ λυπηρὸν αὐτῷ εἴη· διὸ τοὺς φίλους ἡδεῖς ζητοῦσιν. δεῖ δ' ἴσως καὶ ἀγαθοὺς τοιούτους ὄντας, καὶ ἔτι αὐτοῖς· οὕτω γὰρ ὑπάρξει αὐτοῖς ὅσα δεῖ τοῖς φίλοις. Οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις διῃρημένοις φαίνονται χρῆσθαι τοῖς φίλοις· ἄλλοι γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἰσὶ χρήσιμοι καὶ ἕτεροι ἡδεῖς, ἄμφω δ' οἱ αὐτοὶ οὐ πάνυ· οὔτε γὰρ ἡδεῖς μετ' ἀρετῆς ζητοῦσιν οὔτε χρησίμους εἰς τὰ καλά, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν εὐτραπέλους τοῦ ἡδέος ἐφιέμενοι, τοὺς δὲ δεινοὺς πρᾶξαι τὸ ἐπιταχθέν· ταῦτα δ' οὐ πάνυ γίνεται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ. ἡδὺς δὲ καὶ χρήσιμος ἅμα εἴρηται ὅτι ὁ σπουδαῖος· ἀλλ' ὑπερέχοντι οὐ γίνεται ὁ τοιοῦτος φίλος, ἂν μὴ καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ ὑπερέχηται· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἰσάζει ἀνάλογον ὑπερεχόμενος. οὐ πάνυ δ' εἰώθασι τοιοῦτοι γίνεσθαι.

Of the friendships formed by men in power.

8 Εἰσὶ δ' οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι φιλίαι ἐν ἰσότητι· τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ γίγνεται ἀπ' ἀμφοῖν καὶ βούλονται ἀλλήλοις, ἢ ἕτερον ἀνθ' ἑτέρου ἀντικαταλλάττονται, οἷον ἡδονὴν ἀντ' ὠφελείας. ὅτι δ' ἧττον εἰσὶν αὗται αἱ φιλίαι καὶ μένουσιν, εἴρηται. δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ δι' ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα ταὐτοῦ εἶναί τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι φιλίαι· καθ' ὁμοιότητα γὰρ τῆς κατ' ἀρετὴν φαίνονται φιλίαι (ἡ

That these friendships are in equality.

1. τὸ δὲ λυπηρὸν] Friendship formed for the sake of pleasure more resembles the friendship of the good, than that formed from motives of interest, because the good whose energies consist in the exercise of virtue do not require the latter, but they do the former. For even the good is intolerable, at least for a continuance, unless with some admixture of pleasure.

μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ ἔχει ἡ δὲ τὸ χρήσιμον, ταῦτα δ' ὑπάρχει κἀκείνῃ), τῷ δὲ τὴν μὲν ἀδιάβλητον καὶ μόνιμον εἶναι, ταύτας δὲ ταχέως μεταπίπτειν ἄλλοις τε διαφέρειν πολλοῖς, οὐ φαίνονται φιλίαι δι' ἀνομοιότητα ἐκείνης.

From which there is a different kind of friendship; in cases where there is not an equality in the persons.

Ἕτερον δ' ἐστὶ φιλίας εἶδος τὸ καθ' ὑπεροχήν, οἷον πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ ὅλως πρεσβυτέρῳ πρὸς νεώτερον, ἀνδρί τε πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ παντὶ ἄρχοντι πρὸς ἀρχόμενον. διαφέρουσι δ' αὗται καὶ ἀλλήλων· οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ γονεῦσι πρὸς τέκνα καὶ ἄρχουσι πρὸς ἀρχομένους, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ υἱῷ πρὸς πατέρα, οὐδ' ἀνδρὶ πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ γυναικὶ πρὸς ἄνδρα. ἑτέρα γὰρ ἑκάστῳ τούτων ἀρετὴ καὶ τὸ ἔργον, ἕτερα δὲ καὶ δι' ἃ φιλοῦσιν· ἕτεραι οὖν καὶ αἱ φιλήσεις καὶ αἱ φιλίαι.

And how an equality is to be observed between them.

Ταὐτὰ μὲν δὴ οὔτε γίγνεται ἑκατέρῳ παρὰ θατέρου οὔτε δεῖ ζητεῖν·

2. ἀδιάβλητον] See p. 322.

13. ἑτέρα γὰρ—ἀρετή] οὔ φασι δή τινες ἄλλην ἀρετὴν εἶναι πατρὸς καὶ ἄλλην υἱοῦ, οὐδὲ ἄλλην ἀνδρὸς, γυναικὸς δὲ ἑτέραν. ἐξαρκεῖ δὲ ἐπ' ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς ἐξετάσαι τὸν λόγον· τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ καὶ περὶ πατρὸς ῥητέον καὶ υἱοῦ. ἐρωτῶσι δὲ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, καὶ μάλιστα οἱ Σωκρατικοί. (See Plato's Republic, particularly the 5th book.) ἆρα τὸν μὲν ἄνδρα χρὴ δίκαιον εἶναι, τὴν δὲ γυναῖκα ἄδικον; οὐ δῆτα. τί δέ; τὸν μὲν ἄνδρα σώφρονα, τὴν δὲ γυναῖκα ἀκόλαστον;' οὐδὲ τοῦτο. οὕτω δὴ καθ' ἑκάστην ἐπιόντες ἀρετὴν καὶ λαμβάνοντες, ὅτι δεῖ καὶ τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα ἔχειν τὰς ἀρετὰς πάσας, συμπεραίνονται ὅτι ἡ αὐτὴ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς ἀρετή. τί οὖν ῥητέον πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα; ἢ ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄρχοντος καὶ ἀρχομένου; εἰ γὰρ τοῦ μὲν ἄρχοντος ἀρετὴ ἐν τῷ ἄρχειν καλῶς, τοῦ δὲ ἀρχομένου ἐν τῷ ἄρχεσθαι καλῶς, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ αὐτὴ ἄρχοντος καὶ ἀρχομένου ἀρετή. καὶ γὰρ κακία μὲν ἀρχομένου ἂν τὰ τοῦ ἄρχοντος πράττῃ, κακία δὲ ἄρχοντος ἂν τὰ τοῦ ἀρχομένου. ὡς καὶ κυβερνήτου μὲν ἀρετὴ ἂν τὰ τοῦ κυβερνήτου ποιῇ, καὶ ἄρχοντος τῶν ναυτῶν, ναυτῶν δὲ ἂν ἄρχωνται ὑπὸ τοῦ κυβερνήτου. εἰ δὲ τῆς αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης τὸ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι, οὐδὲν τοῦτο ἐμποδὼν τῷ λόγῳ. τάχα μὲν γὰρ καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον ἐνσταίη ἄν τις, ὡς ἱκανοῦ τινος ἐσομένου ἄρχεσθαι, μὴ πάντως δὲ ἄρχειν. οἱ γὰρ εἰθισμένοι ὑπακούειν τῶν ἀρχόντων ἄρχεσθαι μὲν ἂν δύναιντο καθ' ἔθος, ἄρχειν δὲ οὐκ ἴσασιν. εἰ δὲ καὶ δοθείη, τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπίστασθαι ἄμφω, ἀλλ' ᾗ μὲν ἄρχει ἄλλη ἀρετή, ᾗ δὲ ἄρχεται ἑτέρα. Schol. See also Aristot. Pol. i. 5.

ὅταν δὲ γονεῦσι μὲν τέκνα ἀπονέμῃ ἃ δεῖ τοῖς γεννήσασι, γονεῖς δὲ υἱέσιν ἃ δεῖ τοῖς τέκνοις, μόνιμος ἡ τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἐπιεικὴς ἔσται φιλία. ἀνάλογον δ' ἐν πάσαις ταῖς καθ' ὑπεροχὴν οὔσαις φιλίαις καὶ τὴν φίλησιν δεῖ γίνεσθαι, οἷον τὸν ἀμείνω μᾶλλον φιλεῖσθαι ἢ φιλεῖν, καὶ τὸν ὠφελιμώτερον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ὁμοίως· ὅταν γὰρ κατ' ἀξίαν ἡ φίλησις γίγνηται, τότε γίγνεταί πως ἰσότης, ὃ δὴ τῆς φιλίας εἶναι δοκεῖ.

CHAP. VII.

Of the chief requisites for Friendship.

9 ΟΥΧ ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἔν τε τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ἐν τῇ φιλίᾳ φαίνεται ἔχειν· ἔστι γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς δικαίοις ἴσον πρώτως τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν, τὸ δὲ

As friendship is generally and properly between

8. κατ' ἀξίαν] A species of geometrical proportion is to be observed in friendships of this kind. For the inferior is to compensate to the superior for the greater benefits which he receives from him, a return not in kind, but in proportion of love and respect, κατ' ἀξίαν. (See p. 180.) Differing, however, from the proportion observed in distributive justice in certain points, which he now proceeds to state.

According to the Scholiast, another question is also raised as to this class of friendships, whether they ought to be included in any of the previous species, or form a distinct one by themselves. Eudæmus and Theophrastus distributed them among the previous ones. For both father and son, husband and wife, and so on, may be virtuous, and consequently the highest degree of friendship exist between them. But if not, then the motives of their friendship must be sought in that of interest or pleasure, and consequently such friendships be included in the other species.

10. οὐχ ὁμοίως] In justice, geometrical proportion, or rather the dignity of the different persons, is primarily considered; in friendship, an equal compensation (τὸ ποσόν) between equals. For friendship correctly and properly speaking is among equals. Which is plain from the fact, that when a great distance exists between the relative state of the parties, friendship can scarcely ever take place between them.

equals, Arithmetical is more observed than Geometrical proportion between them.

κατὰ ποσὸν δευτέρως, ἐν δὲ τῇ φιλίᾳ τὸ μὲν κατὰ ποσὸν πρώτως, τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀξίαν δευτέρως. δῆλον δ', ἐὰν πολὺ διάστημα γίγνηται ἀρετῆς ἢ κακίας ἢ εὐπορίας ἤ τινος ἄλλου· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι φίλοι εἰσίν, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἀξιοῦσιν. ἐμφανέστατον δὲ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ τῶν θεῶν· πλεῖστον γὰρ οὗτοι πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχουσιν. δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν βασιλέων· οὐδὲ γὰρ τούτοις ἀξιοῦσιν εἶναι φίλοι οἱ πολὺ καταδεέστεροι, οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἢ σοφωτάτοις οἱ μηδενὸς ἄξιοι.

Whence is a question, whether one friend can wish so great a good to another, so as entirely to destroy this equality, and consequently their friendship.

Ἀκριβὴς μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις οὐκ ἔστιν ὁρισμός, ἕως τίνος οἱ φίλοι· πολλῶν γὰρ ἀφαιρουμένων ἔτι μένει, πολὺ δὲ χωρισθέντος, οἷον τοῦ θεοῦ, οὐκέτι. ὅθεν καὶ ἀπορεῖται, μή ποτ' οὐ βούλονται οἱ φίλοι τοῖς φίλοις τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, οἷον θεοὺς εἶναι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔτι φίλοι ἔσονται αὐτοῖς, οὐδὲ δὴ ἀγαθά· οἱ γὰρ φίλοι ἀγαθά. εἰ δὴ καλῶς εἴρηται ὅτι ὁ φίλος τῷ φίλῳ βούλεται τἀγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, μένειν ἂν δέοι οἷός ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνος· ἀνθρώπῳ δὲ ὄντι βουλήσεται τὰ μέγιστα ἀγαθά. ἴσως δ' οὐ πάντα· αὑτῷ γὰρ μάλισθ' ἕκαστος βούλεται τἀγαθά.

That more desire to be loved than to love, (and why.)

Οἱ πολλοὶ δὲ δοκοῦσι διὰ φιλοτιμίαν βούλεσθαι φιλεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ φιλεῖν, διὸ φιλοκόλακες οἱ πολλοί· ὑπερεχόμενος γὰρ φίλος ὁ κόλαξ, ἢ προσποιεῖται τοιοῦτος εἶναι καὶ μᾶλλον φιλεῖν ἢ φιλεῖσθαι. τὸ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι ἐγγὺς εἶναι δοκεῖ τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι, οὗ δὴ οἱ πολλοὶ ἐφίενται. οὐ δι' αὐτὸ δ' ἐοίκασιν αἱρεῖσθαι τὴν τιμήν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· χαίρουσι γὰρ οἱ

24. ὑπερεχόμενος] See p. 74.

μὲν πολλοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις τιμώμενοι διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα· οἴονται γὰρ τεύξεσθαι παρ' αὐτῶν, ἄν του δέωνται· ὡς δὴ σημείῳ τῆς εὐπαθείας χαίρουσι τῇ τιμῇ. οἱ δ' ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν καὶ εἰδότων ὀρεγόμενοι τιμῆς βεβαιῶσαι τὴν οἰκείαν δόξαν ἐφίενται περὶ αὐτῶν· χαίρουσι δὴ ὅτι εἰσὶν ἀγαθοί, πιστεύοντες τῇ τῶν λεγόντων κρίσει. τῷ φιλεῖσθαι δὲ καθ' αὐτὸ χαίρουσιν· διὸ δόξειεν ἂν κρεῖττον εἶναι τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ ἡ φιλία καθ' αὐτὴν αἱρετὴ εἶναι.

But yet friendship consists more in the latter than the former.

Δοκεῖ δ' ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ φιλεῖσθαι εἶναι. σημεῖον δ' αἱ μητέρες τῷ φιλεῖν χαίρουσαι· ἔνιαι γὰρ διδόασι τὰ ἑαυτῶν τρέφεσθαι, καὶ φιλοῦσι μὲν εἰδυῖαι, ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι δ' οὐ ζητοῦσιν, ἐὰν ἀμφότερα μὴ ἐνδέχηται, ἀλλ' ἱκανὸν αὐταῖς ἔοικεν εἶναι, ἐὰν ὁρῶσιν εὖ πράττοντας, καὶ αὐταὶ φιλοῦσιν αὐτούς, κἂν ἐκεῖνοι μηδὲν ὧν μητρὶ προσ-
10 *ήκει ἀπονέμωσι διὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν.*

Three requisites for lasting friendship.

Μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς φιλίας οὔσης ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν, καὶ τῶν φιλοφίλων ἐπαινουμένων, φίλων ἀρετὴ τὸ φιλεῖν ἔοικεν, ὥστ' ἐν οἷς τοῦτο γίνεται κατ' ἀξίαν, οὗτοι μόνιμοι φίλοι καὶ ἡ τούτων φιλία. οὕτω δ' ἂν καὶ οἱ ἄνισοι μάλιστ' εἶεν φίλοι· ἰσάζοιντο γὰρ ἄν. ἡ δ' ἰσότης καὶ ὁμοιότης φιλότης, καὶ μάλιστα μὲν ἡ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ὁμοιότης· μόνιμοι γὰρ ὄντες καθ' αὐτοὺς καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους μένουσι, καὶ οὔτε δέονται φαύλων οὔθ' ὑπηρετοῦσι τοιαῦτα,

3. τῆς εὐπαθείας] Compare the Rhetoric, i. 5.

4. ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν] *But they who are desirous of being honored* (ὀρεγόμενοι τιμᾶσθαι) *by the good and prudent, aim at honor in order to have a confirmation of their own self-opinion.* Compare p.13. See also the Rhet. i. 9.

ἀλλ' ὡς εἰπεῖν καὶ διακωλύουσιν· τῶν ἀγαθῶν γὰρ μήτ' αὐτοὺς ἁμαρτάνειν μήτε τοῖς φίλοις ἐπιτρέπειν. οἱ δὲ μοχθηροὶ τὸ μὲν βέβαιον οὐκ ἔχουσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτοῖς διαμένουσιν ὅμοιοι ὄντες· ἐπ' ὀλίγον δὲ χρόνον γίγνονται φίλοι, χαίροντες τῇ ἀλλήλων μοχθηρίᾳ· οἱ χρήσιμοι δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς ἐπὶ πλεῖον διαμένουσιν· ἕως γὰρ ἂν πορίζωσιν ἡδονὰς ἢ ὠφελείας ἀλλήλοις.

The friendship of persons in opposite stations, formed generally from motives of interest.

Ἐξ ἐναντίων δὲ μάλιστα μὲν δοκεῖ ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον γίγνεσθαι φιλία, οἷον πένης πλουσίῳ, ἀμαθὴς εἰδότι· οὗ γὰρ τυγχάνει τις ἐνδεὴς ὤν, τούτου ἐφιέμενος ἀντιδωρεῖται ἄλλο. ἐνταῦθα δ' ἄν τις ἕλκοι καὶ ἐραστὴν καὶ ἐρώμενον, καὶ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν. διὸ φαίνονται καὶ οἱ ἐρασταὶ γελοῖοι ἐνίοτε, ἀξιοῦντες φιλεῖσθαι ὡς φιλοῦσιν· ὁμοίως δὴ φιλητοὺς ὄντας ἴσως ἀξιωτέον, μηδὲν δὲ τοιοῦτον ἔχοντας γελοῖον. ἴσως δὲ οὐδ' ἐφίεται τὸ ἐναντίον τοῦ ἐναντίου καθ' αὑτό, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ἡ δ' ὄρεξις τοῦ μέσου ἐστίν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἀγαθόν, οἷον τῷ ξηρῷ οὐχ ὑγρῷ γενέσθαι ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον ἐλθεῖν, καὶ τῷ θερμῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀφείσθω· καὶ γάρ ἐστιν ἀλλοτριώτερα.

4. αὐτοῖς διαμένουσιν] Compare the advice of Polonius to Laertes:

> To thine own self be true;
> And it must follow as the night the day;
> Thou can'st not then be false to any man. Hamlet, Act i. 3.

See particularly Plato's Republic, Book ix. near the beginning.

20. ξηρῷ οὐχ ὑγρῷ] Alluding to the words of Euripides. See above, p. 315.

CHAP. VIII.

That there are different Friendships according to the different communities.

11 ΕΟΙΚΕ δέ, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται, περὶ ταὐτὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς εἶναι ἥ τε φιλία καὶ τὸ δίκαιον· ἐν ἁπάσῃ γὰρ κοινωνίᾳ δοκεῖ τι δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ φιλία δέ· προσαγορεύουσι γοῦν ὡς φίλους τοὺς σύμπλους καὶ τοὺς συστρατιώτας, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις κοινωνίαις. καθ' ὅσον δὲ κοινωνοῦσιν, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτόν ἐστι φιλία· καὶ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον. καὶ ἡ παροιμία "κοινὰ τὰ φίλων," ὀρθῶς· ἐν κοινωνίᾳ γὰρ ἡ φιλία. ἔστι δ' ἀδελφοῖς μὲν καὶ ἑταίροις πάντα κοινά, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις ἀφωρισμένα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν πλείω τοῖς δ' ἐλάττω· καὶ γὰρ τῶν φιλιῶν αἱ μὲν μᾶλλον αἱ δ' ἧττον. διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὰ δίκαια· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ γονεῦσι πρὸς τέκνα καὶ ἀδελφοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, οὐδ' ἑταίροις καὶ πολίταις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων φιλιῶν. ἕτερα δὴ καὶ τὰ ἄδικα πρὸς ἑκάστους τούτων, καὶ αὔξησιν λαμβάνει τῷ μᾶλλον πρὸς φίλους εἶναι, οἷον χρήματα ἀποστερῆσαι ἑταῖρον δεινότερον ἢ πολίτην, καὶ μὴ βοηθῆσαι ἀδελφῷ ἢ ὀθνείῳ, καὶ πατάξαι πατέρα ἢ ὁντινοῦν ἄλλον.

That there is a friendship peculiar to every community.

CHAP. VIII.

In this Chapter Aristotle proceeds to show, that all friendship consists in society, all society is part of that chief society which is called the political, and consequently there will be as many kinds of friendships as of political communions.

8. κοινὰ τὰ φίλων] Erasm. Adag. i. 1. 1.

αὔξεσθαι δὲ πέφυκεν ἅμα τῇ φιλίᾳ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, ὡς ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὄντα καὶ ἐπ' ἴσον διήκοντα.

That all communities are part of the Political.

Αἱ δὲ κοινωνίαι πᾶσαι μορίοις ἐοίκασι τῆς πολιτικῆς· συμπορεύονται γὰρ ἐπί τινι συμφέροντι, καὶ πορίζόμενοί τι τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον· καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ δὲ κοινωνία τοῦ συμφέροντος χάριν δοκεῖ καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς συνελθεῖν καὶ διαμένειν· τούτου γὰρ καὶ οἱ νομοθέται στοχάζονται, καὶ δίκαιόν φασιν εἶναι τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον. αἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλαι κοινωνίαι κατὰ μέρη τοῦ συμφέροντος ἐφίενται, οἷον πλωτῆρες μὲν τοῦ κατὰ τὸν πλοῦν πρὸς ἐργασίαν χρημάτων ἤ τι τοιοῦτον, συστρατιῶται δὲ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον, εἴτε χρημάτων εἴτε νίκης ἢ πόλεως ὀρεγόμενοι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ φυλέται καὶ δημόται. ἔνιαι δὲ τῶν κοινωνιῶν δι' ἡδονὴν δοκοῦσι γίγνεσθαι, θιασωτῶν καὶ ἐρανιστῶν· αὗται γὰρ θυσίας ἕνεκα καὶ συνουσίας. πᾶσαι δ' αὗται ὑπὸ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἐοίκασιν εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ τοῦ παρόντος συμφέροντος ἡ πολιτικὴ ἐφίεται, ἀλλ' εἰς ἅπαντα τὸν βίον, θυσίας τε ποιοῦντες καὶ περὶ ταύτας συνόδους, τιμὰς ἀπονέμοντες τοῖς θεοῖς, καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀναπαύσεις πορίζοντες μεθ' ἡδονῆς. αἱ γὰρ ἀρχαῖαι θυσίαι καὶ σύνοδοι φαίνονται γίνεσθαι μετὰ τὰς τῶν καρπῶν συγκομιδὰς οἷον ἀπαρχαί· μά-

6. συμφέροντος] Compare the Politics, iii. 4. φύσει μέν ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος ζῶον πολιτικόν· διὸ καὶ μηδὲν δεόμενοι τῆς παρ' ἀλλήλων βοηθείας οὐκ ἔλαττον ὀρέγονται τοῦ συζῆν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον συνάγει, καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει μέρος ἑκάστῳ τοῦ ζῆν καλῶς. See also note p. 192.

16. θιασωτῶν] θίασος est sodalitas eorum qui statis diebus in honorem alicujus dei congregati peracto sacrificio una epulantur et genio indulgent. Cf. præter alios locos Xenophon. Mem. ii. 1. §. 31. Plutarch. iii. p. 204. Ed. Hutten. Casaubon ad Theophrast. Charact. xv. p. 168. Ed. Fischer. ZELL.

λιστα γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ἐσχόλαζον τοῖς καιροῖς. πᾶσαι δὴ φαίνονται αἱ κοινωνίαι μόρια τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι· ἀκολουθήσουσι δὲ αἱ τοιαῦται φιλίαι ταῖς τοιαύταις κοινωνίαις.

CHAP. IX.

Of the three forms of Political Communities, and their perversions.

That there are three forms of political communities; 1. Kingdom, and its perversion, Tyranny.

12 ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ δ' ἐστὶν εἴδη τρία, ἴσαι δὲ καὶ παρεκβάσεις, οἷον φθοραὶ τούτων. εἰσὶ δ' αἱ μὲν πολιτεῖαι βασιλεία τε καὶ ἀριστοκρατία, τρίτη δ' ἡ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, ἣν τιμοκρατικὴν λέγειν οἰκεῖον φαίνεται, πολιτείαν δ' αὐτὴν εἰώθασιν οἱ πλεῖστοι καλεῖν. Τούτων δὲ βελτίστη μὲν ἡ βασιλεία, χειρίστη δ' ἡ τιμοκρατία. παρέκβασις δὲ βασιλείας μὲν τυραννίς· ἄμφω γὰρ μοναρχίαι, διαφέρουσι δὲ πλεῖστον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ τύραννος τὸ ἑαυτῷ συμφέρον σκοπεῖ, ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων. οὐ γάρ ἐστι βασιλεὺς ὁ μὴ αὐτάρκης καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχων· ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος οὐδενὸς προσδεῖται· τὰ ὠφέλιμα οὖν αὐτῷ μὲν οὐκ ἂν σκοποίη, τοῖς δ' ἀρχομένοις· ὁ γὰρ μὴ τοιοῦτος κληρωτὸς ἄν τις εἴη βασιλεύς. ἡ δὲ

Chap. IX.

On this Chapter see the third and fourth Books of the Politics, and the last four Books of Plato's Republic, and Sir Walter Ralegh's Maxims of State.

6. παρεκβάσεις] See Goettling's Pref. to the Politics, p. xviii.

13. τὸ ἑαυτῷ συμφέρον] See the state of the ancient tyrannies as described by Thucydides, i. c. 17. See the Rhet. i. 8.

19. κληρωτός] A king merely by good luck or chance. Aristotle appears to have had in view the method of choosing magistrates in Athens. The reader will remember the caustic jest of Socrates on this subject.

τυραννὶς ἐξ ἐναντίας ταύτῃ· τὸ γὰρ ἑαυτῷ ἀγαθὸν διώκει. καὶ φανερώτερον ἐπὶ ταύτης ὅτι χειρίστη· κάκιστον δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ βελτίστῳ. μεταβαίνει δ' ἐκ βασιλείας εἰς τυραννίδα· φαυλότης γάρ ἐστι μοναρχίας ἡ τυραννίς· ὁ δὴ μοχθηρὸς βασιλεὺς τύραννος γίνεται.

2. Aristocracy, and its perversion, Oligarchy.

Ἐξ ἀριστοκρατίας δὲ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν κακίᾳ τῶν ἀρχόντων, οἳ νέμουσι τὰ τῆς πόλεως παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν, καὶ πάντα ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς, περὶ πλείστου ποιούμενοι τὸ πλουτεῖν· ὀλίγοι δὴ ἄρχουσι καὶ μοχθηροὶ ἀντὶ τῶν ἐπιεικεστάτων.

3. Timocracy, and its perversion, Democracy.

Ἐκ δὲ δὴ τιμοκρατίας εἰς δημοκρατίαν· σύνοροι γάρ εἰσιν αὗται· πλήθους γὰρ βούλεται καὶ ἡ τιμοκρατία εἶναι, καὶ ἴσοι πάντες οἱ ἐν τῷ τιμήματι. ἥκιστα δὲ μοχθηρόν ἐστιν ἡ δημοκρατία· ἐπὶ μικρὸν γὰρ παρεκβαίνει τὸ τῆς πολιτείας εἶδος. μεταβάλλουσι μὲν οὖν μάλισθ' οὕτως αἱ πολιτεῖαι· ἐλάχιστον γὰρ οὕτω καὶ ῥᾷστα μεταβαίνουσιν.

That the types of them are found in the domestic relationships;

Ὁμοιώματα δ' αὐτῶν καὶ οἷον παραδείγματα λάβοι τις ἂν καὶ ἐν ταῖς οἰκίαις. ἡ μὲν γὰρ πατρὸς πρὸς υἱεῖς κοινωνία βασιλείας ἔχει σχῆμα· τῶν τέκνων γὰρ τῷ πατρὶ μέλει. ἐντεῦθεν δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρος τὸν Δία πατέρα προσαγορεύει· πατρικὴ γὰρ ἀρχὴ βούλεται ἡ βασιλεία εἶναι. ἐν Πέρσαις δ' ἡ τοῦ πατρὸς τυραννική· χρῶνται γὰρ ὡς δούλοις τοῖς υἱέσιν.

As that of father and son to the first;

Τυραννικὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ δεσπότου πρὸς δούλους· τὸ γὰρ τοῦ δεσπότου συμφέρον ἐν αὐτῇ

13. τιμοκρατίας] This in the Rhetoric is called by the more vague and popular term ὀλιγαρχία. Rhet. i. 8.

24. πατρική] See the Politics, i. 5.

πράττεται. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ὀρθὴ φαίνεται, ἡ Περσικὴ δ' ἡμαρτημένη· τῶν διαφερόντων γὰρ αἱ ἀρχαὶ διάφοροι. Ἀνδρὸς δὲ καὶ γυναικὸς ἀριστοκρατικὴ φαίνεται· κατ' ἀξίαν γὰρ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἄρχει, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα ἃ δεῖ τὸν ἄνδρα· ὅσα δὲ γυναικὶ ἁρμόζει, ἐκείνῃ ἀποδίδωσιν. ἁπάντων δὲ κυριεύων ὁ ἀνὴρ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν μεθίστησιν· παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐχ ᾗ ἀμείνων. ἐνίοτε δὲ ἄρχουσιν αἱ γυναῖκες ἐπίκληροι οὖσαι· οὐ δὴ γίνονται κατ' ἀρετὴν αἱ ἀρχαί, ἀλλὰ διὰ πλοῦτον καὶ δύναμιν, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις. Τιμοκρατικῇ δ' ἔοικεν ἡ τῶν ἀδελφῶν· ἴσοι γάρ, πλὴν ἐφ' ὅσον ταῖς ἡλικίαις διαλλάττουσιν· διόπερ ἂν πολὺ ταῖς ἡλικίαις διαφέρωσιν, οὐκέτι ἀδελφικὴ γίνεται ἡ φιλία. δημοκρατία δὲ μάλιστα μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἀδεσπότοις τῶν οἰκήσεων (ἐνταῦθα γὰρ πάντες ἐξ ἴσου), καὶ ἐν αἷς ἀσθενὴς ὁ ἄρχων καὶ ἑκάστῳ ἐξουσία.

Of husband and wife to the second.

Of brethren to the third.

CHAP. X.

Of the peculiar Friendships in peculiar forms of Government.

13 ΚΑΘ' ἑκάστην δὲ τῶν πολιτειῶν φιλία φαίνεται, ἐφ' ὅσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, βασιλεῖ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς βασιλευομένους ἐν ὑπεροχῇ εὐεργεσίας· εὖ γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς βασιλευομένους, εἴπερ ἀγαθὸς ὢν ἐπιμελεῖται αὐτῶν, ἵν' εὖ πράττωσιν, ὥσπερ

Of friendships which are according to kingly governments.

Chap. X.

After having distinguished the several forms of political communities, Aristotle now divides the several species of friendship in the same manner, showing what relation each bears to each.

νομεὺς προβάτων· ὅθεν καὶ Ὅμηρος τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα ποιμένα λαῶν εἶπεν. τοιαύτη δὲ καὶ ἡ πατρική, διαφέρει δὲ τῷ μεγέθει τῶν εὐεργετημάτων· αἴτιος γὰρ τοῦ εἶναι, δοκοῦντος μεγίστου, καὶ τροφῆς καὶ παιδείας· καὶ τοῖς προγόνοις δὲ ταῦτα ἀπονέμεται· φύσει τε ἀρχικὸν πατὴρ υἱῶν καὶ πρόγονοι ἐκγόνων καὶ βασιλεὺς βασιλευομένων. ἐν ὑπεροχῇ δὲ αἱ φιλίαι αὗται, διὸ καὶ τιμῶνται οἱ γονεῖς. καὶ τὸ δίκαιον δὴ ἐν τούτοις οὐ ταὐτὸ ἀλλὰ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἡ φιλία.

To Aristocracy.

Καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὲ πρὸς γυναῖκα ἡ αὐτὴ φιλία καὶ ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ· κατ' ἀρετὴν γάρ, καὶ τῷ ἀμείνονι πλέον ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ ἁρμόζον ἑκάστῳ· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον.

To Timocracy.

Ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀδελφῶν τῇ ἑταιρικῇ ἔοικεν· ἴσοι γὰρ καὶ ἡλικιῶται, οἱ τοιοῦτοι δ' ὁμοπαθεῖς καὶ ὁμοήθεις ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. ἔοικε δὴ ταύτῃ καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν τιμοκρατικήν· ἴσοι γὰρ οἱ πολῖται βούλονται καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι· ἐν μέρει δὴ τὸ ἄρχειν, καὶ ἐξ ἴσου· οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἡ φιλία.

In their perversions friendship is seldom found: and not at all in a tyranny, equally as there is no justice.

Ἐν δὲ ταῖς παρεκβάσεσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐπὶ μικρόν ἐστιν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ φιλία ἐστί, καὶ ἥκιστα ἐν τῇ χειρίστῃ· ἐν τυραννίδι γὰρ οὐδὲν ἢ μικρὸν φιλίας. ἐν οἷς γὰρ μηδὲν κοινόν ἐστι τῷ ἄρχοντι καὶ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ, οὐδὲ φιλία· οὐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιον· ἀλλ'

3. διαφέρει δέ] *But excels the kingly* (sc. φιλίας) *in the magnitude of its benefactions.*

6. ταῦτα] ἤτοι συγκεχώρηται παρ' ἡμῶν τὸ ἀγαγεῖν εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἡμᾶς καὶ τὰ λοιπά, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἀμέσως, ἀλλὰ διὰ μέσων τῶν πατέρων. ἢ καὶ τοῖς προγόνοις ταῦτα ἀπονέμεται παρὰ τῶν πατέρων ἡμῶν τὸ ἀγαγεῖν αὐτοὺς εἰς τὸ εἶναι. Schol.

9. τιμῶνται] According to the rule before given, p. 328.

25. οὐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιον] See p. 193.

οἷον τεχνίτῃ πρὸς ὄργανον καὶ ψυχῇ πρὸς σῶμα καὶ δεσπότῃ πρὸς δοῦλον· ὠφελεῖται μὲν γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν χρωμένων, φιλία δ' οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχα οὐδὲ δίκαιον. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πρὸς ἵππον ἢ βοῦν, οὐδὲ πρὸς δοῦλον ᾗ δοῦλος. οὐδὲν γὰρ κοινόν ἐστιν· ὁ γὰρ δοῦλος ἔμψυχον ὄργανον, τὸ δ' ὄργανον ἄψυχος δοῦλος. ᾗ μὲν οὖν δοῦλος, οὐκ ἔστι φιλία πρὸς αὐτόν, ᾗ δ' ἄνθρωπος· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναί τι δίκαιον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ πρὸς πάντα τὸν δυνάμενον κοινωνῆσαι νόμου καὶ συνθήκης· καὶ φιλίας δή, καθ' ὅσον ἄνθρωπος. ἐπὶ μικρὸν δὴ καὶ ἐν ταῖς τυραννίσιν αἱ φιλίαι καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἐπὶ πλεῖστον· πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ κοινὰ ἴσοις οὖσιν.

CHAP. XI.

Of Friendship formed by communities and by nature.

14 EN κοινωνίᾳ μὲν οὖν πᾶσα φιλία ἐστίν, καθάπερ εἴρηται· ἀφορίσειε δ' ἄν τις τήν τε συγγενικὴν Friendships formed by communi-

2. δεσπότῃ πρὸς δοῦλον] See Pol. p. 6. and Eth. p. 194.

6. ἔμψυχον ὄργανον] Compare Pol. i. 2. τῶν δ' ὀργάνων, τὰ μὲν ἄψυχα τὰ δ' ἔμψυχα· οἷον τῷ κυβερνήτῃ ὁ μὲν οἴαξ ἄψυχον ὁ δὲ πρωρεὺς ἔμψυχον· ὁ γὰρ ὑπηρέτης ἐν ὀργάνου εἴδει ταῖς τέχναις ἐστίν. οὕτω καὶ τὸ κτῆμα ὄργανον πρὸς ζωήν ἐστι καὶ ἡ κτῆσις πλῆθος ὀργάνων ἐστί, καὶ ὁ δοῦλος κτῆμά τι ἔμψυχον, καὶ ὥσπερ ὄργανον πρὸ ὀργάνων πᾶς ὁ ὑπηρέτης.

CHAP. XI.

In this chapter, Aristotle considers two divisions of friendship generally, derived from a consideration of their efficient causes, society and nature, (κοινωνία, φύσις.) Not but what all friendship depends upon society, but some entirely, others not so. These he again subdivides; the first into πολιτικαί (used in its strict sense), φυλετικαί, συμπλοϊκαί, and the like; these depend upon certain conditions

ties divided from those formed by nature.

καὶ τὴν ἑταιρικήν. αἱ δὲ πολιτικαὶ καὶ φυλετικαὶ καὶ συμπλοϊκαί, καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται, κοινωνικαῖς ἐοίκασι μᾶλλον· οἷον γὰρ καθ' ὁμολογίαν τινὰ φαίνονται εἶναι. εἰς ταύτας δὲ τάξειεν ἄν τις καὶ τὴν ξενικήν.

Those formed by nature of various kinds.

1. Of parents and children.

Καὶ ἡ συγγενικὴ δὲ φαίνεται πολυειδὴς εἶναι, ἠρτῆσθαι δὲ πᾶσα ἐκ τῆς πατρικῆς· οἱ γονεῖς μὲν γὰρ στέργουσι τὰ τέκνα ὡς ἑαυτῶν τι ὄντα, τὰ δὲ τέκνα τοὺς γονεῖς ὡς ἀπ' ἐκείνων τι ὄντα. μᾶλλον δ' ἴσασιν οἱ γονεῖς τὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἢ τὰ γεννηθέντα ὅτι ἐκ τούτων, καὶ μᾶλλον συνῳκείωται τὸ ἀφ' οὗ τῷ γεννηθέντι ἢ τὸ γενόμενον τῷ ποιήσαντι· τὸ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτοῦ οἰκεῖον τῷ ἀφ' οὗ, οἷον ὀδοὺς ἢ θρὶξ ἢ ὁτιοῦν τῷ ἔχοντι· ἐκείνῳ δ' οὐθὲν τὸ ἀφ' οὗ, ἢ ἧττον. καὶ τῷ πλήθει δὲ τοῦ χρόνου· οἱ μὲν γὰρ εὐθὺς γενόμενα στέργουσιν, τὰ δὲ προελθόντα τοῖς χρόνοις τοὺς γονεῖς, σύνεσιν ἢ αἴσθησιν λαβόντα. ἐκ τούτων δὲ δῆλον καὶ δι' ἃ φιλοῦσι μᾶλλον αἱ μητέρες.

2. Of brothers.

Γονεῖς μὲν οὖν τέκνα φιλοῦσιν ὡς ἑαυτούς (τὰ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῶν οἷον ἕτεροι αὐτοὶ τῷ κεχωρίσθαι), τέκνα δὲ γονεῖς ὡς ἀπ' ἐκείνων πεφυκότα, ἀδελφοὶ δ' ἀλλήλους τῷ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν

entered into by the communicating parties, and for which such communities are formed. But in natural friendships no such conditions are made; nature herself is the tacit organ, engendering them in the minds of both parties, who in the formation of these friendships are as it were guided by a natural instinct. These are of two kinds; one arising from the ties of blood (*συγγενικαί*), of which there are four kinds, I. parents and children; II. brothers; III. cousins and kindred; IV. husband and wife; or from the ties of companionship (*ἑταιρικαί*.)

13. *οἰκεῖον*] *Proprium, proper to.* Aristotle seems to use this word in the same way as in the argument at the commencement of the Politics; that the part is proper to the whole, belongs to the whole, not the whole to the part.

19. *μητέρες*] See ix. 7.

πεφυκέναι· ἡ γὰρ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ταὐτότης ἀλλήλοις ταὐτοποιεῖ· ὅθεν φασὶ ταὐτὸν αἷμα καὶ ῥίζαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. εἰσὶ δὴ ταὐτό πως καὶ ἐν διῃρημένοις.

3. Of companions.

Μέγα δὲ πρὸς φιλίαν καὶ τὸ σύντροφον καὶ τὸ καθ' ἡλικίαν· ἧλιξ γὰρ ἥλικα, καὶ οἱ συνήθεις ἑταῖροι· διὸ καὶ ἡ ἀδελφικὴ τῇ ἑταιρικῇ ὁμοιοῦται.

4. Of kith and kin.

Ἀνεψιοὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ συγγενεῖς ἐκ τούτων συνῳκείωνται· τῷ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι. γίγνονται δ' οἱ μὲν οἰκειότεροι οἱ δ' ἀλλοτριώτεροι τῷ σύνεγγυς ἢ πόρρω τὸν ἀρχηγὸν εἶναι.

The peculiarities in the friendship of parents;

Ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν πρὸς γονεῖς φιλία τέκνοις, καὶ ἀνθρώποις πρὸς θεούς, ὡς πρὸς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὑπερέχον· εὖ γὰρ πεποιήκασι τὰ μέγιστα· τοῦ γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τραφῆναι αἴτιοι, καὶ γενομένοις τοῦ παιδευθῆναι. ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον ἡ τοιαύτη φιλία μᾶλλον τῶν ὀθνείων, ὅσῳ καὶ κοινότερος ὁ βίος αὐτοῖς ἐστίν.

Of brothers;

Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀδελφικῇ ἅπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἑταιρικῇ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσι, καὶ ὅλως ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις, ὅσῳ οἰκειότεροι καὶ ἐκ γενετῆς ὑπάρχουσι στέργοντες ἀλλήλους, καὶ ὅσῳ ὁμοηθέστεροι οἱ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ σύντροφοι καὶ παιδευθέντες ὁμοίως· καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον δοκιμασία πλείστη καὶ βεβαιοτάτη. ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς τῶν συγγενῶν τὰ φιλικά.

Of husband and wife.

Ἀνδρὶ δὲ καὶ γυναικὶ φιλία δοκεῖ κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχειν· ἄνθρωπος γὰρ τῇ φύσει συνδυαστικὸν μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτικόν, ὅσῳ πρότερον καὶ ἀναγκαιότερον οἰκία πόλεως, καὶ

5. ἧλιξ] See the Rhetoric, i. 11. See also p. 315.

12. πρὸς θεούς] See p. 317. and note.

28. πρότερον] Compare the Polit. i. 1.

τεκνοποιία κοινότερον τοῖς ζῴοις. τοῖς μὲν οὖν ἄλλοις ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἡ κοινωνία ἐστίν, οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι οὐ μόνον τῆς τεκνοποιίας χάριν συνοικοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον· εὐθὺς γὰρ διῄρηται τὰ ἔργα, καὶ ἔστιν ἕτερα ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός· ἐπαρκοῦσιν οὖν ἀλλήλοις, εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τιθέντες τὰ ἴδια. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ. εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ δι' ἀρετήν, εἰ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶεν· ἔστι γὰρ ἑκατέρου ἀρετή, καὶ χαίροιεν ἂν τῷ τοιούτῳ. σύνδεσμος δὲ τὰ τέκνα δοκεῖ εἶναι· διὸ θᾶττον οἱ ἄτεκνοι διαλύονται· τὰ γὰρ τέκνα κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀμφοῖν, συνέχει δὲ τὸ κοινόν. τὸ δὲ πῶς συμβιωτέον ἀνδρὶ πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ ὅλως φίλῳ πρὸς φίλον, οὐδὲν ἕτερον φαίνεται ζητεῖσθαι ἢ πῶς δίκαιον· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν φαίνεται τῷ φίλῳ πρὸς τὸν φίλον καὶ τὸν ὀθνεῖον καὶ τὸν ἑταῖρον καὶ τὸν συμφοιτητήν.

CHAP. XII.

Of offences which arise in Friendship between equals, and how they are to be avoided.

Rule for requiting friends.

ΤΡΙΤΤΩΝ δ' οὐσῶν φιλιῶν, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται, καὶ καθ' ἑκάστην. τῶν μὲν ἐν ἰσότητι

1. τεκνοποιία] See the first and second chapters of the Politics, first Book.

CHAP. XII.

Aristotle now proceeds to speak of the causes of the corruption of friendship, which subject is continued into the next Book, first premising a general rule for avoiding offences, which cause the dissolution of friendship. Towards those who are equal

φίλων ὄντων τῶν δὲ καθ' ὑπεροχήν (καὶ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀγαθοὶ φίλοι γίνονται καὶ ἀμείνων χείρονι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς, καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἰσάζοντες ταῖς ὠφελείαις καὶ διαφέροντες), τοὺς ἴσους μὲν κατ' ἰσότητα δεῖ τῷ φιλεῖν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἰσάζειν, τοὺς δ' ἀνίσους τῷ ἀνάλογον ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς ἀποδιδόναι. Γίγνεται δὲ τὰ ἐγκλήματα καὶ αἱ μέμψεις ἐν τῇ κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλίᾳ ἢ μόνῃ ἢ μάλιστα εὐλόγως. οἱ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἀρετὴν φίλοι ὄντες εὖ δρᾶν ἀλλήλους προθυμοῦνται· τοῦτο γὰρ ἀρετῆς καὶ φιλίας. πρὸς τοῦτο δ' ἁμιλλωμένων οὐκ ἔστιν ἐγκλήματα οὐδὲ μάχαι· τὸν γὰρ φιλοῦντα καὶ εὖ ποιοῦντα οὐδεὶς δυσχεραίνει, ἀλλ' ἐὰν ᾖ χαρίεις, ἀμύνεται εὖ δρῶν. ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων, τυγχάνων οὗ ἐφίεται, οὐκ ἂν ἐγκαλοίη τῷ φίλῳ· ἑκάτερος γὰρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐφίεται. οὐ πάνυ δ' οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς δι' ἡδονήν· ἅμα γὰρ ἀμφοῖν γίνεται οὗ ὀρέγονται, εἰ τῷ συνδιάγειν χαίρουσιν. γελοῖος δ' ἂν φαίνοιτο καὶ ὁ ἐγκαλῶν τῷ μὴ τέρποντι, ἐξὸν μὴ συνδιημερεύειν. ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἐγκληματική· ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ γὰρ χρώμενοι ἀλλήλοις ἀεὶ τοῦ πλείονος δέονται, καὶ ἔλαττον ἔχειν οἴονται τοῦ προσήκοντος, καὶ μέμφονται ὅτι οὐχ ὅσων δέονται τοσούτων τυγχάνουσιν ἄξιοι ὄντες· οἱ δ' εὖ ποιοῦντες οὐ δύνανται ἐπαρκεῖν τοσαῦτα ὅσων οἱ πάσχοντες δέονται. Ἔοικε δέ, καθάπερ τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι διττόν, τὸ μὲν ἄγραφον τὸ δὲ κατὰ νόμον, καὶ τῆς κατὰ

Complaints are almost entirely confined to friendships formed from interested motives.

On what account such complaints arise.

the Arithmetical ratio of return is to be observed, towards those who are not, the Geometrical proportion.

28. ἄγραφον] See the Rhetoric, i. 13.

τὸ χρήσιμον φιλίας ἡ μὲν ἠθικὴ ἡ δὲ νομικὴ εἶναι. γίγνεται οὖν τὰ ἐγκλήματα μάλισθ' ὅταν μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν συναλλάξωσι καὶ διαλύωνται. ἔστι δὴ νομικὴ μὲν ἡ ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς, ἡ μὲν πάμπαν ἀγοραία ἐκ χειρὸς εἰς χεῖρα, ἡ δὲ ἐλευθεριωτέρα εἰς χρόνον, καθ' ὁμολογίαν δὲ τί ἀντὶ τίνος. δῆλον δ' ἐν ταύτῃ τὸ ὀφείλημα κοὐκ ἀμφίλογον, φιλικὸν δὲ τὴν ἀναβολὴν ἔχει· διὸ παρ' ἐνίοις οὐκ εἰσὶ τούτων δίκαι, ἀλλ' οἴονται δεῖν στέργειν τοὺς κατὰ πίστιν συναλλάξαντας. ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς, ἀλλ' ὡς φίλῳ δωρεῖται ἢ ὁτιδήποτε ἄλλο. κομίζεσθαι δὲ ἀξιοῖ τὸ ἴσον ἢ πλέον, ὡς οὐ δεδωκὼς ἀλλὰ χρήσας. οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ συναλλάξας καὶ διαλυόμενος ἐγκαλέσει. τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι μὲν πάντας ἢ τοὺς πλείστους τὰ καλά, προαιρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ ὠφέλιμα. καλὸν δὲ τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν μὴ ἵνα ἀντιπάθῃ, ὠφέλιμον δὲ τὸ εὐεργετεῖσθαι.

How such complaints may be avoided. Δυναμένῳ δὴ ἀνταποδοτέον τὴν ἀξίαν ὧν ἔπαθεν, καὶ ἑκόντι· ἄκοντα γὰρ φίλον οὐ ποιητέον. ὡς δὴ διαμαρτόντα ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ καὶ εὖ παθόντα ὑφ' οὗ οὐκ ἔδει· οὐ γὰρ ὑπὸ φίλου, οὐδὲ δι' αὐτὸ τοῦτο δρῶντος· καθάπερ οὖν ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς εὐεργετηθέντα διαλυτέον. καὶ ὁμολογήσαι δ' ἂν δυνάμενος ἀποδώσειν· ἀδυνατοῦντα δ' οὐδ' ὁ δοὺς ἠξίωσεν ἄν· ὥστ' εἰ δυνατός, ἀποδοτέον. ἐν ἀρχῇ δ' ἐπισκεπτέον ὑφ'

20. ἄκοντα γάρ] The Paraphrast appears to me to have correctly interpreted this passage, although much diversity of opinion exists concerning it. οὐ γὰρ ἕλκειν δεῖ βίᾳ πρὸς τὴν ἀληθῆ φιλίαν μὴ βουλομένους, ἀλλὰ δυσχεραίνειν ὅτι ἔλαβον εὖ παθόντες ὑφ' οὗ οὐκ ἔδει, οὐ γὰρ ὑπὸ φίλου, καὶ ζητεῖν ὅπως ἑκόντες ἀποτρίψωνται τὰς αἰσχρὰς εὐεργεσίας, ἃς ἄκοντες ἐδέξαντο τῷ ἀγνοεῖν τὸν εὐεργετοῦντα.

οὗ εὐεργετεῖται καὶ ἐπὶ τίνι, ὅπως ἐπὶ τούτοις ὑπομένῃ ἢ μή. Ἀμφισβήτησιν δ' ἔχει πότερα δεῖ τῇ τοῦ παθόντος ὠφελείᾳ μετρεῖν καὶ πρὸς ταύτην ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν, ἢ τῇ τοῦ δράσαντος εὐεργεσίᾳ. οἱ μὲν γὰρ παθόντες τοιαῦτά φασι λαβεῖν παρὰ τῶν εὐεργετῶν ἃ μικρὰ ἦν ἐκείνοις καὶ ἐξῆν παρ' ἑτέρων λαβεῖν, κατασμικρίζοντες· οἱ δ' ἀνάπαλιν τὰ μέγιστα τῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἃ παρ' ἄλλων οὐκ ἦν, καὶ ἐν κινδύνοις ἢ τοιαύταις χρείαις. ἆρ' οὖν διὰ μὲν τὸ χρήσιμον τῆς φιλίας οὔσης ἡ τοῦ παθόντος ὠφέλεια μέτρον ἐστίν; οὗτος γὰρ ὁ δεόμενος, καὶ ἐπαρκεῖ αὐτῷ ὡς κομιούμενος τὴν ἴσην· τοσαύτη οὖν γεγένηται ἡ ἐπικουρία ὅσον οὗτος ὠφέληται, καὶ ἀποδοτέον δὴ αὐτῷ ὅσον ἐπηύρατο, ἢ καὶ πλέον· κάλλιον γάρ. ἐν δὲ ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐγκλήματα μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, μέτρῳ δ' ἔοικεν ἡ τοῦ δράσαντος προαίρεσις· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ καὶ τοῦ ἤθους ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει τὸ κύριον.

Who is to fix the value of the benefits.

CHAP. XIII.

Of offences which arise in Friendships, where one party is superior to the other.

16 ΔΙΑΦΕΡΟΝΤΑΙ δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς καθ' ὑπεροχὴν φιλίαις· ἀξιοῖ γὰρ ἑκάτερος πλέον ἔχειν, ὅταν

How and what equality of return

20. καθ' ὑπεροχὴν] This particular friendship is more subject to complaints and dissensions than any others being generally formed, as has been already stated for the sake of mutual interests, and such are generally full of recriminations. (See p. 343.) And because the good man very rarely contracts friendship with one in a more exalted station than himself, on account of the difficulty of making an adequate return of favours.

is to be observed where one party greatly exceeds the other.

δὲ τοῦτο γίγνηται, διαλύεται ἡ φιλία. οἴεται γὰρ ὅ τε βελτίων προσήκειν αὐτῷ πλέον ἔχειν· τῷ γὰρ ἀγαθῷ νέμεσθαι πλέον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ ὠφελιμώτερος· ἀχρεῖον γὰρ ὄντα οὔ φασι δεῖν ἴσον ἔχειν· λειτουργίαν τε γὰρ γίνεσθαι καὶ οὐ φιλίαν, εἰ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν τῶν ἔργων ἔσται τὰ ἐκ τῆς φιλίας· οἴονται γάρ, καθάπερ ἐν χρημάτων κοινωνίᾳ πλεῖον λαμβάνουσιν οἱ συμβαλλόμενοι πλεῖον, οὕτω δεῖν καὶ ἐν τῇ φιλίᾳ. ὁ δ' ἐνδεὴς καὶ ὁ χείρων ἀνάπαλιν· φίλου γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι τὸ ἐπαρκεῖν τοῖς ἐνδεέσιν· τί γάρ, φασίν, ὄφελος σπουδαίῳ ἢ δυνάστῃ φίλον εἶναι, μηθέν γε μέλλοντα ἀπολαύειν; ἔοικε δὲ ἑκάτερος ὀρθῶς ἀξιοῦν, καὶ δεῖν ἑκατέρῳ πλέον νέμειν ἐκ τῆς φιλίας, οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ δέ, ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν ὑπερέχοντι τιμῆς, τῷ δ' ἐνδεεῖ κέρδους· τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς εὐεργεσίας ἡ τιμὴ γέρας, τῆς δ' ἐνδείας ἐπικουρία τὸ κέρδος.

Which is also observed in the distribution of state rewards.

Οὕτω δ' ἔχειν τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις φαίνεται· οὐ γὰρ τιμᾶται ὁ μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν τῷ κοινῷ πορίζων· τὸ κοινὸν γὰρ δίδοται τῷ τὸ κοινὸν εὐεργετοῦντι, ἡ τιμὴ δὲ κοινόν. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἅμα χρηματίζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ τιμᾶσθαι· ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τὸ ἔλαττον οὐδεὶς ὑπομένει. τῷ δὴ περὶ χρήματα ἐλαττουμένῳ τιμὴν ἀπονέμουσι καὶ τῷ δωροδόκῳ χρήματα· τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν γὰρ ἐπανισοῖ καὶ σώζει τὴν φιλίαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται.

The inferior therefore is to make a return to the best of his

Οὕτω δὴ καὶ τοῖς ἀνίσοις ὁμιλητέον, καὶ τῷ εἰς χρήματα ὠφελουμένῳ ἢ εἰς ἀρετὴν τιμὴν ἀνταποδοτέον, ἀνταποδι-

24. ὑπομένει] *No man can endure to have less than he ought on all occasions.*

δόντα τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον. τὸ δυνατὸν γὰρ ἡ φιλία ἐπιζητεῖ, οὐ τὸ κατ᾽ ἀξίαν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐν πᾶσι, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς τιμαῖς καὶ τοὺς γονεῖς· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἄν ποτε τὴν ἀξίαν ἀποδοίη, εἰς δύναμιν δὲ ὁ θεραπεύων ἐπιεικὴς εἶναι δοκεῖ. διὸ κἂν δόξειεν οὐκ ἐξεῖναι υἱῷ πατέρα ἀπείπασθαι, πατρὶ δ᾽ υἱόν· ὀφείλοντα γὰρ ἀποδοτέον, οὐθὲν δὲ ποιήσας ἄξιον τῶν ὑπηργμένων δέδρακεν, ὥστ᾽ ἀεὶ ὀφείλει. οἷς δ᾽ ὀφείλεται, ἐξουσία ἀφεῖναι· καὶ τῷ πατρὶ δή. ἅμα δ᾽ ἴσως οὐδείς ποτ᾽ ἂν ἀποστῆναι δοκεῖ μὴ ὑπερβάλλοντος μοχθηρίᾳ· χωρὶς γὰρ τῆς φυσικῆς φιλίας τὴν ἐπικουρίαν ἀνθρωπικὸν μὴ διωθεῖσθαι. τῷ δὲ φευκτὸν ἢ οὐ σπουδαστὸν τὸ ἐπαρκεῖν, μοχθηρῷ ὄντι· εὖ πάσχειν γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ βούλονται, τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν φεύγουσιν ὡς ἀλυσιτελές. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω.

ability; and though it be not an equivalent, it should be received as such, as the father receives the duty of a son.

INTRODUCTION TO BOOK IX.

In the concluding part of the last Book, Aristotle has shown what are the causes which lead to the dissolution of Friendship, and the means of preventing such effects, which brought him to the consideration of the offices of Friendship, and the returns which ought to be made by friends, more particularly when the parties are unequal. The same subject is also pursued in this book, in which, after showing that in dissimilar Friendship, of all others, dissensions are likely to arise, and that in Friendship, which is a kind of Justice, where the parties are unequal a geometrical proportion must be observed, he proceeds to determine the point who should estimate the value of the benefit, the giver or receiver, in order to the making of a just return. This point being determined, he then lays down some general precepts for the guidance of our conduct in the returning of favors, examining whether every kind of return is justifiable or not, and how far, and in what kinds; and whether, when from alteration of circumstances or changes in individuals one of the essentials of Friendship is lost, so that no adequate return can be made, the dissolution of Friendship is justifiable; and thus concludes that part of his subject.

But the examination of this last question naturally engages him in the consideration of another springing out of it; What is the origin, and what are the essentials for the existence of Friendship? Considering it then in its most simple and primitive state, the love of a man towards himself, (for a friend is a second self, and how can he love another as a second self who loves not his own

self?) Aristotle is led to a consideration of self-love, and whether it is possible for one to love another who loves not himself. And if this be not possible, and the love of one's self must be the first of all friendships, and the good man only can love himself, and the good man is the canon of all moral truth, we must seek for the essentials of friendship in the love of the good man towards himself: but this consists of three things; benevolence (εὔνοια), unanimity (ὁμόνοια), and beneficence (εὐεργεσία). To each of these then he devotes a separate chapter, and concludes the book with a consideration of certain questions arising out of this subject.

As to the need of friends, their number, and society.

ARISTOTELIS

ETHICA NICOMACHEA.

LIB. IX.

CHAP. I.

Of the causes of quarrels in Friendship—and of the right estimate of benefits in order to preserve Friendship.

The dissimilar friendship may be preserved, if a proportionately return of benefits be observed.

ΕΝ πάσαις δὲ ταῖς ἀνομοιοειδέσι φιλίαις τὸ ἀνάλογον ἰσάζει καὶ σώζει τὴν φιλίαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται, οἷον καὶ ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ τῷ σκυτοτόμῳ ἀντὶ τῶν ὑποδημάτων ἀμοιβὴ γίνεται κατ' ἀξίαν, καὶ τῷ ὑφάντῃ, καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς. ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν πεπόρισται κοινὸν μέτρον τὸ νόμισμα, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο δὴ πάντα ἀναφέρεται, καὶ τούτῳ μετρεῖται· ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐρωτικῇ ἐνίοτε μὲν ὁ ἐραστὴς

1. ἀνομοιοειδέσι] *Of different species.* That is, when friendship is formed between two or more, but each person has a different motive. As the poor loves the rich for the sake of money or reward; the rich the poor for the sake of his services or respect, and so on. In such friendships, of course, a return in kind is indeed no return, since it is not a return of the object for which the connexion was formed. As has been already shown in the case of commutative justice. (See p. 187. sq. Compare also p. 344.) If one party, therefore, has received a certain gratification in the particular object which he had in view, he must make a return in proportion of the particular object which the other party had in view. But in friendships formed from motives of virtue, of course a return in kind is equivalent, since the object of both parties is the same.

3. οἷον καὶ ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ] See v. 7.

6. κοινὸν μέτρον] See p. 187, 23. sq.

ἐγκαλεῖ ὅτι ὑπερφιλῶν οὐκ ἀντιφιλεῖται, οὐθὲν ἔχων φιλητόν, εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, πολλάκις δ' ὁ ἐρώμενος ὅτι πρότερον ἐπαγγελλόμενος πάντα νῦν οὐθὲν ἐπιτελεῖ. συμβαίνει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐπειδὰν ὁ μὲν δι' ἡδονὴν τὸν ἐρώμενον φιλῇ, ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον τὸν ἐραστήν, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχῃ· διὰ ταῦτα γὰρ τῆς φιλίας οὔσης διάλυσις γίνεται, ἐπειδὰν μὴ γίνηται ὧν ἕνεκα ἐφίλουν· οὐ γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἔστεργον ἀλλὰ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, οὐ μόνιμα ὄντα· διὸ τοιαῦται καὶ αἱ φιλίαι. ἡ δὲ τῶν ἠθῶν καθ' αὑτὴν οὖσα μένει, καθάπερ εἴρηται. διαφέρονται δὲ καὶ ὅταν ἕτερα γίγνηται αὐτοῖς καὶ μὴ ὧν ὀρέγονται· ὅμοιον γὰρ τῷ μηθὲν γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν οὗ ἐφίεται μὴ τυγχάνῃ, οἷον καὶ τῷ κιθαρῳδῷ ὁ ἐπαγγελλόμενος, καὶ ὅσῳ ἄμεινον ᾄσειεν, τοσούτῳ πλείω· εἰς ἕω δ' ἀπαιτοῦντι τὰς ὑποσχέσεις ἀνθ' ἡδονῆς ἡδονὴν ἀποδεδωκέναι ἔφη. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἑκάτερος τοῦτο ἐβούλετο, ἱκανῶς ἂν εἶχεν· εἰ δ' ὁ μὲν τέρψιν ὁ δὲ κέρδος, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἔχει ὁ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ κατὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν καλῶς· ὧν γὰρ δεόμενος τυγχάνει, τούτοις καὶ προσέχει, κἀκείνου γε χάριν ταῦτα δώσει.

In whose power the determination of the value of the return ought to be.

Τὴν ἀξίαν δὲ ποτέρου τάξαι ἐστί, τοῦ προϊεμένου ἢ τοῦ προλαβόντος; ὁ γὰρ προϊέμενος ἔοικ' ἐπι-

10. ἡ δὲ τῶν ἠθῶν] *But virtuous friendship* ——.

24. προϊέμενος] He who commences with conferring a favour upon another, seems to leave to the person upon whom the favour is conferred the fixing the estimate of the return. As Protagoras who conferred the favour first, by teaching his disciples, and left them to fix his reward. And in such cases, the person who confers the services ought to be satisfied with the reward which is given him. And although by the persons gratified an equivalent return is not always made, yet such persons escape censure because they violate no stipulation. But when a stipulation is made, and

τρέπειν ἐκείνῳ. ὅπερ φασὶ καὶ Πρωταγόραν ποιεῖν· ὅτε γὰρ διδάξειεν ἀδήποτε, τιμῆσαι τὸν μαθόντα ἐκέλευεν ὅσου δοκεῖ ἄξια ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ ἐλάμβανε τοσοῦτον. ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δ' ἐνίοις ἀρέσκει τὸ "μισθὸς δ' ἀνδρί." οἱ δὲ προλαβόντες τὸ ἀργύριον, εἶτα μηθὲν ποιοῦντες ὧν ἔφασαν, διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν, εἰκότως ἐν ἐγκλήμασι γίνονται· οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτελοῦσιν ἃ ὡμολόγησαν. τοῦτο δ' ἴσως ποιεῖν οἱ σοφισταὶ ἀναγκάζονται διὰ τὸ μηθένα ἂν δοῦναι ἀργύριον ὧν ἐπίστανται. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ὧν ἔλαβον τὸν μισθόν, μὴ ποιοῦντες εἰκότως ἐν ἐγκλήμασίν εἰσιν.

In cases of pure friendship.

Ἐν οἷς δὲ μὴ γίγνεται διομολογία τῆς ὑπουργίας, οἱ μὲν δι' αὑτοὺς προϊέμενοι εἴρηται ὅτι ἀνέγκλητοι· τοιαύτη γὰρ ἡ κατ' ἀρετὴν φιλία. τὴν ἀμοιβήν τε ποιητέον κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν· αὕτη γὰρ τοῦ φίλου καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς. οὕτω δ' ἔοικε καὶ τοῖς φιλοσοφίας κοινωνήσασιν· οὐ γὰρ πρὸς χρήμαθ' ἡ ἀξία μετρεῖται, τιμή τ' ἰσόρροπος οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, ἀλλ' ἴσως ἱκανόν, καθάπερ καὶ πρὸς θεοὺς καὶ πρὸς γονεῖς, τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον.

In cases where friendship is formed from motives of mutual interest or pleasure.

Μὴ τοιαύτης δ' οὔσης τῆς δόσεως ἀλλ' ἐπί τινι, μάλιστα μὲν ἴσως δεῖ τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν γίγνεσθαι δοκοῦσαν ἀμφοῖν κατ' ἀξίαν εἶναι, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ συμβαίνοι, οὐ μόνον ἀναγκαῖον δόξειεν ἂν τὸν προέ-

he who has received a benefit upon certain conditions makes no equivalent return, and breaks his promise, as was the case with the Sophists, he is exposed to very great censure.

1. Πρωταγόραν] Of Protagoras, see Diog. Laert. ix. §. 52. and Menag. ib. See also Geel's Hist. Sophist. in v. Protag.

5. μισθός] Compare Hesiod. Op. et Dier. v. 368. μισθὸς δ' ἀνδρὶ φίλῳ εἰρημένος ἄρκιος ἔστω.

22. ἐπί τινι] Sc. ἢ διὰ χρήσιμον ἢ διὰ ἡδονήν.

25. προέχοντα] This word seems to be used as equivalent to προλαβόντα. See line 5.

χοντα τάττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δίκαιον· ὅσον γὰρ οὗτος ὠφελήθη ἢ ἀνθ᾽ ὅσον τὴν ἡδονὴν εἵλετ᾽ ἄν, τοσοῦτον ἀντιλαβὼν ἕξει τὴν παρὰ τούτου ἀξίαν· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὠνίοις οὕτω φαίνεται γινόμενον, ἐνιαχοῦ τ᾽ εἰσὶ νόμοι τῶν ἑκουσίων συμβολαίων δίκας μὴ εἶναι ὡς δέον, ᾧ ἐπίστευσε, διαλυθῆναι πρὸς τοῦτον καθάπερ ἐκοινώνησεν. ᾧ γὰρ ἐπετράφθη, τοῦτον οἴεται δικαιότερον εἶναι τάξαι τοῦ ἐπιτρέψαντος. τὰ πολλὰ γὰρ οὐ τοῦ ἴσου τιμῶσιν οἱ ἔχοντες καὶ οἱ βουλόμενοι λαβεῖν· τὰ γὰρ οἰκεῖα καὶ ἃ διδόασιν ἑκάστοις φαίνεται πολλοῦ ἄξια. ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως ἡ ἀμοιβὴ γίνεται πρὸς τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἂν τάττωσιν οἱ λαβόντες. δεῖ δ᾽ ἴσως οὐ τοσούτου τιμᾶν ὅσου ἔχοντι φαίνεται ἄξιον, ἀλλ᾽ ὅσου πρὶν ἔχειν ἐτίμα.

4. ἐν τοῖς ὠνίοις] ὁ γὰρ ὠνούμενος τάττει τὴν τιμὴν καὶ μετρεῖ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ὠφελείᾳ ἢ τῇ ἡδονῇ, καὶ τοσούτου ἄξιον εἶναι λέγει τὸ ζητούμενον ὤνιον. Paraph.

12. ἡ ἀμοιβὴ γίνεται] Ex iis omnibus patet quod is debet statuere remunerationem qui accepit beneficia non is qui contulit. Et hoc videtur probasse philosophus supra per totum tam in amicitiis et societatibus quæ fiunt cum pactione quam in iis quæ sponte fiunt. Sin vero acciderit ut animus conferentis responderet judicio recipientis tunc remuneratio esset utrisque accommodata, et id est quod dicit philosophus, oportet forsitan remunerationem fieri judicio utrorumque; sed si id non accidat ut concurrant in judicia et conveniant, tunc ex parte recipientis repensio statuenda videtur qui novit et animadvertere debet quanti sit beneficium susceptum et quantum sibi profuerit et quanti æstimabat antequam susciperet. Acciaj. See p. 345.

CHAP. II.

Of the offices and return which ought to be made to friends.

2 ΑΠΟΡΙΑΝ δ' ἔχει καὶ τὰ τοιάδε, οἷον πότερα δεῖ πάντα τῷ πατρὶ ἀπονέμειν καὶ πείθεσθαι, ἢ κάμνοντα μὲν ἰατρῷ πειστέον, στρατηγὸν δὲ χειροτονητέον τὸν πολεμικόν· ὁμοίως δὲ φίλῳ μᾶλλον ἢ σπουδαίῳ ὑπηρετητέον, καὶ εὐεργέτῃ ἀνταποδοτέον χάριν μᾶλλον ἢ ἑταίρῳ δοτέον, ἐὰν ἀμφοῖν μὴ ἐνδέχηται. ἆρ' οὖν πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκριβῶς μὲν διορίσαι οὐ ῥᾴδιον; πολλὰς γὰρ καὶ παντοίας ἔχει διαφορὰς καὶ μεγέθει καὶ μικρότητι καὶ τῷ καλῷ καὶ ἀναγκαίῳ. Ὅτι δ' οὐ πάντα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀποδοτέον, οὐκ ἄδηλον. καὶ τὰς μὲν εὐεργεσίας ἀνταποδοτέον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ χαριστέον ἑταίροις, καὶ ὥσπερ δάνειον, ᾧ ὀφείλει ἀποδοτέον μᾶλλον ἢ ἑταίρῳ δοτέον. ἴσως δ' οὐδὲ τοῦτ' ἀεί, οἷον τῷ λυτρωθέντι παρὰ λῃστῶν πότερον τὸν λυσάμενον ἀντιλυτρωτέον, κἂν ὁστισοῦν ᾖ, ἢ καὶ μὴ ἑαλωκότι

Three questions proposed touching the return of benefits.

General solution of the questions.

CHAP. II.

In the first part of this chapter, Aristotle proposes three questions touching the return of benefits. First, whether obedience is to be yielded by a son to his father in all things; secondly, whether is our duty, to assist a good man or our friend when both are not possible; and lastly, whether if both be not in our power, are we to return a favour to him who has conferred one upon us, or upon our companion. To these he replies, that exact rules cannot be given for our conduct on these occasions. But as a general maxim, favours conferred ought to be returned, but not every kind to our benefactors in all cases, but we ought to be guided by what is suitable to each person: ἅπασιν ἀεὶ πειρατέον τὸ οἰκεῖον ἀπονέμειν, καὶ συγκρίνειν τὰ ἑκάστοις ὑπάρχοντα κατ' οἰκειότητα καὶ ἀρετὴν ἢ χρῆσιν.

ἀπαιτοῦντι δὲ ἀποδοτέον, ἢ τὸν πατέρα λυτρωτέον; δόξειε γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ μᾶλλον τὸν πατέρα. Ὅπερ οὖν εἴρηται, καθόλου μὲν τὸ ὀφείλημα ἀποδοτέον, ἐὰν δ' ὑπερτείνῃ ἡ δόσις τῷ καλῷ ἢ τῷ ἀναγκαίῳ, πρὸς ταῦτ' ἀποκλιτέον· ἐνίοτε γὰρ οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἴσον τὸ τὴν προϋπαρχὴν ἀμείψασθαι, ἐπειδὰν ὁ μὲν σπουδαῖον εἰδὼς εὖ ποιήσῃ, τῷ δὲ ἡ ἀνταπόδοσις γίγνηται, ὃν οἴεται μοχθηρὸν εἶναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ δανείσαντι ἐνίοτε ἀντιδανειστέον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ οἰόμενος κομιεῖσθαι ἐδάνεισεν ἐπιεικεῖ ὄντι, ὁ δ' οὐκ ἐλπίζει κομιεῖσθαι παρὰ πονηροῦ. εἴτε τοίνυν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὕτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἴσον τὸ ἀξίωμα· εἴτ' ἔχει μὲν μὴ οὕτως οἴονται δέ, οὐκ ἂν δόξαιεν ἄτοπα ποιεῖν. ὅπερ οὖν πολλάκις εἴρηται, οἱ περὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς πράξεις λόγοι ὁμοίως ἔχουσι τὸ ὡρισμένον τοῖς περὶ ἅ εἰσιν. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐ ταὐτὰ πᾶσιν ἀποδοτέον, οὐδὲ τῷ πατρὶ πάντα, καθάπερ οὐδὲ τῷ Διὶ θύεται, οὐκ ἄδηλον· ἐπεὶ δ' ἕτερα γονεῦσι καὶ ἀδελφοῖς καὶ ἑταίροις καὶ εὐεργέταις, ἑκάστοις τὰ οἰκεῖα καὶ τὰ ἁρμόττοντα ἀπονεμητέον· οὕτω δὲ καὶ ποιεῖν φαίνονται· εἰς γάμους μὲν γὰρ

More particular solution of the second and third questions.

More particular solution of the first question.

13. οὐκ ἴσον τὸ ἀξίωμα] *The character of the good and bad are not equal.* Consequently if the good man make the same return of favour to the bad as he receives from him, he breaks that rule of proportion which friendship ought to observe.

15. πολλάκις εἴρηται] See particularly p. 7, 6.

19. τῷ Διὶ θύεται] ἦσαν γάρ τινα ἃ οὐ θεμιτὸν ἐδόκει τοῖς Ἕλλησι θύειν τῷ Διί. κύνας γὰρ καὶ ὄφεις καὶ ἄλλ' ἄττα πολλὰ ἀνόσιον ἐδόκει θυσίαν προσφέρειν τῷ Διὶ πατρὶ καθ' Ἕλληνας ὄντι ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε. οὕτως οὐδὲ τῷ πατρὶ πάντα ἀποδοτέον. Schol.

21. οὕτω δὲ καί] Aristotle illustrates his argument, that what is fitting ought to be returned to each, by the conduct of men to their different relatives. We invite our relatives to marriage feasts, &c. we think this a befitting return

καλοῦσι· τοὺς συγγενεῖς· τούτοις γὰρ κοινὸν τὸ γένος καὶ αἱ περὶ τοῦτο δὴ πράξεις· καὶ εἰς τὰ κήδη δὲ μάλιστ' οἴονται δεῖν τοὺς συγγενεῖς ἀπαντᾶν διὰ ταὐτό. δόξειε δ' ἂν τροφῆς μὲν γονεῦσι δεῖν μάλιστ' ἐπαρκεῖν, ὡς ὀφείλοντας, καὶ τοῖς αἰτίοις τοῦ εἶναι κάλλιον ὂν ἢ ἑαυτοῖς εἰς ταῦτ' ἐπαρκεῖν. καὶ τιμὴν δὲ γονεῦσι καθάπερ θεοῖς, οὐ πᾶσαν δέ· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν πατρὶ καὶ μητρί· οὐδ' αὖ τὴν τοῦ σοφοῦ ἢ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ, ἀλλὰ τὴν πατρικήν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν μητρικήν. καὶ παντὶ δὲ τῷ πρεσβυτέρῳ τιμὴν τὴν καθ' ἡλικίαν, ὑπαναστάσει καὶ κατακλίσει καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις. πρὸς ἑταίρους δ' αὖ καὶ ἀδελφοὺς παρρησίαν καὶ ἁπάντων κοινότητα. καὶ συγγενέσι δὴ καὶ φυλέταις καὶ πολίταις καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἅπασιν ἀεὶ πειρατέον τὸ οἰκεῖον ἀπονέμειν, καὶ συγκρίνειν τὰ ἑκάστοις ὑπάρχοντα κατ' οἰκειότητα καὶ ἀρετὴν ἢ χρῆσιν. τῶν μὲν οὖν ὁμογενῶν ῥᾴων ἡ κρίσις, τῶν δὲ διαφερόντων

to those having a common interest with us. But to our parents we do more than this, as being greater debtors to them, not only inviting them to feasts, but providing them with sustenance, a return particularly appropriate to those from whom we have received it.

2. τὰ κήδη] Miror Argyropylum Græcum hominem et illum quidem valde doctum non vidisse quid hic valeret εἰς τὰ κήδη. Reddidit enim, ut ad sponsalia; secutus autem ille in eo est Eustratium, quod non debebat, non magnæ auctoritatis interpretem. Aretinus tamen in hoc lapsus non est. Nam præterquam quod non est dubium, quin κῆδος quoque valeat bustum et obitum: (unde ἐπικήδειος θρῆνος vocatus est fletus, lamentatioque qua propinqui lugent fato functum quempiam ipsorum; nam Statius quoque carmen funebre Græco hoc nomine indicavit,) admonere ipsos debuit, morem esse institutumque mortalium non minus quam in nuptiis, hoc tempore adesse propinquos, ac pio hoc officio fungi, atque illos quidem non invitatos, ab ostendere etiam videtur philosophus, qui ait eos solere ἀπαντᾶν ad hoc munus obeundum. VICTOR.

ἐργωδεστέρα. οὐ μὴν διά γε τοῦτο ἀποστατέον, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν ἐνδέχηται, οὕτω διοριστέον.

CHAP. III.

Upon what occasions Friendships may be dissolved, and what conduct ought to be observed in such cases.

A question as to the dissolution of friendship formed for interest or pleasure, where one party is changed.

ΕΧΕΙ δ' ἀπορίαν καὶ περὶ τοῦ διαλύεσθαι τὰς φιλίας ἢ μὴ πρὸς τοὺς μὴ διαμένοντας. ἢ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ τὸ ἡδὺ φίλους ὄντας, ὅταν μηκέτι ταῦτ' ἔχωσιν, οὐδὲν ἄτοπον διαλύεσθαι; ἐκείνων γὰρ ἦσαν φίλοι· ὧν ἀπολιπόντων εὔλογον τὸ μὴ φιλεῖν. ἐγκαλέσειε δ' ἄν τις, εἰ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαπῶν προσεποιεῖτο διὰ τὸ ἦθος· ὅπερ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴπομεν, πλεῖσται διαφοραὶ γίγνονται τοῖς φίλοις, ὅταν μὴ ὁμοίως οἴωνται καὶ ὦσι φίλοι. ὅταν μὲν οὖν διαψευσθῇ

Chap. III.

Having discussed in the preceding chapters what returns of kind offices ought to be observed towards friends, and the offences which cause the dissolution of friendship, Aristotle now proceeds to consider upon what grounds friendship may be justly dissolved. In such cases where the intimacy has been formed for the sake of pleasure or utility, the object ceasing with either party, it is reasonable that the friendship between them should cease likewise. But in such cases where friendship has been formed from virtuous motives, if one party prove vicious, or so far, in course of time, excel the other in virtue as to leave an extreme disparity between them, then it is likewise reasonable that their friendship should be destroyed, since no similarity exists between them, (τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φίλον), and no congeniality of sentiment: πῶς ἂν εἶεν φίλοι μήτ' ἀρεσκόμενοι τοῖς αὐτοῖς μήτε χαίροντες καὶ λυπούμενοι; οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ ἀλλήλους ταῦθ' ὑπάρξει αὐτοῖς, ἄνευ δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἦν φίλους εἶναι.

3. περὶ τοῦ διαλύεσθαι] *As to the dissolution or non-dissolution of friendship with those who do not continue the same.*

11. ὅταν μὴ ὁμοίως] *When they may not be friends for the same motives as they were thought to be.* Or according to some interpreters: "quando non eadem pacto, ut ipsi expectaverint, illi fuerint amici."

τις καὶ ὑπολάβῃ φιλεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ ἦθος, μηθὲν τοιοῦτον ἐκείνου πράττοντος, ἑαυτὸν αἰτιῷτ' ἄν· ὅταν δ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου προσποιήσεως ἀπατηθῇ, δίκαιον ἐγκαλεῖν τῷ ἀπατήσαντι, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς τὸ νόμισμα κιβδηλεύουσιν, ὅσῳ περὶ τιμιώτερον ἡ κακουργία. Ἐὰν δ' ἀποδέχηται ὡς ἀγαθόν, γένηται δὲ μοχθηρὸς καὶ δοκῇ, ἆρ' ἔτι φιλητέον; ἢ οὐ δυνατόν, εἴπερ μὴ πᾶν φιλητὸν ἀλλὰ τἀγαθόν; οὔτε δὲ φιλητέον πονηρὸν οὔτε δεῖ· φιλοπόνηρον γὰρ οὐ χρὴ εἶναι, οὐδ' ὁμοιοῦσθαι φαύλῳ· εἴρηται δ' ὅτι τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φίλον. ἆρ' οὖν εὐθὺς διαλυτέον; ἢ οὐ πᾶσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνιάτοις κατὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν; ἐπανόρθωσιν δ' ἔχουσι μᾶλλον βοηθητέον εἰς τὸ ἦθος ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν, ὅσῳ βέλτιον καὶ τῆς φιλίας οἰκειότερον. δόξειε δ' ἂν ὁ διαλυόμενος οὐδὲν ἄτοπον ποιεῖν· οὐ γὰρ τῷ τοιούτῳ φίλος ἦν· ἀλλοιωθέντα οὖν ἀδυνατῶν ἀνασῶσαι ἀφίσταται. εἰ δ' ὁ μὲν διαμένοι ὁ δ' ἐπιεικέστερος γένοιτο καὶ πολὺ διαλλάττοι τῇ ἀρετῇ, ἆρα χρηστέον φίλῳ, ἢ οὐκ

As to the dissolution of it, under the same or similar circumstances when formed from virtuous motives.

11. τὸ ὅμοιον] See p. 341, 5. n.

13. τοῖς ἀνιάτοις—ἐπανόρθωσιν δ' ἔχουσι] This is a truly Christian principle, though frequently neglected by those who have been led to see the folly of their conduct, who not only desert their previous companions, but even regard them with a degree of acrimony, when by no means utterly reprobate; ἀνίατοι κατὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν. "Quid ergo, inquit Aristoteles, amicitia itane dissolvetur funditus ut nullum prorsus vestigium superesse debeat? et eo loco vetus ille amicus sit habendus, quo quivis extraneus aut alienus? minime. Nam quemadmodum plus amicis quam alienis ita et huic propter pristinæ memoriam amicitiæ aliquid erit tribuendum, quibusdam in rebus interdum gratificandum, exceptis illis plane perditis et profligatis seu insigniter improbis. Qua de re extat et elegans locus in Lælio Ciceronis: cap. 21. Quamobrem primum danda opera est, nequa amicorum dissidia fiant: sin tale aliquid evenerit, ut extinctæ potius amicitiæ, quam oppressæ esse videantur." GIPH.

18. ἀνασῶσαι] *To save and recover.*

ἐνδέχεται; ἐν μεγάλῃ δὲ διαστάσει μάλιστα δῆλον γίνεται, οἷον ἐν ταῖς παιδικαῖς φιλίαις· εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν διαμένοι τὴν διάνοιαν παῖς ὁ δ' ἀνὴρ εἴη οἷος κράτιστος, πῶς ἂν εἶεν φίλοι μήτ' ἀρεσκόμενοι τοῖς αὐτοῖς μήτε χαίροντες καὶ λυπούμενοι; οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ ἀλλήλους ταῦθ' ὑπάρξει αὐτοῖς, ἄνευ δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἦν φίλους εἶναι· συμβιοῦν γὰρ οὐχ οἷόν τε. εἴρηται δὲ περὶ τούτων. ἆρ' οὖν οὐθὲν ἀλλοιότερον πρὸς αὐτὸν ἑκτέον ἢ εἰ μὴ ἐγεγόνει φίλος μηδέποτε; ἢ δεῖ μνείαν ἔχειν τῆς γενομένης συνηθείας, καὶ καθάπερ φίλοις μᾶλλον ἢ ὀθνείοις οἰόμεθα δεῖν χαρίζεσθαι, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς γενομένοις ἀπονεμητέον τι διὰ τὴν προγεγενημένην φιλίαν, ὅταν μὴ δι' ὑπερβολὴν μοχθηρίας ἡ διάλυσις γένηται.

CHAP. IV.

Of the offices of Friendship and their origin—that no one can be a friend to another unless he be a friend.

What are the affections and offices of friendship.

ΤΑ φιλικὰ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους, καὶ οἷς 4 αἱ φιλίαι ὁρίζονται, ἔοικεν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν

5. οὐδὲ γὰρ] *For neither will these feelings exist in them with respect to each other.*

8. εἴρηται] See viii. c. 6.

CHAP. IV.

Aristotle now proceeds to show, that the offices which are to be observed towards friends, derive their origin from the feelings and conduct which men observe towards themselves. For a friend is a second self. Not indeed, that we are to judge of these offices from the conduct of any one, but in this, as in all other instances involving our moral nature, the good man is to be the rule and measure, by which to guide our actions and affections.

The notions then of mankind concerning friendship and its offices may be brought under three heads; bene-

ἐληλυθέναι. τιθέασι γὰρ φίλον τὸν βουλόμενον καὶ πράττοντα τἀγαθὰ ἢ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, ἢ τὸν βουλόμενον εἶναι καὶ ζῆν τὸν φίλον αὐτοῦ χάριν· ὅπερ αἱ μητέρες πρὸς τὰ τέκνα πεπόνθασι, καὶ τῶν φίλων οἱ προσκεκρουκότες. οἱ δὲ τὸν συνδιάγοντα καὶ ταὐτὰ αἱρούμενον, ἢ τὸν συναλγοῦντα καὶ συγχαίροντα τῷ φίλῳ· μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς μητέρας συμβαίνει. τούτων δέ τινι καὶ τὴν φιλίαν ὁρίζονται. Πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δὲ τούτων ἕκαστον τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ ὑπάρχει, τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς, ᾗ τοιοῦτοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι. ἔοικε γάρ, καθάπερ εἴρηται, μέτρον ἑκάστῳ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος εἶναι. οὗτος γὰρ ὁμογνωμονεῖ ἑαυτῷ, καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὀρέγεται κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ βούλεται δὴ ἑαυτῷ τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα

How the good man observes these towards himself.

ficence (τὸν βουλόμενον καὶ πράττοντα τἀγαθά), benevolence (τὸν βουλόμενον εἶναι καὶ ζῆν τὸν φίλον), and concord (συναλγοῦντα καὶ συγχαίροντα τῷ φίλῳ). The good man only entertains these feelings, for the vicious cannot as far as he is vicious, towards himself, and consequently can only feel them towards others. The good man therefore only can feel real friendship.

Upon this subject, the reader may consult a similar passage in the Republic of Plato, and Butler's Analogy, i. 3. See above p. 332.

In this beautiful chapter, Aristotle seems to have been carried away, though not beyond the limits of strict philosophical language, by the eloquence of his feelings, so as fully to justify what Cicero says of him.

1. τὸν βουλόμενον καὶ πράττοντα] sc. τῷ φίλῳ, quod jam Paraphrastes addidit. Quæ hic exponuntur in universum amicitiæ officia, suum singula nanciscuntur caput in hoc secundo libri ix. tractatu: Benevolentia (c. 5), beneficentia (c. 7), concordia (c. 6). MICH.

5. οἱ προσκεκρουκότες] *Who have fallen out, or clashed.* It is a proof that a friend wishes another friend to live and that for his own sake, because even those who have quarrelled and expect no advantage from each other, still entertain such wishes.

12. μέτρον—ὁ σπουδαῖος] See p. 102, 2. n.

13. ὁμογνωμονεῖ] For he alone acts reasonably, his appetite is in complete subjection to his reason. Not distracted as the incontinent, at one time guided by reason, another time by appetite.

καὶ πράττει (τοῦ γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τἀγαθὸν διαπονεῖν) καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα· τοῦ γὰρ διανοητικοῦ χάριν, ὅπερ ἕκαστος εἶναι δοκεῖ. καὶ ζῆν δὲ βούλεται ἑαυτὸν καὶ σώζεσθαι, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦτο ᾧ φρονεῖ· ἀγαθὸν γὰρ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τὸ εἶναι. ἕκαστος δ' ἑαυτῷ βούλεται τἀγαθά, γενόμενος δ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς αἱρεῖται πάντ' ἔχειν ἐκεῖνο τὸ γενόμενον· ἔχει γὰρ καὶ νῦν ὁ θεὸς τἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' ὢν ὅ τι ποτ'

2. *καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα*] Compare the Rhetoric, i. 11. *ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ τὸ συγγενὲς ἡδὺ ἑαυτῷ ἅπαν, μάλιστα δ' αὐτὸς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν τοῦτο πέπονθεν, ἀνάγκη πάντας φιλαύτους εἶναι ἢ μᾶλλον ἢ ἧττον· πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὑπάρχει πρὸς αὑτὸν μάλιστα. ἐπεὶ δὲ φίλαυτοι πάντες, καὶ τὰ αὑτῶν ἀνάγκη ἡδέα εἶναι πᾶσιν, οἷον ἔργα καὶ λόγους.*

5. *τὸ εἶναι*] Compare ix. 4. and x. 3.

6. *γενόμενος δ' ἄλλος*] The great man is something divine (*θεῖόν τι*), since man is properly the intellectual soul, and that which is properly and peculiarly adapted to his nature, is for him the greatest happiness, and consequently a life of intelligence, (*καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δὴ ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος, εἴπερ τοῦτο μάλιστα ἄνθρωπος.* x. 5. ad fin.) If then, as it has been stated, each one wishes good for himself (see iii. 4.), and he only, properly speaking, is a man who is a good man, (for he only lives according to the dictates of this divine principle within him), the good man only can wish for himself what is really good. For he who desires wealth, or pleasure, or luxury, only wishes what is good for the irrational, and not the real part of himself, whose desires and wants are ever varying, tormenting and racking him, and like an imperious and wrong-headed master driving him to various tasks at one and the same moment. Thus wasting his time and labour in subservience to his animal passions, man becomes transformed from a rational to an irrational being. Transformed then into another species (*γενόμενος δ' ἄλλος*), how can he any longer desire the good of that essence which he has lost, since every thing desires that which is good to itself? Consequently the good man only can wish that which is good to himself, and therefore he only can be a true friend. *ὁ δὲ σπουδαῖος βούλεται ἑαυτῷ ζῆν. ἀγαθὸν γὰρ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τὸ εἶναι. τὴν γὰρ θεωρητικὴν διώκει ζωήν. ἐν γὰρ τῷ νοῒ ἡ ἑκάστου οὐσία συνίσταται, ἢ ἐν τούτῳ μάλιστα. ὃς δὲ τῷ ἀλόγῳ βούλεται τὸ εἶναι καὶ σώζεσθαι, καὶ ἑαυτῷ βούλεται, τὰ ἀγαθὰ τοῦ οἰκείου εἶναι παρατρεπόντι, οὐχ ἑαυτῷ βούλεται τὰ ἀγαθά, ἀλλ' ἐκείνῳ εἰς ὃ μετεβλήθη· καὶ ἕκαστος δὲ ἑαυτῷ βούλεται γενέσθαι τὰ ἀγαθά, οἰόμενος μένειν ὅπερ ἐστίν· εἰ δὲ συνίδοι ἑαυτὸν ἄλλον γενόμενον, οὐκ ἂν ἕλοιτο πάντα τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἔχειν ἐκεῖνο τὸ γενόμενον, οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει ἄλλῳ τινὶ βούλεσθαι τὰ ἀγαθά, ἢ ἑαυτῷ μεταβληθέντι.* Paraph.

8. *ἀλλ' ὢν ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστίν*] *But only by being what he is.* sc. *ἤτοι ὁ θεὸς ὤν. εἰ δ' ἄλλο τι γένοιτο ἐκ τῆς φύσεως ἧν ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἕξει ὅπερ ἔχει νῦν ἀγαθόν, ἢ εἰ καὶ δοίη τὶς ἕξειν, οὐχ ὡς ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ παρέσται.* Schol.

ἐστίν. δόξειε δ' ἂν τὸ νοοῦν ἕκαστος εἶναι, ἢ μάλιστα. συνδιάγειν τε ὁ τοιοῦτος ἑαυτῷ βούλεται· ἡδέως γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ· τῶν τε γὰρ πεπραγμένων ἐπιτερπεῖς αἱ μνῆμαι, καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐλπίδες ἀγαθαί· αἱ τοιαῦται δ' ἡδεῖαι. καὶ θεωρημάτων δ' εὐπορεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ, συναλγεῖ τε καὶ συνήδεται μάλισθ' ἑαυτῷ· πάντοτε γάρ ἐστι τὸ αὐτὸ λυπηρόν τε καὶ ἡδύ, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλο· ἀμεταμέλητος γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν. τῷ δὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν μὲν ἕκαστα τούτων ὑπάρχειν τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ, πρὸς δὲ τὸν φίλον ἔχειν ὥσπερ πρὸς ἑαυτόν (ἔστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός), καὶ ἡ φιλία τούτων εἶναί τι δοκεῖ, καὶ φίλοι οἷς ταῦθ' ὑπάρχει. πρὸς αὐτὸν δὲ πότερόν ἐστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστι φιλία, ἀφείσθω ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος· δόξειε δ' ἂν ταύτῃ εἶναι φιλία, ᾗ ἐστὶ δύο ἢ πλείω ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, καὶ ὅτι ἡ ὑπερβολὴ τῆς φιλίας τῇ πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁμοιοῦται.

The bad cannot possess these feelings.

Φαίνεται δὲ τὰ εἰρημένα καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν, καίπερ οὖσι φαύλοις. ἆρ' οὖν ᾗ ἀρέσκουσιν ἑαυτοῖς καὶ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι, ταύτῃ μετέχουσιν αὐτῶν; ἐπεὶ τῶν γε κομιδῇ φαύλων καὶ ἀνοσιουργῶν οὐθενὶ ταῦθ' ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ φαίνεται. σχεδὸν δὲ οὐδὲ τοῖς φαύλοις· διαφέρονται γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ ἑτέρων μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἄλλα δὲ βούλονται, οἷον οἱ

1. τὸ νοῦν] See x. c. 5. ad fin.

11. ἔστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος] *For a friend is another self.* A friend is another self; consequently what feelings we entertain towards ourselves, we must entertain towards others. But the good man only is a friend to himself, entertaining towards himself the feelings of benevolence, beneficence, and concord, other men only as far as they are good, consequently the good only can be friends.

25. βούλονται] See p. 201. and p. 213. n. Aristotle appears from

ἀκρατεῖς· αἱροῦνται γὰρ ἀντὶ τῶν δοκούντων ἑαυτοῖς ἀγαθῶν εἶναι τὰ ἡδέα βλαβερὰ ὄντα· οἱ δ' αὖ διὰ δειλίαν καὶ ἀργίαν ἀφίστανται τοῦ πράττειν ἃ οἴονται ἑαυτοῖς βέλτιστα εἶναι· οἷς δὲ πολλὰ καὶ δεινὰ πέπρακται διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν, μισοῦσί τε καὶ φεύγουσι τὸ ζῆν καὶ ἀναιροῦσιν ἑαυτούς. ζητοῦσί τε οἱ μοχθηροὶ μεθ' ὧν συνδιημερεύσουσιν, ἑαυτοὺς δὲ φεύγουσιν· ἀναμιμνήσκονται γὰρ πολλῶν καὶ δυσχερῶν, καὶ τοιαῦθ' ἕτερα ἐλπίζουσι, καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ὄντες, μεθ' ἑτέρων δ' ὄντες ἐπιλανθάνονται. οὐθέν τε φιλητὸν ἔχοντες οὐθὲν φιλικὸν πάσχουσι πρὸς ἑαυτούς. οὐδὲ δὴ συγχαίρουσιν οὐδὲ συναλγοῦσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑαυτοῖς· στασιάζει γὰρ αὐτῶν ἡ ψυχή, καὶ τὸ μὲν διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἀλγεῖ ἀπεχόμενον τινῶν, τὸ δ' ἥδεται, καὶ τὸ μὲν δεῦρο τὸ δ' ἐκεῖσε ἕλκει ὥσπερ διασπῶντα. εἰ δὲ μὴ οἷόν τε ἅμα λυπεῖσθαι καὶ ἥδεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μετὰ μικρόν γε λυπεῖται ὅτι ἥσθη, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐβούλετο ἡδέα ταῦτα γενέσθαι αὐτῷ· μεταμελείας γὰρ οἱ φαῦλοι γέμουσιν. οὐ δὴ φαίνεται ὁ φαῦλος οὐδὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν φιλικῶς διακεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν φιλητόν. εἰ δὴ τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν λίαν ἐστὶν ἄθλιον, φευκτέον τὴν μοχθηρίαν διατεταμένως καὶ πειρατέον ἐπιεικῆ εἶναι· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν φιλικῶς ἂν ἔχοι καὶ ἑτέρῳ φίλος γένοιτο.

this passage to have made the same distinction as Socrates, that the will can be only of good, the desire of good or evil.

20. μεταμελείας] Compare p. 363, 9. See also p. 309.

CHAP. V.

Of Benevolence (εὔνοια), and what relation it bears to Friendship.

5 Η δ' εὔνοια φιλίᾳ μὲν ἔοικεν, οὐ μὴν ἐστί γε φιλία· γίνεται γὰρ εὔνοια καὶ πρὸς ἀγνῶτας καὶ λανθάνουσα, φιλία δ' οὔ. καὶ πρότερον δὲ ταῦτ' εἴρηται. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ φίλησίς ἐστιν· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει διάτασιν οὐδ' ὄρεξιν, τῇ φιλήσει δὲ ταῦτ' ἀκολουθεῖ. καὶ ἡ μὲν φίλησις μετὰ συνηθείας, ἡ δ' εὔνοια καὶ ἐκ προσπαίου, οἷον καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἀγωνιστὰς συμβαίνει· εὖνοι γὰρ αὐτοῖς γίνονται καὶ συνθέλουσιν, συμπράξαιεν δ' ἂν οὐθέν· ὅπερ γὰρ εἴπομεν, προσπαίως εὖνοι γίνονται καὶ ἐπιπολαίως στέργουσιν. Ἔοικε δὴ ἀρχὴ φιλίας εἶναι, ὥσπερ τοῦ ἐρᾶν ἡ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως ἡδονή· μὴ γὰρ προησθεὶς τῇ ἰδέᾳ οὐθεὶς ἐρᾷ, ὁ δὲ χαίρων τῷ εἴδει οὐθὲν μᾶλλον ἐρᾷ, ἀλλ' ὅταν καὶ ἀπόντα ποθῇ καὶ τῆς παρουσίας ἐπιθυμῇ. οὕτω δὴ καὶ φίλους οὐχ οἷόν τ' εἶναι μὴ εὔνους γενομένους, οἱ δ' εὖνοι οὐθὲν μᾶλλον φιλοῦσιν· βούλονται γὰρ μόνον τἀγαθὰ οἷς εἰσὶν εὖνοι, συμπράξαιεν

εὔνοια differs from φιλία, and φίλησις.

But is the ἀρχὴ of friendship.

3. πρότερον] See viii. c. 3. p. 317.

5. διάτασιν] διάτασις non est *intensio* multoque minus quod Lambinus putat, *contentio*, sed *continuatio* quædam ac *tractus temporis*. Hæc Muretus. Nos autem cum Paraph. vet., Eustrat., Giphan., Lambino, aliis, *animi intentionem* interpretamur; ipse enim Arist. adverbium διατεταμένως (ix. 4. et x. 2.) hoc sensu usurpat. Optime vocab. aperit Demosth. 275, 8. ἐπηρέαμαι καὶ διατεινάμην οὑτωσὶ σφοδρῶς. ZELL.

But Muretus evidently followed the interpretation of Eustratius, who thus observes upon this word: οὐ γὰρ ἔχει διάτασιν, ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ, οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἔκτασις καὶ ὁδὸς πόθεν ποῖ, ὡς ἡ λεύκανσις.

10. προσπαίως] *Suddenly.*

17. οὐθὲν μᾶλλον] *Are not the more friends.* See p. 137.

δ' ἂν οὐθέν, οὐδ' ὀχληθείεν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν. διὸ μεταφέρων φαίη τις ἂν αὐτὴν ἀργὴν εἶναι φιλίαν, χρονιζομένην δὲ καὶ εἰς συνήθειαν ἀφικνουμένην γίνεσθαι φιλίαν, οὐ τὴν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον οὐδὲ τὴν διὰ τὸ ἡδύ· οὐδὲ γὰρ εὔνοια ἐπὶ τούτοις γίνεται. ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὐεργετηθεὶς ἀνθ' ὧν πέπονθεν ἀπονέμει τὴν εὔνοιαν, τὰ δίκαια δρῶν· ὁ δὲ βουλόμενός τιν' εὐπραγεῖν, ἐλπίδα ἔχων εὐπορίας δι' ἐκείνου, οὐκ ἔοικ' εὔνους ἐκείνῳ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἑαυτῷ, καθάπερ οὐδὲ φίλος, εἰ θεραπεύει αὐτὸν διά τινα χρῆσιν. ὅλως δ' ἡ εὔνοια δι' ἀρετὴν καὶ ἐπιείκειάν τινα γίνεται, ὅταν τῳ φανῇ καλός τις ἢ ἀνδρεῖος ἤ τι τοιοῦτον, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγωνιστῶν εἴπομεν.

CHAP. VI.

Of Concord.

The object-matter of ὁμόνοια.

ΦΙΛΙΚΟΝ δὲ καὶ ἡ ὁμόνοια φαίνεται· διόπερ 6
οὐκ ἔστιν ὁμοδοξία· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀγνοοῦσιν ἀλλήλους ὑπάρξειεν ἄν. οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ ὁτουοῦν ὁμογνωμονοῦντας ὁμονοεῖν φασίν, οἷον τοὺς περὶ τῶν οὐρανίων (οὐ γὰρ φιλικὸν τὸ περὶ τούτων ὁμονοεῖν), ἀλλὰ τὰς πόλεις ὁμονοεῖν φασίν, ὅταν περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ὁμογνωμονῶσι καὶ ταὐτὰ

2. μεταφέρων] That is to say; as benevolence (εὔνοια) may be termed an inoperative friendship, so friendship may be termed an operative benevolence, using the rule for metaphor mentioned in the Rhetoric, iii. 10.

11. εὔνοια δι' ἀρετήν] See above p. 317, 15. and the Rhetoric, ii. 1.

16. οὐκ ἔστιν ὁμοδοξία] For ὁμόνοια, as he afterwards shows, is confined to things practical (πρακτά); but δόξα is speculative. See p. 95.

προαιρῶνται καὶ πράττωσι τὰ κοινῇ δόξαντα. περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ δὴ ὁμονοοῦσιν, καὶ τούτων περὶ τὰ ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχειν ἢ πᾶσιν, οἷον αἱ πόλεις, ὅταν πᾶσι δοκῇ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἱρετὰς εἶναι, ἢ συμμαχεῖν Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἢ ἄρχειν Πιττακόν, ὅτε καὶ αὐτὸς ἤθελεν. ὅταν δ' ἑκάτερος ἑαυτὸν βούληται, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς Φοινίσσαις, στασιάζουσιν· οὐ γάρ ἐσθ' ὁμονοεῖν τὸ αὐτὸ ἑκάτερον ἐννοεῖν ὁδήποτε, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, οἷον ὅταν καὶ ὁ δῆμος καὶ οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρχειν· οὕτω γὰρ πᾶσι γίγνεται οὗ ἐφίενται. πολιτικὴ δὲ φιλία φαίνεται ἡ ὁμόνοια, καθάπερ καὶ λέγεται· περὶ τὰ συμφέροντα γάρ ἐστι καὶ τὰ εἰς τὸν βίον ἀνήκοντα.

In whom only ὁμόνοια is to be found.

Ἔστι δ' ἡ τοιαύτη ὁμόνοια ἐν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν· οὗτοι γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτοῖς ὁμονοοῦσι καὶ ἀλλήλοις, ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντες ὡς εἰπεῖν· τῶν τοιούτων γὰρ μένει τὰ βουλήματα καὶ οὐ μεταρρεῖ ὥσπερ Εὔριπος,

6. Πιττακόν] Pittacus communi reipublicæ consensu, et suo (nam et hoc requiritur ad plenam concordiam) princeps in patria constitutus fuit ad decennium, quo elapso, cum amplius eum imperare vellet civitas recusavit, quo allusit Aristoteles his verbis ὅτε καὶ αὐτὸς ἤθελεν. GIPH. See Diog. L. i. §. 75.

8. Φοινίσσαις] Aristotle alludes to the quarrel of Eteocles and Polynices as represented in the Phœnissæ of Euripides. To constitute concord, it is not sufficient that two should agree in wishing the same thing (τὸ αὐτὸ ἑκάτερον ἐννοεῖν ὁδήποτε) as Eteocles and Polynices, who both wished to reign alone, but they must also agree as to the same person (ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ).

9. ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ] τουτέστι περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ. Schol.

18. οὐ μεταρρεῖ] *Is not subject to ebb and flow as a Euripus.* Vocare solitos Græcos hoc nomine loca quædam maris in quibus fierent hujuscemodi contrarii inter se motus fluctuum, et ut inferioris ætatis ipsos vocant, fluxus et refluxus, notum est. VICTOR. Isaiah uses a somewhat similar illustration. "The wicked are like the troubled sea, when it cannot rest, whose waters cast up mire and dirt." cap. lvii. 20. Compare with this the fourth chapter, p. 364.

βούλονταί τε τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα, τούτων δὲ καὶ κοινῇ ἐφίενται. τοὺς δὲ φαύλους οὐχ οἷόν τε ὁμονοεῖν πλὴν ἐπὶ μικρόν, καθάπερ καὶ φίλους εἶναι, πλεονεξίας ἐφιεμένους ἐν τοῖς ὠφελίμοις, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πόνοις καὶ ταῖς λειτουργίαις ἐλλείποντας· ἑαυτῷ δ' ἕκαστος βουλόμενος ταῦτα τὸν πέλας ἐξετάζει καὶ κωλύει· μὴ γὰρ τηρούντων τὸ κοινὸν ἀπόλλυται. συμβαίνει οὖν αὐτοῖς στασιάζειν, ἀλλήλους μὲν ἐπαναγκάζοντας, αὐτοὺς δὲ μὴ βουλομένους τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν.

CHAP. VII.

Of Beneficence.

The reasons stated why it was supposed that there is more love in the benefactor than the benefitted.

ΟΙ δ' εὐεργέται τοὺς εὐεργετηθέντας δοκοῦσι 7 μᾶλλον φιλεῖν ἢ οἱ εὖ παθόντες τοὺς δράσαντας, καὶ ὡς παρὰ λόγον γινόμενον ἐπιζητεῖται. τοῖς μὲν οὖν πλείστοις φαίνεται, ὅτι οἱ μὲν ὀφείλουσι τοῖς δὲ ὀφείλεται· καθάπερ οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν δανείων οἱ μὲν ὀφείλοντες βούλονται μὴ εἶναι οἷς ὀφείλουσιν, οἱ δὲ δανείσαντες καὶ ἐπιμέλονται τῆς τῶν ὀφειλόντων σωτηρίας, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς εὐεργετήσαντας βούλεσθαι εἶναι τοὺς παθόντας ὡς

9. ἐπαναγκάζοντες] sc. τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν.

11. οἱ δ' εὐεργέται] Compare Thucyd. ii. 40. καὶ τὰ ἐς ἀρετὴν ἠναντιώμεθα τοῖς πολλοῖς· οὐ γὰρ πάσχοντες εὖ ἀλλὰ δρῶντες κτώμεθα τοὺς φίλους. βεβαιότερος δὲ ὁ δράσας τὴν χάριν, ὥστε ὀφειλομένην δι' εὐνοίας ᾧ δέδωκε σώζειν· ὁ δ' ἀντοφείλων ἀμβλύτερος, εἰδὼς οὐκ ἐς χάριν ἀλλ' ἐς ὀφείλημα τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀποδώσων. There can be little doubt but that Aristotle tacitly alludes to this passage.

13. ἐπιζητεῖται] *And the reason of this is required, as though it were something strange and paradoxical.*

κομιουμένους τὰς χάριτας, τοῖς δ' οὐκ εἶναι ἐπιμελὲς τὸ ἀνταποδοῦναι. Ἐπίχαρμος μὲν οὖν τάχ' ἂν φαίη ταῦτα λέγειν αὐτοὺς ἐκ πονηροῦ θεωμένους, ἔοικε δ' ἀνθρωπικῷ· ἀμνήμονες γὰρ οἱ πολλοί, καὶ μᾶλλον εὖ πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἐφίενται. δόξειε δ' ἂν φυσικώτερον εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον, καὶ οὐχ ὅμοιον τῷ περὶ τοὺς δανείσαντας· οὐ γάρ ἐστι φίλησις περὶ ἐκείνους, ἀλλὰ τοῦ σώζεσθαι βούλησις τῆς κομιδῆς ἕνεκα· οἱ δ' εὖ πεποιηκότες φιλοῦσι καὶ ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς πεπονθότας, κἂν μηθὲν ὦσι χρήσιμοι μηδ' εἰς ὕστερον γένοιντ' ἄν. ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν συμβέβηκεν· πᾶς γὰρ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον ἀγαπᾷ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγαπηθείη ἂν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔργου ἐμψύχου γενομένου. μάλιστα δ' ἴσως τοῦτο περὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς συμβαίνει· ὑπεραγαπῶσι γὰρ οὗτοι τὰ οἰκεῖα ποιήματα, στέργοντες ὥσπερ τέκνα. τοιούτῳ δὴ ἔοικε καὶ τὸ τῶν εὐεργετῶν· τὸ γὰρ εὖ πεπονθὸς ἔργον ἐστὶν αὐτῶν· τοῦτο δὴ ἀγαπῶσι μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἔργον τὸν ποιήσαντα. τούτου δ' αἴτιον ὅτι τὸ εἶναι πᾶσιν αἱρετὸν καὶ φιλητόν, ἐσμὲν δ' ἐνεργείᾳ· τῷ ζῆν γὰρ καὶ πράττειν. ἐνεργείᾳ δὴ ὁ

Which reasoning is objected to by Epicharmus. Nevertheless it is true that benefactors love more than they do who are benefited. But not for the reasons stated. The reasons for this investigated.

2. Ἐπίχαρμος μὲν οὖν] Epicharmus would, perhaps, say, that this view of the question was derived merely from considering an insufficient portion of mankind, from vitiated specimens, and not from a correct view of them. But, indeed, this appears to be the fault of man generally, a natural infirmity not confined merely to the worst and defective part of them.

22. ἐνεργείᾳ δὴ ὁ ποιήσας] *For the producer is in a sense* (πῶς) *his own work in energy* (ἐνεργείᾳ, that is, *actually*, not *virtually* δυνάμει) as previous to production. The argument appears to be this.

Existence is desirable (αἱρετὸν καὶ φιλητόν) by all. But we can properly be said to exist, only when we are in energy; (for life is not the capacity of living, but the actually living), and we are in energy when we live and act. But he who acts is actually (ἐνεργείᾳ ἐστίν) in his work

ποιήσας τὸ ἔργον ἐστί πως· στέργει δὴ τὸ ἔργον, διότι καὶ τὸ εἶναι. τοῦτο δὲ φυσικόν· ὃ γάρ

(ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ). For the art of building, which is the method of constructing a house (ὁ λόγος τῆς οἰκοδομίας), is actually (ἐνεργείᾳ) in the house, or the house would not have been built. And the house itself, therefore, is part of the builder, or the builder actually (ἐνεργείᾳ), as far as his art is concerned, his art being actually in the building. Consequently every production is part actually (ἐνεργείᾳ) of a man's self: or, in the words of Aristotle, every producer is in a sense his own work in energy. But every one loves himself, and consequently his own work as part of himself, and therefore every benefactor loves the person whom he has benefited, standing in the same relation to him as the artist to his ἔργον.

The following is the comment of Eustratius on this passage:

τοῦ φυσικῶς φιλεῖν φησιν ἕκαστον τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον αἴτιόν ἐστιν, ὅτι πᾶσιν αἱρετὸν καὶ φιλητόν ἐστι τὸ εἶναι καὶ ζῆν. ἐσμὲν δὲ οὐ τῷ δύνασθαι γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἤδη ἐνεργείᾳ εἶναι. ὡς γὰρ οὐ λέγομεν ῥήτορα τὸ βρέφος, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἔχοντα τὴν τέχνην καὶ δυνάμενον ἐνεργεῖν, καὶ ἀνδριάντα οὐ τὸν ἁπλῶς χαλκόν, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἐσχηματισμένον τῷ τοῦ ἀνδριάντος σχήματι, οὕτω καὶ ὄν, ἤτοι ἄνθρωπον ὄντα ἢ λέοντα ὄντα ἢ ἵππον ὄντα λέγομεν, οὐ τὸν μήπω ὄντα δυνάμενον δὲ γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἤδη ὄντα καὶ ζῶντα καὶ ἐνεργοῦντα, ἢ δυνάμενον ἐνεργήσειν. εἰπὼν δέ, ἐσμὲν δὴ ἐνεργείᾳ, σαφηνίζων τί ἐστι τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ, ἐπήγαγε, τῷ ζῆν καὶ πράττειν, δυνάμει ὅταν λέγομεν, ὅτι ὅδε ζῇ καὶ ἐνεργεῖ ἢ δύναται ἐνεργήσειν. καὶ ἔστιν ὁ συλλογισμὸς τοιοῦτος. ὅταν λέγωμεν ἄνθρωπον τὸν ζῶντα καὶ ἐνεργοῦντα ἢ ἐνεργεῖν δυναμένον, ὁ ζῶν καὶ ἐνεργῶν ἐνεργείᾳ ἐστίν. ὧν ἄρα ἐνεργείᾳ ἐστίν. εἰ δὴ πᾶσιν αἱρετὸν καὶ φιλητὸν τὸ εἶναι ἐνεργείᾳ, ἔστιν δὲ φέρε εἰπεῖν τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους ἔργον οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ αὐτὸς ὁ Σωκράτης, φιλητὸν ἄρα τῷ Σωκράτει τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ, ὅτι τὸ εἶναι τοῦ ποιήσαντος Σωκράτους αὐτό ἐστι τὸ ποίημα αὐτοῦ. ὅτι δὲ τὸ ἔργον αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ ἐνεργείᾳ ποιήσας οὐ πάντη ἄδηλόν ἐστιν. ἡ γὰρ εἰκὼν αὕτη ἐνεργείᾳ ἐστὶν ὁ ζωγράφος· ἡ γὰρ τέχνη δυνάμει ἐστὶ τὰ τεχναστά. ἡ γὰρ οἰκοδομικὴ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ οἰκία μετὰ λίθων, καὶ ἥδε ἄρα ἡ οἰκία ἡ οἰκοδομική ἐστι μετὰ λίθων, καὶ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ οἰκίᾳ ἡ οἰκοδομική, ἤτοι ὁ οἰκοδόμος ᾗ οἰκοδόμος, ἀλλ' οὐχ ᾗ ἄνθρωπος. εἰ οὖν οἰκοδομικὴ οἰκία ἐστὶ μετὰ λίθων, ἡ δὲ οἰκοδομικὴ ἡ καὶ οἰκοδόμος ταὐτόν, ἡ οἰκία ἄρα καὶ ὁ οἰκοδόμος ταὐτόν, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ οἰκία ἄρα ἐνεργείᾳ αὐτὸς ὁ οἰκοδόμος. Compare also the Paraph.

1. τὸ ἔργον ἐστί πως] τὸ ἔργον ἔστι πως. Bekk. The reading of the text was first adopted by Michelet, with this explanation. τὸ ἔργον est nominativus et sensus alius esse non potest nisi quem expressit Argyropylus secutus Eustratium, Paraphrastane Thom. Aquinatem: *Qui igitur fecit, est actu suum quodammodo opus*; quod et sequentia confirmant; ὃ γάρ ἐστι δυνάμει, τοῦτο ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ ἔργον μηνύει. Eodem modo ut Aristoteles dixit Hegelius, *Rechts-philosophie*, §. 124. *Was das Subject ist, ist die Reihe seiner Handlungen.* Et convenit inter utrumque philosophum, operationem et actum demum esse veram rerum substantiam.

2. ὃ γάρ ἐστι δυνάμει] *For of that which existed merely potentially before, the* ἔργον *shows the actual existence.* The house shows the actual existence of

ἔστι δυνάμει, τοῦτο ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ ἔργον μηνύει. Ἅμα δὲ καὶ τῷ μὲν εὐεργέτῃ καλὸν τὸ κατὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν, ὥστε χαίρειν ἐν ᾧ τοῦτο, τῷ δὲ παθόντι οὐθὲν καλὸν ἐν τῷ δράσαντι, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, συμφέρον· τοῦτο δ' ἧττον ἡδὺ καὶ φιλητόν. Ἡδεῖα δ' ἐστὶ τοῦ μὲν παρόντος ἡ ἐνέργεια, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος ἡ ἐλπίς, τοῦ δὲ γεγενημένου ἡ μνήμη. ἥδιστον δὲ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, καὶ φιλητὸν

That a good deed is honorable to him who confers it.

The actual is more pleasant than hope or memory.

that which existed only potentially before. For when the art exists its productions exist potentially, but actually only by production. As Eustratius expresses in the above quotation: ἡ γὰρ τέχνη δυνάμει ἐστὶ τὰ τεχναστά.

2. τὸ κατὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν] *At the same time to the benefactor his action* (τὸ κατὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν sc. *id quod egit*) *is beautiful*. He who has conferred a favour upon another has performed a beautiful action, and this beautiful work or action is, as was shown above, the person who has been benefited as far as he has received the benefit, and he is a standing memorial of the ἔργον of his benefactor. But in the benefactor there is no beautiful ἔργον which has been produced by the benefited, in which he can take pleasure, contemplating it as his own work. But if there be any thing in the contemplation of his benefactor in which he can take pleasure, it must be the contemplation of his own advantage and profit (τὸ συμφέρον). But this is less pleasant to him, as being merely the means to an end, than is his own work to the benefactor; for that which is useful is as a mean to some end, whereas the ἔργον of the benefactor is that end already produced. As therefore the ends are more desirable than the means, and the means desirable only in relation to the end; it follows, that in reference to benefits, the pleasure of the benefactor is great, whilst that of the benefited is inconsiderable.

ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὅτι ὁ μὲν εὐεργέτης ἑαυτοῦ γίνεται βελτίων εὐεργετῶν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ ἐστι τὸ εὐεργετεῖν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο χαίρει τῷ εὖ πάσχοντι, ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ θεωρεῖ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἀγαθόν. ὁ δὲ εὖ πάσχων οὐ γίνεται βελτίων ἑαυτοῦ τῷ πάσχειν, οὐδὲ ἐν τῷ εὐεργέτῃ ἔχει τι ἀγαθόν, βελτίων γάρ τις δύναται γενέσθαι ἐξ ὧν αὐτὸς ποιεῖ, ἐν τῷ ἐνεργεῖν γάρ ἐστι τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν. ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν εἴρηται. διὰ τοῦτο εἴ τί ἐστιν ἡδὺ τῷ εὖ πάσχοντι παρὰ τῷ εὐεργέτῃ, οὐκ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ συμφέρον· τὸ δὲ συμφέρον οὐχ οὕτως ἡδὺ καὶ φιλητόν ἐστιν ὡς τὸ ἀγαθόν. τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν τέλος ἐστὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος, καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον φιλητόν ἐστι καὶ ἡδύ. μᾶλλον ἄρα φιλεῖ ὁ εὐεργέτης τὸν εὖ πάσχοντα ἢ ὑπ' ἐκείνου φιλεῖται. Paraph.

5. ἡδεῖα δ' ἐστί] Compare the Rhetoric, i. 11.

8. τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν] *But that which is in act, or which actually is, is most pleasant*. All pleasure is consequent upon the exercise of some energy, but all energies are of the past, the present, or the future. But of

ὁμοίως. τῷ μὲν οὖν πεποιηκότι μένει τὸ ἔργον (τὸ καλὸν γὰρ πολυχρόνιον), τῷ δὲ παθόντι τὸ χρήσιμον παροίχεται. ἥ τε μνήμη τῶν μὲν καλῶν

these, the energy of the present, that is the actual energy, is more vivid and more real than either of the others, and consequently the pleasure attending upon such energies is greater than that upon the others. For the pleasures arising from memory or hope, proceed from imagination picturing as present what is past or future, and consequently must be less pleasant than that which is actually present.

But to him who has conferred a favor, his work is ever present in the person of him upon whom he has conferred the favor, and consequently his energies are actual. Whereas in the case of the person benefited, it is merely the expectation of the future, or memory of the past, which brings pleasure.

To this it may be urged, that the expectation is often more pleasant than the reality; that in the words of Pope,

"Hope springs eternal in the human breast,
Man never is, but always to be blest."

But this is only a seeming objection; for the good, when really present, is not the same good which our hope pictured. Whether he who has received only a slight favour, but expects a very great one from his benefactor, may not receive more pleasure than his benefactor does from him, may reasonably be doubted. But this is another question.

3. ἥ τε μνήμη] There are two ways of considering this passage, either as a further explanation of the previous sentence, or as an answer to an objector. If the first, then Aristotle says; the memory of past καλὰ is more pleasant than that of past χρήσιμα; but, on the contrary, the hope of future χρήσιμα is more pleasant than that of future καλά. For since the καλὰ are ends but the χρήσιμα means, and the end cannot exist without the means, the ends as being more distant less affect our minds, and are to us less desirable than the means, as happiness than money. But where the end has already happened, the eligibility of the means, and the reason for which only they are desirable, has passed away, and consequently cannot afford us the same pleasure as the end, if any at all. This is one way of considering the passage.

Or it may be an answer to an objection. "How can the benefactor who has conferred a favour be said actually to energize, since when he has conferred the favor his energy has ceased? Let it be granted. Nevertheless the benefactor feels more love than the benefited. For if the memory of the καλὰ is more pleasant than that of the χρήσιμα, and the benefactor has conferred the χρήσιμα from which follow the καλά, and if he remembers the καλά, and so much the more vividly as having them before his eyes, but the debtor only the χρήσιμα, and that but feebly since they are passed away, therefore the benefactor has more pleasure than the benefited, and therefore naturally loves more than the benefited.

Michelet gives a different interpretation: Pulchre facta, antequam acta

ἡδεῖα, τῶν δὲ χρησίμων οὐ πάνυ ἢ ἧττον· ἡ προσδοκία δ' ἀνάπαλιν ἔχειν ἔοικεν. Καὶ ἡ μὲν φίλησις ποιήσει ἔοικεν, τὸ φιλεῖσθαι δὲ τῷ πάσχειν. τοῖς ὑπερέχουσι δὴ περὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν ἕπεται τὸ φιλεῖν καὶ τὰ φιλικά. Ἔτι δὲ τὰ ἐπιπόνως γενόμενα πάντες μᾶλλον στέργουσιν, οἷον καὶ τὰ χρήματα οἱ κτησάμενοι τῶν παραλαβόντων· δοκεῖ δὴ τὸ μὲν εὖ πάσχειν ἄπονον εἶναι, τὸ δ' εὖ ποιεῖν ἐργῶδες. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ αἱ μητέρες φιλοτεκνότεραι· ἐπιπονωτέρα γὰρ ἡ γέννησις, καὶ μᾶλλον ἴσασιν ὅτι αὐτῶν. δόξειε δ' ἂν τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς εὐεργέταις οἰκεῖον εἶναι.

And in conferring benefits there is an ὑπεροχή.

As also greater labor.

sint plus laboris habere quam jucunditatis videntur, externa autem bona sive utilia quæ speramus majorem expectationem movent, quam possunt explere, cum non sint vere bonum; unde patet ante beneficium collatum eum, qui accepturus est, daturum majore amplecti amore, post autem contra.

4. τοῖς ὑπερέχουσι] *But to those who excel in any action, there follows a delight upon that action.* Thus, as he says in the Rhetoric i. 11. *τὸ νικᾶν ἡδύ, οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλονίκοις ἀλλὰ πᾶσιν· φαντασία ὑπεροχῆς γίγνεται, οὗ πάντες ἔχουσιν ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ ἠρέμα ἢ μᾶλλον.* And again in the same chapter, in reference to the particular subject before us: *καὶ τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ εὖ πάσχειν τῶν ἡδέων· τὸ μὲν γὰρ εὖ πάσχειν τυγχάνειν ἐστὶν ὧν ἐπιθυμοῦσι, τὸ δὲ εὖ ποιεῖν ἔχειν καὶ ὑπερέχειν, ὧν ἀμφοτέρων ἐφίενται.*

The feeling of superiority is pleasant to us, because it is the contemplation of an actual good which we possess, the love of superiority being a *natural* feeling, as Aristotle appears to consider it in his Rhetoric; or because, to reduce it to a primary principle, in the possession of superiority we possess a greater degree of power over our energies; the greater our superiority, the less are our energies impeded. The reverse of superiority must therefore, as far as this is concerned, be painful. Since therefore he who confers a favor exercises a superiority, but he who receives is placed in a degree of inferiority, the benefactor, as far as he excels, is not a natural object of delight to him whom he has benefited. Whilst the reverse holds good with the benefactor.

6. ἐπιπόνως γενόμενα] See the Rhetoric i. 7.

7. οἱ κτησάμενοι] Compare Plato's Repub. p. 330. *οὔ τοι ἕνεκα ἠρόμην, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι μοι ἔδοξας οὐ σφόδρα ἀγαπᾶν τὰ χρήματα. τοῦτο δὲ ποιοῦσιν ὡς τὸ πολὺ οἳ ἂν μὴ αὐτοὶ κτήσωνται· οἱ δὲ κτησάμενοι διπλῇ ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀσπάζονται αὐτά. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ ποιηταὶ τὰ αὑτῶν ποιήματα καὶ οἱ πατέρες τοὺς παῖδας ἀγαπῶσι, ταύτῃ τε δὴ καὶ οἱ χρηματισάμενοι περὶ τὰ χρήματα σπουδάζουσιν ὡς ἔργον ἑαυτῶν.*

CHAP. VIII.

Of Self-love.

Reasons for and against self-love stated.

ΑΠΟΡΕΙΤΑΙ δὲ καὶ πότερον δεῖ φιλεῖν ἑαυτὸν 8 μάλιστα ἢ ἄλλον τινά· ἐπιτιμῶσι γὰρ τοῖς ἑαυτοὺς μάλιστα ἀγαπῶσι, καὶ ὡς ἐν αἰσχρῷ φιλαύτους ἀποκαλοῦσι, δοκεῖ τε ὁ μὲν φαῦλος ἑαυτοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττειν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μοχθηρότερος ᾖ, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον· ἐγκαλοῦσι δὴ αὐτῷ ὅτι οὐθὲν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ πράττει· ὁ δ' ἐπιεικὴς διὰ τὸ καλόν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν βελτίων ᾖ, μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ καλόν, καὶ φίλου ἕνεκα· τὸ δ' αὑτοῦ παρίησιν. τοῖς λόγοις δὲ τούτοις τὰ ἔργα διαφωνεῖ, οὐκ ἀλόγως. φασὶ γὰρ δεῖν φιλεῖν μάλιστα τὸν μάλιστα φίλον, φίλος δὲ μάλιστα ὁ βουλόμενος ᾧ βούλεται τἀγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, καὶ εἰ μηθεὶς εἴσεται. ταῦτα δ' ὑπάρχει μάλιστ' αὐτῷ πρὸς αὑτόν, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ δὴ πάνθ' οἷς ὁ φίλος ὁρίζεται· εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ πάντα τὰ φιλικὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους διήκει. καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι δὲ πᾶσαι ὁμογνωμονοῦσιν, οἷον τὸ "μία ψυχή" καὶ "κοινὰ τὰ φίλων" καὶ "ἰσότης φιλότης" καὶ "γόνυ κνήμης ἔγγιον·" πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα πρὸς αὑτὸν μάλισθ' ὑπάρχει· μάλιστα γὰρ φίλος αὑτῷ, καὶ

6. οὐθὲν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ] *Does nothing of himself: mero motu: without self-interested motives.* ἐγκαλεῖται διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐδὲν τῶν ἰδίων πλέον ἐπιζητεῖ, ἀλλ' ἑαυτοῦ χάριν πάντα ποιεῖ. Paraph.

14. αὐτῷ πρὸς αὑτόν] See chap. 4. p. 361.

15. εἴρηται γάρ] See above, p. 363.

21. μάλιστα γὰρ φίλος] If to love one's self be reprehensible, then to love

φιλητέον δὴ μάλισθ' ἑαυτόν. Ἀπορεῖται δ' εἰκότως ποτέροις χρεὼν ἕπεσθαι, ἀμφοῖν ἐχόντοιν τὸ πιστόν. ἴσως οὖν τοὺς τοιούτους δεῖ τῶν λόγων διαιρεῖν καὶ διορίζειν ἐφ' ὅσον ἑκάτεροι καὶ πῇ ἀληθεύουσιν. εἰ δὴ λάβοιμεν τὸ φίλαυτον πῶς ἑκάτεροι λέγουσιν, τάχ' ἂν γένοιτο δῆλον. οἱ μὲν οὖν εἰς ὄνειδος ἄγοντες αὐτὸ φιλαύτους καλοῦσι τοὺς ἑαυτοῖς ἀπονέμοντας τὸ πλεῖον ἐν χρήμασι καὶ τιμαῖς καὶ ἡδοναῖς ταῖς σωματικαῖς· τούτων γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀρέγονται, καὶ ἐσπουδάκασι περὶ αὐτὰ ὡς ἄριστα ὄντα, διὸ καὶ περιμάχητά ἐστιν. οἱ δὴ περὶ ταῦτα πλεονέκται χαρίζονται ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὅλως τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ τῷ ἀλόγῳ τῆς ψυχῆς. τοιοῦτοι δ' εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοί· διὸ καὶ ἡ προσηγορία γεγένηται ἀπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ φαύλου ὄντος. δικαίως δὴ τοῖς οὕτω φιλαύτοις ὀνειδίζεται. ὅτι δὲ τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦθ' αὑτοῖς ἀπονέμοντας εἰώθασι λέγειν οἱ πολλοὶ φιλαύτους, οὐκ ἄδηλον· εἰ γάρ τις ἀεὶ σπουδάζοι τὰ δίκαια πράττειν αὐτὸς μάλιστα πάντων ἢ τὰ σώφρονα ἢ ὁποιαοῦν ἄλλα τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετάς, καὶ ὅλως ἀεὶ τὸ καλὸν ἑαυτῷ περιποιοῖτο, οὐθεὶς ἐρεῖ τοῦτον φίλαυτον οὐδὲ ψέξει. Δόξειε δ' ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος μᾶλλον εἶναι φίλαυτος· ἀπονέμει γοῦν ἑαυτῷ τὰ κάλλιστα

That self-love is of two kinds; rational and irrational. But from the latter being most common, the notion has arisen that all self-love is censurable.

Whereas the former appears in

one's friend as another self is also reprehensible. And conversely, if to love one's friend as one's self be praiseworthy, then the loving one's self must also be so. Such is the force of the proverbs which Aristotle cites, all resting on the principle that we must first love ourselves before we can love another. Self-love being the inmost circle, proceeding next to those who are part of ourselves, thence to those further removed. This is most truly and beautifully illustrated in the Epistles of St. John.

23. δόξειε δ' ἂν] Compare the argument generally in Plato's Gorgias, p. 509. sq.

reality rather to be self-love, since it reserves the greatest good for itself. But such self-love can only exist with virtue. And must therefore be commendable.

καὶ μάλιστ' ἀγαθά, καὶ χαρίζεται ἑαυτοῦ τῷ κυριωτάτῳ, καὶ πάντα τούτῳ πείθεται· ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ πόλις τὸ κυριώτατον μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ πᾶν ἄλλο σύστημα, οὕτω καὶ ἄνθρωπος· καὶ φίλαυτος δὴ μάλιστα ὁ τοῦτο ἀγαπῶν καὶ τούτῳ χαριζόμενος. καὶ ἐγκρατὴς δὲ καὶ ἀκρατὴς λέγεται τῷ κρατεῖν τὸν νοῦν ἢ μή, ὡς τούτου ἑκάστου ὄντος· καὶ πεπραγέναι δοκοῦσιν αὐτοὶ καὶ ἑκουσίως τὰ μετὰ λόγου μάλιστα. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦθ' ἕκαστός ἐστιν ἢ μάλιστα, οὐκ ἄδηλον, καὶ ὅτι ὁ ἐπιεικὴς μάλιστα τοῦτ' ἀγαπᾷ. διὸ φίλαυτος μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη, καθ' ἕτερον εἶδος τοῦ ὀνειδιζομένου, καὶ διαφέρων τοσοῦτον ὅσον τὸ κατὰ λόγον ζῆν τοῦ κατὰ πάθος, καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ ἢ τοῦ δοκοῦντος συμφέρειν. τοὺς μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς καλὰς πράξεις διαφερόντως σπουδάζοντας πάντες ἀποδέχονται καὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν· πάντων δὲ ἁμιλλωμένων πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ διατεινομένων τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν κοινῇ τ' ἂν πάντ' εἴη τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστῳ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, εἴπερ ἡ ἀρετὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν. ὥστε τὸν μὲν ἀγαθὸν δεῖ φίλαυτον εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὀνήσεται τὰ καλὰ πράττων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὠφελήσει· τὸν δὲ μοχθηρὸν οὐ δεῖ· βλάψει γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς πέλας, φαύλοις πάθεσιν ἑπόμενος. τῷ μοχθηρῷ μὲν οὖν διαφωνεῖ ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ

2. ὥσπερ δὲ καί] *And just as that which has the chief sway in a city appears par excellence to be the city, and that which has the chief sway in any system, the system, so is it with man.* After σύστημα and ἄνθρωπος respectively the words τὸ κυριώτατον μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ ought to be supplied.

7. ὡς τούτου ἑκάστου] See above, p. 363, 1.

ἃ πράττει· ὁ δ' ἐπιεικής, ἃ δεῖ, ταῦτα καὶ πράττει· πᾶς γὰρ νοῦς αἱρεῖται τὸ βέλτιστον ἑαυτῷ, ὁ δ' ἐπιεικὴς πειθαρχεῖ τῷ νῷ. Ἀληθὲς δὲ περὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου καὶ τὸ τῶν φίλων ἕνεκα πολλὰ πράττειν καὶ τῆς πατρίδος, κἂν δέῃ ὑπεραποθνήσκειν· προήσεται γὰρ καὶ χρήματα καὶ τιμὰς καὶ ὅλως τὰ περιμάχητα ἀγαθά, περιποιούμενος ἑαυτῷ τὸ καλόν· ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον ἡσθῆναι σφόδρα μᾶλλον ἕλοιτ' ἂν ἢ πολὺν ἠρέμα, καὶ βιῶσαι καλῶς ἐνιαυτὸν ἢ πόλλ' ἔτη τυχόντως, καὶ μίαν πρᾶξιν καλὴν καὶ μεγάλην ἢ πολλὰς καὶ μικράς. τοῖς δ' ὑπεραποθνήσκουσι τοῦτ' ἴσως συμβαίνει· αἱροῦνται δὴ μέγα καλὸν ἑαυτοῖς. καὶ χρήματα προοῖντ' ἂν ἐφ' ᾧ πλείονα λήψονται οἱ φίλοι· γίγνεται γὰρ τῷ μὲν φίλῳ χρήματα, αὐτῷ δὲ τὸ καλόν· τὸ δὴ μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἑαυτῷ ἀπονέμει. καὶ περὶ τιμὰς δὲ καὶ ἀρχὰς ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος· πάντα γὰρ τῷ φίλῳ ταῦτα προήσεται· καλὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπαινετόν. εἰκότως δὴ δοκεῖ σπουδαῖος εἶναι, ἀντὶ πάντων αἱρούμενος τὸ καλόν. ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ πράξεις τῷ φίλῳ προΐεσθαι, καὶ εἶναι κάλλιον τοῦ αὐτὸν πρᾶξαι τὸ αἴτιον τῷ φίλῳ γενέσθαι. ἐν πᾶσι δὴ τοῖς ἐπαινετοῖς ὁ

That this exercise of self-love in the good man is shown by his reserving for himself the excess of virtue and honor, and not of absolute goods.

2. πᾶς γὰρ νοῦς] See above, p. 362, 6. n.

3. ἀληθὲς δὲ περί] Besides showing in this place in what way the good man displays his self-love, Aristotle indirectly gives direction as to the offices of virtuous friendship.

8. ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον] Aristotle seems to refer to Homer's Il. A. 418. See the note of the Schol. on that passage.

23. ἐν πᾶσι δή] In tota hac disputatione Platonis sententiam scriptor noster respexisse videtur amorem sui non accuratius distinguentis, sed universe damnantis. De Legib. V. p. 731. πάντων δὲ μέγιστον κακὸν ἀνθρώποις τοῖς πολλοῖς ἔμφυτον ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐστιν· οὗ πᾶς ἑαυτῷ συγγνώμην ἔχων ἀποφυγὴν οὐδεμίαν μηχανᾶται. τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ὃ λέγουσιν ὡς φίλος αὑτῷ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος

σπουδαῖος φαίνεται ἑαυτῷ τοῦ καλοῦ πλέον νέμων. οὕτω μὲν οὖν φίλαυτον εἶναι δεῖ, καθάπερ εἴρηται· ὡς δ' οἱ πολλοί, οὐ χρή.

CHAP. IX.

Whether Friendship is necessary to Happiness or not.

That the happy, being all-sufficient in themselves, are not likely to require the aid of friends.

ΑΜΦΙΣΒΗΤΕΙΤΑΙ δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα, 9 εἰ δεήσεται φίλων ἢ μή. οὐθὲν γάρ φασι δεῖν φίλων τοῖς μακαρίοις καὶ αὐτάρκεσιν· ὑπάρχειν γὰρ αὐτοῖς τἀγαθά· αὐτάρκεις οὖν ὄντας οὐδενὸς προσδεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ φίλον, ἕτερον αὐτὸν ὄντα, πορίζειν ἃ δι' αὑτοῦ ἀδυνατεῖ· ὅθεν τὸ "ὅταν ὁ δαίμων εὖ διδῷ, τί δεῖ φίλων;"

But yet it seems absurd if we suppose that he who possesses all good should not possess the greatest. Especially if friendship consists in conferring rather than in receiving favors; and it is more honorable to bestow them on friends than strangers.

Ἔοικε δ' ἀτόπῳ τὸ πάντ' ἀπονέμοντας τἀγαθὰ τῷ εὐδαίμονι φίλους μὴ ἀποδιδόναι, ὃ δοκεῖ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μέγιστον εἶναι. εἴ τε φίλου μᾶλλόν ἐστι τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν, καὶ ἔστι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸ εὐεργετεῖν, κάλλιον δ' εὖ ποιεῖν φίλους ὀθνείων, τῶν εὖ πεισομένων δεήσεται ὁ σπουδαῖος. διὸ καὶ ἐπιζητεῖται πότερον ἐν εὐτυχίαις μᾶλλον δεῖ φίλων ἢ ἐν ἀτυχίαις, ὡς καὶ τοῦ ἀτυχοῦντος δεομένου τῶν εὐεργετησόντων καὶ τῶν εὐτυχούντων

φύσει τί ἐστι, καὶ ὀρθῶς ἔχει τὸ δεῖν εἶναι τοιοῦτον &c. in fine his verbis additis: διὸ πάντα ἄνθρωπον χρὴ φεύγειν τὸ σφόδρα φιλεῖν αὑτόν· τὸν δ' ἑαυτοῦ βελτίω διώκειν δεῖ. ZELL.

CHAP. IX.

Upon this Chapter, as for some other points of this Book, see Diog. Laert. vii. §. 23. §. 123. sq. viii. §. 10.

9. ὅταν ὁ δαίμων] Euripid. Orestes, v. 667.

13. τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν] See the seventh Chapter of this Book.

οὓς εὖ ποιήσουσιν. Ἄτοπον δ' ἴσως καὶ τὸ μονώτην ποιεῖν τὸν μακάριον· οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἕλοιτ' ἂν καθ' αὑτὸν τὰ πάντ' ἔχειν ἀγαθά· πολιτικὸν γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ συζῆν πεφυκός. καὶ τῷ εὐδαίμονι δὴ τοῦθ' ὑπάρχει· τὰ γὰρ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὰ ἔχει. δῆλον δ' ὡς μετὰ φίλων καὶ ἐπιεικῶν κρεῖττον ἢ μετ' ὀθνείων καὶ τῶν τυχόντων συνημερεύειν· δεῖ ἄρα τῷ εὐδαίμονι φίλων. Τί οὖν λέγουσιν οἱ πρῶτοι, καὶ πῇ ἀληθεύουσιν; ἢ ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ φίλους οἴονται τοὺς χρησίμους εἶναι; τῶν τοιούτων μὲν οὖν οὐθὲν δεήσεται ὁ μακάριος, ἐπειδὴ τἀγαθὰ ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ. οὐδὲ δὴ τῶν διὰ τὸ ἡδύ, ἢ ἐπὶ μικρόν· ἡδὺς γὰρ ὁ βίος ὢν οὐθὲν δεῖται ἐπεισάκτου ἡδονῆς. οὐ δεόμενος δὲ τῶν τοιούτων φίλων οὐ δοκεῖ δεῖσθαι φίλων. Τὸ

Or that the happy man can be a solitary being.

Besides, that it is better to live with the virtuous and friendly than with strangers.

That the negative of this question came to be asserted from the good not requiring friends for pleasure or profit.

Nevertheless they require vir-

1. ἄτοπον δ' ἴσως] The supposition that a man can be happy without friends contravenes not only the general notions of mankind, but likewise the undoubted truth that man is a social animal, and can only be happy in a state of society, that being the state for which nature intended him, and for which she has endowed him with capacities and desires. As elsewhere he expresses it: ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος κοινωνεῖν ἢ μηδὲν δεόμενος δι' αὐτάρκειαν οὐθὲν μέρος πόλεως· ὥστε ἢ θηρίον ἢ θεός. he is either above or below human nature. (Pol. i. 1. p. 4.) If, therefore, the happy man were a solitary being, he would be cut off from the exercise of his noblest energies, and consequently of the greatest part of his happiness, and a solitary he must be if he have not a friend. For how can he with pleasure spend his life with those who are totally dissimilar to himself?

— ἴσως] This term appears to me to be used only to qualify the harshness of the word preceding it, although the Scholiast thinks that Aristotle uses it in reference to the subject of the tenth Book, where he shows that the life of the happy man consists chiefly in contemplation (θεωρία).

2. μονώτην] See p. 22. and p. 31, 16.

3. πολιτικὸν γάρ] See p. 192. n.

14. ἐπεισάκτου ἡδονῆς] *Of adventitious pleasure*. Compare p. 30. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ βίος αὐτῶν καθ' αὑτὸν ἡδύς.—οὐδὲν δὴ προσδεῖται τῆς ἡδονῆς ὁ βίος αὐτῶν ὥσπερ περιάπτου τινός.

15. τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν] Having shown that people inferred erroneously that because the happy man did not require friends either for pleasure or for profit, therefore he did not require them at all, Aristotle now proceeds to show, that though he does not stand in need of these which are but accidental friendships, he does of that which is

tuous friends, since in them they contemplate two things which are the sources of the greatest pleasure.

δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἴσως ἀληθές· ἐν ἀρχῇ γὰρ εἴρηται ὅτι ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐνέργειά τίς ἐστιν, ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια δῆλον ὅτι γίνεται καὶ οὐχ ὑπάρχει ὥσπερ κτῆμά τι· εἰ δὲ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ζῆν καὶ ἐνεργεῖν, τοῦ δ' ἀγαθοῦ ἡ ἐνέργεια σπουδαία καὶ ἡδεῖα καθ' αὑτήν, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται, ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον τῶν ἡδέων, θεωρεῖν δὲ μᾶλλον τοὺς πέλας δυνάμεθα ἢ ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὰς ἐκείνων πράξεις ἢ τὰς οἰκείας, αἱ τῶν σπουδαίων δὴ πράξεις φίλων ὄντων ἡδεῖαι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς· ἄμφω γὰρ ἔχουσι τὰ τῇ φύσει ἡδέα. ὁ μακάριος δὴ φίλων τοιούτων δεήσεται, εἴπερ θεωρεῖν προαιρεῖται πράξεις ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ οἰκείας· τοιαῦται δ' αἱ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φίλου ὄντος.

And friends are necessary to him not only for the full de-

Οἴονταί τε δεῖν ἡδέως ζῆν τὸν εὐδαίμονα· μονώτῃ μὲν οὖν χαλεπὸς ὁ βίος· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον καθ' αὑτὸν ἐνεργεῖν

real friendship, the friendship of the good. And this argument will be more intelligible if it be simplified as Muretus has simplified it, by commencing with the concluding syllogism.

Happiness is an energy, but the energies of happiness consist not only in action but contemplation, and consequently in a contemplation of those things which are pleasant. But these things the happy man must contemplate either in himself or in others. But in himself he cannot contemplate them so well as in others. He must, therefore, contemplate them in his friends or in strangers. If in strangers, though they be virtuous they will not be οἰκεῖαι. But if in others they will possess both these qualities, (ἄμφω ἔχουσι τὰ τῇ φύσει ἡδέα); they will be οἰκεῖαι since a friend is a second self; virtuous (ἐπιεικεῖς) since he is a good man.

The friend therefore of the good man, is the mirror in which he sees himself and his own actions reflected. The same simile is beautifully applied in Shakespeare's Julius Cæsar, in the celebrated dialogue of Brutus and Cassius. Act i. sc. 2.

1. ἐν ἀρχῇ] See p. 26, 1.

3. ὅτι γίνεται] εἰ δὲ ἐνέργεια δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ὅλον τί καὶ ὑφεστηκός, ὡς οἰκία ἢ ἱμάτιον ἢ ἐγὼ ἢ σύ, ἀλλὰ γίνεται ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ κίνησις. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ κίνησίς ἐστιν ὁμοῦ ξυμπᾶσα, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν αὐτῆς γέγονε, τὸ δὲ ἐστί, τὸ δὲ μέλλει γενέσθαι· οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ὅλον τί. Schol. See also i. 7.

6. ἐν ἀρχῇ] See note above, p. 30, and p. 363.

7. τὸ οἰκεῖον] *That which is appropriate to, or part of one's self, is pleasant.*

συνεχῶς, μεθ' ἑτέρων δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους ῥᾷον. ἔσται οὖν ἡ ἐνέργεια συνεχεστέρα, ἡδεῖα οὖσα καθ' αὐτήν, ὃ δεῖ περὶ τὸν μακάριον εἶναι· ὁ γὰρ σπουδαῖος, ᾗ σπουδαῖος, ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεσι χαίρει, ταῖς δ' ἀπὸ κακίας δυσχεραίνει, καθάπερ ὁ μουσικὸς τοῖς καλοῖς μέλεσιν ἥδεται, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς φαύλοις λυπεῖται. γίνοιτο δ' ἂν καὶ ἄσκησίς τις τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐκ τοῦ συζῆν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, καθάπερ καὶ Θέογνίς φησιν.

velopement but also pleasurable exercise of his energies.

Φυσικώτερον δ' ἐπισκοποῦσιν ἔοικεν ὁ σπουδαῖος φίλος τῷ σπουδαίῳ τῇ φύσει αἱρετὸς εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν εἴρηται ὅτι τῷ σπουδαίῳ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδύ ἐστι καθ' αὐτό. τὸ δὲ ζῆν ὁρίζονται τοῖς ζῴοις

Which is further proved from the perception of life generally being pleasant and natural to us.

9. Θέογνις] The verses to which Aristotle here refers are quoted at length with some others of the same writer by Plato, Meno, p. 95. D.

καὶ παρὰ τοῖσιν πῖνε καὶ ἔσθιε, καὶ
μετὰ τοῖσιν
ἵζε, καὶ ἅνδανε τοῖς ὧν μεγάλη δύναμις.
ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄπ' ἐσθλὰ διδάξεαι· ἢν
δὲ κακοῖσιν
συμμίσγῃς ἀπολεῖς καὶ τὸν ἐόντα νόον.

— φυσικώτερον] The previous arguments were derived from the nature of the happy man, as far as he is happy, which is not a consideration derived from his natural state, because virtue is the efficient cause of happiness, and this is not given us by nature (see ii. 1.) But the following view of the subject is derived from the consideration of life generally, not such as is peculiar to the happy man, but such as nature gives to all; and hence Aristotle uses the term φυσικώτερον in application to it. σκεψώμεθα γὰρ οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίᾳ προσόντων τῷ εὐδαίμονι ἀλλὰ ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῇ πᾶσι. Paraph.

12. εἴρηται] See p. 30, 14.

13. τὸ δὲ ζῆν] Aristotle commences his argument drawn from a consideration of the natural life, by first defining what life is. That of plants consists in vegetation and reproduction; that of animals in vegetation, reproduction, and sensation; that of man in vegetation, reproduction, sensation, and perception (νόησις). Not in the mere power of vegetation &c. but in the actual vegetating (ἐνεργείᾳ), for it is the actual employment not the dormant possession merely of their differentia which distinguishes man from animal, and animal from plant. For the energy is the perfection (τὸ κύριον) of the power, and the power is always referred to the energy; therefore, the life of man should be defined by the actual, rather than the power of feeling and perceiving. Having premised thus much, he then proceeds to the main argument, which appears involved from his mixing up with it the proofs of the different propositions. To make it therefore more clear, we shall omit the

δυνάμει αἰσθήσεως, ἀνθρώποις δ' αἰσθήσεως ἢ νοήσεως, ἡ δὲ δύναμις εἰς τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἀνάγεται, τὸ δὲ κύριον ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ, ἔοικε δὴ τὸ ζῆν εἶναι κυρίως τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ νοεῖν. τὸ δὲ ζῆν τῶν καθ' αὑτὸ ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων· (ὡρισμένον γάρ, τὸ δ' ὡρισμένον τῆς τἀγαθοῦ φύσεως) τὸ δὲ

prosyllogisms, as they are termed, representing merely the principal argument.

Since that which is absolutely and naturally good is pleasant to the good man, and life is such a good; (1) then,

Life is pleasant to the good man;

But life is feeling and perception; therefore,

Feeling and perception is pleasant to the good man.

But he who feels, feels that he feels, and he who perceives, perceives that he perceives; therefore,

The feeling that he feels, and the perceiving that he perceives is pleasant to the good man.

But the feeling that a man feels and the perceiving that he perceives is nothing else than the perceiving that he lives, or the perceiving of a good in one's self, (for life is such a good),

And the perceiving of a good in one's self is pleasant; therefore,

The feeling that he lives is pleasant to a good man.

But as a good man feels to himself, so does he towards his friend; therefore,

The feeling and perceiving the life of his friend is pleasant to a good man.

But these are not possible without a friend and without his presence; therefore,

A friend and his presence (συζῆν) is pleasant and good to the good man.

2. ἡ δὲ δύναμις] τὴν δύναμιν ἔχουσι διὰ τὸ ἐνεργεῖν, τὸ γὰρ κύριον ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ· λέγει δὲ κυρίως τὸ τέλος, καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα· τῆς γὰρ ἐνεργείας ἕνεκα ἡ φύσις τὰς δυνάμεις ἡμῖν ἐνέσπειρε, καὶ ταύτης ἕνεκα περιέπομεν καὶ ἀσπαζόμεθα ταύτας. Paraph.

4. τὸ δὲ ζῆν] See x. 3. ad fin.

5. ὡρισμένον γάρ] See the συστοιχία of the Pythagoreans, p. 17. See also x. 2. ἴσμεν δὲ ὅτι οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι δύο συστοίχους ἐποίουν, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ πάντα ἔταττον ὑπὸ τὴν μίαν, τὰ δὲ κακὰ ὑπὸ τὴν λοιπὴν καὶ ἐκάλουν ἐν ᾗ. ὑπῆγον τὰ καλὰ ὡρισμένην, ἐν ᾗ δὲ τὰ κακὰ ἀόριστον, καὶ ἀντιστρέφειν ἔλεγον τὰ καλὰ καὶ ὡρισμένα,—ὁμοίως καὶ τὰ κακὰ ἀόριστα.—ὅτι δὲ τὸ κατ' ἀρετὴν ὡρισμένον ἐν πολλοῖς τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει καὶ Πλάτωνι δέδεικται. ὁ μὲν γὰρ φαῦλος διὰ τὰς ἀλόγους ὀρέξεις αἷς ἕπεται καὶ τὴν ἀπέραντον ἐπιθυμίαν τῶν φαύλων ἡδονῶν ἀορίστως ζῇ. παντοῖος γὰρ γινόμενος μηδενὶ ἂν πράττει ἀρεσκόμενος, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀπὸ ἄλλων ἐπ' ἄλλα μεταπηδῶν, ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ ὥρᾳ ἐπί τινος τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἱστάμενος.—ὁ δὲ σπουδαῖος, βλέπει γὰρ ὀρθά, τὰ ὄντως ἀγαθὰ καὶ ὄντως ἡδέα διώκων καὶ πράττων αὐτοῖς ἐμμένει. Schol.

6. ὡρισμένον] This passage, as the next, διόπερ ἔοικε πᾶσιν—, is used to prove the minor of the second syllogism, (1) that life is naturally good.

τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν καὶ τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ· διόπερ ἔοικε πᾶσιν ἡδὺ εἶναι. (οὐ δεῖ δὲ λαμβάνειν μοχθηρὰν ζωὴν καὶ διεφθαρμένην, οὐδ' ἐν λύπαις· ἀόριστος γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη, καθάπερ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτῇ. ἐν τοῖς ἐχομένοις δὲ περὶ τῆς λύπης ἔσται φανερώτερον)· εἰ δ' αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδύ (ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πάντας ὀρέγεσθαι αὐτοῦ, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ μακαρίους· τούτοις γὰρ ὁ βίος αἱρετώτατος, καὶ ἡ τούτων μακαριωτάτη ζωή)· ὁ δ' ὁρῶν ὅτι ὁρᾷ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ὁ ἀκούων ὅτι ἀκούει καὶ ὁ βαδίζων ὅτι βαδίζει, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως ἔστι τι τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ὅτι ἐνεργοῦμεν, ὥστε αἰσθανοίμεθ' ἂν ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα καὶ νοοῖμεν ὅτι νοοῦμεν, τὸ δ' ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα ἢ νοοῦμεν, ὅτι ἐσμέν· (τὸ γὰρ εἶναι ἦν αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ νοεῖν)· τὸ δ' αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι ζῇ, τῶν ἡδέων καθ' αὑτό· (φύσει γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ζωή, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἡδύ)· αἱρετὸν δὲ τὸ ζῆν καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ὅτι

2. *οὐ δεῖ δὲ λαμβάνειν*] Aristotle here meets an objection, that we must except a life of vice and depravity, of course, from the natural goods, as not falling under the genus of *ὡρισμένα*.

4. *καθάπερ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα*] *Just as the things which belong to it; the vices which attend it.* As the vices and pains of a profligate life are multifarious and innumerable, so is the profligate life itself.

"Cur autem vita finita sit hæc est ratio, quia est ἐνέργεια seu actio quædam; nam ut potestas (δύναμις) est interminata et quæ ad multa deduci et explicari potest, ita ἐνέργεια est terminata: exemplo sint materia et forma." GIPH. Of the word *ὑπάρχοντα*, see above p. 28. 3.

5. *τοῖς ἐχομένοις*] The Scholiast refers to the discussion concerng pleasure in the next Book.

7. *πάντας ὀρέγεσθαι*] See x. 3.

— *μάλιστα τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς*] See above, p. 362, 5.

13. *αἰσθανοίμεθ' ἂν ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα*] Explicatur a Physicis initio libri tertii de Anima. GIPH.

14. *τὸ δ' ὅτι*] *But the fact of our feeling and perceiving is a fact that we exist.*

15. *ἦν*] *Was said to be.* In p. 382, 4.

τὸ εἶναι ἀγαθόν ἐστιν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἡδύ· (συναισθανόμενοι γὰρ τοῦ καθ' αὑτὸ ἀγαθοῦ ἥδονται)· ὡς δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔχει ὁ σπουδαῖος, καὶ πρὸς τὸν φίλον· (ἕτερος γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ φίλος ἐστίν)· καθάπερ οὖν τὸ αὐτὸν εἶναι αἱρετόν ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τὸν φίλον, ἢ παραπλησίως. τὸ δ' εἶναι ἦν αἱρετὸν διὰ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι αὑτοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὄντος. ἡ δὲ τοιαύτη αἴσθησις ἡδεῖα καθ' ἑαυτήν. συναισθάνεσθαι ἄρα δεῖ καὶ τοῦ φίλου ὅτι ἔστιν, τοῦτο δὲ γίνοιτ' ἂν ἐν τῷ συζῆν καὶ κοινωνεῖν λόγων καὶ διανοίας· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν δόξειε τὸ συζῆν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγεσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν βοσκημάτων τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νέμεσθαι. εἰ δὴ τῷ μακαρίῳ τὸ εἶναι αἱρετόν ἐστι καθ' αὑτό, ἀγαθὸν τῇ φύσει ὂν καὶ ἡδύ, παραπλήσιον δὲ καὶ τὸ τοῦ φίλου ἐστίν, καὶ ὁ φίλος τῶν αἱρετῶν ἂν εἴη. ὃ δ' ἐστὶν αὐτῷ αἱρετόν, τοῦτο δεῖ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ, ἢ ταύτῃ ἐνδεὴς ἔσται. δεήσει ἄρα τῷ εὐδαιμονήσοντι φίλων σπουδαίων.

CHAP. X.

Of the number of Friends.

The question resolved in reference first to friendships of interest.

ΑΡ' οὖν ὡς πλείστους φίλους ποιητέον, ἢ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ξενίας ἐμμελῶς εἰρῆσθαι δοκεῖ "μήτε πολύξεινος μήτ' ἄξεινος," καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας ἁρμόσει μήτ' ἄφιλον εἶναι μήτ' αὖ πολύ-

10. ἐν τῷ συζῆν] See above viii. 5. — ὡς πλείστους] See viii. 6.

20. ὡς πλείστους] See what Diog. Laert. says of the followers of Zeno. vii. 124.

21. εἰρῆσθαι] By Hesiod. Oper. et D. v. 713.

φίλον καθ' ὑπερβολήν; τοῖς μὲν δὴ πρὸς χρῆσιν καὶ πάνυ δόξειεν ἂν ἁρμόζειν τὸ λεχθέν· πολλοῖς γὰρ ἀνθυπηρετεῖν ἐπίπονον, καὶ οὐχ ἱκανὸς ὁ βίος αὐτοῖς τοῦτο πράττειν. οἱ πλείους δὴ τῶν πρὸς τὸν οἰκεῖον βίον ἱκανῶς περίεργοι καὶ ἐμπόδιοι πρὸς τὸ καλῶς ζῆν· οὐθὲν οὖν δεῖ αὐτῶν. καὶ οἱ πρὸς ἡδονὴν δὲ ἀρκοῦσιν ὀλίγοι, καθάπερ ἐν τῇ τροφῇ τὸ ἥδυσμα. Τοὺς δὲ σπουδαίους πότερον πλείστους κατ' ἀριθμόν, ἢ ἔστι τι μέτρον καὶ φιλικοῦ πλήθους, ὥσπερ πόλεως; οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ δέκα ἀνθρώπων γένοιτ' ἂν πόλις, οὔτ' ἐκ δέκα μυριάδων ἔτι πόλις ἐστίν. τὸ δὲ ποσὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἴσως ἕν τι, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ μεταξὺ τινῶν ὡρισμένων. καὶ φίλων δή ἐστι πλῆθος ὡρισμένον, καὶ ἴσως οἱ πλεῖστοι, μεθ' ὧν ἂν δύναιτό τις συζῆν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐδόκει φιλικώτατον εἶναι, ὅτι δ' οὐχ οἷόν τε πολλοῖς συζῆν καὶ διανέμειν αὑτόν, οὐκ ἄδηλον. ἔτι δὲ κἀκείνους δεῖ ἀλλήλοις φίλους εἶναι, εἰ μέλλουσι πάντες μετ' ἀλλήλων συνημερεύειν· τοῦτο δ' ἐργῶδες ἐν πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν. χαλεπὸν δὲ γίνεται καὶ τὸ συγχαίρειν καὶ τὸ συναλγεῖν οἰκείως πολλοῖς· εἰκὸς γὰρ συμπίπτειν ἅμα τῷ μὲν συνήδεσθαι τῷ δὲ συνάχθεσθαι. ἴσως οὖν εὖ ἔχει μὴ ζητεῖν ὡς πολυφιλώτατον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ

In virtuous friendships.

3. οὐχ ἱκανὸς ὁ βίος] Quod quidam hic vertunt *βίος facultates et rem familiarem* errant. Argumento sit quod ait, πρὸς οἰκεῖον βίον, et quod hic βίος in magnis dicitur φύσις, id est, vitam et naturam nostram esse imparem ad omnia amicorum obsequia plurimorum. Exemplum affert elegans Plutarchus in libello de πολυφιλίᾳ: "Si ex multis unus roget ad cœnam, alius ad funus, alius ut in foro sibi sis advocatus, alius ad nuptias, alius ad iter, alius denique alio, alius pecuniam roget mutuam, alius vestem," &c. omnes eodem tempore, quis par his omnibus esse posset? GIPH.

11. δέκα μυριάδων] See Polit. vii. 4.

τοσούτους ὅσοι εἰς τὸ συζῆν ἱκανοί· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι δόξειεν ἂν πολλοῖς εἶναι φίλον σφόδρα. διόπερ οὐδ᾽ ἐρᾶν πλειόνων· ὑπερβολὴ γάρ τις εἶναι βούλεται φιλίας, τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ἕνα· καὶ τὸ σφόδρα δὴ πρὸς ὀλίγους. οὕτω δ᾽ ἔχειν ἔοικε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων· οὐ γίγνονται γὰρ φίλοι πολλοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἑταιρικὴν φιλίαν, αἱ δ᾽ ὑμνούμεναι ἐν δυσὶ λέγονται. οἱ δὲ πολύφιλοι καὶ πᾶσιν οἰκείως ἐντυγχάνοντες οὐδενὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φίλοι, πλὴν πολιτικῶς, οὓς καὶ καλοῦσιν ἀρέσκους. πολιτικῶς μὲν οὖν ἔστι πολλοῖς εἶναι φίλον καὶ μὴ ἄρεσκον ὄντα, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐπιεικῆ· δι᾽ ἀρετὴν δὲ καὶ δι᾽ αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς πολλούς, ἀγαπητὸν δὲ καὶ ὀλίγους εὑρεῖν τοιούτους.

CHAP. XI.

Whether there is greater need of Friends in adversity or prosperity.

ΠΟΤΕΡΟΝ δ᾽ ἐν εὐτυχίαις μᾶλλον φίλων δεῖ 11
ἢ ἐν δυστυχίαις; ἐν ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ἐπιζητοῦνται· οἵ τε γὰρ ἀτυχοῦντες δέονται ἐπικουρίας, οἵ τ᾽ εὐτυχοῦντες συμβίων καὶ οὓς εὖ ποιήσουσιν·

That we require friends both in adversity and prosperity.

3. ὑπερβολὴ γάρ] See above p. 326, 16.

8. ἐν δυσί] As Pylades and Orestes, Damon and Pythias, and the like.

10. πλὴν πολιτικῶς] Aristotle says it is not possible for a good man to have many friends, for the reason stated above. Nevertheless he may be a friend to many at once in a certain sense, as to his country or his own party. But this feeling differs from friendship, properly so called, because he does not entertain this affection towards individuals on account of their individual virtue, but as parts of a whole, and with a view to the benefit of that whole; as of happiness to his country or victory to his party.

14. ἀγαπητόν] *It is enough.*

βούλονται γὰρ εὖ δρᾶν. ἀναγκαιότερον μὲν δὴ ἐν ταῖς ἀτυχίαις, διὸ τῶν χρησίμων ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, κάλλιον δ' ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις, διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ζητοῦσιν· τούτους γὰρ αἱρετώτερον εὐεργετεῖν καὶ μετὰ τούτων διάγειν. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἡ παρουσία αὐτὴ τῶν φίλων ἡδεῖα καὶ ἐν ταῖς δυστυχίαις· κουφίζονται γὰρ οἱ λυπούμενοι συναλγούντων τῶν φίλων. διὸ κἂν ἀπορήσειέν τις πότερον ὥσπερ βάρους μεταλαμβάνουσιν, ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὔ, ἡ παρουσία δ' αὐτῶν ἡδεία οὖσα καὶ ἡ ἔννοια τοῦ συναλγεῖν ἐλάττω τὴν λύπην ποιεῖ. εἰ μὲν οὖν διὰ ταῦτα ἢ δι' ἄλλο τι κουφίζονται, ἀφείσθω· συμβαίνειν δ' οὖν φαίνεται τὸ λεχθέν. Ἔοικε δ' ἡ παρουσία μικτή τις αὐτῶν εἶναι. αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ὁρᾶν τοὺς φίλους ἡδύ, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀτυχοῦντι, καὶ γίνεταί τις ἐπικουρία πρὸς τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι· παραμυθητικὸν γὰρ ὁ φίλος καὶ τῇ ὄψει καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, ἐὰν ᾖ ἐπιδέξιος· οἶδε γὰρ τὸ ἦθος καὶ ἐφ' οἷς ἥδεται καὶ λυπεῖται. τὸ δὲ λυπούμενον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς αὐτοῦ ἀτυχίαις λυπηρόν· πᾶς γὰρ φεύγει λύπης αἴτιος εἶναι τοῖς φίλοις. διόπερ οἱ μὲν ἀνδρώδεις τὴν φύσιν εὐλαβοῦνται συλλυπεῖν τοὺς φίλους αὐτοῖς, κἂν μὴ ὑπερτείνῃ τῇ ἀλυπίᾳ, τὴν ἐκείνοις γινομένην λύπην οὐχ ὑπομένει, ὅλως τε συνθρήνους οὐ προσίεται

But the pleasure derived from the society of friends in sorrow is mixed with pain: pleasure from the mere sight of them, but pain from seeing them grieving for us.

4. αἱρετώτερον εὐεργετεῖν] See above chap. 9.

22. διόπερ οἱ μὲν ἀνδρώδεις] *Wherefore the brave are cautious of having their friends to condole with them, for unless he* (the brave) *be very insensible* (ὑπερτείνῃ τῇ ἀλυπίᾳ) *he will not endure to see grief coming upon them* (*from his own troubles*); *and secondly, and in short, he does not readily admit commiserators, from himself not being given to weeping and lamentation.* Such seems to me to be the simplest and most grammatical way of constructing the passage, though great diversity of opinion exists respecting it.

But in joy we receive, on the contrary, double pleasure; from their presence, and from seeing them pleased at our own good fortune. Wherefore we should court their society in our prosperity, but not call for them in adversity, except in certain cases. But when they are in prosperity or adversity we should act just the reverse.

διὰ τὸ μηδ' αὐτὸς εἶναι θρηνητικός· γύναια δὲ καὶ οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες τοῖς συστένουσι χαίρουσι, καὶ φιλοῦσιν ὡς φίλους καὶ συναλγοῦντας. μιμεῖσθαι δ' ἐν ἅπασι δεῖ δῆλον ὅτι τὸν βελτίω. Ἡ δ' ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις τῶν φίλων παρουσία τήν τε διαγωγὴν ἡδεῖαν ἔχει καὶ τὴν ἔννοιαν ὅτι ἥδονται ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἀγαθοῖς. διὸ δόξειεν ἂν δεῖν εἰς μὲν τὰς εὐτυχίας καλεῖν τοὺς φίλους προθύμως· εὐεργετητικὸν γὰρ εἶναι καλόν· εἰς δὲ τὰς ἀτυχίας ὀκνοῦντα· μεταδιδόναι γὰρ ὡς ἥκιστα δεῖ τῶν κακῶν, ὅθεν τὸ "ἅλις ἐγὼ δυστυχῶν." μάλιστα δὲ παρακλητέον, ὅταν μέλλωσιν ὀλίγα ὀχληθέντες μεγάλ' αὐτὸν ὠφελήσειν. ἰέναι δ' ἀνάπαλιν ἴσως ἁρμόζει πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἀτυχοῦντας ἄκλητον καὶ προθύμως (φίλου γὰρ εὖ ποιεῖν, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐν χρείᾳ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀξιώσαντας· ἀμφοῖν γὰρ κάλλιον καὶ ἥδιον), εἰς δὲ τὰς εὐτυχίας συνεργοῦντα μὲν προθύμως (καὶ γὰρ εἰς ταῦτα χρεία φίλων), πρὸς εὐπάθειαν δὲ σχολαίως· οὐ γὰρ καλὸν τὸ προθυμεῖσθαι ὠφελεῖσθαι. δόξαν δ' ἀηδίας ἐν τῷ διωθεῖσθαι ἴσως εὐλαβητέον·

2. *καὶ οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες*] sc. *and womanish men.*

3. *μιμεῖσθαι—δεῖ*] This is said in reference to the words preceding. We ought not, like effeminate persons, to give way to sorrow and be ready to communicate it to our friends, but bear it like the brave.

11. *ἅλις ἐγώ*] Paraphrastes: *ὁ τραγῳδός φησιν.* Interpretes putant locum significari Euripidis in Oreste v. 239:

λέξεις τι καινόν; καὶ μὲν εὖ χάριν φέρεις·
εἰ δ' ἐς βλάβην τιν', ἅλις ἔχω τοῦ
δυστυχεῖν.

Quapropter alius locus indicandus erat, nisi, quod verisimilius videtur, tragœdia unde hic versus desumptus est, periit. Similis autem valde loco huic est veteris tragici, quod ad sententiam facit, locus itidem Sophoclis e fabula, cujus index est Œdipus Tyrannus (v. 1061.) ita enim loquitur Jocasta, *ἅλις νοσοῦσ' ἐγώ.* VICTOR and GIPH.

15. *ἄκλητον*] Aristotle appears to allude in this passage to Homer's description of Menelaus visiting Agamemnon in his troubles. See Iliad B. 408.

αὐτόματος δέ οἱ ἦλθε βοὴν ἀγαθὸς
Μενέλαος,
ᾔδεε γὰρ κατὰ θυμὸν ἀδελφεὸν ὡς
ἐπονεῖτο.

ἐνίοτε γὰρ συμβαίνει. ἡ παρουσία δὴ τῶν φίλων ἐν ἅπασιν αἱρετὴ φαίνεται.

12 Ἆρ' οὖν, ὥσπερ τοῖς ἐρῶσι τὸ ὁρᾶν ἀγαπητότατόν ἐστι καὶ μᾶλλον αἱροῦνται ταύτην τὴν αἴσθησιν ἢ τὰς λοιπάς, ὡς κατὰ ταύτην μάλιστα τοῦ ἔρωτος ὄντος καὶ γινομένου, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς φίλοις αἱρετώτατόν ἐστι τὸ συζῆν; κοινωνία γὰρ ἡ φιλία. καὶ ὡς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὸν φίλον. περὶ αὑτὸν δ' ἡ αἴσθησις ὅτι ἔστιν αἱρετή· καὶ περὶ τὸν φίλον δή. ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια γίνεται αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ συζῆν, ὥστ' εἰκότως τούτου ἐφίενται. καὶ ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστὶν ἑκάστοις τὸ εἶναι ἢ οὗ χάριν αἱροῦνται τὸ ζῆν, ἐν τούτῳ μετὰ τῶν φίλων βούλονται διάγειν· διόπερ οἱ μὲν συμπίνουσιν, οἱ δὲ συγκυβεύουσιν, ἄλλοι δὲ συγγυμνάζονται καὶ συγκυνηγοῦσιν ἢ συμφιλοσοφοῦσιν, ἕκαστοι ἐν τούτῳ συνημερεύοντες ὅ τί περ μάλιστα ἀγαπῶσι τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ· συζῆν γὰρ βουλόμενοι μετὰ τῶν φίλων, ταῦτα ποιοῦσι καὶ τούτων κοινωνοῦσιν οἷς οἴονται συζῆν. γίνεται οὖν ἡ μὲν τῶν φαύλων φιλία μοχθηρά· κοινωνοῦσι γὰρ φαύλων ἀβέβαιοι ὄντες, καὶ μοχθηροὶ δὲ γίνονται ὁμοιούμενοι ἀλλήλοις· ἡ δὲ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἐπιεικής, συναυξανομένη ταῖς ὁμιλίαις· δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ βελτίους γίνεσθαι ἐνεργοῦντες καὶ διορθοῦντες ἀλλήλους· ἀπομάττονται γὰρ παρ' ἀλ-

Some concluding remarks, tending to shew why the presence of friends is delightful in all friendships.

6. ἔρωτος ὄντος] See above ix. 5; and compare the Rhetoric, i. 11.

8. πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔχει] Compare p. 384.

9. ἡ αἴσθησις ὅτι ἔστιν αἱρετή] See above p. 382.

10. ἐνέργεια—ἐν τῷ συζῆν] Compare p. 384, 10. note.

12. τὸ εἶναι] Compare p. 383.

22. ἀβέβαιοι ὄντες] See p. 364.

26. ἀπομάττονται] πολυχρήστον ῥῆμα τὸ μάσσειν, ἐξ οὗ κατὰ παραγωγὴν

λήλων οἷς ἀρέσκονται, ὅθεν "ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄπ' ἐσθλά." περὶ μὲν οὖν φιλίας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω· ἑπόμενον δ' ἂν εἴη διελθεῖν περὶ ἡδονῆς.

ἀπομάσσειν μὲν τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀποσπογγίζειν. ἀναμάσσειν δὲ τὸ ἄνω ποιεῖν τοῦτο περὶ κεφαλήν. ἐκμάσσειν δὲ καὶ ἐκμάσσεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀποσπογγίζειν μέν, μάλιστα δὲ τὸ ἔκ τινος τύπου αἴρειν τινὰ ἰδέαν καὶ ἐκμαγεῖον κατὰ τοὺς παλαιοὺς ἀποτύπωμα, σφραγίς, εἰκών. Eustathius, p. 1857.

1. ἐσθλῶν μὲν γάρ] These are part of the verses of Theoguis, quoted above ix. 9. p. 381.

INTRODUCTION TO BOOK X.

At the conclusion of the Seventh Book (p. 295 sq.) Aristotle took occasion to glance from the discussion of Temperance and Intemperance and their kindred habits, to the consideration of their particular object-matter, the more immediate pleasures derived from sensual gratification; and although some of the remarks there introduced apply to the nature of pleasure in general, yet it is easily seen, that they are made more especially with reference to corporeal pleasures. That discussion is left unfinished, Aristotle contenting himself with exposing the weakness of the arguments brought for and against it, not entering very deeply or explicitly into an explanation or refutation of the theories of Eudoxus and Plato, which he reserves for the present Book. Both because such a refutation serves for a natural introduction of his own system, which strikes the midway between the other two, and because the further and more intricate prosecution of this subject is coincident with a more complete and conclusive explanation of the true nature of Happiness. In the same way Plato also, in his dialogue of the Philebus, proceeds from a consideration of the nature of Pleasure to that of the chief and perfect Good.

The opinion that Pleasure is the Chief Good had been much advanced by the efforts of Democritus, the Sophists, Aristippus, and others, and was entertained by many of the contemporaries of Aristotle and Plato. The dialogues of the latter are full of objections to this popular theory: but in none are they refuted with more care and labor than in the Philebus; to which dialogue and its reasonings and representations of the nature of Pleasure particularly, constant reference is made in the following Book.

According to Plato's theory [a], as there set forth, all things are either of the finite (*πέρας*), or infinite (*ἄπειρον*), or formed from the union of these two, the mixed (*τὸ ξυμμισγόμενον*), and, lastly, the cause of this union which regulates and directs it (*τὸ αἴτιον*). The indefinite is that which admits of more or less, without the destruction of its essence, in which there is a constant vicissitude of qualities (*ποιοτήτων*), possessing in itself neither beginning, middle, nor end [b]. The finite is that which has the power of bounding and restraining the infinite. But since neither of these, separated and disunited, are desirable by

[a] ΣΩ. *ἀναλάβωμεν ἄττα τῶν νῦν δὴ λόγων.* ΠΡΩ. *ποῖα;* ΣΩ. *τὸν θεὸν ἐλέγομέν που, τὸ μὲν ἄπειρον δεῖξαι τῶν ὄντων, τὸ δὲ πέρας;* ΠΡΩ. *πάνυ μὲν οὖν* ΣΩ. *τούτω δὴ τῶν εἰδῶν τὰ δύο τιθώμεθα, τὸ δὲ τρίτον, ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τούτοιν ἕν τι ξυμμισγόμενον. — τετάρτου μοι γένους αὖ προσδεῖν φαίνεται* ΠΡΩ. *λέγε τίνος;* ΣΩ. *τῆς ξυμμίξεως τούτων πρὸς ἄλληλα τὴν αἰτίαν ὅρα, καὶ τίθει μοι πρὸς τρισὶν ἐκείνοις τέταρτον τοῦτο.*—Phileb. p. 23. *πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν ἄπειρον λέγω, δεύτερον δὲ πέρας, ἔπειτ' ἐκ τούτων τρίτον μικτὴν καὶ γεγενημένην οὐσίαν· τὴν δὲ τῆς μίξεως αἰτίαν καὶ γενέσεως τετάρτην λέγω.* ib. p. 27.

[b] ΣΩ. *θερμοτέρου καὶ ψυχροτέρου πέρι πρῶτον ὅρα, πέρας εἴ ποτέ τι νοήσαις, ἢ τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον ἐν αὐτοῖς οἰκοῦν τοῖς γένεσιν, ἕωσπερ ἂν ἐνοικῆτον, τέλος οὐκ ἂν ἐπιτρεψαίτην γίγνεσθαι· γενομένης γὰρ τελευτῆς καὶ αὐτὼ τετελευτήκατον.—ἀεὶ δέ γε φαμὲν ἔν τε τῷ ψυχροτέρῳ καὶ τῷ θερμοτέρῳ τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον ἔνι.—ἀεὶ τοίνυν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν σημαίνει τούτω μὴ τέλος ἔχειν, ἀτελῆ δ' ὄντε δήπου παντάπασιν ἀπείρω γίγνεσθον.* ΠΡΩ. *καὶ σφόδρα γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.* ΣΩ. *ἀλλ' εὖ γε, ὦ φίλε Πρώταρχε ὑπέλαβες καὶ ἀνέμνησας, ὅτι καὶ τὸ σφόδρα τοῦτο, ὃ σὺ νῦν ἐφθέγξω, καὶ τό γε ἠρέμα τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν ἔχετον τῷ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον· ὅπου γὰρ ἂν ἐνῆτον οὐκ ἐᾶτον εἶναι ποσὸν ἕκαστον ἀλλ' ἀεὶ σφοδρότερον ἡσυχαιτέρου καὶ τοὐναντίον ἑκάσταις πράξεσιν ἐμποιοῦντε τὸ πλέον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ἀπεργάζεσθον, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν ἀφανίζετον. ὃ γὰρ ἐλέχθη νῦν δή, μὴ ἀφανίσαντε τὸ ποσόν. ἀλλ' ἐάσαντε αὐτό τε καὶ τὸ μέτριον ἐν τῇ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον καὶ σφόδρα καὶ ἠρέμα ἕδρᾳ ἐγγενέσθαι αὐτά, ἔρρει ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς αὐτῶν χώρας ἐν ᾗ ἐνῆν. οὐ γὰρ ἔτι θερμοτέρω οὐδὲ ψυχροτέρω ἤτην ἂν λαβόντε τὸ ποσόν. προχωρεῖ γὰρ καὶ οὐ μένει τό τε θερμότερον ἀεὶ καὶ τὸ ψυχρότερον ὡσαύτως. τὸ δὲ ποσὸν ἔστη καὶ προϊὸν ἐπαύσατο. κατὰ δὴ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἄπειρον γίγνοιτ' ἂν τὸ θερμότερον καὶ τοὐναντίον ἅμα.—νῦν μέντοι ἄθρει, τῆς τοῦ ἀπείρου φύσεως εἰ τοῦτο δεξόμεθα σημεῖον;*—ΠΡΩ. *τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;* ΣΩ. *ὁπόσ' ἂν ἡμῖν φαίνηται μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον γιγνόμενα, καὶ τὸ σφόδρα καὶ ἠρέμα δεχόμενα καὶ τὸ λίαν, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτ' ἅπαντα, εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου γένος ὡς εἰς ἓν δεῖ πάντα ταῦτα τιθέναι.—οὐκοῦν τὰ μὴ δεχόμενα ταῦτα, τούτων δὲ τὰ ἐναντία πάντα δεχόμενα, πρῶτον μὲν τὸ ἴσον καὶ ἰσότητα, μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἴσον τὸ διπλάσιον, καὶ πᾶν ὅ τί περ ἂν πρὸς ἀριθμὸν ἀριθμὸς ἢ μέτρον ᾖ πρὸς μέτρον, ταῦτα ξύμπαντα εἰς τὸ πέρας ἀπολογιζόμενοι, καλῶς ἂν δοκοῖμεν δρᾶν τοῦτο.* Phileb. p. 24.

themselves, and nothing generated (ἡ γεγενημένη οὐσία) can be produced, except by operation of the finite upon the infinite, hence arises the necessity of their union (τὸ ξυμμισγόμενον), by which the opponent qualities of the infinite are reduced to harmony and concord [c]. And by this union all that is excellent in nature or art is produced. (Tim. p. 27. c.) But since the Chief Good is that which is perfect and symmetrical (τὸ μέτριον or τὸ ξύμμετρον καὶ καλὸν καὶ τέλειον), it is evident that if Pleasure be indefinite it cannot be the Chief Good; but that such is Pleasure is evident from the fact admitted by its greatest admirers, that it may be infinitely increased or diminished without its essence being destroyed [d]. And such is the nature of the infinite; thus you may add to a heap of earth or subtract from it ad infinitum, and still it remains

[c] ΣΩ. θερμότερον ἐφθεγγόμεθα νῦν δή πού τι καὶ ψυχρότερον.—προσθεὶς δὴ ξηρότερον καὶ ὑγρότερον αὐτοῖς, καὶ πλέον καὶ ἔλαττον, καὶ θᾶττον καὶ βραδύτερον, καὶ μεῖζον καὶ σμικρότερον, καὶ ὁπόσα ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν τῆς τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον δεχομένης ἐτίθεμεν εἰς ἓν φύσεως. ΠΡΩ. τῆς τοῦ ἀπείρου λέγεις; ΣΩ. ναί. ξυμμίγνυ δέ γε εἰς αὐτὴν τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα τὴν αὖ τοῦ πέρατος γένναν.—ΠΡΩ. ποίαν καὶ πῶς λέγεις; ΣΩ. τὴν τοῦ ἴσου καὶ διπλασίου, καὶ ὁπόση παύει πρὸς ἄλληλα τἀναντία διαφόρως ἔχοντα, ξύμμετρα δὲ καὶ ξύμφωνα ἐνθεῖσα ἀριθμὸν ἀπεργάζεται. ΠΡΩ. μανθάνω· φαίνει γάρ μοι λέγειν, μιγνὺς ταῦτα γενέσεις τινὰς ἐφ' ἑκάστων αὐτῶν ξυμβαίνειν.—ΣΩ. ἆρ' οὐκ ἐν μὲν νόσοις ἡ τούτων ὀρθὴ κοινωνία τὴν ὑγιείας φύσιν ἐγέννησεν;—ἐν δὲ ὀξεῖ καὶ βαρεῖ καὶ ταχεῖ καὶ βραδεῖ ἀπείροις οὖσιν, ἆρ' οὐ ταὐτὰ ἐγγιγνόμενα τὰ αὐτὰ ἅμα πέρας τε ἀπειργάσατο, καὶ μουσικὴν ξύμπασαν τελεώτατα ξυνεστήσατο;—καὶ μὴν ἔν γε χειμῶσι καὶ πνίγεσιν ἐγγενομένη τὸ μὲν λίαν καὶ ἄπειρον ἀφείλετο, τὸ δὲ ἔμμετρον καὶ ἅμα ξύμμετρον ἀπειργάσατο;—οὐκοῦν ἐκ τούτων ὧραί τε καὶ ὅσα καλὰ πάντα ἡμῖν γέγονε, τῶν τε ἀπείρων καὶ τῶν πέρας ἐχόντων ξυμμιχθέντων;—καὶ ἄλλα γε δὴ μυρία ἐπιλείπω λέγων, οἷον μεθ' ὑγιείας κάλλος καὶ ἰσχύν, καὶ ἐν ψυχαῖς αὖ πάμπολλα ἕτερα καὶ πάγκαλα. Phileb. p. 25. Then a little after, p. 26, he defines this third form of existence (τὸ ξυμμισγόμενον in these words: τρίτον φάθι με λέγειν ἓν τοῦτο τιθέντα τὸ τούτων ἔκγονον ἅπαν, γένεσιν εἰς οὐσίαν ἐκ τῶν μετὰ τοῦ πέρατος ἀπειργασμένων μέτρων, *a generation into essence, or an essence generated from measures, or things rendered definite* (μέτρων) *by means of the finite* (πέρατος). The infinite and chaotic mass is rendered fixed by the finite, and the essence produced by this action is the τὸ ξυμμισγόμενον.

[d] ΣΩ. ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη πέρας ἔχετον, ἢ τῶν τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον δεχομένων ἐστόν; ΦΙ. ναί, τῶν τὸ μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἡδονὴ πᾶν ἀγαθὸν ἦν, εἰ μὴ ἄπειρον ἐτύγχανε πεφυκὸς καὶ πλήθει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον. Phil. p. 28. ἡδονὴ ἄπειρός τε αὐτὴ καὶ τοῦ μήτε ἀρχὴν μήτε μέσα μήτε τέλος ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔχοντος, μηδὲ ἕξοντός ποτε, γένους. Ib. p. 31.

a heap of earth: but if you form a foot-measure you can neither add to nor subtract from it without destroying its essence. Pleasure therefore cannot be the Chief Good[e], nor yet desirable at all without the admixture of the finite wisdom (the φρόνησις of Aristotle p. 402.) to govern and direct it. And as in the universe the Supreme Intelligence (νοῦς βασιλεὺς)[f] rules over all, directing and uniting the finite and the infinite, so in man it attempers the union of pleasure and wisdom, directing all things according to the *Ideal Good*, which alone can render life completely happy.

In the contemplation therefore of the *Ideal Good*, and not in pleasure, consists the real happiness of man; but of its full and perfect contemplation none are capable except God, and those who resemble him; consequently, the great object and happiness of this life is to direct our efforts to the imitation of God, to return to that bright and pure state in which we were placed before our union with the body. In this Aristotle joins issue with Plato, arriving at a similar result, although by a different process. For having shown that the greatest pleasure results from the most perfect energies, and the most perfect energies from the exercise of the noblest faculties on the noblest object-matter, that that noblest faculty is νοῦς, and the noblest object-matter the particular object of νοῦς, it follows that from its energies we must derive the greatest pleasures. And this is not the only result, but its energies constitute

[e] Pleasure absolutely speaking is not a good at all. For unless the harmony naturally produced by the finite united with the infinite be first broken pleasure cannot be produced. So that the very existence of pleasure must presuppose a pain. λέγω τοίνυν τῆς ἁρμονίας μὲν λυομένης ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς ζώοις ἅμα λύσιν τῆς φύσεως καὶ γένεσιν ἀλγηδόνων ἐν τῷ τότε γίγνεσθαι χρόνῳ.—καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ σκόπει εἴ σοι μέτριος ὁ λόγος, ὃς ἂν φῇ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἀπείρου καὶ πέρατος κατὰ φύσιν ἐμψύχων γεγονὸς εἶδος, ὅπερ ἔλεγον ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν, ὅταν μὲν τοῦτο φθείρηται τὴν μὲν φθορὰν λύπην εἶναι, τὴν δ' εἰς τὴν αὑτῶν οὐσίαν ὁδόν, ταύτην δ' αὖ πάλιν τὴν ἀναχώρησιν πάντων, ἡδονήν. ib. p. 32.

[f] Plato proves that νοῦς is that which applies the finite to the infinite (pleasure) from the analogy of the divine mind. For as the divine mind rules and moderates all things in heaven and earth, (νοῦς ἐστὶ βασιλεὺς ἡμῖν οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ γῆς p. 28.) so does the mind of man, which is part of that divine mind, rule the body, which is a compound of the same elements as the universe.

our greatest happiness. For since Happiness is the most perfect energy (ἐνεργεία κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀριστήν), and the energies of νοῦς most perfect, they also constitute the greatest happiness; so that from the greatest happiness essentially results the greatest pleasures, and the converse. Is it then needful to exhort mankind to cultivate these energies, to live according to νοῦς, to imitate the gods and study to live like them (for they only can exercise the energies of νοῦς), thus at the same time ensuring our own happiness by such a mode of life, and ensuring their favour from most resembling themselves, ὅμοιοι ὡς τὸν ὅμοιον?

But yet since man is a compound being possessing a moral as well as an intellectual nature, to complete his happiness he must possess in perfection the energies and virtues of that inferior nature, as well as of the higher and more divine; and consequently since these energies are for the most part external acts dependent upon external means, he must possess to a certain degree both means and objects for the performance of those acts: which shows not only that this class of energies are essentially inferior to the theoretical as being less independent, and less possessing those qualities which we invariably attach to Happiness, but also that they are less adapted to a perfect state of existence, such as we attribute to immortal beings. Yet at the same time they are not so dependent upon external means as some seem ready to imagine. οὐ μὴν οἰητέον γε πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων δεήσεσθαι τὸν εὐδαιμονήσοντα, εἰ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἄνευ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μακάριον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τὸ αὔταρκες οὐδ' ἡ πρᾶξις, δυνατὸν δὲ καὶ μὴ ἄρχοντα γῆς καὶ θαλάττης πράττειν τὰ καλά· καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ μετρίων δύναιτ' ἄν τις πράττειν κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν (p. 435.).

Having thus concluded the argument, and reverted to the same position from which we started, we may now substitute in our definition of Happiness what was obscure. We have learnt what virtue is and what are the best virtues. If, then, those virtues be σοφία and φρόνησις (including moral virtue in φρόνησις), the Happiness of man will be the energies resulting from the exercise of those habits.

ARISTOTELIS

ETHICA NICOMACHEA.

LIB. X.

CHAP. I.

The consideration of Pleasure necessary from two causes: from its own intrinsic importance; from the designed or undesigned errors of those who have treated upon it.

The necessity of this consideration shown from the importance of Pleasure in itself.

ΜΕΤΑ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ ἡδονῆς ἴσως ἕπεται διελθεῖν· μάλιστα γὰρ δοκεῖ συνῳκειῶσθαι τῷ γένει ἡμῶν· διὸ παιδεύουσι τοὺς νέους οἰακίζοντες ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἤθους ἀρετὴν μέγιστον εἶναι τὸ χαίρειν οἷς δεῖ καὶ μισεῖν ἃ δεῖ· διατείνει γὰρ ταῦτα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου, ῥοπὴν ἔχοντα καὶ δύναμιν πρὸς ἀρετὴν

1. *μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα*] The connexion of this with the other parts of this Treatise will be seen at p. 295.

— *ἴσως*] The Greek Scholiast thinks that this word has been used by Aristotle not merely as expressive of the diffidence with which he always proposes his opinions, but likewise from this consideration. If pleasure be a part of virtue, as we cannot know the whole without knowing first each of the parts, it is requisite that we should now consider pleasure; if, however, it be only *accidental* to virtue it would not be requisite, it would only *perhaps* be requisite to consider it. Only *perhaps*, because as the accidentia are never included in the definition, and the definition expresses the whole of a thing, it is plain that we may know the whole without the accidentia, consequently we might know what virtue is without knowing what pleasure is.

τε καὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡδέα προαιροῦνται, τὰ δὲ λυπηρὰ φεύγουσιν. Ὑπὲρ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων ἥκιστ' ἂν δόξειε παρετέον εἶναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ πολλὴν ἐχόντων ἀμφισβήτησιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τἀγαθὸν ἡδονὴν λέγουσιν, οἱ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας κομιδῇ φαῦλον, οἱ μὲν ἴσως πεπεισμένοι οὕτω καὶ ἔχειν, οἱ δὲ οἰόμενοι βέλτιον εἶναι πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡμῶν ἀποφαίνειν τὴν ἡδονὴν τῶν φαύλων, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐστίν· ῥέπειν γὰρ τοὺς πολλοὺς πρὸς αὐτὴν καὶ δουλεύειν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, διὸ δεῖν εἰς τοὐναντίον ἄγειν· ἐλθεῖν γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον. Μή ποτε δὲ οὐ καλῶς τοῦτο λέγεται. οἱ γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσι λόγοι ἧττόν εἰσι πιστοὶ τῶν ἔργων· ὅταν οὖν διαφωνῶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, καταφρονούμενοι καὶ τἀληθὲς προσαναιροῦσιν· ὁ γὰρ ψέγων τὴν ἡδονήν, ὀφθείς ποτ' ἐφιέμενος, ἀποκλίνειν δοκεῖ πρὸς αὐτὴν ὡς τοιαύτην οὖσαν ἅπασαν· τὸ διορίζειν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τῶν πολλῶν. ἐοίκασιν οὖν οἱ ἀληθεῖς τῶν λόγων οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι χρησιμώτατοι εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον· συνῳδοὶ γὰρ ὄντες τοῖς ἔργοις

And from the errors of others concerning it.

i. Of those who called it the Chief Good.

ii. Of those who called it entirely evil.

The evil consequences of such misrepresentations.

4. ἀμφισβήτησιν] After this word Eustratius supplies τῶν περὶ τὸν Εὔδοξον.

5. τἀγαθόν] That is, Eudoxus, who said that pleasure was the specific cause and principle of all good. Just in the same way as the Platonists introduced their doctrine of the idea, and affirmed, that the αὐτοαγαθὸν was the only good, and the specific principle (εἰδικὴ ἀρχή) of all other goods.

8. τῶν φαύλων] Irrational creatures, creatures inferior to man. See the Politics, i. 1. (p. 4. Ed. Goet.)

12. μή ποτε δὲ οὐ] *But surely they do not well*, or *I question whether they do well in making such an assertion.* A gentle way of expressing a negative, and when attended with a subjunctive mood expressing a doubt in the mind of the speaker. Had it been οὐ μή ποτε, it would have implied, *they* CERTAINLY *do not, I am positive they do not well, &c.*

πιστεύονται, διὸ προτρέπονται τοὺς ξυνιέντας ζῆν κατ' αὐτούς. τῶν μὲν οὖν τοιούτων ἅλις, τὰ δ' εἰρημένα περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐπέλθωμεν.

CHAP. II.

The opinion of Eudoxus and Plato, concerning Pleasure, refuted—that Pleasure is not the Chief Good—that it is not all to be sought nor all avoided—that it differs in species, or in those things from which it is derived.

2 ΕΥΔΟΞΟΣ μὲν οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν τἀγαθὸν ᾤετ' εἶναι διὰ τὸ πάνθ' ὁρᾶν ἐφιέμενα αὐτῆς, καὶ The arguments of Eudoxus to

4. Εὔδοξος] Of the tenets of Eudoxus on this subject, little else is known than what is here mentioned by Aristotle. He was the son of Æschines and born at Cnidos: and was celebrated for his knowledge of legislation, physic, and geometry, in which latter science he had the celebrated Archytas for his master. At the age of twenty-three, although in great poverty, he was so struck with the fame of Socrates, that he resolved to take a journey to Athens in order to become his hearer: and afterwards studied under Plato, whom he accompanied into Egypt. Although none of his writings remain, he is said to have composed treatises upon various subjects: upon astronomy, geometry, and medicine. He was so ardent an admirer of the first of these sciences, as to have wished that he might share the fate of Phaeton, provided that he might have the opportunity of as closely inspecting the sun, and discovering its form and magnitude. See Diog. Laert. viii. §. 86—91. and Menag. ibid. See also Plutarch, Non posse s. v. secund. Epicurum. Vol. xiv. p. 99. Hutten.

— τἀγαθόν] It was usual among the Platonists to designate what they termed the *specific principle* (εἰδητικὴ ἀρχή) by the prefix of the letter (τ) or the word αὐτό: meaning thereby to express the very thing itself, the αὐτὸ τοῦτο, from that which was only *accidentally* such. Thus by the word ταυταγαθὸν or τἀγαθὸν they meant that which was solely and primarily ἀγαθόν, whereas all other things, such as νοῦς, ψυχή, ἐπιστήμη &c. were called by them ἀγαθὰ but not τἀγαθά, as partaking only of the *quality* of the τἀγαθόν. And according to Eudoxus, who had been a disciple of Plato, pleasure was not ἀγαθὸν but τἀγαθόν.

The Platonists used also these words in a particular sense, αὐτοέν, αὐτοζῶον, αὐτοόν. By the word αὐτοὲν they understood the principle or ἀρχὴ of units, (ἑνῶν) and monades: making a distinction between this and other units. The ἀρχὴ of all things they termed αὐτοὲν αὐτοαγαθὸν or τἀγαθόν. But the αὐτοὸν they called the ἀρχὴ of all

prove that Pleasure is the Chief Good. 1. Because all things aimed at it

ἔλλογα καὶ ἄλογα· ἐν πᾶσι δ' εἶναι τὸ αἱρετὸν ἐπιεικές, καὶ τὸ μάλιστα κράτιστον· τὸ δὴ πάντ'

things, (πάντων τῶν ὄντων), which was subsequent to αὐτοέν. For the αὐτοὲν was first of all things, then the αὐτοόν, next the αὐτοζωή, and finally the αὐτοζῶον. (See the Scholiast.)

Now Eudoxus thought that pleasure was the chief good, τἀγαθόν, for if that which is aimed at is a good, that which is most aimed at is the greatest good, and pleasure is the most aimed at, and therefore it is the greatest good.

2dly. That which is opposite to the greatest evil, is the greatest good; pleasure is opposed to the greatest evil (pain); and therefore, pleasure is the greatest good.

3dly. Pleasure is sought entirely for its own sake, is ultimate and perfect, and consequently is the chief good.

4thly. That which when added to every other good makes that good more eligible is τἀγαθόν.

Pleasure added to any other good makes it more eligible;

Consequently pleasure is τἀγαθόν.

Eudoxus confirmed his major premise, by saying that good could only be made more eligible by the addition of its own essence, (αὐτὸ αὐτῷ.) That the ἀρχὴ πρώτη or τἀγαθὸν was the only thing which when added to every other good made it more eligible, since that alone could be congenerous with all goods, as being the source from which they derived their essence. But this argument, as Aristotle shows, is not conclusive: for though pleasure added to φρόνησις makes φρόνησις more eligible, it is not because the *essence* of φρόνησις is increased or altered, but because it is the *addition* of one good to another, and two goods are better than one. And by the same argument Plato overturned the conclusion of Eudoxus: for he says,

If good can only be made greater by the addition of its own essence, the chief good, as embracing the essence of all other goods, cannot be increased; and consequently if ἡδονὴ be the τἀγαθὸν it cannot be improved by the addition of any other good;

But it is increased by the addition of some other good (e. g. pleasure with φρόνησις is better than pleasure without); and therefore,

Pleasure is not τἀγαθόν.

Yet some have doubted, from the inconclusiveness of these arguments of Eudoxus, whether he intended to prove that pleasure is a good or the chief good. But that he rather intended to prove that pleasure was the chief good can scarcely be doubted, both from the first objection of Plato and from the conclusion of this Chapter, more particularly the last lines of it, in which Aristotle thus sums up the argument: ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὔτε τἀγαθὸν ἡ ἡδονὴ οὔτε πᾶσα αἱρετή, δῆλον ἔοικεν εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι εἰσί τινες αἱρεταὶ καθ' αὑτάς. p. 411. Here then are three opinions:

1. That of Eudoxus, that pleasure is the chief good, and essentially good, and that all pleasures are good. In which latter opinion he was supported by the Sophists. Compare the Gorgias of Plato, p. 495. ΣΩ. πότερον φὴς εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἡδὺ καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἢ εἶναί τι τῶν ἡδέων ὃ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν; ΚΑΛ. —τὸ αὐτό φημι εἶναι.

2. The doctrine of Plato, who denied that *any* pleasure was a good. This is also questioned by some, whether

ἐπὶ ταὐτὸ φέρεσθαι μηνύειν ὡς πᾶσι τοῦτο ἄριστον· ἕκαστον γὰρ τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν εὑρίσκειν, ὥσπερ καὶ τροφήν· τὸ δὴ πᾶσιν ἀγαθόν, καὶ οὗ πάντ' ἐφίεται, τἀγαθὸν εἶναι. ἐπιστεύοντο δ' οἱ λόγοι διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἤθους ἀρετὴν μᾶλλον ἢ δι' αὐτούς· διαφερόντως γὰρ ἐδόκει σώφρων εἶναι· οὐ δὴ ὡς φίλος τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐδόκει ταῦτα λέγειν, ἀλλ' οὕτως ἔχειν κατ' ἀλήθειαν.

2. Because it is the opposite of the greatest evil.

Οὐχ ἧττον δ' ᾤετ' εἶναι φανερὸν ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου· τὴν γὰρ λύπην καθ' αὑτὸ πᾶσι φευκτὸν εἶναι, ὁμοίως δὴ τοὐναντίον αἱρετόν.

3. Sought entirely for its own sake.

Μάλιστα δ' εἶναι αἱρετὸν ὃ μὴ δι' ἕτερον μηδ' ἑτέρου χάριν αἱρούμεθα· τοιοῦτον δ' ὁμολογουμένως εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν· οὐδένα γὰρ ἐπερωτᾶν τίνος ἕνεκα ἥδεται, ὡς καθ' αὑτὴν οὖσαν αἱρετὴν τὴν ἡδονήν.

4. All other goods are essentially improved by it.

Προστιθεμένην τε ὁτῳοῦν τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἱρετώτερον ποιεῖν, οἷον τῷ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ σωφρονεῖν· καὶ αὔξεσθαι δὴ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ αὑτῷ.

Objection to this argument urged by Plato.

Ἔοικε δὴ οὗτός γε ὁ λόγος τῶν ἀγαθῶν αὐτὴν ἀποφαίνειν, καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἑτέρου· πᾶν γὰρ μεθ' ἑτέρου

Plato did exclude *all* pleasure from the class of good. But this seems certain: for good is placed by him in the category of *οὐσία*, (whether this term be understood in its logical sense or as implying the *ideal*, will not signify,) pleasure in that of relation (*γένεσις*). Compare also his own words. ΣΩ. *ἆρ' οὖν ἡδονή γε εἴπερ γένεσίς ἐστιν, εἰς ἄλλην ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν αὐτὴν τιθέντες ὀρθῶς θήσομεν;* ΠΡΩ. *ὀρθότατα μὲν οὖν.* Philebus, p. 54. See the whole argument. See also p. 226. l. n. of this treatise.

3. The opinion of Aristotle striking the mid way between the two, that some pleasures are good and some are not. Or perhaps more correctly, that pleasures are essentially good, but some accidentally evil.

— *τὸ δὴ πᾶσιν ἀγαθόν*] Compare p. 4. 1.

11. *μάλιστα δ' εἶναι αἱρετόν*] See Cic. de Fin. i. 12.

18. *αὐτὸ αὑτῷ*] Although the text is undoubtedly correct, and it will amount to the same, nevertheless I think the argument would be clearer if with the Greek Scholiast we were to read *αὐτῇ* for *αὑτῷ*. sc. *ἡδονῇ*.

ἀγαθοῦ αἱρετώτερον ἢ μονούμενον. τοιούτῳ δὴ λόγῳ καὶ Πλάτων ἀναιρεῖ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδονὴ τἀγαθόν· αἱρετώτερον γὰρ εἶναι τὸν ἡδὺν βίον μετὰ φρονήσεως ἢ χωρίς, εἰ δὲ τὸ μικτὸν κρεῖττον, οὐκ εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν τἀγαθόν· οὐδενὸς γὰρ προστεθέντος αὐτὸ τἀγαθὸν αἱρετώτερον γίνεσθαι. δῆλον δ' ὡς οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν τἀγαθὸν ἂν εἴη, ὃ μετά τινος τῶν καθ' αὑτὸ ἀγαθῶν αἱρετώτερον γίνεται. τί οὖν ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον, οὗ καὶ ἡμεῖς κοινωνοῦμεν; τοιοῦτον γὰρ ἐπιζητεῖται. Οἱ δ' ἐνιστάμενοι ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθὸν οὗ πάντ' ἐφίεται,

The objection to the first argument of

2. Πλάτων] See the Philebus, p. 21. sq.

— Πλάτων] See the Philebus, p. 60. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε . . . ἡμῖν ἂν ξυνομολογοῖτο; ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον; ΣΩ. τὴν τἀγαθοῦ διαφέρειν φύσιν τῷδε μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων. ΠΡΩ. τίνι; ΣΩ. ᾧ παρείη τοῦτ' ἀεὶ τῶν ζώων διὰ τέλους πάντως καὶ πάντη, μηδενὸς ἑτέρου ποτὲ ἔτι προσδεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἱκανὸν τελεώτατον ἔχειν· οὐχ οὕτως; ΠΡΩ. οὕτω μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τῷ λόγῳ ἐπειράθημεν χωρὶς ἑκάτερον ἑκατέρου θέντες εἰς τὸν βίον ἑκάστων, ἄμικτον μὲν ἡδονὴν φρονήσει, φρόνησιν δὲ ἡδονῆς ὡσαύτως μηδὲ τὸ σμικρότατον ἔχουσαν;—εἰ δέ γε παρηνέχθημέν τι τότε, νῦν ὁστισοῦν ἐπαναλαβὼν ὀρθότερον εἰπάτω, μνήμην καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ ἀληθῆ δόξαν τῆς αὐτῆς ἰδέας τιθέμενος, καὶ σκοπῶν εἴ τις ἄνευ τούτων δέξαιτ' ἄν οἱ καὶ ὁτιοῦν εἶναι ἢ καὶ γίγνεσθαι, μὴ ὅτι δή γε ἡδονήν, εἴθ' ὡς πλείστην εἴθ' ὡς σφοδροτάτην, εἰ μήτε ἀληθῶς δοξάζοι χαίρειν, μήτε τοπαράπαν γιγνώσκοι τί ποτε πέπονθε πάθος, μήτ' αὖ μνήμην τοῦ πάθους μηδ' ὁντινοῦν χρόνον ἔχοι. ταὐτὰ λέγε καὶ περὶ φρονήσεως, εἴ τις ἄνευ πάσης ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς βραχυτάτης δέξαιτ' ἂν φρόνησιν ἔχειν μᾶλλον ἢ μετά τινων ἡδονῶν, ἢ πάσας ἡδονὰς χωρὶς φρονήσεως μᾶλλον ἢ μετὰ φρονήσεως αὖ τινός.—οὐκοῦν τό γε τέλεον καὶ πᾶσιν αἱρετὸν καὶ τὸ παντάπασιν ἀγαθὸν οὐδέτερον ἂν τούτων εἴη. See also p. 21. of the same dialogue.

8. τί οὖν ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον] τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τοιοῦτον ἀγαθόν, οὗ καὶ ἡμεῖς κοινωνοῦμεν; ὁποῖον ἀγαθόν εἰσιν αἱ ἀρεταὶ καὶ αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι; πᾶσα γὰρ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμη μεθ' ἡδονῆς αἱρετωτέρα τῆς ἀνηδόνου. τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον γὰρ ἐπιζητεῖται, ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων γὰρ ἀγαθῶν ὧν καὶ ἡμεῖς κοινωνοῦμεν ἐπιζητεῖ ὁ λόγος. εἰ τούτων τί ἐστιν ἡ ἡδονή. οἷον πότερον ἡ ἡδονὴ σωφροσύνη ἐστίν, ἢ ἀνδρεία, ἢ φρόνησις, ἤ τις τῶν ἐπιστημῶν. Schol.

10. οἱ δ' ἐνιστάμενοι] Eudoxus had asserted, that that which all things aim at is a good, and consequently that pleasure being more aimed at than any thing else is the greatest good. To this reasoning Plato objected, saying, that it did not necessarily follow that that was a good at which all things aimed. For as the tastes of mankind are corrupted, they generally seek after the apparent and not the real good. The

Eudoxus, and Aristotle's reply to that objection.

μὴ οὐθὲν λέγωσιν· ὃ γὰρ πᾶσι δοκεῖ, τοῦτ' εἶναί φαμεν. ὁ δ' ἀναιρῶν ταύτην τὴν πίστιν οὐ πάνυ πιστότερα ἐρεῖ· εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὰ ἀνόητα ὠρέγετο αὐτῶν, ἦν ἄν τι τὸ λεγόμενον, εἰ δὲ καὶ τὰ φρόνιμα, πῶς λέγοιεν ἄν τι; ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις ἐστί τι φυσικὸν ἀγαθὸν κρεῖττον ἢ καθ' αὑτά, ὃ ἐφίεται τοῦ οἰκείου ἀγαθοῦ. Οὐκ ἔοικε δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου καλῶς λέγεσθαι.

Objection to the second argument of

appetites of animals are without reason and judgment, and therefore can afford no criterion upon this subject. Against these remarks of the Platonists, Aristotle brings two objections. If only bad men and brutes sought pleasure as a good, then, he says, this argument would be of some weight; but as the wise and the good seek it as well as the bad and the foolish, it is not conclusive, it avails nothing to the proof that pleasure is not a good. Nay, even granting the assumption, that only the irrational and brutes seek it, yet as they do it from a natural impulse, it is plain that there is some good in pleasure, for all *natural* impulses are to good. See p. 303, 11. n. and Butler's Analogy, i. 2.

4. *εἰ δὲ καὶ τὰ φρόνιμα*] This remark is probably aimed against Plato's doctrine in the Philebus, who considers the life of the wise (*οἱ φρόνιμοι*) to be a state removed beyond the reach of pleasure or pain; from the influences of which he is exempt as are the Gods, though not in the same degree. ΣΩ. *οὐκοῦν ἔστι τις τρίτη ἡμῶν ἡ τοιαύτη διάθεσις παρά τε τὴν τοῦ χαίροντος καὶ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ λυπουμένου;* ΠΡΩ. *τί μήν;*—ΣΩ. *τῷ τὸν τοῦ φρονεῖν ἑλομένῳ βίον οἶσθ' ὡς τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει ζῆν.* ΠΡΩ. *τὸν τοῦ μὴ χαίρειν μηδὲ λυπεῖσθαι λέγεις;* ΣΩ. *ἐῤῥήθη γάρ που τότε ἐν τῇ παραβολῇ τῶν βίων μηδὲν δεῖν μήτε μέγα μήτε σμικρὸν χαίρειν τῷ τὸν τοῦ νοεῖν καὶ φρονεῖν βίον ἑλομένῳ.—οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἂν ἐκείνῳ γε ὑπάρχοι· καὶ ἴσως οὐδὲν ἄτοπον εἰ πάντων τῶν βίων ἐστὶ θειότατος.* Philebus, p. 33. And this was consequent upon his theory of pleasure. For pain and pleasure he considered to be both evil, both extremes, but that the real and natural state was that of quiescence, a middle state equally removed from both. See the exquisite passage in the Republic, p. 585. sq.

6. *φυσικὸν ἀγαθὸν*] Compare p. 304, 9.

7. *οὐκ ἔοικε*] Eudoxus had endeavoured to prove, by the following argument, that pleasure is the greatest good:

Whatever is opposed to the greatest evil is the greatest good;
Pleasure is opposed to the greatest evil (pain); and therefore it is the greatest good.

He endeavoured to prove that pain is the greatest evil by a similar kind of argument, as that by which he proved that pleasure is the greatest good; for if that which is sought for is a good, that which is avoided is an evil, and that which is most avoided is the greatest evil. This argument was afterwards adopted by the Epicureans:

Eudoxus, and Aristotle's reply.

οὐ γάρ φασιν, εἰ ἡ λύπη κακόν ἐστι, τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι· ἀντικεῖσθαι γὰρ καὶ κακὸν κακῷ καὶ ἄμφω τῷ μηδετέρῳ, λέγοντες ταῦτα οὐ κακῶς, οὐ μὴν ἐπί γε τῶν εἰρημένων ἀληθεύοντες. ἀμφοῖν μὲν γὰρ ὄντων κακῶν καὶ φευκτὰ ἔδει ἄμφω εἶναι, τῶν μηδετέρων δὲ μηδέτερον ἢ ὁμοίως· νῦν δὲ φαίνονται τὴν μὲν φεύγοντες ὡς κακόν, τὴν δ' αἱρούμενοι ὡς ἀγαθόν· οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἀντίκειται.

Plato's first argument against pleasure, refuted.

Οὐ μὴν οὐδ' εἰ μὴ τῶν ποιοτήτων ἐστὶν ἡ ἡδονή, διὰ τοῦτ' οὐδὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αἱ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειαι ποιότητές εἰσιν, οὐδ' ἡ εὐδαιμονία.

His second, also, that it

Λέγουσι δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ὡρίσθαι,

see it set forth and refuted in Cic. de Fin. i. 9. sq.

To this syllogism it was objected by Plato, (see Repub. ix. in init. and Philebus, p. 33. sq.) as well as by Speusippus his successor, (see above p. 301, 19. n.) that the major is not universally true, for evil is opposed to evil as well as to good, as extremes to extremes as well as to the mean; that pleasure is opposed to pain not as a mean to an extreme, but as an extreme to an extreme, and consequently both are evil. To this Aristotle replies, that if this reasoning be true, if both be extremes, then both would be objects of avoidance, whereas pain only is an object of avoidance, pleasure is not; therefore as far as this objection is concerned, the argument of Eudoxus remains in its full force. See p. 301, 15.

9. ποιοτήτων] Aristotle now proceeds to examine and refute the arguments of the Platonists and others against pleasure. Their first reason was, that all goods are qualities, but that pleasure was not a quality, and consequently not a good. To this he replies by denying the major, by showing that there are many goods, such as the energies of virtue, which are good and yet are not qualities. The reason for asserting that all goods are qualities, arose from their placing all good and evil in that category. But whether Plato was the author of this doctrine, it is difficult to determine. But if so, we must separate from this number Plato's *ideal Good*.

12. λέγουσι δὲ] This second argument of the Platonists against pleasure will be more clearly seen by stating it at full length, and in a syllogistic form:

Whatever admits of more and less is indefinite;
Pleasure admits of more and less; therefore
Pleasure is indefinite.
Whatever is indefinite is an evil;
Pleasure therefore is an evil;—is not a good.

For the proof of the major premise of both syllogisms, Plato referred to the συστοιχία of the Pythagoreans. See p. 17, 7. note, and p. 382, 5.

τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν ἀόριστον εἶναι, ὅτι δέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τοῦ ἥδεσθαι τοῦτο κρίνουσι, καὶ περὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς, καθ' ἃς ἐναργῶς φασὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον τοὺς ποιοὺς ὑπάρχειν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετάς, ἔσται τὸ αὐτό· δίκαιοι γάρ εἰσι μᾶλλον καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, ἔστι δὲ καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ σωφρονεῖν μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον. Εἰ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, μή 2. ποτ' οὐ λέγουσι τὸ αἴτιον, ἂν ὦσιν αἱ μὲν ἀμιγεῖς αἱ δὲ μικταί. τί γὰρ κωλύει, καθάπερ ὑγίεια ὡρισμένη οὖσα δέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον, οὕτω καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν; οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ συμμετρία ἐν πᾶσίν ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μία τις ἀεί, ἀλλ' ἀνιεμένη διαμένει ἕως τινός, καὶ διαφέρει τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον. τοιοῦτον δὴ καὶ τὸ περὶ

is indefinite.

To both of these Aristotle objects. In the first place, he says, if from seeing men more or less pleased they infer that pleasure admits of more and less, and is consequently indefinite, by the same principle virtue is indefinite, because men are more and less virtuous, and consequently the major proposition of the second syllogism, that whatever is indefinite is an evil, is not true.

2. But if they draw this inference from the consideration of pleasure in itself, then it is by no means universally true that pleasure admits of more and less. It is only the mixed pleasures which differ in degree, and have an admixture of pain, the increase or diminution of which causes a variation in those pleasures. Just as in the case of health: health is something definite and determined, yet is continually varying not only in different but likewise in the same persons: at one time the body is perfectly free from sickness, at another time not; the health of the body is greater at one time, less at another; and consequently the major premise of the first syllogism is not true.

12. *συμμετρία*] Compare Theages de Virtutibus: *ἐπειδὴ ἁ τοῦ ἤθεος ἀρετὰ περὶ πάθεα, τῶν δὲ παθέων ἡδονὰ καὶ λύπα ὑπέρτατα, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἐν τῷ ὑπεξελέσθαι τὰ πάθεα τῆς ψυχῆς ἁδονὰν καὶ λύπαν ἁ ἀρετὰ πέπτωκεν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ ταῦτα συναρμόσασθαι. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑγίεια, εὐκρασία τις ἐοῦσα τῶν τοῦ σώματος δυνάμεων, ἐν τῷ ὑπεξελέσθαι τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν πέπτωκεν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ ταῦτα συγκερασθῆναι, ἔντι γὰρ οἷον συμμετρία τις τούτων.* Frag. Pythag. p. 33. See also Plato's Philebus, p. 26. n. Stallb. §. 42. And for the subsequent argument, the Philebus, p. 174. and Stallb. Introd. p. 56.

His third argument, that pleasure is a κίνησις, refuted.

τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι. Τέλειόν τε τἀγαθὸν τιθέντες, τὰς δὲ κινήσεις καὶ τὰς γενέσεις ἀτελεῖς, τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησιν καὶ γένεσιν ἀποφαίνειν πειρῶνται. οὐ καλῶς δ' ἐοίκασι λέγειν οὐδ' εἶναι κίνησιν· πάσῃ γὰρ οἰκεῖον εἶναι δοκεῖ τάχος καὶ βραδυτής, καὶ εἰ μὴ καθ' αὑτήν, οἷον τῇ τοῦ κόσμου, πρὸς ἄλλο· τῇ δ' ἡδονῇ τούτων οὐδέτερον ὑπάρχει· ἡσθῆναι μὲν γάρ ἔστι ταχέως ὥσπερ ὀργισθῆναι, ἥδεσθαι δ' οὔ, οὐδὲ πρὸς ἕτερον, βαδίζειν δὲ καὶ αὔξεσθαι καὶ πάντα τὰ

1. τέλειόν τε τἀγαθόν] This is the third argument of Plato against pleasure:

All motions and generations are imperfect;

All pleasure is a motion and a generation; and consequently all pleasure is imperfect, and consequently not the chief good. (See p. 402.)

To this reasoning Aristotle replies by confuting the minor premise. All motion, he says, is attended with quickness or slowness, but neither of them are compatible with pleasure. We may pass from a state of pain to pleasure (ἡσθῆναι) either quickly or slowly, but when we are in the state (status or standing) of pleasure (ἥδεσθαι) it is absurd to say that we energize as to that state quickly or slowly; that, in other words, we stand in a state of pleasure quickly or slowly.

2. τὰς δὲ κινήσεις—ἀτελεῖς] The earlier philosophers, who were much puzzled to define motion, included it under the notion of inequality, alteration, nonentity (εἰς ἀνισότητα καὶ ἑτερότητα καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν τιθέασι, ὅτι ἀόριστόν τι δοκεῖ ἡ κίνησις). This they probably derived from the Pythagoreans, in whose συστοιχία the indefinite (ἄπειρον) and the moving (κινούμενον) are placed under the head of evil; which probably is one reason why Plato was induced to consider motion and pleasure as an evil.

Aristotle also himself acknowledges this difficulty. Compare Phys. Ausc. iii. 2. ἥ τε κίνησις ἐνέργεια μέν τις εἶναι δοκεῖ, ἀτελὴς δέ. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ἀτελὲς τὸ δυνατὸν οὗ ἐστιν ἐνέργεια κίνησις, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δὴ χαλεπὸν αὐτὴν λαβεῖν τί ἐστιν. See Simplicius, ibid.

6. τάχος καὶ βραδυτής] Compare Phys. Ausc. iv. 14. φανερὸν ὅτι ἅπασαν μεταβολὴν καὶ ἅπαν τὸ κινούμενον ἀνάγκη κινεῖσθαι ἐν χρόνῳ· τὸ γὰρ θᾶττον καὶ βραδύτερον κατὰ πᾶσάν ἐστι μεταβολήν.

— καθ' αὑτήν—πρὸς ἄλλο] Motus celer est et tardus vel per se et absolute, vel comparate πρὸς ἄλλο. Per se in rebus quarum non est æquabilis motus, ut navis cursus nunc est tardior, nunc celerior; item equi cursus, etc. Comparate, quo modo plerumque motus intelligi solet, ut Solis cursus, cum Saturno comparatus est celer, cum Luna tardus, suapte alioqui natura æquabilis. Cœlum etiam ipsum cujus rotatio est æquabilis et per se neque celera neque tarda, comparatione tamen aliarum rerum ita dici potest. GIPH.

τοιαῦτα. μεταβάλλειν μὲν οὖν εἰς τὴν ἡδονὴν ταχέως καὶ βραδέως ἔστιν, ἐνεργεῖν δὲ κατ' αὐτὴν οὐκ ἔστι ταχέως, λέγω δ' ἥδεσθαι. Γένεσίς τε πῶς ἂν εἴη; δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος τὸ τυχὸν γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐξ οὗ γίγνεται, εἰς τοῦτο διαλύεσθαι. καὶ οὗ γένεσις ἡ ἡδονή, τούτου ἡ λύπη φθορά. καὶ λέγουσι δὲ τὴν μὲν λύπην ἔνδειαν τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι, τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν

His fourth argument, that it is a generation or repletion, refuted.

3. **γένεσίς τε πῶς**] Aristotle now proceeds to refute the doctrine of Plato, that pleasure is a generation or progression (γένεσις).

For every generation, he says, there must be that from which generation proceeds, and that in which it ends: and that from which it proceeds must virtually be of the same elements as the thing generated, possessing a power of producing something similar to itself; **οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος τὸ τυχὸν γίγνεται.** (Phys. Ausc. i. 4. sq.) 2ndly. Every thing generated is resolvable into that from which it was generated by the operation of a corruption (φθορά) opposed to its generation. If therefore pleasure were a generation, it must be a progression or change from something determined into something determinate; but pleasure generates nothing which is resolvable into the same elements from which it was generated.

Further; if it were a generation, some change must take place in some subject-matter which is virtually the same as that into which it changes. But pleasure produces no such effect in the subject-matter, nor is the effect produced by pleasure similar to the subject-matter from which it was produced.

Finally, pleasure is not resolvable into any thing similar to itself, but into pain which is its opposite.

II. If pleasure were a generation, pain a corruption, then what was generated by pleasure would be corrupted by pain, and the reverse; but this is not the case. For pleasure actually generates nothing.

The reasons here urged against pleasure being a generation, are somewhat different from those in the Seventh Book. See p. 296, 1.

6. **γένεσις — φθορά**] See Plato's Philebus, p. 55.

7. **τὴν μὲν λύπην ἔνδειαν**] This also is another argument, by which it was attempted to be proved that pleasure is not a good. (See also p. 307.)

All pleasure is a repletion (ἀναπλήρωσις), all repletion is a generation, all generation is imperfect, therefore pleasure is imperfect, and consequently not a good. That pleasure is a repletion, was proved from consideration of its opposite, pain. If pain is a deficiency (ἔνδεια), then its opposite, pleasure, is a repletion. That pain then is a deficiency, is clear from these considerations: if whilst we feel hunger and thirst we feel pain, then hunger and thirst are pains; but hunger and thirst are deficiencies of the natural habits. For the body when it is in want of its proper moist or dry elements, is disturbed from its natural constitution, and feels in consequence a pain and craving

ἀναπλήρωσιν. ταῦτα δὲ σωματικά ἐστι τὰ πάθη. εἰ δή ἐστι τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἀναπλήρωσις ἡ ἡδονή, ἐν ᾧ ἀναπλήρωσις, τοῦτ' ἂν καὶ ἥδοιτο· τὸ σῶμα ἄρα· οὐ δοκεῖ δέ· οὐδ' ἔστιν ἄρα ἀναπλήρωσις ἡ ἡδονή, ἀλλὰ γινομένης μὲν ἀναπληρώσεως ἥδοιτ' ἄν τις, καὶ τεμνόμενος λυποῖτο.

(The origin of these notions). Ἡ δόξα δ' αὕτη δοκεῖ γεγενῆσθαι ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὴν τροφὴν λυπῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν· ἐνδεεῖς γὰρ γινομένους καὶ προλυπηθέντας ἥδεσθαι τῇ ἀναπληρώσει. τοῦτο δ' οὐ περὶ πάσας συμβαίνει τὰς ἡδονάς· ἄλυποι γάρ εἰσιν αἵ τε μαθηματικαὶ καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις αἱ διὰ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως, καὶ ἀκροάματα δὲ καὶ ὁράματα πολλὰ καὶ μνῆμαι καὶ ἐλπίδες. τίνος οὖν αὗται γενέσεις ἔσονται; οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἔνδεια γεγένηται, οὗ γένοιτ' ἂν ἀναπλήρωσις.

That pleasure is nei- Πρὸς δὲ τοὺς προφέροντας τὰς ἐπονειδίστους τῶν

to have those wants supplied, and in the supplying of them receives pleasure. Therefore pain is a natural deficiency, and pleasure is a natural repletion.

To this Aristotle replies; that if this be true, then this deficiency and repletion are certain affections of the body, and consequently, if pain and pleasure consist in them, then in whatever they take place, that must feel pleasure; consequently the body only would feel pleasure. But this is not the case. For were it so, then every body (*σῶμα*, corpus) would be sensible of pleasure, which is absurd. For the body truly is delighted with repletion, but not with respect to itself, but with regard to the sensitive and nutritive part of the soul. Since therefore the body, as a corporeal substance, does not receive pleasure from repletion, it is plain that pleasure is not a repletion.

That we feel pain from hunger, arises from the energies of the nutritive part of the soul being impeded, and we consequently feel pleasure when that impediment is removed, and this class of energies resume their free and unobstructed exercise.

11. *αἵ τε μαθηματικαί*] According to Plato's own acknowledgment. See the Philebus, p. 52. *τούτοις προσθῶμεν τὰς περὶ τὰ μαθήματα ἡδονάς, εἰ ἄρα δοκοῦσιν ἡμῖν αὗται πείνας μὲν μὴ ἔχειν τοῦ μανθάνειν, μηδὲ διὰ μαθημάτων πείνην ἀλγηδόνας ἐξ ἀρχῆς γιγνομένας.* ΠΡΩ. *ἀλλ' οὕτω ξυνδοκεῖ.* ΣΩ. *τί δέ; μαθημάτων πληρωθεῖσιν ἐὰν ὕστερον ἀποβολαὶ διὰ τῆς λήθης γίγνωνται, καθορᾷς τινὰς ἐν αὐταῖς ἀλγηδόνας;* ΠΡΩ. *οὔτι φύσει γε.*—ΣΩ. *ταύτας τοίνυν τὰς τῶν μαθημάτων ἡδονὰς ἀμίκτους τε εἶναι λύπης ῥητέον.* See also Repub. p. 584.

16. *πρὸς δὲ τούς*] This argument,

ἡδονῶν λέγοι τις ἂν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι ταῦθ' ἡδέα· οὐ γὰρ εἰ τοῖς κακῶς διακειμένοις ἡδέα ἐστίν, οἰητέον αὐτὰ καὶ ἡδέα εἶναι πλὴν τούτοις, καθάπερ οὐδὲ

ther entirely evil, nor entirely good.

though generally supposed to be directed merely against the Platonists, applies equally to those who said pleasure is a chief good, as to those who denied that it was a good at all; between whom Aristotle takes the middle course, in conformity with his observation at p. 29. 10. of this treatise.

Both are wrong in considering pleasure as contained under one species. Thus when the Platonist argued; as are the things which cause delight, so are the pleasures derived from them; but many of those things which cause delight are disgraceful, consequently so are the pleasures derived from them; it does not follow from this argument, that pleasure is not a good, but that there are various species of pleasures, as there are of the things from which they are derived, and consequently as there may be virtuous and vicious pleasures, it follows that pleasure is not entirely (that is, throughout all its species) a good, nor entirely an evil. This however is not the answer which Aristotle *here* makes to this argument of Plato. But he observes, that to judge correctly of pleasure, we are not to form our notions of it from what is pleasant to the vicious, any more than we should form our notions of what is healthy from what appears so to the diseased. If therefore, to those whose moral constitution is depraved, that which is vicious appears pleasant, we are not to conclude absolutely, therefore, that pleasures are vicious: but rather to judge from those things which are pleasant to the good and the virtuous. (See the following chapters.)

2dly. Because some pleasures are said to be disgraceful, this is not to be so understood of pleasures absolutely and in themselves, but only accidentally, inasmuch as they are derived from actions or things which are disgraceful. For instance, the pleasure which is derived from the eating of food is not absolutely vicious, but accidentally it is; when for instance it is derived from excess, from immoderate eating. Although the intemperate therefore appears to derive pleasure from immoderate food, yet it is not real pleasure, nor should it be considered as such. And thus to use the instances before us, to desire and seek after riches is not dishonourable, though it is so to seek for them by committing treason: and to desire health is not dishonourable, though it would be so could it only be done by cannibalism.

But if we are to follow the general opinion, and term those things pleasures, whatsoever are pleasant to any one, then we must make a distinction, and say that pleasures differ in species. For the pleasures of the good, and those who live according to nature, differ specifically from those of the depraved and intemperate. For in what the virtuous differ from the vicious, so do the pleasures of the one from the other; otherwise the unjust might be delighted with exercising justice, and the temperate with temperance. Otherwise the pleasure derived from the society of a flatterer and a friend would be the same, and equally virtuous or equally vicious. Which is absurd. Whence we infer that pleasures differ in species.

τὰ τοῖς κάμνουσιν ὑγιεινὰ ἢ γλυκέα ἢ πικρά,
οὐδ' αὖ λευκὰ τὰ φαινόμενα τοῖς ὀφθαλμιῶσιν:
2. Ἢ οὕτω λέγοιτ' ἄν, ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἡδοναὶ αἱρεταί
εἰσιν, οὐ μὴν ἀπό γε τούτων, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ
πλουτεῖν, προδόντι δ' οὔ, καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, οὐ
3. μὴν ὁτιοῦν φαγόντι. Ἢ τῷ εἴδει διαφέρουσιν
αἱ ἡδοναί· ἕτεραι γὰρ αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν τῶν
ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσχρῶν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡσθῆναι τὴν
τοῦ δικαίου μὴ ὄντα δίκαιον οὐδὲ τὴν τοῦ μου-
σικοῦ μὴ ὄντα μουσικόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
ἄλλων. ἐμφανίζειν δὲ δοκεῖ καὶ ὁ φίλος, ἕτερος
ὢν τοῦ κόλακος, οὐκ οὖσαν ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἡδονὴν
ἢ διαφόρους εἴδει· ὁ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τἀγαθὸν ὁμι-
λεῖν δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ πρὸς ἡδονήν, καὶ τῷ μὲν ὀνειδί-
ζεται, τὸν δ' ἐπαινοῦσιν ὡς πρὸς ἕτερα ὁμιλοῦντα.

Nor the chief good.

Οὐδείς τ' ἂν ἕλοιτο ζῆν παιδίου διάνοιαν ἔχων διὰ βίου, ἡδόμενος ἐφ' οἷς τὰ παιδία ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα, οὐδὲ χαίρειν ποιῶν τι τῶν αἰσχίστων, μηδέποτε μέλλων λυπηθῆναι. περὶ πολλά τε

5. καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν] Probably Aristotle had in view that remarkable discussion in the Repub. of Plato, p. 406.

6. τῷ εἴδει διαφέρουσιν] Compare Plato: ἥδεσθαι μὲν φαμεν τὸν ἀκολασταίνοντα ἄνθρωπον, ἥδεσθαι δὲ καὶ τὸν σωφρονοῦντα αὐτῷ τῷ σωφρονεῖν, ἥδεσθαι δ' αὖ καὶ τὸν ἀνοηταίνοντα καὶ ἀνοήτων δοξῶν καὶ ἐλπίδων μεστόν, ἥδεσθαι δ' αὖ καὶ τὸν φρονοῦντα αὐτῷ τῷ φρονεῖν· καὶ τούτων τῶν ἡδονῶν ἑκατέρας πῶς ἄν τις ὁμοίας ἀλλήλαις εἶναι λέγων, οὐκ ἀνόητος φαίνοιτο ἐνδίκως; Phileb. p. 11.

16. οὐδείς τ' ἂν ἕλοιτο] That not all pleasures are good, that pleasure is not the chief good, is evident from these considerations; that then any life of enjoyment would be good and desirable, even that of children. 2dly. That then we should do nothing but with reference to pleasure. Whereas there are many things we now study and pursue with much toil and labour without any such view. And though it may be said that the practice and pursuit of such things necessarily carries pleasure along with it, yet this does not affect the argument: for we should still pursue them, though we were certain that we should derive no pleasure from them. This subject is more copiously discussed in chap. iv.

σπουδὴν ποιησαίμεθ' ἂν καὶ εἰ μηδεμίαν ἐπιφέροι ἡδονήν, οἷον ὁρᾶν, μνημονεύειν, εἰδέναι, τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν. εἰ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἕπονται τούτοις ἡδοναί, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· ἑλοίμεθα γὰρ ἂν ταῦτα καὶ εἰ μὴ γίνοιτ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἡδονή. Ὅτι Conclusion. μὲν οὖν οὔτε τἀγαθὸν ἡ ἡδονὴ οὔτε πᾶσα αἱρετή, δῆλον ἔοικεν εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι εἰσί τινες αἱρεταὶ καθ' αὑτὰς διαφέρουσαι τῷ εἴδει ἢ ἀφ' ὧν. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἱκανῶς εἰρήσθω.

CHAP. III.

The definition of Pleasure investigated.

3 ΤΙ δ' ἐστὶν ἢ ποῖόν τι, καταφανέστερον γένοιτ' Pleasure is not a κίνησις.
ἂν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἀναλαβοῦσιν. δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ μὲν 1. For time

8. ἢ ἀφ' ὧν] If pleasures differ not in species as to themselves, yet they differ in species accidentally, inasmuch as they are derived from things different in species.

Chap. III.

Having thus far examined the opinions of others touching pleasure, Aristotle now proceeds to explain his own, first investigating its essence (τί ἐστίν) in order to settle more scientifically the much disputed question respecting its quality (ποῖόν τι), and to determine whether it should be considered the chief good, or sometimes good and sometimes or entirely evil. τοῖς μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ εἶναι ἀγαθόν, οὔτε καθ' αὑτὸ οὔτε κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ταὐτὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδονήν· τοῖς δ' ἔνιαι μὲν εἶναι, αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ φαῦλαι. ἔτι δὲ τούτων τρίτον, εἰ καὶ πᾶσαι ἀγαθόν, ὅμως μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι εἶναι τὸ ἄριστον ἡδονήν. p. 295, 11.

In this chapter, therefore, he proceeds to its definition by farther narrowing the field of investigation, and showing by a comparison between the essentials of motion and pleasure, that they are specifically different, a mode of proceeding, which necessarily draws out certain qualities of pleasure, and lays down certain data by which we may more easily arrive at the discovery of the real nature, the definition of pleasure.

The reader cannot fail being struck with admiration at the exquisite manner in which Aristotle generally pro-

and place constitute specific differences with respect to κίνησις, but not with respect to pleasure.

ὅρασις καθ' ὁντινοῦν χρόνον τελεία εἶναι· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐνδεὴς οὐδενός, ὃ εἰς ὕστερον γενόμενον τελειώσει αὐτῆς τὸ εἶδος. τοιούτῳ δ' ἔοικε καὶ ἡ ἡδονή· ὅλον γάρ τί ἐστι, καὶ κατ' οὐδένα χρόνον λάβοι τις ἂν ἡδονὴν ἧς ἐπὶ πλείω χρόνον γινομένης τελειωθήσεται τὸ εἶδος. διόπερ οὐδὲ κίνησίς ἐστιν· ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ πᾶσα κίνησις καὶ τέλους τινός, οἷον ἡ οἰκοδομικὴ τελεία, ὅταν ποιήσῃ οὗ ἐφίεται. ἢ ἐν ἅπαντι δὴ τῷ χρόνῳ ἢ τούτῳ.

2. The parts of motion differ in species.

Ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέρεσι τοῦ χρόνου πᾶσαι ἀτελεῖς, καὶ ἕτεραι τῷ εἴδει τῆς ὅλης καὶ ἀλλήλων· ἡ γὰρ τῶν λίθων σύνθεσις ἑτέρα τῆς τοῦ κίονος ῥαβδώσεως, καὶ αὗται τῆς τοῦ ναοῦ ποιήσεως.

ceeds to the most difficult of all tasks, the investigation of the several definitions which are to be found in this book; and the similarity of method which may be traced in all of them, is an evident proof that he proceeded in this as in all other parts of his subject, upon fixed and scientific principles.

See his own admirable dissertation upon this subject in Anal. Post. ii. 12.

1. ὅρασις—τελεία εἶναι] Vision or the act of seeing is perfect at each indivisible moment of time. The moment we see, we see: nor does the act of sight require any thing for its perfection at a posterior moment, which it possessed not at the moment it was exercised. And as is vision such is pleasure. For pleasure does not consist of an aggregate of many other pleasures: nor does one pleasure succeed to the first, the first remaining, and a third to the second, and so on; nor do the different parts succeed each other in different divisions of time, as in extension and duration. But pleasure is perfect and complete at each moment of time; wherefore it is not a motion, and for the same reason it is not a generation. Every motion also, and generation, require not only time for their completion, but the attainment of or extension to their end. In this resembling a line, consisting of a point from which it is generated, a point in which it ends, and extension through the intermediate space; neither is the line generated at any moment, its generation and motion is not complete till it has reached its end; consequently generation and motion are not perfect in any time, but only in perfect time. ἄνευ τόπου καὶ κενοῦ καὶ χρόνου ἀδύνατον κίνησιν εἶναι. Phys. Aus. iii. 1. Whereas neither of the latter are required for pleasure.

For the whole argument of this chapter, consult particularly Phys. Ausc. vi. Book.

13. ῥαβδώσεως] Levelling or erecting the column. Or, more correctly, mea-

καὶ ἡ μὲν τοῦ ναοῦ τελεία· οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἐνδεὴς πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον· ἡ δὲ τῆς κρηπῖδος καὶ τοῦ τριγλύφου ἀτελής· μέρους γὰρ ἑκατέρα. τῷ εἴδει οὖν διαφέρουσι, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ὁτῳοῦν χρόνῳ λαβεῖν κίνησιν τελείαν τῷ εἴδει, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, ἐν τῷ ἅπαντι. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ βαδίσεως καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν· εἰ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ φορὰ κίνησις πόθεν ποῖ, καὶ ταύτης διαφοραὶ κατ' εἴδη, πτῆσις βάδισις ἅλσις καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. οὐ μόνον δ' οὕτως, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ βαδίσει· τὸ γὰρ πόθεν ποῖ οὐ ταὐτὸν ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ μέρει, καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ μέρει καὶ ἑτέρῳ, οὐδὲ τὸ διεξιέναι τὴν γραμμὴν τήνδε κἀκείνην· οὐ μόνον γὰρ γραμμὴν διαπορεύεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τόπῳ οὖσαν, ἐν ἑτέρῳ δ' αὕτη ἐκείνης. Δι' ἀκριβείας μὲν οὖν περὶ κινήσεως ἐν ἄλλοις εἴρηται, ἔοικε δ' οὐκ ἐν ἅπαντι χρόνῳ τελεία εἶναι, ἀλλ' αἱ πολλαὶ ἀτελεῖς καὶ διαφέρουσαι τῷ εἴδει, εἴπερ τὸ πόθεν ποῖ εἰδοποιόν. τῆς ἡδονῆς δ' ἐν ὁτῳοῦν χρόνῳ τέλειον τὸ εἶδος. δῆλον οὖν ὡς ἕτεραί τ' ἂν εἶεν ἀλλήλων, καὶ τῶν ὅλων τι καὶ τελείων ἡ ἡδονή. δόξειε δ' ἂν τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι κινεῖσθαι μὴ

3. Place constitutes specific difference in motion, not in pleasure.

Recapitulation.

suring it by a wand to discover whether it is perpendicular. Such is the opinion of the Greek Scholiast, from which Camerarius departs not only without any authority, but also with considerable prejudice to the sense. He translates it, the fluting of the column.

7. ἡ φορά] Compare Phys. vii. 3. ἐπεὶ δὲ τρεῖς εἰσὶ κινήσεις, ἥ τε κατὰ τόπον, καὶ κατὰ ποιὸν, καὶ κατὰ τὸ ποσόν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ κινούμενα τρία. ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τόπον, φορά· ἡ δὲ κατὰ ποιόν, ἀλλοίωσις· ἡ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ποσόν, αὔξησις καὶ φθίσις.

16. ἐν ἄλλοις] See Phys. Ausc. vi—viii. Books.

17. πολλαί] Except circular motions, which are always perfect. See De Cælo, c. 4. According to Eustratius.

21. δόξειε δ' ἄν] All motion is extension, and is therefore divisible, but pleasure is not divisible, therefore pleasure is not motion.

ἐν χρόνῳ, ἥδεσθαι δέ· τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῷ νῦν ὅλον τί. ἐκ τούτων δὲ δῆλον καὶ ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγουσι κίνησιν ἢ γένεσιν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν. οὐ γὰρ πάντων ταῦτα λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῶν μεριστῶν καὶ μὴ ὅλων· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁράσεώς ἐστι γένεσις οὐδὲ στιγμῆς οὐδὲ μονάδος, οὐδὲ τούτων οὐθὲν κίνησις οὐδὲ γένεσις· οὐδὲ δὴ ἡδονῆς· ὅλον γάρ τι.

But since pleasure at- Αἰσθήσεως δὲ πάσης πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἐνερ-

1. *τῷ νῦν*] *διττοῦ ὄντος τοῦ νῦν, τοῦ μὲν ὡς ἀρχῆς καὶ πέρατος τοῦ χρόνου, ὃ ἀναλογεῖ τῇ στιγμῇ τῇ ἐν τῇ γραμμῇ, τοῦ δὲ κατὰ τὸν ἐνεστῶτα χρόνον λεγομένου, ὃς ἀντιδιῄρηται πρὸς τὸν παρεληλυθότα καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα, τὸ μὲν ὡς ἀρχὴν καὶ πέρας ὃ καὶ ἀδιαίρετόν ἐστι καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ πρώτως νῦν λέγεσθαί φησι.* Simplicius in Arist. Phys. Aus. vi. 3. §. 1.

— *τῷ νῦν ὅλον τί*] See Phys. Aus. vi. 3.

5. *γένεσις—στιγμῆς*] Compare Phys. Ausc. vi. 10, 4. *ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶνδε φανερὸν ὅτι οὔτε στιγμὴν οὔτ' ἄλλο ἀδιαίρετον οὐδὲν ἐνδέχεται κινεῖσθαι.—ἔτι δ', εἰ ἅπαν ἐν χρόνῳ κινεῖται, ἐν δὲ τῷ νῦν μηθέν, ἅπας δὲ χρόνος διαιρετός, εἴη ἄν τις χρόνος ἐλάττων ὁτουοῦν τῶν κινουμένων ἐν ᾧ κινεῖται ὅσον αὐτό· οὗτος μὲν γὰρ ἔσται ὁ χρόνος ἐν ᾧ κινεῖται, διὰ τὸ πᾶν ἐν χρόνῳ κινεῖσθαι· χρόνος δὲ πᾶς διαιρετὸς δέδεικται πρότερον. εἰ δὴ ἄρα ἡ στιγμὴ κινεῖται, ἔσται τις χρόνος ἐλάττων ἐν ᾧ αὐτὴ ἐκινήθη· ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον.*

8. *αἰσθήσεως δὲ πάσης*] *χρὴ ἀντὶ τοῦ δὲ συνδέσμου, τὸν δὴ σύνδεσμον γράφειν. καὶ εἴη ἂν ὁ λόγος δυνάμει τοιοῦτος. δῆλον δὴ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι πάσῃ κατ' ἐνέργειαν αἰσθήσει ἀνεμποδίστως ἐνεργούσῃ συνέζευκταί τις ἡδονή. καὶ ἐπεὶ καθ' ἕκαστον μέρος χρόνου καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον νῦν ἡ ὅρασις ὅλη καὶ τελεία ἐστι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ ἡδονή, ταὐτὸν τρόπον τινά ἐστιν ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν αἴσθησις τῇ σὺν αὐτῇ ἡδονῇ. καὶ οὐχ ὥρισται αὐτῆς. εἰ δὲ ἀχωρίστως συμβαίνει αὐτῇ, δῆλον ὡς ἐκ πάσης αἰσθήσεως πρὸς τὸ οἰκεῖον αἰσθητὸν ἐνεργούσης ἔστιν οἰκεία ἡδονή.* Schol.

8. *αἰσθήσεως δὲ πάσης*] Adhuc docuit voluptatem non esse motum sed perfectionem: nunc docet quæ voluptas sit et perfectissima seu plenissima et unde hæc perfectio manet et oriatur. Qua recognita continuo intelligetur vera vis et natura voluptatis. (Aristoteles rem aliquam volens definire, primum causam quærit, inventa causa forma cognoscitur, statim forma cognita res ipsa). Qui locus quia et verborum interjectionibus et iterationibus est obscurior, et vim omnem fere et naturam voluptatis complectitur, eum paulo altius repetito principio, sic explicemus.

Notum est ex prioribus voluptatem quicquid tandem sit; esse in animo non in corpore; (vii.14. x.2.) Animi autem partes tres esse, altricem, sentientem et intelligentem, notum est ex Physicis. Jam vero in altrice nulla est voluptas (see p. 407, 7. and note.) quia nulla actio, cujus perpetua comes est voluptas. Reliquum est igitur, ut in his tantum duobus animi partibus, sentiente et intelligente collocetur: atque ita omnis voluptas vel est in sensu vel in mente. Hoc uno jam præmunito

γούσης, τελείως δὲ τῆς εὖ διακειμένης πρὸς τὸ κάλλιστον τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν αἴσθησιν· τοιοῦτον γὰρ μάλιστ᾽ εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ τελεία ἐνέργεια· (αὐτὴν δὲ λέγειν ἐνεργεῖν, ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἐστί, μηθὲν διαφερέτω)· καθ᾽ ἕκαστον δὲ βελτίστη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια τοῦ ἄριστα διακειμένου πρὸς τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ὑφ᾽ αὐτήν. αὕτη δ᾽ ἂν τελειοτάτη εἴη καὶ ἡδίστη· κατὰ πᾶσαν γὰρ αἴσθησίν ἐστιν ἡδονή, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ διάνοιαν καὶ θεωρίαν, ἡδίστη δ᾽ ἡ τελειοτάτη, τελειοτάτη δ᾽ ἡ τοῦ εὖ ἔχοντος πρὸς τὸ σπουδαιότατον τῶν ὑφ᾽ αὐτήν. Τελειοῖ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονή. οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἡ

tends the exercise of every αἴσθησις, the most perfect pleasure will be derived from the most perfect αἴσθησις.

Pleasure then perfects the energy, but in a differ-

et alterum est cognoscendum, nimirum ad hujus utriusque animi partis perfectionem duo esse necessaria, ipsam animi facultatem sive sensum sive mentem, et rem denique facultati utrique subjectam; hæc, inquam, duo hic spectari debent, facultas et res subjecta. Est et tertius; utriusque facultatis suam esse voluptatem, non quo sit facultatis (nam actionis est comes voluptas) sed quia actio ex facultate manat, cujus actionis propria est voluptas. Sensus igitur voluptates sunt ἀκροάματα aurium, oculorum spectacula &c. Mentis voluptates sunt in artibus et scientiis.

His præmunitis nunc videamus de hoc loco. Docet igitur Aristoteles sensum et mentem perfici tribus rebus, facultate ipsa, re subjecta et voluptate. Perfici id dicitur quod ita expletur ut ad summam naturam perductum nihil amplius desideret. His igitur tribus earum facultatum actiones expleri et perfici docet. GIPH.

4. μηθὲν διαφερέτω] See p. 369, 22. and note.

8. κατὰ πᾶσαν γὰρ αἴσθησιν] See the Rhetoric i. 11.

9. διάνοιαν καὶ θεωρίαν] The exercise of the practical and scientific energies. For this use of the term διάνοια, see p. 223, 10. But the Scholiast gives a different, and what appears to be a better interpretation: εἴη δ᾽ ἂν λέγων διάνοιαν τὴν ἐπιστημονικὴν γνῶσιν, θεωρίαν δὲ τὴν νοερὰν ζωὴν καὶ ἐνέργειαν. ἄλλως γὰρ ἐνεργήσει ὁ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀφεὶς κάτω καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν στραφεὶς καὶ διὰ τῆς τοιαύτης ἐπιστροφῆς τοῖς νοητοῖς ἑαυτὸν ἐνιδρύσας, καὶ ἄλλως ὁ ἔξω βλέπων, καὶ ἄλλως ὁ ἐκ προτάσεως εἰς ἐπιφορὰς ἐπανιών. ὥστε καὶ διάφοροι αἱ τούτων ἡδοναὶ καὶ οὐχ αἱ αὐταὶ ἔσονται. καὶ ἔστιν ἡ μὲν νοερὰ ζωὴ τελειοτάτη καὶ ἡδίστη. αἱ δ᾽ ἄλλαι τέλειοι καὶ ἡδεῖαι, ἥδισται δὲ οὐδαμῶς.

11. τελειοῖ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν] *Pleasure perfects the energy. But pleasure perfects the energy not in the same way as the object of sensation* (τὸ αἰσθητὸν) *and sense perfect the energy. Just as health and the physician are not in the same way the cause of health.* See the same illustration above, p. 251. 2.

If pleasure is consequent upon every exercise of αἴσθησις, it will follow that

ent way from the faculty or object-matter.

τε ἡδονὴ τελειοῖ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν τε καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις, σπουδαῖα ὄντα, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἡ ὑγίεια

the most perfect pleasure will attend the most perfect *αἴσθησις*, and consequently by discovering what is the most perfect *αἴσθησις*, we shall best discover the nature of pleasure. Now to perfect *αἴσθησις* it is required that not only the organ which energizes, but also the object-matter upon which it energizes, should be perfect; and the more or less this is the case, the more or less will be the pleasure resulting from the energy. Consequently there will be infinite varieties of pleasure, depending not only upon the perfectness of the organ, but also of the object-matter, the exercise of the faculty being more or less free according to the perfection of its object-matter. For as Hooker beautifully expresses it: "Let Phidias have rude and obstinate stuff to carve, though his art do that it should, his work will lack that beauty, which otherwise in fitter matter it might have had. He that striketh an instrument with skill may cause notwithstanding a very unpleasant sound, if the string whereon he striketh chance to be uncapable of harmony." (Vol. i. 259. ed. Keble.) And he will from this imperfection in the energy, an imperfection not arising from the faculty but the object-matter, either diminish or wholly destroy the pleasure resulting from it.

ἕπεται τοίνυν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἡ ἡδονὴ καὶ τελειότης τίς ἐστιν αὐτῆς. τελειοῖ δὲ οὐχ ὡς ἕξις τὸν ἔχοντα ἀπὸ τοῦ δυνάμει εἰς τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ἄγουσα· (see note p. 372, 2.) *ὥσπερ τὸν δυνάμει οἰκοδόμον ἡ οἰκοδομικὴ τελειοῖ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ποιεῖ οἰκοδόμον, καθάπερ οὐδὲ ἡ ὑγιεία καὶ ὁ ἰατρὸς ὁμοίως αἴτιά εἰσι τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὴ ποιεῖ μὴ οὖσα τὴν τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν ἐνέργειαν, ὁ δὲ συντηρεῖ καὶ φυλάττει καὶ ὅπως παραμείνῃ ζητεῖ. ἔτι δὲ οὐδ' ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τελειοῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἢ τὸ διανοητὸν τὴν διάνοιαν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ τελειοῖ τὴν ἐνέργειαν αὐτῶν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἕξις καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον ἀπὸ τοῦ δυνάμει εἰς τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ προάγουσι τὴν ἐνεργείαν, ἡ δὲ ἡδονὴ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ γινομένη συμπεφυκυῖα συντηρεῖ καὶ φυλάττει· πείθει γὰρ ἐνεργεῖν ἡ ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἡδονή, καὶ ἔστι τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ καθάπερ ἐπιγινόμενον τέλος· ὥσπερ ἡ ὥρα τοῖς ἐν ἀκμῇ· καὶ ἕπεται ἀεὶ ταύτῃ, ἕως ἂν ᾖ ἥτε αἴσθησις καὶ ἡ διάνοια, καὶ περὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν καὶ διανοητὸν ἐνεργῇ, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν εὖ καὶ ἄριστα ἔχωσι, καὶ περὶ τὸ ἄριστον ἐνεργῶσιν.* Paraph.

18. *τελειοῖ—τὸ αἰσθητόν*] The object of sensation perfects the energy or the *αἴσθησις*, (for it will amount to the same) by carrying out into act that which only virtually exists before. The energy can only be performed by the object-matter being presented to the sense. And as the energy is the perfection of the faculty (*δύναμις*) for that is the end and object of all our faculties, they having been given to us that we should employ them, (as has been previously stated), therefore, the object of sense as causing the energy perfects the *αἴσθησις*. This then exists previously to the sense and the energizer, and is extraneous to either of them. But not so pleasure; it is neither extraneous from nor previous to the energy, but inseparably allied to and consequent upon it, by a simultaneous consequence. (See Rhet. i. 7.) Thus health and the physician are not in the same way the causes of a person being healthy. For the physician is extraneous, and as causing the health of the healthy person, is previous to

καὶ ὁ ἰατρὸς ὁμοίως αἰτιά ἐστι τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν. καθ' ἑκάστην δ' αἴσθησιν ὅτι γίνεται ἡδονή, δῆλον· (φαμὲν γὰρ ὁράματα καὶ ἀκούσματα εἶναι ἡδέα)· δῆλον δὲ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα, ἐπειδὰν ἥ τε αἴσθησις ᾖ κρατίστη καὶ πρὸς τοιοῦτον ἐνεργῇ. τοιούτων δ' ὄντων τοῦ τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ τοῦ αἰσθανομένου, ἀεὶ ἔσται ἡδονὴ ὑπάρχοντός γε τοῦ ποιήσοντος καὶ τοῦ πεισομένου. Τελειοῖ *δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονὴ οὐχ ὡς ἡ ἕξις ἐνυπάρχουσα, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπιγιγνόμενόν τι τέλος, οἷον τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἡ ὥρα. ἕως ἂν οὖν τό τε νοητὸν ἢ αἰσθητὸν ᾖ οἷον δεῖ καὶ τὸ κρῖνον ἢ θεωροῦν, ἔσται ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἡ ἡδονή· ὁμοίων γὰρ ὄντων καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐχόντων τοῦ τε παθητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ ταὐτὸ πέφυκε γίνεσθαι.* Πῶς *οὖν οὐδεὶς συνεχῶς ἥδεται; ἢ κάμνει; πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἀδυνατεῖ συνεχῶς ἐνεργεῖν. οὐ γίνεται οὖν οὐδ' ἡδονή· ἕπεται γὰρ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ. ἔνια δὲ τέρπει καινὰ ὄντα, ὕστερον δὲ οὐχ ὁμοίως διὰ ταὐτό· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον παρακέκληται ἡ διάνοια καὶ διατεταμένως περὶ αὐτὰ ἐνεργεῖ, ὥσπερ κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν οἱ ἐμβλέποντες, μετέπειτα δ' οὐ τοιαύτη ἡ ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ παρη-*

In what way pleasure perfects the energies.

Why some are not continually pleased.

the healthy person: whereas health is not.

But yet pleasure does not perfect the energy as a habit, as a formal and essential cause. For it arises from the energy when it is already perfect, when its essence is already whole and complete. Pleasure therefore does not perfect the energy, either materially as *τὸ αἰσθητόν*, nor efficiently as *αἴσθησις*, nor essentially and formally as *ἕξις ἐνυπάρχουσα*.

11. *οἷον δεῖ*] That is, by being perfect.

15. *πῶς οὖν οὐδείς*] *Why then is it that we are not continually pleased? Is it that men grow tired and so forego energizing, and consequently fail to receive pleasure? For nothing human can energize without intermission.*

Whether life be desirable for pleasure, or the reverse.

μελημένη· διὸ καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀμαυροῦται. Ὀρέγεσθαι δὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς οἰηθείη τις ἂν ἅπαντας, ὅτε καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἅπαντες ἐφίενται· ἡ δὲ ζωὴ ἐνέργειά τίς ἐστι, καὶ ἕκαστος περὶ ταῦτα καὶ τούτοις ἐνεργεῖ ἃ καὶ μάλιστ᾽ ἀγαπᾷ, οἷον ὁ μὲν μουσικὸς τῇ ἀκοῇ περὶ τὰ μέλη, ὁ δὲ φιλομαθὴς τῇ διανοίᾳ περὶ τὰ θεωρήματα, οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἕκαστος. ἡ δ᾽ ἡδονὴ τελειοῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας, καὶ τὸ ζῆν δέ, οὗ ὀρέγονται. εὐλόγως οὖν καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐφίενται· τελειοῖ γὰρ ἑκάστῳ τὸ ζῆν, αἱρετὸν ὄν. πότερον δὲ διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὸ ζῆν αἱρούμεθα ἢ διὰ τὸ ζῆν τὴν ἡδονήν, ἀφείσθω ἐν τῷ παρόντι. συνεζεῦχθαι μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα φαίνεται καὶ χωρισμὸν οὐ δέχεσθαι· ἄνευ τε γὰρ ἐνεργείας οὐ γίνεται ἡδονή, πᾶσάν τε ἐνέργειαν τελειοῖ ἡ ἡδονή.

That pleasures differ in species because they perfect the energies which differ in species.

Ὅθεν δοκοῦσι καὶ τῷ εἴδει διαφέρειν· τὰ γὰρ ἕτερα τῷ εἴδει ὑφ᾽ ἑτέρων οἰόμεθα τελειοῦσθαι. οὕτω γὰρ φαίνεται καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τέχνης, οἷον ζῷα καὶ δένδρα καὶ γραφὴ καὶ ἀγάλματα καὶ οἰκία καὶ σκεῦος. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς διαφερούσας τῷ εἴδει ὑπὸ διαφερόντων εἴδει τελειοῦσθαι. διαφέρουσι δ᾽ αἱ τῆς διανοίας τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ αὐταὶ ἀλλήλων κατ᾽ εἶδος·

15. πᾶσαν—ἐνέργειαν] And consequently happiness, and the life of the happy man: for which purpose this digression appears to have been introduced.

16. ὅθεν δοκοῦσι] Since the musician has a peculiar pleasure, and the philosopher a peculiar pleasure, resulting from their respective energies, for the musician feels not the pleasure of the philosopher nor the philosopher of the musician, as such, it would seem that the pleasures differ as the energies. As well because the perfections of things different in species must themselves differ in species.

Because properties which flow from the essence of things essentially different, must themselves be essentially different.

καὶ αἱ τελειοῦσαι δὴ ἡδοναί. Φανείη δ' ἂν τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ συνῳκειῶσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἑκάστην τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἣν τελειοῖ. συναύξει γὰρ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ οἰκεία ἡδονή· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἕκαστα κρίνουσι καὶ ἐξακριβοῦσιν οἱ μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἐνεργοῦντες, οἷον γεωμετρικοὶ γίνονται οἱ χαίροντες τῷ γεωμετρεῖν, καὶ κατανοοῦσιν ἕκαστα μᾶλλον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ φιλόμουσοι καὶ φιλοικοδόμοι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστοι ἐπιδιδόασιν εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον χαίροντες αὐτῷ. συναύξουσι δὲ αἱ ἡδοναί, τὰ δὲ συναύξοντα οἰκεῖα. τοῖς ἑτέροις δὲ τῷ εἴδει καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἕτερα τῷ εἴδει.

Because the pleasure resulting from one energy is not compatible with that resulting from an opposite energy;

Ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦτ' ἂν φανείη ἐκ τοῦ τὰς ἀφ' ἑτέρων ἡδονὰς ἐμποδίους ταῖς ἐνεργείαις εἶναι· οἱ γὰρ φίλαυλοι ἀδυνατοῦσι τοῖς λόγοις προσέχειν, ἐὰν κατακούσωσιν αὐλοῦντος, μᾶλλον χαίροντες αὐλητικῇ τῆς παρούσης ἐνεργείας· ἡ κατὰ τὴν αὐλητικὴν οὖν ἡδονὴ τὴν περὶ τὸν λόγον ἐνέργειαν φθείρει. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμβαίνει, ὅταν ἅμα περὶ δύο ἐνεργῇ· ἡ γὰρ ἡδίων τὴν ἑτέραν ἐκκρούει, κἂν πολὺ διαφέρῃ κατὰ τὴν ἡδονήν, μᾶλλον, ὥστε μηδ' ἐνεργεῖν κατὰ τὴν ἑτέραν. διὸ χαίροντες ὁτῳοῦν σφόδρα οὐ πάνυ δρῶμεν ἕτερον, καὶ ἄλλα ποιοῦμεν ἄλλοις ἠρέμα ἀρεσκόμενοι, καὶ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις οἱ τραγηματίζοντες, ὅταν φαῦλοι οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι ὦσι,

9. ἐπιδιδόασιν] See p. 77.

12. ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον] Those things which produce effects specifically different, are themselves specifically different. But pleasures produce such effects. The peculiar pleasure of one energy increases that energy, the pleasure resulting from a different energy, produces the opposite effect, by destroying the previous energy.

Opposite pleasures producing the same effect as peculiar pain.

τότε μάλιστ' αὐτὸ δρῶσιν. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ μὲν οἰκεία ἡδονὴ ἐξακριβοῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ χρονιωτέρας καὶ βελτίους ποιεῖ, αἱ δ' ἀλλότριαι λυμαίνονται, δῆλον ὡς πολὺ διεστᾶσιν· σχεδὸν γὰρ αἱ ἀλλότριαι ἡδοναὶ ποιοῦσιν ὅπερ αἱ οἰκεῖαι λῦπαι· φθείρουσι γὰρ τὰς ἐνεργείας αἱ οἰκεῖαι λῦπαι, οἷον εἴ τῳ τὸ γράφειν ἀηδὲς καὶ ἐπίλυπον ἢ τὸ λογίζεσθαι· ὁ μὲν γὰρ οὐ γράφει, ὁ δ' οὐ λογίζεται, λυπηρᾶς οὔσης τῆς ἐνεργείας. συμβαίνει δὴ περὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τοὐναντίον ἀπὸ τῶν οἰκείων ἡδονῶν τε καὶ λυπῶν· οἰκεῖαι δ' εἰσὶν αἱ ἐπὶ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ καθ' αὐτὴν γινόμεναι. αἱ δ' ἀλλότριαι ἡδοναὶ εἴρηται ὅτι παραπλήσιόν τι τῇ λύπῃ ποιοῦσιν· φθείρουσι γάρ, πλὴν οὐχ ὁμοίως.

But since pleasures differ as the energies, they must also differ in virtue and viciousness. Consequently in species.

Διαφερουσῶν δὲ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἐπιεικείᾳ καὶ φαυλότητι, καὶ τῶν μὲν αἱρετῶν οὐσῶν τῶν δὲ φευκτῶν τῶν δ' οὐδετέρων, ὁμοίως ἔχουσι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί· καθ' ἑκάστην γὰρ ἐνέργειαν οἰκεία ἡδονή ἐστιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν τῇ σπουδαίᾳ οἰκεία ἐπιεικής, ἡ δὲ τῇ φαύλῃ μοχθηρά· καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἐπαινεταί, τῶν δ'

5. *αἱ οἰκεῖαι λῦπαι*] This passage seems to be a fuller explanation of the previous syllogism, particularly of its major premise, that things which produce opposite effects, &c.

τὸ σχεδὸν πρόσκειται, ὅτι αἱ οἰκεῖαι λῦπαι ἀεὶ καὶ πάντως εἰσὶ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν φθαρτικαί, αἱ δὲ ἡδοναὶ οὐκ ἀεί. Schol.

14. *οὐχ ὁμοίως*] *Non similiter* adjunxit philosophus, quia aliena voluptas videtur minuere operationem, dolor vero impedire ne producatur. ACCIAJ.

20. *καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι*] If the desires are partly good and partly bad, and that in reference to actions, (for desire is no farther blameable than as productive of vicious internal or external acts), much more are the pleasures, because they are more closely united with actions and energies, than are the desires, both in time and by nature. Desire is disunited in time from energy or action; desire being first, action subsequent. In nature, because action is in itself perfect, as including an end within itself, desire not. Whereas pleasure is closely

αἰσχρῶν ψεκταί. οἰκειότεραι δὲ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αἱ ἐν αὐταῖς ἡδοναὶ τῶν ὀρέξεων· αἱ μὲν γὰρ διωρισμέναι εἰσὶ καὶ τοῖς χρόνοις καὶ τῇ φύσει, αἱ δὲ σύνεγγυς ταῖς ἐνεργείαις, καὶ ἀδιόριστοι οὕτως ὥστ' ἔχειν ἀμφισβήτησιν εἰ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἡ ἐνέργεια τῇ ἡδονῇ. οὐ μὴν ἔοικέ γε ἡ ἡδονὴ διάνοια εἶναι οὐδ' αἴσθησις· ἄτοπον γάρ· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ χωρίζεσθαι φαίνεταί τισι ταὐτόν. ὥσπερ οὖν αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἕτεραι, καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί. Διαφέρει δὲ ἡ ὄψις ἁφῆς καθαριότητι, καὶ ἀκοὴ καὶ ὄσφρησις γεύσεως· ὁμοίως δὴ διαφέρουσι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί, καὶ τούτων αἱ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, καὶ ἑκάτεραι ἀλλήλων. Δοκεῖ δ' εἶναι ἑκάστῳ ζῴῳ καὶ ἡδονὴ οἰκεία, ὥσπερ καὶ ἔργον· ἡ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. καὶ ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ δὲ θεωροῦντι τοῦτ' ἂν φανείη· ἑτέρα γὰρ ἵππου ἡδονὴ καὶ κυνὸς καὶ ἀνθρώπου, καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτός φησιν ὄνον σύρματ' ἂν ἑλέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ χρυσόν· ἥδιον γὰρ χρυσοῦ τροφὴ ὄνοις. αἱ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἑτέρων τῷ εἴδει διαφέρουσιν εἴδει, τὰς δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀδιαφόρους εὔλογον εἶναι. διαλλάττουσι

As also in degrees of purity; as do the energies.

As the energies also of different men and other animals are different, their pleasures must also be different.

allied to energy as not to be separable or distinct from it. So that we might almost imagine that pleasure was an energy. Yet it is not; for surely pleasure is not an act of the understanding (διάνοια) nor of sense (αἴσθησις).

10. καθαριότητι] διαφέρει γὰρ ὄψις ἁφῆς καθαριότητι, καθ' ὅσον ἡ μὲν τοῦ εἴδους ἀντιλαμβάνεται μόνου, ἡ δὲ ἁφὴ τῇ ὕλῃ μᾶλλον προσάγει, καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ ταύτῃ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως καὶ τῆς γεύσεως διαφέρει, ὅτι τῆς ὕλης ἅπτονται μᾶλλον. Paraph. See also p. 279, 9. n.

13. ἑκάτεραι ἀλλήλων] *And the pleasures of the intellect differ each from one other.* ἐπεὶ γὰρ διττὸς ὁ νοῦς, ὅ τε θεωρητικὸς καὶ ὁ πρακτικός, καὶ αἱ τούτων ἡδοναὶ διαφέρουσι. Schol.

14. ἡ γάρ] sc. ἡδονή.

21. διαλλάττουσι] See Plato's Philebus, p. 45. The observation here made by Aristotle is probably intended as a reply to the reasoning of Plato in the passage above quoted. In that dialogue Plato makes no essential distinction between the pleasures of the good or of the vicious, of the

δ' οὐ μικρὸν ἐπί γε τῶν ἀνθρώπων· τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ τοὺς μὲν τέρπει τοὺς δὲ λυπεῖ, καὶ τοῖς μὲν λυπηρὰ καὶ μισητά ἐστι τοῖς δὲ ἡδέα καὶ φιλητά. καὶ ἐπὶ γλυκέων δὲ τοῦτο συμβαίνει· οὐ γὰρ τὰ αὐτὰ δοκεῖ τῷ πυρέττοντι καὶ τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι, οὐδὲ θερμὸν εἶναι τῷ ἀσθενεῖ καὶ τῷ εὐεκτικῷ. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐφ' ἑτέρων συμβαίνει. Δοκεῖ δ' ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς τοιούτοις εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον τῷ σπουδαίῳ. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο καλῶς λέγεται, καθάπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἔστιν ἑκάστου μέτρον ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ ἀγαθός, ᾗ τοιοῦτος, καὶ ἡδοναὶ εἶεν ἂν αἱ τούτῳ φαινόμεναι καὶ ἡδέα οἷς οὗτος χαίρει. τὰ δὲ

In this variety of pleasures arising both from their own and our natures we must be guided by the good man. He is to deter-

healthy and diseased, a necessary consequence of his theory, as he considered pleasure to be an ἀναπλήρωσις, and derived his notions primarily from too exclusive a view of our bodily desires. Thus, in investigating the nature of pleasure, instead of considering what is really and naturally pleasant in itself, and which can only be discovered by examining what is pleasant to him who is a correct and competent judge of these things in the natural and perfect man, he draws his inferences from what is pleasant to the wicked and diseased; a mode of reasoning wholly unphilosophical, and diametrically at variance with his practice on other occasions. (See p. 33. n.) Thus he argues; ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν, εἰ καὶ τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς γένος ἰδεῖν ἥντινά ποτε ἔχει φύσιν βουληθείημεν, οὐκ εἰς τὰς πολλοστὰς ἡδονὰς ἀποβλεπτέον, ἀλλ' εἰς τὰς ἀκροτάτας καὶ σφοδροτάτας λεγομένας; ΠΡΩ. πᾶς ἄν σοι ταύτῃ ξυγχωροίη τανῦν. ΣΩ. ἆρ' οὖν αἱ πρόχειροί γε, αἵπερ καὶ μέγισται τῶν ἡδονῶν, ὃ λέγομεν πολλάκις, αἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμα εἰσὶν αὗται; ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν καὶ μείζους εἰσὶ καὶ γίγνονται περὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας ἐν ταῖς νόσοις, ἢ περὶ τοὺς ὑγιαίνοντας; — ἆρ' οὖν ὅτι οἱ πυρέττοντες καὶ ἐν τοιούτοις νοσήμασιν ἐχόμενοι μᾶλλον διψῶσι καὶ ῥιγοῦσι, καὶ πάντα ὁπόσα διὰ τοῦ σώματος εἰώθασι πάσχειν, μᾶλλον τ' ἐνδείᾳ ξυγγίγνονται, καὶ ἀποπληρούμενοι μείζους ἡδονὰς ἴσχουσιν; — τί οὖν; ὀρθῶς ἂν φαινοίμεθα λέγοντες, ὡς εἴ τις τὰς μεγίστας ἡδονὰς ἰδεῖν βούλοιτο, οὐκ εἰς ὑγίειαν ἀλλ' εἰς νόσον ἰόντας δεῖ σκοπεῖν.

7. δοκεῖ δ' ἐν ἅπασι] If these pleasures differ in species, and some are good and some are bad, how are we to discover what are good pleasures, or rather what are true pleasures?

8. τὸ φαινόμενον] *And in all such things, that which appears to the good man, that is the truth and the reality.* To him all such things exhibit themselves in their true and native colors. To others not so, being viewed through a false and distorting medium.

11. αἱ τούτῳ φαινόμεναι] The question therefore which was left undecided, in iii. 4. here receives its real answer.

τούτῳ δυσχερῆ εἴ τῳ φαίνεται ἡδέα, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν· πολλαὶ γὰρ φθοραὶ καὶ λῦμαι ἀνθρώπων γίνονται· ἡδέα δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τούτοις καὶ οὕτω διακειμένοις. τὰς μὲν οὖν ὁμολογουμένως αἰσχρὰς δῆλον ὡς οὐ φατέον ἡδονὰς εἶναι, πλὴν τοῖς διεφθαρμένοις· τῶν δ' ἐπιεικῶν εἶναι δοκουσῶν ποίαν ἢ τίνα φατέον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι; ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν δῆλον; ταύταις γὰρ ἕπονται αἱ ἡδοναί. εἴτ' οὖν μία ἐστὶν εἴτε πλείους αἱ τοῦ τελείου καὶ μακαρίου ἀνδρός, αἱ ταύτας τελειοῦσαι ἡδοναὶ κυρίως λέγοιντ' ἂν ἀνθρώπου ἡδοναὶ εἶναι, αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ δευτέρως καὶ πολλοστῶς, ὥσπερ αἱ ἐνέργειαι.

mine for us what is true, and what is not so.

CHAP. IV.

CONCLUSION OF THE TREATISE.

That Happiness is a perfect energy, eligible for its own sake.

6 ΕΙΡΗΜΕΝΩΝ δὲ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς τε καὶ φιλίας καὶ ἡδονάς, λοιπὸν περὶ εὐδαιμονίας τύπῳ

The definition of happiness set

Chap. IV.

Aristotle now proceeds to give a kind of summary and application of the whole book. Having observed at the conclusion of the last chapter that, however multifarious pleasure might be, owing to the very different energies from which it is derived, nevertheless the greatest pleasure is to be derived from the most perfect energies of man as man, (which he has already shown to be happiness by the very manner in which he arrived at his definition), it remains that we should further consider what are the most perfect energies of man. But the most perfect energies (ἐνέργειαι κατ' ἀρετὰς ἀρίσται) are happiness, as we have already seen; our inquiry therefore now respecting pleasure joins issue with that respecting happiness, and become one and the same thing. So that, consequently, when we shall have discovered the most perfect energies, that is, the most perfect happiness, the same result will inform us what are the most perfect pleasures.

Aristotle consequently in this chapter directs our attention to the fact, that pleasure is an energy; which he also substantiates by further arguments.

forth in the first book (p. 23. sq.) resumed. That it is a self-eligible energy.

διελθεῖν, ἐπειδὴ τέλος αὐτὴν τίθεμεν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων. ἀναλαβοῦσι δὴ τὰ προειρημένα συντομώτερος ἂν εἴη ὁ λόγος. εἴπομεν δ' ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἕξις· καὶ γὰρ τῷ καθεύδοντι διὰ βίου ὑπάρχοι ἄν, φυτῶν ζῶντι βίον, καὶ τῷ δυστυχοῦντι τὰ μέγιστα. εἰ δὴ ταῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκει, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον εἰς ἐνέργειάν τινα θετέον, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρότερον εἴρηται, τῶν δ' ἐνεργειῶν αἱ μέν εἰσιν ἀναγκαῖαι καὶ δι' ἕτερα αἱρεταί, αἱ δὲ καθ' αὐτάς, δῆλον ὅτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τῶν καθ' αὐτὰς αἱρετῶν τινὰ θετέον καὶ οὐ τῶν δι' ἄλλο· οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἐνδεὴς ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἀλλ' αὐτάρκης. καθ' αὐτὰς δ' εἰσὶν αἱρεταί, ἀφ' ὧν μηδὲν ἐπιζητεῖται παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν.

But not a sport, though this seems to be an energy of such a nature. And why.

Τοιαῦται δ' εἶναι δοκοῦσιν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις· τὰ γὰρ καλὰ καὶ σπουδαῖα πράττειν τῶν δι' αὐτὰ αἱρετῶν. καὶ τῶν παιδιῶν δὲ αἱ ἡδεῖαι· οὐ γὰρ δι' ἕτερα αὐτὰς αἱροῦνται· βλάπτονται γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῶν μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφελοῦνται, ἀμελοῦντες τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τῆς κτήσεως. καταφεύγουσι δ' ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας διαγωγὰς τῶν εὐδαιμονιζομένων οἱ πολλοί, διὸ παρὰ τοῖς τυράννοις εὐδοκιμοῦσιν οἱ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς εὐτράπελοι· ὧν γὰρ ἐφίενται, ἐν τούτοις παρέχουσι σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἡδεῖς· δέονται δὲ τοιούτων. δοκεῖ μὲν οὖν εὐδαιμονικὰ ταῦτα εἶναι διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἐν δυναστείαις ἐν τούτοις ἀποσχολάζειν, οὐδὲν δὲ ἴσως σημεῖον οἱ τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ

3. εἴπομεν] See p. 29.

9. ἀναγκαῖαι] Necessaria non sunt hoc loco ea quæ per se necessaria sunt et summe expetenda; sed media et instrumenta quæ fini alicui subjecta, ad illum finem exsequendum sunt necessaria. MICH.

ἐν τῷ δυναστεύειν ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐδ' ὁ νοῦς, ἀφ' ὧν αἱ σπουδαῖαι ἐνέργειαι· οὐδ' εἰ ἄγευστοι οὗτοι ὄντες ἡδονῆς εἰλικρινοῦς καὶ ἐλευθερίου ἐπὶ τὰς σωματικὰς καταφεύγουσιν, διὰ τοῦτο ταύτας οἰητέον αἱρετωτέρας εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ οἱ παῖδες τὰ παρ' αὐτοῖς τιμώμενα κράτιστα οἴονται εἶναι. εὔλογον δή, ὥσπερ παισὶ καὶ ἀνδράσιν ἕτερα φαίνεται τίμια, οὕτω καὶ φαύλοις καὶ ἐπιεικέσιν. καθάπερ οὖν πολλάκις εἴρηται, καὶ τίμια καὶ ἡδέα ἐστὶ τὰ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τοιαῦτα ὄντα· ἑκάστῳ δὲ ἡ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἕξιν αἱρετωτάτη ἐνέργεια, καὶ τῷ σπουδαίῳ δὲ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν. οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ ἄρα ἡ εὐδαιμονία· καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον τὸ τέλος εἶναι παιδιάν, καὶ πραγματεύεσθαι καὶ κακοπαθεῖν τὸν βίον ἅπαντα τοῦ παίζειν χάριν. ἅπαντα γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν ἑτέρου ἕνεκα αἱρούμεθα πλὴν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας· τέλος γὰρ αὕτη. σπουδάζειν δὲ καὶ πονεῖν παιδιᾶς χάριν ἠλίθιον φαίνεται καὶ λίαν παιδικόν· παίζειν δ' ὅπως σπουδάζῃ, κατ' Ἀνάχαρσιν, ὀρθῶς ἔχειν δοκεῖ· ἀναπαύσει γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ παιδιά, ἀδυνατοῦντες δὲ συνεχῶς πονεῖν ἀναπαύσεως δέονται. οὐ δὴ τέλος ἡ ἀνάπαυσις· γίνεται γὰρ ἕνεκα τῆς ἐνεργείας. δοκεῖ δ' ὁ εὐδαίμων βίος κατ' ἀρετὴν εἶναι· οὗτος δὲ μετὰ σπουδῆς, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ. βελτίω τε λέγομεν τὰ σπουδαῖα τῶν γελοίων καὶ τῶν μετὰ παιδιᾶς, καὶ τοῦ βελτίονος ἀεὶ καὶ μορίου καὶ ἀνθρώπου σπουδαιοτέραν τὴν ἐνέργειαν· ἡ δὲ τοῦ βελτίονος κρείττων καὶ εὐδαιμονικωτέρα

19. παίζειν] Compare Plato's Philebus, p. 30.

ἤδη. ἀπολαύσειέ τ' ἂν τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν ὁ τυχὼν καὶ ἀνδράποδον οὐχ ἧττον τοῦ ἀρίστου· εὐδαιμονίας δ' οὐδεὶς ἀνδραπόδῳ μεταδίδωσιν, εἰ μὴ καὶ βίου· οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς ἡ εὐδαιμονία, ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργείαις, καθάπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται.

CHAP. V.

That perfect energies being of two kinds, happiness is according to the best.—What that best is.

That the energies according to νοῦς are the most perfect, being;

7 ΕΙ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργεια, εὔλογον κατὰ τὴν κρατίστην· αὕτη δ' ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀρίστου. εἴτε δὴ νοῦς τοῦτο εἴτε ἄλλο τι, ὃ δὴ

3. ἀνδραπόδῳ] Compare the Politics, iii. 5. (p. 86. ed. Goet.) καὶ γὰρ ἂν δούλων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἦν πόλις· νῦν δ' οὐκ ἔστι, διὰ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν εὐδαιμονίας μηδὲ τοῦ ζῆν κατὰ προαίρεσιν. Compare Plato's Gorg. p. 491. E.

4. βίου] Compare Mag. Moral. p. 10. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τέλειον ἀγαθὸν καὶ τέλος, οὐδὲ τοῦτο δεῖ λανθάνειν ὅτι καὶ ἐν τελείῳ ἔσται· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται ἐν παιδί, οὐ γάρ ἐστι παῖς εὐδαίμων, ἀλλ' ἐν ἀνδρί, οὗτος γὰρ τέλειος. Some refer the words εἰ μὴ καὶ βίου to σπουδαίου or εὐδαίμονος. But Aristotle uses the term βίος simply and absolutely. As he observes in his Politics, the life of the master is not referred to his slave, but the slave to the master; the slave lives in the master, not the master in the slave; in the same way as the hand is referred to the man, not the man to his hand. If the hand be cut off or the man die, it is no longer a hand except equivocally. In the same way the slave lives in the master, and has no life independently as far as he is a slave; no energies therefore which can be called his own, consequently no happiness. See the introductory chapters to the first book of the Politics upon this subject. See also the Pol. vii. 13.

CHAP. V.

If the theoretical energies possess all the qualities which we attribute to happiness in the greatest degree, then they are the happiness of man.

But they do possess these qualities (for they are κρατίσται, συνεχεστάται, ἡδίσται, αὐταρκεστάται, ἐν σχολῇ, τελειοτάται) beyond all other energies, and consequeutly they are the happiness of man. Compare with this chapter i. 6.

κατὰ φύσιν δοκεῖ ἄρχειν καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ ἔννοιαν ἔχειν περὶ καλῶν καὶ θείων, εἴτε θεῖον ὂν καὶ αὐτὸ εἴτε τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ θειότατον, ἡ τούτου ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν εἴη ἂν ἡ τελεία εὐδαιμονία. ὅτι δ' ἐστὶ θεωρητική, εἴρηται. κρατίστη. Ὁμολογούμενον δὲ τοῦτ' ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι καὶ τοῖς πρότερον καὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ. κρατίστη τε γὰρ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ τῶν γνωστῶν, περὶ ἃ ὁ νοῦς. συνεχεστάτη. Ἔτι δὲ συνεχεστάτη· θεωρεῖν τε γὰρ δυνάμεθα συνεχῶς μᾶλλον ἢ πράττειν ὁτιοῦν. ἡδίστη. Οἰόμεθά τε δεῖν ἡδονὴν παραμεμῖχθαι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἡδίστη δὲ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργειῶν ἡ κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν ὁμολογουμένως ἐστίν· δοκεῖ γοῦν ἡ φιλοσοφία θαυμαστὰς ἡδονὰς ἔχειν καθαριότητι καὶ τῷ βεβαίῳ, εὔλογον δὲ τοῖς εἰδόσι τῶν ζητούντων ἡδίω τὴν διαγωγὴν εἶναι. αὐτάρκεια. Ἥ τε λεγομένη αὐτάρκεια περὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη· τῶν μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν ἀναγκαίων καὶ σοφὸς καὶ δίκαιος καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ δέονται, τοῖς δὲ τοιούτοις ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένων ὁ μὲν δίκαιος δεῖται πρὸς οὓς δικαιοπραγήσει καὶ μεθ' ὧν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ

7. κρατίστη τε γάρ] νοῦς is the noblest of all our faculties; its object-matter is the most perfect of all matters upon which we can operate; consequently the energies of νοῦς must be most perfect (see p. 414, 8), and consequently the most pleasant of all our energies.

15. καθαριότητι] See p. 421, 10.

19. πρὸς τὸ ζῆν ἀναγκαίων] The wise man and the just man both require external goods and the necessaries of life. But the former only accidentally, the latter essentially, as far as their energies are concerned. The just and the liberal, and those whose energies are of the moral nature, require external goods as organs by which they may energize; and not only external means, but persons upon whom and with whom they may operate. Whereas the contemplative energies require neither the one nor the other, but are sufficient in themselves.

ὁ σώφρων καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστος, ὁ δὲ σοφὸς καὶ καθ' αὑτὸν ὢν δύναται θεωρεῖν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν σοφώτερος ᾖ μᾶλλον· βέλτιον δ' ἴσως συνεργοὺς ἔχων, ἀλλ' ὅμως αὐταρκέστατος.

Sought for their own sake.

Δόξαι τ' ἂν αὐτὴ μόνη δι' αὑτὴν ἀγαπᾶσθαι· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῆς γίνεται παρὰ τὸ θεωρῆσαι, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν πρακτῶν ἢ πλεῖον ἢ ἔλαττον περιποιούμεθα παρὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν.

ἐν σχολῇ.

Δοκεῖ τε ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῇ σχολῇ εἶναι· ἀσχολούμεθα γὰρ ἵνα σχολάζωμεν, καὶ πολεμοῦμεν ἵν' εἰρήνην ἄγωμεν. τῶν μὲν οὖν πρακτικῶν ἀρετῶν ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς ἢ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἡ ἐνέργεια· αἱ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις δοκοῦσιν ἄσχολοι εἶναι, αἱ μὲν πολεμικαὶ καὶ παντελῶς· οὐδεὶς γὰρ αἱρεῖται τὸ πολεμεῖν τοῦ πολεμεῖν ἕνεκα, οὐδὲ παρασκευάζει πόλεμον· δόξαι γὰρ ἂν παντελῶς μιαιφόνος τις εἶναι, εἰ τοὺς φίλους πολεμίους ποιοῖτο, ἵνα μάχαι καὶ φόνοι γίγνοιντο. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ἄσχολος, καὶ παρ' αὐτὸ τὸ

3. βέλτιον δ' ἴσως] This is said in reference to ix. 7.

7. ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν πρακτῶν] The moral energies are less perfect than the contemplative, since they are all exercised with a view to some end extraneous and ulterior to themselves. As courage for victory, temperance for tranquillity, and the like. Whereas the contemplative energies are exercised merely for the sake of contemplation.

9. ἐν τῇ σχολῇ] Whatever qualities have been attributed to happiness, are only to be found perfectly in the contemplative life. For whether it be considered as that which is eligible merely for its own sake, or an energy of the soul upon absolute and perfect good, or as some have thought, whose opinions were afterwards adopted by Epicurus and his followers, that happiness consists in a life of ease and freedom from trouble, all these, and especially the last, are only to be found in the life of contemplation. For the political life, whether in war or peace, is continually occupied with troubles; either in war with a view to a peace, or in a peace with a view to the preservation of peace, or in providing for war, or for increase of dominion, or, in short, the happiness of its citizens.

πολιτεύεσθαι περιποιουμένη δυναστείας καὶ τιμὰς ἢ τήν γε εὐδαιμονίαν αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς πολίταις, ἑτέραν οὖσαν τῆς πολιτικῆς, ἣν καὶ ζητοῦμεν δῆλον ὡς ἑτέραν οὖσαν. Εἰ δὴ τῶν μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πράξεων αἱ πολιτικαὶ καὶ πολεμικαὶ κάλλει καὶ μεγέθει προέχουσιν, αὗται δ' ἄσχολοι καὶ τέλους τινὸς ἐφίενται καὶ οὐ δι' αὑτὰς αἱρεταί εἰσιν, ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργεια σπουδῇ τε διαφέρειν δοκεῖ θεωρητικὴ οὖσα, καὶ παρ' αὑτὴν οὐδενὸς ἐφίεσθαι τέλους, ἔχειν τε ἡδονὴν οἰκείαν, αὕτη δὲ συναύξει τὴν ἐνέργειαν, καὶ τὸ αὔταρκες δὴ καὶ σχολαστικὸν καὶ ἄτρυτον ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τῷ μακαρίῳ ἀπονέμεται, κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐνέργειαν φαίνεται ὄντα. ἡ τελεία δὴ εὐδαιμονία αὕτη ἂν εἴη ἀνθρώπου, λαβοῦσα μῆκος βίου τέλειον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀτελές ἐστι τῶν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας. Ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη βίος κρείττων ἢ κατ' ἄνθρωπον· οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν

If, then, the energies of νοῦς possess in the greatest perfection all those qualities which we attribute to happiness, they constitute consequently our greatest happiness, the peculiar happiness of man: which it is our duty to further.

And such a life, as it is most pecu-

3. ἑτέραν οὖσαν] The sense of this passage seems clear enough, although the reading is apparently corrupt. Aristotle is proving, that the theoretical energies are only the true happiness of man, because they only are final, and have their end in themselves. Now the political life, which seems to be the next to the contemplative in dignity, must be engaged either with war or peace: if with war, it cannot be final; for we make war, with some ulterior object, namely to have peace. If with peace, still it is not final; for in peace the statesman still seeks something further, either aggrandizement of territory, honor, or happiness for himself or his citizens, indicating by this conduct that there is some end or good, that is, a happiness yet ulterior, and consequently different from that which he already possesses; and that happiness, says Aristotle, we are in search of; clearly entertaining the same view as the politician, and proving it also in this chapter, that it must be different from any derived from the political energies, and consequently from the political *happiness*.

15. μῆκος βίου] See p. 26, 3. n.

17. κρείττων ἢ κατ' ἄνθρωπον] *Above the reach of man.* Compare the Philebus of Plato, p. 11. τὸ δ' ἐμὸν δέος οὐκ ἔστι κατ' ἄνθρωπον. Stallbaum's note and app. ibid.

liarly adapted to him as a man, so does it exalt him nearest to the gods, and raises the immortal part within him.

οὕτω βιώσεται, ἀλλ' ᾗ θεῖόν τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει· ὅσῳ δὲ διαφέρει τοῦτο τοῦ συνθέτου, τοσούτῳ καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν. εἰ δὴ θεῖον ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦτον βίος θεῖος πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον. οὐ χρὴ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς παραινοῦντας ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν ἄνθρωπον ὄντα οὐδὲ θνητὰ τὸν θνητόν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ· εἰ γὰρ καὶ τῷ ὄγκῳ μικρόν ἐστι, δυνάμει καὶ τιμιότητι πολὺ μᾶλλον πάντων ὑπερέχει. δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ εἶναι ἕκαστος τοῦτο, εἴπερ τὸ κύριον καὶ ἄμεινον· ἄτοπον οὖν γίνοιτ' ἄν, εἰ μὴ τὸν αὑτοῦ βίον αἱροῖτο ἀλλά τινος ἄλλου. τὸ λεχθέν τε πρότερον ἁρμόσει καὶ νῦν· τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἑκάστῳ τῇ φύσει κράτιστον καὶ ἥδιστόν ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ. καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δὴ ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος, εἴπερ τοῦτο μάλιστα ἄνθρωπος. οὗτος ἄρα καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατος.

1. θεῖόν τι] What Cicero has observed respecting this part of the teaching of the Stoics is perfectly just. "Vitæ autem degendæ ratio maxime quidem illis placuit quieta, in contemplatione et cognitione posita rerum: quæ quia deorum erat vitæ simillima, sapiente visa est dignissima, atque his de rebus et splendida est eorum et illustris oratio." De Finibus, v. 4.

7. φρονεῖν] See Sophocles, frag. 515. p. 392. Ed. Oxon. 1832. and Æschyl. Pers. 807.

14. τὸν αὑτοῦ βίον] See p. 362, 6. n.

15. λεχθέν τε πρότερον] See p. 380, 7.

16. οἰκεῖον] πάντων γὰρ τῶν κτημάτων μετὰ θεοὺς ψυχὴ θειότατον, οἰκειότατον ὄν. Plato De Leg. p. 726.

CHAP. VI.

Nevertheless as man consists of body as well as soul, to complete his happiness he must possess in perfection the energies of the inferior part.

8 ΔΕΥΤΕΡΩΣ δ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν· αἱ γὰρ κατ' αὐτὴν ἐνέργειαι ἀνθρωπικαί· δίκαια γὰρ καὶ ἀνδρεῖα καὶ ἄλλα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους πράττομεν ἐν συναλλάγμασι καὶ χρείαις καὶ πράξεσι παντοίαις ἔν τε τοῖς πάθεσι διατηροῦντες τὸ πρέπον ἑκάστῳ. ταῦτα δ' εἶναι φαίνεται πάντα ἀνθρωπικά. ἔνια δὲ καὶ συμβαίνειν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος δοκεῖ, καὶ πολλὰ συνῳκειῶσθαι τοῖς πάθεσιν ἡ τοῦ ἤθους ἀρετή. συνέζευκται δὲ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις τῇ τοῦ ἤθους ἀρετῇ, καὶ αὕτη τῇ φρονήσει, εἴπερ αἱ μὲν τῆς φρονήσεως ἀρχαὶ κατὰ τὰς ἠθικάς εἰσιν ἀρετάς, τὸ δ' ὀρθὸν τῶν ἠθικῶν κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. συνηρτημέναι δ' αὗται καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι περὶ τὸ σύνθετον ἂν εἶεν· αἱ δὲ τοῦ συνθέτου ἀρεταὶ ἀνθρωπικαί. καὶ ὁ βίος δὴ ὁ κατ' αὐτὰς καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία. ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ κεχωρισμένη· τοσοῦτον γὰρ περὶ αὐτῆς εἰρήσθω· διακριβῶσαι γὰρ μεῖζον τοῦ προκειμένου ἐστίν. Δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς χορηγίας ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ ἐπ' ἔλαττον δεῖσθαι

That the happiness derived from the moral energies is the happiness of man merely as far as he is a human being.

And are essentially dependent

10. συνέζευκται] See p. 251, 11. sq.

11. αἱ μὲν τῆς φρονήσεως ἀρχαί] The final causes of every action are the ἀρχαὶ of φρόνησις, and of φρόνησις in the correct use of the term, as has been already shown, a good end. But the right conception of this end is only to be derived from moral virtue. Moral virtue then points out the right end, φρόνησις the right means to that end.

upon external means. Not so the theoretical.

τῆς ἠθικῆς· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίων ἀμφοῖν χρεία καὶ ἐξ ἴσου ἔστω, εἰ καὶ μᾶλλον διαπονεῖ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ὁ πολιτικός, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα. μικρὸν γὰρ ἄν τι διαφέροι· πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας πολὺ διοίσει. τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθερίῳ δεήσει χρημάτων πρὸς τὸ πράττειν τὰ ἐλευθέρια, καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ δὴ εἰς τὰς ἀνταποδόσεις (αἱ γὰρ βουλήσεις ἄδηλοι, προσποιοῦνται δὲ καὶ οἱ μὴ δίκαιοι βούλεσθαι δικαιοπραγεῖν), τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ δυνάμεως, εἴπερ ἐπιτελεῖ τι τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ τῷ σώφρονι ἐξουσίας· πῶς γὰρ δῆλος ἔσται ἢ οὗτος ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τις; ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ πότερον κυριώτερον τῆς ἀρετῆς ἡ προαίρεσις ἢ αἱ πράξεις, ὡς ἐν ἀμφοῖν οὔσης. τὸ δὴ τέλειον δῆλον ὡς ἐν ἀμφοῖν ἂν εἴη. πρὸς δὲ τὰς πράξεις πολλῶν δεῖται, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μείζους ὦσι καὶ καλλίους, πλειόνων. τῷ δὲ θεωροῦντι οὐδενὸς τῶν τοιούτων πρός γε τὴν ἐνέργειαν χρεία, ἀλλ' ὡς εἰπεῖν καὶ ἐμπόδιά ἐστι πρός γε τὴν θεωρίαν· ᾗ δ' ἄνθρωπός ἐστι καὶ πλείοσι συζῇ, αἱρεῖται τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράττειν· δεήσεται οὖν τῶν τοιούτων πρὸς τὸ ἀνθρωπεύεσθαι.

That the theoretical is the perfect happiness would also appear from its

Ἡ δὲ τελεία εὐδαιμονία ὅτι θεωρητική τίς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἂν φανείη. τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ μάλιστα ὑπειλήφαμεν μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαίμονας εἶναι πρά-

1. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίων] See above, p. 427, 19.

22. ἡ δὲ τελεία] That happiness is θεωρία, is proved from considering in what the happiness of the gods consists.

The gods live, consequently they energize. But their energies can be only those according to the matter they are employed on, sc. θεωρία, πρᾶξις, or ποίησις. Their energies cannot be those of the two last, consequently they must be of the former, sc. theoretical.

ξεις δὲ ποίας ἀπονεῖμαι χρεὼν αὐτοῖς; πότερα τὰς δικαίας, ἢ γελοῖοι φανοῦνται συναλλάττοντες καὶ παρακαταθήκας ἀποδιδόντες καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα; ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνδρείους, ὑπομένοντας τὰ φοβερὰ καὶ κινδυνεύοντας, ὅτι καλόν; ἢ τὰς ἐλευθερίους; τίνι δὲ δώσουσιν; ἄτοπον δ' εἰ καὶ ἔσται αὐτοῖς νόμισμα ἤ τι τοιοῦτον. αἱ δὲ σώφρονες τί ἂν εἶεν; ἢ φορτικὸς ὁ ἔπαινος, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχουσι φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας; διεξιοῦσι δὲ πάντα φαίνοιτ' ἂν τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις μικρὰ καὶ ἀνάξια θεῶν.

being the happiness of the gods. For the happiness of the gods cannot consist in πρᾶξις.

'Αλλὰ μὴν ζῆν τε πάντες ὑπειλήφασιν αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἄρα· οὐ γὰρ δὴ καθεύδειν ὥσπερ τὸν 'Ενδυμίωνα. τῷ δὴ ζῶντι τοῦ πράττειν ἀφαιρουμένου, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ποιεῖν, τί λεί-

But in θεωρία.

2. ἢ γελοῖοι] Some persons have represented it, as if Aristotle differed from Butler, who observes, that though there may be no scope for the exercise of the moral energies in a future state, yet there may be for the temper of mind and disposition which have been previously formed by such energies. (Anal. i. 5. ad fin.) But it is evident that Aristotle is here speaking merely of the energies and moral acts (πράξεις δὲ ποίας κ. τ. λ.)

But even granting the objection its full weight, unless Aristotle had considered that the Gods had the opportunities of acquiring such habits by the performance of their proper acts, he could not reasonably have taken these dispositions into consideration on this occasion; and by proving that the Gods did not perform moral acts, he sufficiently proved that their happiness could not consist in the disposition springing from such acts.

And it may with some reason be urged against Butler, whether if the moral acts be needful for the generation and preservation of such dispositions, (and such is the fact as far as we can trace) upon the acts ceasing, the disposition would not eventually cease likewise; and consequently as there would be no such acts, and no occasion for them in a future life, so there would be no such disposition. At all events Aristotle to be consistent could take no other view. Of course I speak here merely as far as unassisted human reason is concerned. Not only our moral habits, but even our moral energies may be so sublimated as to be rendered fit for another world; but this is as far above the discovery of human reason as the resurrection and immortality of the body.

9. διεξιοῦσι] So Cicero; see frag. p. 1094. Ed. Ernesti.

πεται πλὴν θεωρία; ὥστε ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια, μακαριότητι διαφέρουσα, θεωρητικὴ ἂν εἴη. καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων δὴ ἡ ταύτῃ συγγενεστάτη εὐδαιμονικωτάτη. σημεῖον δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα εὐδαιμονίας, τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ἐστερημένα τελείως. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ θεοῖς ἅπας ὁ βίος μακάριος, τοῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις, ἐφ' ὅσον ὁμοίωμά τι τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει· τῶν δ' ἄλλων ζῴων οὐδὲν εὐδαιμονεῖ, ἐπειδὴ οὐδαμῇ κοινωνεῖ θεωρίας. ἐφ' ὅσον δὴ διατείνει ἡ θεωρία καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ οἷς μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει τὸ θεωρεῖν καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν, οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν· αὐτὴ γὰρ καθ' αὑτὴν τιμία. ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἡ εὐδαιμονία θεωρία τις.

1. *ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια*] The following passage of the Metaphysics furnishes an important comment upon this subject. *δῆλον οὖν ὡς δι' οὐδεμίαν αὐτὴν ζητοῦμεν χρείαν ἑτέραν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπός φαμεν ἐλεύθερος ὁ αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου, οὕτως καὶ αὐτὴ μόνη ἐλευθέρα οὖσα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν. μόνη γὰρ αὕτη αὑτῆς ἕνεκέν ἐστι. διὸ καὶ δικαίως ἂν οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνη νομίζοιτο αὐτῆς ἡ κτῆσις. πολλαχῇ γὰρ ἡ φύσις δούλη τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν· ὥστε κατὰ Σιμωνίδην, θεὸς ἂν μόνος τοῦτο ἔχοι τὸ γέρας· ἄνδρα δ' οὐκ ἄξιον μὴ ζητεῖν τὴν καθ' αὑτὸν ἐπιστήμην. εἰ δὲ λέγουσί τι οἱ ποιηταί, καὶ πέφυκε φθονεῖν τὸ θεῖον, ἐπὶ τούτου συμβῆναι μάλιστα εἰκὸς καὶ δυστυχεῖς εἶναι πάντας τοὺς περιττούς. ἀλλ' οὔτε τὸ θεῖον φθονερὸν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι· ἀλλά, κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν, πολλὰ ψεύδονται ἀοιδοί· οὔτε τῆς τοιαύτης ἄλλην χρὴ νομίζειν τιμιωτέραν. ἡ γὰρ θειοτάτη καὶ τιμιωτάτη· τοιαύτη δὲ διχῶς ἂν εἴη μόνη.* Metaph. i. 2. See also Met. xi. 7. xiv. 8.

8. *ὁμοίωμα*] See Stallbaum's Prol. in Platon. Phil. p. 25, 29.

CHAP. VII.

And for this purpose will require external prosperity.

9 ΔΕΗΣΕΙ δὲ καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς εὐημερίας ἀνθρώπῳ ὄντι· οὐ γὰρ αὐτάρκης ἡ φύσις πρὸς τὸ θεωρεῖν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὸ σῶμα ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τροφὴν καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν θεραπείαν ὑπάρχειν. οὐ μὴν οἰητέον γε πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων δεήσεσθαι τὸν εὐδαιμονήσοντα, εἰ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἄνευ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μακάριον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τὸ αὔταρκες οὐδ' ἡ πρᾶξις, δυνατὸν δὲ καὶ μὴ ἄρχοντα γῆς καὶ θαλάττης πράττειν τὰ καλά· καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ μετρίων δύναιτ' ἄν τις πράττειν κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν. τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ἐναργῶς· οἱ γὰρ ἰδιῶται τῶν δυναστῶν οὐχ ἧττον δοκοῦσι τὰ ἐπιεικῆ πράττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον. ἱκανὸν δὲ τοσαῦθ' ὑπάρχειν· ἔσται γὰρ ὁ βίος εὐδαίμων τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐνεργοῦντος. καὶ Σόλων δὲ τοὺς εὐδαίμονας ἴσως ἀπεφαίνετο καλῶς, εἰπὼν μετρίως τοῖς ἐκτὸς κεχορηγημένους, πεπραγότας δὲ τὰ κάλλισθ', ὡς ᾤετο, καὶ βεβιωκότας σωφρόνως· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ μέτρια κεκτημένους πράττειν ἃ δεῖ. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας οὐ πλούσιον οὐδὲ δυνάστην ὑπολαβεῖν τὸν εὐδαίμονα, εἰπὼν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσειεν εἴ τις ἄτοπος φανείη τοῖς

External means necessary, and how far.

CHAP. VII.

The question which was left undecided, or rather insufficiently explained in i. 8. is here fully and perfectly settled.

19. *μέτρια κεκτημένους*] See note, p. 39, 22.

22. *εἴ τις ἄτοπος*] *If he (the happy man) should appear a strange out of the way being to the generality of mankind.*

πολλοῖς· οὗτοι γὰρ κρίνουσι τοῖς ἐκτός, τούτων αἰσθανόμενοι μόνον. συμφωνεῖν δὴ τοῖς λόγοις ἐοίκασιν αἱ τῶν σοφῶν δόξαι. πίστιν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει τινά, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς ἐκ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τοῦ βίου κρίνεται· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τὸ κύριον. σκοπεῖν δὴ τὰ προειρημένα χρὴ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὸν βίον ἐπιφέροντας, καὶ συνᾳδόντων μὲν τοῖς ἔργοις ἀποδεκτέον, διαφωνούντων δὲ λόγους ὑποληπτέον.

That he who derives his happiness from the theoretical energies, as by so doing he approaches most nearly to the nature of the gods, must be, for that reason, naturally an object of greater love to them.

Ὁ δὲ κατὰ νοῦν ἐνεργῶν καὶ τοῦτον θεραπεύων καὶ διακείμενος ἄριστα καὶ θεοφιλέστατος ἔοικεν εἶναι· εἰ γάρ τις ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὑπὸ θεῶν γίνεται, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ εἴη ἂν εὔλογον χαίρειν τε αὐτοὺς τῷ ἀρίστῳ καὶ τῷ συγγενεστάτῳ (τοῦτο δ' ἂν εἴη ὁ νοῦς) καὶ τοὺς ἀγαπῶντας μάλιστα τοῦτο καὶ τιμῶντας ἀντευποιεῖν ὡς τῶν φίλων αὐτοῖς ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ ὀρθῶς τε καὶ καλῶς πράττοντας. ὅτι δὲ πάντα ταῦτα τῷ σοφῷ μάλισθ' ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἄδηλον. θεοφιλέστατος ἄρα. τὸν αὐτὸν δ' εἰκὸς καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατον· ὥστε κἂν οὕτως εἴη ὁ σοφὸς μάλιστ' εὐδαίμων.

11. θεοφιλέστατος] This proving that the happy man is θεοφιλέστατος is neither a useless nor impertinent argument. For Aristotle by so doing showed that his theory agreed with the received opinions of the ancient philosophers; and in this he was supported by Socrates. See Plato's Protag. p. 345. c. ἐπὶ πλεῖστον δὲ καὶ ἄριστοί εἰσιν οὓς ἂν οἱ θεοὶ φιλῶσι. And if ἄριστοι then also εὐδαιμονέστατοι. See also the magnificent passage in Plato's Repub. 613. A.

CHAP. VIII.

INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICS.

10 ΑΡ' οὖν εἰ περὶ τούτων καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ φιλίας καὶ ἡδονῆς ἱκανῶς εἴρηται τοῖς

That the scope of this treatise is practical.

CHAP. VIII.

The last chapter concludes the treatise. The following one has nothing at all to do with it as far as an ethical investigation, but merely in relation to the Politics. For if, says Aristotle, the end and scope of all this investigation is not to please the fancy or to amuse a passion for speculation, but for a practical purpose, to make men wiser and better, one grand object of our enquiry must be how such a purpose shall be obtained. Perhaps some few generous tempers might be persuaded to the truth of what has been said, and endeavour to direct their conduct for the attainment of happiness according to the rules here laid down. But what hope is there of convincing and moving the great mass of mankind? How, to say nothing of evil habits already acquired and grown inveterate by time, can they be induced to relinquish their prejudices, and enter upon a course of life, for which they neither have a taste, nor motives strong enough to compel them? More especially since the happiness held out to them demands of them not the mere labor of undoing their old habits, but of acquiring new ones; and the real appreciation of the value and pleasure of virtuous habits, can only be formed by those who have in some measure attained them? The only hope then that this treatise may be of practical service to mankind, rests upon the ground of its rules being applied in early life, in the education of mankind from their infancy being governed and directed by its precepts. But all education should have two points in view, not merely the advantage of the individual, but likewise that of the state. For it is impossible to know and act for the benefit of a part, without knowing and acting for the benefit of the whole. And it is not only the duty but the interest of every state to have the minds of its citizens so directed, that their own advantages and private ends shall be in unison with the advantages and ends of the state. But for this, it is necessary that education should be under control of the state. Consequently a knowledge of politics is required, not merely because many things in this treatise, particularly in the eighth and ninth books, are necessarily left unfinished and ill explained without them, but also because otherwise it is necessarily deprived of its chief practical bearing, for which purpose only it was written.

περὶ δ' ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς καὶ τέκνων καὶ πατρός, τῆς τε περὶ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ὁμιλίας, τί τὸ καλῶς καὶ μὴ καλῶς ἐστι, καὶ πῶς δεῖ τὸ μὲν εὖ διώκειν τὸ δὲ κακῶς φεύγειν, ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον ἐπελθεῖν, ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἰκία μὲν πᾶσα μέρος πόλεως, ταῦτα δ' οἰκίας, τὴν δὲ

τύποις, τέλος ἔχειν οἰητέον τὴν προαίρεσιν, ἢ καθάπερ λέγεται, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς τέλος τὸ θεωρῆσαι ἕκαστα καὶ γνῶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ πράττειν αὐτά; οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἱκανὸν τὸ εἰδέναι, ἀλλ' ἔχειν καὶ χρῆσθαι πειρατέον, ἢ εἴ πως ἄλλως ἀγαθοὶ γινόμεθα.

But precepts only are not sufficient to make men virtuous.

Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι αὐτάρκεις πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐπιεικεῖς, πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους δικαίως ἔφερον κατὰ τὸν Θέογνιν, καὶ ἔδει ἂν τούτους πορίσασθαι· νῦν δὲ φαίνονται προτρέψασθαι μὲν καὶ παρορμῆσαι τῶν νέων τοὺς ἐλευθερίους ἰσχύειν, ἦθός τ' εὐγενὲς καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόκαλον ποιῆσαι ἂν κατοκώχιμον ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἀδυνατεῖν πρὸς καλοκαγαθίαν προτρέψασθαι· οὐ γὰρ πεφύκασιν αἰδοῖ πειθαρχεῖν ἀλλὰ φόβῳ, οὐδ' ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν φαύλων διὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς τιμωρίας· πάθει γὰρ ζῶντες τὰς οἰκείας ἡδονὰς διώκουσι καὶ δι' ὧν αὗται ἔσονται, φεύγουσι δὲ τὰς ἀντικειμένας λύπας, τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἡδέος οὐδ' ἔννοιαν ἔχουσιν, ἄγευστοι ὄντες. τοὺς

τοῦ μέρους πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου δεῖ βλέπειν ἀρετήν, ἀναγκαῖον πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν βλέποντας παιδεύειν καὶ τοὺς παῖδας καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας, εἴπερ τι διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ τὴν πόλιν εἶναι σπουδαίαν, καὶ τοὺς παῖδας εἶναι σπουδαίους καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας σπουδαίους. Polit. i. 5. p. 25. See also i. 1.

9. κατὰ τὸν Θέογνιν] Significat locum Theognidis, v. 432.

εἰ δ' Ἀσκληπιάδαις τοῦτο ἔδωκε θεός,
ἰᾶσθαι κακότητα καὶ ἀτηρὰς φρένας ἀνδρῶν
πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους ἔφερον.

Usus est eodem loco etiam Plato in Menone, p. 96. Cf. denique Euripidis quoque Hippolyt. 916. ZELL.

21. ἄγευστοι] It is remarkable to observe how little practical benefit the moral philosophers of antiquity seem to have felt would be derived from their writings; what faint motives they could urge to influence the generality of mankind. For how far could the love of virtue in itself urge men to become virtuous who had no taste for virtue? The very fact of loving virtue for vir-

δὴ τοιούτους τίς ἂν λόγος μεταρρυθμίσαι; οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἢ οὐ ῥᾴδιον τὰ ἐκ παλαιοῦ τοῖς ἤθεσι κατειλημμένα λόγῳ μεταστῆσαι. ἀγαπητὸν δ᾽ ἴσως ἐστὶν εἰ πάντων ὑπαρχόντων, δι᾽ ὧν ἐπιεικεῖς δοκοῦμεν γίνεσθαι, μεταλάβοιμεν τῆς ἀρετῆς.

Wherefore there is a necessity for right education.

Γίνεσθαι δ᾽ ἀγαθοὺς οἴονται οἱ μὲν φύσει, οἱ δ᾽ ἔθει, οἱ δὲ διδαχῇ. τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φύσεως δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ διά τινας θείας αἰτίας τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐτυχέσιν ὑπάρχει· ὁ δὲ λόγος καὶ ἡ διδαχὴ μή ποτ᾽ οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν ἰσχύῃ, ἀλλὰ δέῃ προδιειργάσθαι τοῖς ἔθεσι τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ ψυχὴν πρὸς τὸ καλῶς χαίρειν καὶ μισεῖν, ὥσπερ γῆν τὴν θρέψουσαν τὸ σπέρμα. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀκούσειε λόγου ἀποτρέποντος οὐδ᾽ αὖ συνείη ὁ κατὰ πάθος ζῶν· τὸν δ᾽ οὕτως ἔχοντα πῶς οἷόν τε μεταπεῖσαι; ὅλως τ᾽ οὐ δοκεῖ λόγῳ ὑπείκειν το παθος ἀλλὰ βίᾳ. δεῖ δὴ τὸ ἦθος προϋπάρχειν πως οἰκεῖον τῆς ἀρετῆς, στέργον τὸ καλὸν καὶ δυσχεραῖνον τὸ αἰσχρόν.

But this is not to be obtained except by laws.

Ἐκ νέου δ᾽ ἀγωγῆς ὀρθῆς τυχεῖν πρὸς ἀρετὴν χαλεπὸν μὴ ὑπὸ τοιούτοις τραφέντα νόμοις· τὸ γὰρ σωφρόνως καὶ καρτερικῶς ζῆν οὐχ ἡδὺ τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἄλλως τε καὶ νέοις. διὸ νόμοις δεῖ τετάχθαι τὴν τροφὴν καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα· οὐκ ἔσται γὰρ λυπηρὰ συνήθη γινόμενα. οὐχ ἱκανὸν δ᾽ ἴσως νέους ὄντας τροφῆς καὶ ἐπιμελείας τυχεῖν ὀρθῆς, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀνδρωθέντας δεῖ ἐπιτηδεύειν αὐτὰ

tue's sake, presupposes a proficiency in morals far beyond the general state of mankind. Some other motive was then clearly necessary for men sunk in vice as the heathen world, a powerful motive which no heathen, no human philosophy, could supply.

καὶ ἐθίζεσθαι, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα δεοίμεθ' ἂν νόμων, καὶ ὅλως δὴ περὶ πάντα τὸν βίον· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ ἀνάγκῃ μᾶλλον ἢ λόγῳ πειθαρχοῦσι καὶ ζημίαις ἢ τῷ καλῷ. διόπερ οἴονταί τινες τοὺς νομοθετοῦντας δεῖν μὲν παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ προτρέπεσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ χάριν, ὡς ὑπακουσομένων τῶν ἐπιεικῶς τοῖς ἔθεσι προηγμένων, ἀπειθοῦσι δὲ καὶ ἀφυεστέροις οὖσι κολάσεις τε καὶ τιμωρίας ἐπιτιθέναι, τοὺς δ' ἀνιάτους ὅλως ἐξορίζειν· τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ καὶ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῶντα τῷ λόγῳ πειθαρχήσειν, τὸν δὲ φαῦλον ἡδονῆς ὀρεγόμενον λύπῃ κολάζεσθαι ὥσπερ ὑποζύγιον. διὸ καί φασι δεῖν τοιαύτας γίνεσθαι τὰς λύπας αἳ μάλιστ' ἐναντιοῦνται ταῖς ἀγαπωμέναις ἡδοναῖς. εἰ δ' οὖν, καθάπερ εἴρηται, τὸν ἐσόμενον ἀγαθὸν τραφῆναι καλῶς δεῖ καὶ ἐθισθῆναι, εἶθ' οὕτως ἐν ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἐπιεικέσι ζῆν καὶ μήτ' ἄκοντα μήθ' ἑκόντα πράττειν τὰ φαῦλα, ταῦτα δὲ γίγνοιτ' ἂν βιουμένοις κατά τινα νοῦν καὶ τάξιν ὀρθήν, ἔχουσαν ἰσχύν.

For the education by private persons is ineffectual.

Ἡ μὲν οὖν πατρικὴ πρόσταξις οὐκ ἔχει τὸ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, οὐδὲ δὴ ὅλως ἡ ἑνὸς ἀνδρός, μὴ βασιλέως ὄντος ἤ τινος τοιούτου· ὁ δὲ νόμος ἀναγκαστικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, λόγος ὢν ἀπό τινος φρονήσεως καὶ νοῦ. καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀνθρώπων ἐχθαίρουσι τοὺς ἐναντιουμένους ταῖς ὁρμαῖς, κἂν ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ δρῶσιν· ὁ δὲ νόμος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπαχθὴς τάττων τὸ ἐπιεικές. ἐν μόνῃ δὲ τῇ Λακεδαιμονίων πόλει μετ' ὀλίγων

9. τοὺς δ' ἀνιάτους ἐξορίζειν] This was Plato's notion. See De Legibus, Book v.

ὁ νομοθέτης ἐπιμέλειαν δοκεῖ πεποιῆσθαι τροφῆς τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων· ἐν δὲ ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν πόλεων ἐξημέληται περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ζῇ ἕκαστος ὡς βούλεται, Κυκλωπικῶς "θεμιστεύων παίδων ἠδ' ἀλόχου." Κράτιστον μὲν οὖν τὸ γίγνεσθαι κοινὴν ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ ὀρθὴν καὶ δρᾶν αὐτὸ δύνασθαι· κοινῇ δ' ἐξαμελουμένων ἑκάστῳ δόξειεν ἂν προσήκειν τοῖς σφετέροις τέκνοις καὶ φίλοις εἰς ἀρετὴν συμβάλλεσθαι, ἢ προαιρεῖσθαί γε. μάλιστα δ' ἂν τοῦτο δύνασθαι δόξειεν, ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, νομοθετικὸς γενόμενος· αἱ μὲν γὰρ κοιναὶ ἐπιμέλειαι δῆλον ὅτι διὰ νόμων γίγνονται, ἐπιεικεῖς δ' αἱ διὰ τῶν σπουδαίων. γεγραμμένων δ' ἢ ἀγράφων, οὐδὲν ἂν δόξειε διαφέρειν, οὐδὲ δι' ὧν εἷς ἢ πολλοὶ παιδευθήσονται, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐπὶ μουσικῆς καὶ γυμναστικῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐνισχύει τὰ νόμιμα καὶ τὰ ἔθη, οὕτω καὶ ἐν οἰκίαις οἱ πατρικοὶ λόγοι καὶ τὰ ἔθη, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν καὶ τὰς εὐεργεσίας· προϋπάρχουσι γὰρ στέργοντες καὶ εὐπειθεῖς τῇ φύσει. Ἔτι δὲ καὶ διαφέρουσιν αἱ καθ' ἕκαστον παιδεῖαι τῶν κοινῶν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ἰατρικῆς· καθόλου μὲν γὰρ τῷ πυρέττοντι συμφέρει ἡσυχία καὶ ἀσιτία, τινὶ δ' ἴσως οὔ, ὅ τε πυκτικὸς ἴσως οὐ πᾶσι τὴν αὐτὴν μάχην περιτίθησιν. ἐξακριβοῦσθαι δὴ δόξειεν ἂν μᾶλλον τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον ἰδίας τῆς ἐπιμελείας γινομένης· μᾶλλον γὰρ τοῦ προσφόρου

Necessity of public education.

Comparative advantages of public and private education.

4. Κυκλωπικῶς] See Odyss. i. 114. See Arist. Pol. i. 1.

τυγχάνει ἕκαστος. ἀλλ' ἐπιμεληθείη μὲν ἄριστα καθ' ἓν καὶ ἰατρὸς καὶ γυμναστὴς καὶ πᾶς ἄλλος ὁ τὸ καθόλου εἰδώς, ὅτι πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς τοιοῖσδε· τοῦ κοινοῦ γὰρ αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι λέγονταί τε καὶ εἰσίν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑνός τινος οὐδὲν ἴσως κωλύει καλῶς ἐπιμεληθῆναι καὶ ἀνεπιστήμονα ὄντα, τεθεαμένον δ' ἀκριβῶς τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ δι' ἐμπειρίαν, καθάπερ καὶ ἰατροὶ ἔνιοι δοκοῦσιν ἑαυτῶν ἄριστοι εἶναι, ἑτέρῳ οὐδὲν ἂν δυνάμενοι ἐπαρκέσαι. οὐδὲν δ' ἧττον ἴσως τῷ γε βουλομένῳ τεχνικῷ γενέσθαι καὶ θεωρητικῷ ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλου βαδιστέον εἶναι δόξειεν ἄν, κἀκεῖνο γνωριστέον ὡς ἐνδέχεται· εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι περὶ τοῦθ' αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι.

Necessity of a knowledge of politics to be a good teacher.

Τάχα δὲ καὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ δι' ἐπιμελείας βελτίους ποιεῖν, εἴτε πολλοὺς εἴτ' ὀλίγους, νομοθετικῷ πειρατέον γενέσθαι, εἰ διὰ νόμων ἀγαθοὶ γενοίμεθ' ἄν. ὅντινα γὰρ οὖν καὶ τὸν προτεθέντα διαθεῖναι καλῶς οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ τυχόντος, ἀλλ' εἴπερ τινός, τοῦ εἰδότος, ὥσπερ ἐπ' ἰατρικῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ὧν ἐστὶν ἐπιμέλειά τις καὶ φρόνησις. ἆρ' οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπισκεπτέον πόθεν ἢ πῶς νομοθετικὸς γένοιτ' ἄν τις, ἢ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, παρὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν; μόριον γὰρ ἐδόκει τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι.

Whether politics can be taught.

Ἢ οὐχ ὅμοιον φαίνεται ἐπὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐπιστημῶν τε καὶ δυνάμεων; ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις οἱ αὐτοὶ φαίνονται τάς τε δυνάμεις παραδιδόντες

4. τοῦ κοινοῦ] According to the well-known dictum of Plato.

26. ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις] *For in the other arts and sciences the same persons are seen to teach the use and faculty of them, as exercise them.*

καὶ ἐνεργοῦντες ἀπ' αὐτῶν, οἷον ἰατροὶ καὶ γραφεῖς· τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ ἐπαγγέλλονται μὲν διδάσκειν οἱ σοφισταί, πράττει δ' αὐτῶν οὐδείς, ἀλλ' οἱ πολιτευόμενοι, οἳ δόξαιεν ἂν δυνάμει τινὶ τοῦτο πράττειν καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ διανοίᾳ· οὔτε γὰρ γράφοντες οὔτε λέγοντες περὶ τῶν τοιούτων φαίνονται (καίτοι κάλλιον ἦν ἴσως ἢ λόγους δικανικούς τε καὶ δημηγορικούς), οὐδ' αὖ πολιτικοὺς πεποιηκόντες τοὺς σφετέρους υἱεῖς ἤ τινας ἄλλους τῶν φίλων. εὔλογον δ' ἦν, εἴπερ ἐδύναντο· οὔτε γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄμεινον οὐδὲν κατέλιπον ἄν, οὔθ' αὑτοῖς ὑπάρξαι προέλοιντ' ἂν μᾶλλον τῆς τοιαύτης δυνάμεως, οὐδὲ δὴ τοῖς φιλτάτοις. οὐ μὴν μικρόν γε ἔοικεν ἡ ἐμπειρία συμβάλλεσθαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγίγνοντ' ἂν διὰ τῆς πολιτικῆς συνηθείας πολιτικοί· διὸ τοῖς ἐφιεμένοις περὶ πολιτικῆς εἰδέναι προσδεῖν ἔοικεν ἐμπειρίας. τῶν δὲ σοφιστῶν οἱ ἐπαγγελλόμενοι λίαν φαίνονται πόρρω εἶναι τοῦ διδάξαι· ὅλως γὰρ οὐδὲ ποῖόν τί ἐστιν ἢ περὶ ποῖα ἴσασιν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ ῥητορικῇ οὐδὲ χείρω ἐτίθεσαν, οὐδ' ἂν ᾤοντο ῥᾴδιον εἶναι τὸ νομοθετῆσαι συναγαγόντι τοὺς εὐδοκιμοῦντας τῶν νόμων· ἐκλέξασθαι γὰρ εἶναι τοὺς ἀρίστους, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὴν ἐκλογὴν οὖσαν συνέσεως καὶ τὸ κρῖναι ὀρθῶς μέγιστον, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μουσικήν· οἱ γὰρ ἔμπειροι περὶ ἕκαστα κρίνουσιν ὀρθῶς τὰ ἔργα, καὶ δι' ὧν ἢ πῶς ἐπιτελεῖται συνιᾶσιν, καὶ ποῖα ποίοις

10. εὔλογον δ' ἦν] See Plato's Protag. passim.

συνᾴδει· τοῖς δ' ἀπείροις ἀγαπητὸν τὸ μὴ διαλανθάνειν εἰ εὖ ἢ κακῶς πεποίηται τὸ ἔργον, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ γραφικῆς. οἱ δὲ νόμοι τῆς πολιτικῆς ἔργοις ἐοίκασιν· πῶς οὖν ἐκ τούτων νομοθετικὸς γένοιτ' ἄν τις, ἢ τοὺς ἀρίστους κρίναι; οὐ γὰρ φαίνονται οὐδ' ἰατρικοὶ ἐκ τῶν συγγραμμάτων γίνεσθαι. καίτοι πειρῶνταί γε λέγειν οὐ μόνον τὰ θεραπεύματα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς ἰαθεῖεν ἂν καὶ ὡς δεῖ θεραπεύειν ἑκάστους, διελόμενοι τὰς ἕξεις. ταῦτα δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἐμπείροις ὠφέλιμα εἶναι δοκεῖ, τοῖς δ' ἀνεπιστήμοσιν ἀχρεῖα. ἴσως οὖν καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν αἱ συναγωγαὶ τοῖς μὲν δυναμένοις θεωρῆσαι καὶ κρῖναι τί καλῶς ἢ τοὐναντίον καὶ ποῖα ποίοις ἁρμόττει, εὔχρηστ' ἂν εἴη· τοῖς δ' ἄνευ ἕξεως τὰ τοιαῦτα διεξιοῦσι τὸ μὲν κρίνειν καλῶς οὐκ ἂν ὑπάρχοι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα αὐτόματον, εὐσυνετώτεροι δ' εἰς ταῦτα τάχ' ἂν γένοιντο. παραλιπόντων οὖν τῶν προτέρων ἀνερεύνητον τὸ περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας, αὐτοὺς ἐπισκέψασθαι μᾶλλον βέλτιον ἴσως, καὶ ὅλως δὴ περὶ πολιτείας, ὅπως εἰς δύναμιν ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα φιλοσοφία τελειωθῇ. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εἴ τι κατὰ μέρος εἴρηται καλῶς ὑπὸ τῶν προγενεστέρων πειραθῶμεν ἐπελθεῖν, εἶτα ἐκ τῶν συνηγμένων πολιτειῶν θεωρῆσαι τὰ ποῖα σῴζει καὶ φθείρει τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὰ ποῖα ἑκάστας τῶν πολιτειῶν, καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας αἱ μὲν καλῶς αἱ δὲ τοὐναντίον πολιτεύον-

12. πολιτειῶν αἱ συναγωγαί] Upon which subject Aristotle composed a work, of which unfortunately a few fragments only remain.

ται· θεωρηθέντων γὰρ τούτων τάχ' ἂν μᾶλλον συνίδοιμεν καὶ ποία πολιτεία ἀρίστη, καὶ πῶς ἑκάστη ταχθεῖσα, καὶ τίσι νόμοις καὶ ἔθεσι χρωμένη. λέγωμεν οὖν ἀρξάμενοι.

APPENDIX.

BOOK I. CHAP. III.

Concerning Plato's doctrine of the Chief or Ideal Good.

CONSIDERABLE difficulties present themselves in the explanation of this Chapter. Not so much from any intricacy or obscurity in Aristotle's reasoning, as because the theory of Plato respecting the Chief Good, and more than all, the process by which he arrived at his results, are so little known to us.

Nor does Aristotle enter here very fully or very deeply into the refutation of Plato's notions, which he appears to have done in another treatise expressly directed to this subject: unfortunately both the books in which Plato developed this intricate part of his philosophy, and the writings of Aristotle on the same subject, have been lost; and consequently all our knowledge respecting it must be gathered from scattered and indirect notices which occur in the different parts of his writings, and some of his Greek commentators.

Many such passages have been collected both from books and commentaries yet remaining in manuscript by Brandis; and were published by him in an unpresuming but excellent little dissertation [a], in which he has thrown considerable light upon this subject. Three years after, another essay appeared upon the same subject by Trendelenburg [b], the

[a] Christiani Augusti Brandis Diatribe Academica de perditis Aristotelis libris de ideis et de bono sive philosophia. Bonnæ, apud E. Weber, 1823. 8vo. pp. 69.

[b] Platonis de ideis et numeris doctrina ex Aristotele illustrata, scripsit Friderichus Adolphus Trendelenburg. Lipsiæ, 1826. Sumtibus F. C. G. Vogelii. 8vo. pp. 100.

industrious editor of Aristotle's Treatise De Anima, and a valuable contributor to the Rhenish Museum. By a careful comparison of Plato with Aristotle, in such passages as appeared to bear upon this subject, a consistent and correct view has been endeavoured to be formed of Plato's doctrine of the Ideal Good, although unfortunately much must be still left to conjecture[c].

But the history and origin of this peculiarity in the philosophy of Plato, is not entirely insulated from the systems of his predecessors: in them will be found many of the separate component parts of this doctrine of Ideas. The desire of Plato to reconcile the discordant tenets of his teachers, first directed him to this theory, whilst he amalgamated into a uniform and perfect whole the discordant elements as they passed through the crucible of his mind.

In the earlier part of his life he had associated with Cratylus, and had been a disciple in the school of Heraclitus[d]. That philosopher taught him that all things sensible were in

[c] Some other foreign writers have also composed treatises upon this subject, but generally only with a slight acquaintance with the writings of Aristotle; and some under that old delusion, that Aristotle, the careful, exact and learned disciple of Plato for twenty years, either would not or could not fairly present to us the tenets of his master; that he who has so carefully preserved and explained the doctrines of the earlier philosophers, has not shown the same fairness and ability in regard to Plato. To this objection Trendelenburg most justly replies: "quod si nescivisset Aristoteles tanti ingenii vir, per tot annos Platonis familiaris,—quis tandem sciret? Noluisse vero, ii sibi suadeant, qui iis, quæ hic illic apud seriores scriptores de dissidio inter Platonem et Aristotelem et de quadam Aristotelis in præceptorem superbia leguntur, fidem habere malunt, quam magno et sincero Aristotelis ingenio, quale in scriptis ubique cernitur, et iis ipsis ex Platone apud Aristotelem exemplis, quæ cum Platone collata optime conspirant. Sed fuerint dissidia, de quibus minime satis constat. Num ex his consequens est Aristotelem Platonis philosophiam in pejus detorsisse? Veteres Aristotelis obtrectatores, quodcumque invidia finxit, in eum congerere non verentur. In Platonem ingratum fuisse criminantur; nec tamen ullum hoc ausum esse scio, Aristotelem Platonis sententias falso interpretatum esse. Quare quidquid fabularum est de Aristotelis aut impia malignitate aut sordida æmulatione (quo enim quis major, eo magis multitudinis infra se positæ obtrectationibus objectus), impedimento esse nequit, quominus Aristoteles Platonis sententias exponens locuples testes habeatur." Platonis de Ideis, &c. p. 3.

[d] See Aristot. Met. i. 6. from whom this account of Plato's progression in philosophy is derived.

a constant flux, and of such consequently there could be no certain science (ὡς ἁπάντων τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀεὶ ῥεόντων καὶ ἐπιστήμης περὶ αὐτῶν οὐκ οὔσης). By his master Socrates, on the contrary, whose enquiries were confined exclusively to ethics, his attention was turned in a Logical direction; he was taught to disregard particulars, and to look to universals and general notions.

In unison, therefore, with his master Socrates, and perhaps the Megaric philosophers before him, Plato saw that all knowledge of the truth must be destroyed, unless it could be proved in opposition to Heraclitus, that continued motion is not the essence of things; and secondly, that truth and real essence is not throughout so entirely identical as to have no diversity, (as the Eleatic School asserted,) but embraced within itself many particular ideas, each of which in its own way is expressive of the eternal essence of things.

The method in which he or his predecessors proceeded to prove that there were such things as *Ideas* entirely and essentially distinct, and having a separate and independent existence from things sensible, was in the following way[e].

If every science always performs its ἔργον, keeping in view some one and the same thing (πρὸς ἕν τι καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπαναφέρουσα), and not regarding particulars or individuals, there must be something else in every science beyond and beside things sensible, which is eternal, and a type of all those things which are produced according to each science; and this is the *Idea*. Farther, those things must exist of which there is any science. But all sciences are of something beyond individuals or particulars, (for these are infinite and indefinite, whereas the sciences are finite and definite); there is then something in every science beyond the particulars (τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα) of science, and this is the Idea. Further, if the science of medicine is not a science of any particular or individual health, (τῆσδε τῆς ὑγιείας,) but of health absolutely, there is a certain absolute health (αὐτου-

[e] See the MS. commentary of Alexander on the Metaph. quoted by Brandis l. c. p. 16.

γεία); and if Geometry is not a science merely of this or that particular equal or commensurate quantity, but of the equal and commensurate absolutely there must be some absolute equal and commensurate (τὸ αὐτοΐσον καὶ αὐτοσύμμετρον), and these are the Ideas. 2dly, If every one of the multitude of men is a man, and of animals an animal, and so on, and there is no individual of them of which the absolute, sole and very man can be predicated, (καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐφ' ἑκάστου αὐτῶν αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ τι κατηγορούμενον), but there is something which is predicated of all of them, yet not identical with any one of them, there must be this something besides these particulars, separate and distinct from them; which also must be eternal, for it is always and equally predicated of all things differing in number. But that single thing which may be predicated of the many (ἓν ἐπὶ πολλοῖς), but yet distinct and separate from the many, and eternal, is the *Idea*.

3dly, When we take into our minds the notion of man or animal, we do not consider any particular living man or animal. For if every individual man or animal were destroyed, the notion itself of them would still remain. It is clear, therefore, that there is something besides and beyond particulars, of which, whether they exist or whether they do not exist, we have a conception, which itself must have an existence, (for we cannot have a conception of that which has no existence, or of a non-entity); this then is the Idea[f].

[f] In this Plato differed from his master, (see Metaph. xii. 4.), for Socrates separated not definitions from the things themselves (τὰ καθόλου οὐ χώριστα ἐποίει), as did the authors of the doctrine of Ideas, (οἱ δ' ἐχώρισαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ἰδέας προσηγόρευσαν), and according to these, all things received their appellations, (καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι πάντα). For things sensible are of the same name but not of the same essence with the Ideas. In this point Plato differed from Pythagoras. κατὰ μέθεξιν γὰρ εἶναι τὰ πολλὰ τῶν συνωνύμων ὁμώνυμα τοῖς εἴδεσι· τὴν δὲ μέθεξιν τοὔνομα μόνον μετέβαλεν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ Πυθαγόρειοι μιμήσει τὰ ὄντα φασὶν εἶναι τῶν ἀριθμῶν, Πλάτων δὲ μεθέξει. (Arist. Met. i. 6.) Plato differed from Pythagoras, as it appears to me, only in a different view of the subject; Plato said that things sensible were the same as the *Idea*, only homonymously, the same in name, but not in essence, Pythagoras that they were the same by imitation; which amounts to the same thing. For as a painted horse imitates a real horse, so is it homonymous with a real horse. So that whether we say that a painted horse is a horse, because it is the representation of a horse (μίμησις, according

Having thus determined the existence of the Ideas, which are in themselves immutable, and the vestiges of which exist in our own minds[g], Plato proceeded to investigate their nature and principles. But since he was not competent to investigate these eternal forms in the nature of the things themselves, he turned his attention to those impressions of them only, which he was convinced were to be found in his own and in the minds of every one. These he supposed that he had found in numbers, because they alone might be learnt without the assistance of any other science, and were likewise the elements of all knowledge[h].

For since the Ideas are the causes to all other things of their existence, the elements of the Ideas must be the elements of all things[i]. [k]But since number exists previous to all other things, (for the boundaries of lines are points, and points are only units in position, and previous to lines there can be neither surfaces nor solids), therefore number, and consequently the principles of numbers, must be the principles of all things. But the first of all numbers is the duad, and the principles of the duad are unity, the great and the little. For the duad includes in itself both many and few; as far as it is a double, many; as far it is a half, few; consequently it includes in itself, excess and defect, the great and the small. But inasmuch as each of its parts is a unit, and itself a species of unit, as being the duad and a single number (τὸ δυαδικόν); for this reason it was conceived that

to the Pythagorean view), or whether we say that a painted horse is a horse homonymously (μεθέξει having the name and not the essence), we express much the same thing though in a somewhat different way. This seems to me to be the meaning of the passage; unless more be implied in reference to the particular views of each philosopher; the one looking more to numbers, the other to the abstract terms of Logic. Plato, at all events, appears to use the terms μίμησις and μέθεξις synonimously.

g For the εἴδη have neither substance nor place, and consequently exist in the mind, not derived from sensible objects, but prior to them. See Arist. Phys. iii. 4. iv. 2. Trend. p. 45.

h Brandis, p. 61.

i ἐπεὶ δ' αἴτια τὰ εἴδη τοῖς ἄλλοις τἀκείνων στοιχεῖα ἁπάντων ᾠήθη τῶν ὄντων εἶναι στοιχεῖα· ὡς μὲν οὖν ὕλην τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν εἶναι ἀρχάς, ὡς δ' οὐσίαν τὸ ἕν· ἐξ ἐκείνων γὰρ κατὰ μέθεξιν τοῦ ἑνὸς τὰ εἴδη εἶναι τοὺς ἀριθμούς. Arist. Met. i. 6.

k Brandis 38.

unity, great and small, are the principles or elements of the duad. Since then numbers are the principles of all other things, and exist independently of them, the Ideas must be identical with numbers, and consequently the principles of the one will be the principles of the others. The matter[l] of the Ideas then is the great and small, or the indefinite duad, and their form is unity. Not that these numbers are to be confounded with mathematical numbers. For these ideal numbers (ἀριθμοὶ εἰδητικοί), which are the elements of all things, differ from the mathematical. For the mathematical numbers admit of union, and are combinable (συμβλητοί), but the ideal are not. The ideal numbers differ from each other not only in number, but also in their elements, each ideal number consisting of different elements[m].

It may be questioned then, how it is that Aristotle affirms, that they who introduced this doctrine did not form an IDEA of numbers, inasmuch as they made no ideas of those things in which they predicated priority and posteriority (οὐκ ἐποίουν ἰδέας ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον ἔλεγον· διόπερ οὐδὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἰδέαν κατεσκεύασαν)[i]. But this question receives its answer, if we bear in mind the distinction of numbers already stated. For posteriority and priority are the conditions of the existence of mathematical numbers, for the existence of a posterior number depends upon the previous existence of a prior number. And consequently there can be no common idea of this species of numbers[n].

[l] The matter or ὕλη of Plato was nothing else than that which has a capacity of receiving quality and quantity, or more correctly, *form* (δεξαμένη τῶν εἰδῶν).

[m] This distinction of numbers was afterwards abandoned by the disciples of Plato. Perhaps he was induced to this distinction from the fear lest the diversity of notions, which it was one of his main objects to defend, should be extinguished by referring all things to numbers, which are homogeneous, (ὁμοειδεῖς, συμβλητοί.) Brandis 45. See Trend. 75.

[n] The passage in the Metaphysics, xiii. 6, as it now stands, seems to be directly contrary not only to this in the Ethics, but to all that we yet know of this doctrine of Ideas. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀμφοτέρους φασὶν εἶναι τοὺς ἀριθμούς, τὸν μὲν ἔχοντα τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον τὰς ἰδέας, τὸν δὲ μαθηματικὸν παρὰ τὰς ἰδέας καὶ τὰ αἰσθητά καὶ χωριστοὺς ἀμφοτέρους τῶν αἰσθητῶν. οἱ δὲ τὸν μαθηματικὸν μόνον ἀριθμὸν εἶναι τὸν πρῶτον τῶν ὄντων κεχωρισμένον τῶν αἰσθητῶν. Unless we read τὸν μὲν μὴ ἔχοντα, as Trendelenburg suggests, p. 82, it is not easy to see how the two passages are reconcileable.

° Not to enter then further into the consideration of this abstract subject than may serve to illustrate the chapter before us, it may be observed, in conclusion, that Plato referred the Chief Good to the highest unity [p]. But he distinguished this supreme entity from the unity of mathematical numbers (as we have already stated), but how all other things depended upon this Idea of the Good, he has no where precisely stated [q].

It is also extremely difficult to determine the several relations of the ideal numbers, the Ideas, and the things sensible. For Plato did not hold with the Pythagoreans, that numbers are the things themselves, (that is, that the essence of things is to be found on them). And whether he considered them as the rule and type, according to which ideas were formed by the chief principle of all things, as things sensible were formed from the *Ideas*, or whether certain powers which gave birth to the genera or ideas of all things according to certain numerical combinations, remains uncertain.

° Brandis 65.

p See the Seventh Book of the Republic.

q Neque igitur dubium est, quin Plato inter eos fuerit de quibus Aristoteles: *τῶν δὲ τὰς ἀκινήτους οὐσίας εἶναι λεγόντων οἱ μὲν φάσιν αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι, οὐσίαν μέντοι τὸ ἓν αὐτοῦ ᾤοντο εἶναι μάλιστα* (Metaph. xiv. 4.). Qua in re ab eo dissensit unus ex discipulis, isque Speusippus. Ad Aristotelis enim verba l. 1. p. 247. *διόπερ ὁ μὲν ἔφευγε τὸ ἀγαθὸν προσάπτειν τῷ ἑνὶ ὡς ἐναντίον ὄν, ἐπειδὴ ἐξ ἐναντίων ἡ γένεσις, τὸ κακὸν τὴν τοῦ πλήθους φύσιν εἶναι· οἱ δὲ λέγουσι τὸ ἄνισον τὴν τοῦ κακοῦ φύσιν· συμβαίνει δὴ πάντα τὰ ὄντα μετέχειν τοῦ κακοῦ, ἔξω ἑνὸς αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἑνὸς κ. τ. λ.* quæ ad verba igitur Pseudo-Alexander: *ὁ συνεωρακὼς Σπεύσιππος, λέγω δὴ τό, εἰ τὸ ἓν ἀγαθόν, ἀνάγκη τὸ μὴ ἓν τὸ ὑλικὸν κακὸν εἶναι, ἀπέφυγε καὶ προσάπτειν οὐκ ἠθέλησε τὸ ἀγαθὸν τῷ ἑνί.* Cf. Stob. Ecl. Phys. i. p. 58. ed. Heeren. Brandis 66.

CORRIGENDA.

Page 35. chap. viii. *for* internal *read* external

360. chap. iv. l. 17. *for* unless he be a friend *read* unless he be a friend to himself

362. n. 6. line 1. *for* the great man *read* the good man

INDEX.

INDEX.

INDEX.

INDEX.

B.

E.

INDEX.

INDEX.

INDEX.

INDEX.

I.

K.

INDEX.

Λ.

M.

N.

Π.

INDEX.

INDEX.

INDEX.

INDEX.

Φ.

X.

INDEX.

Ψ.

Ω.

FINIS.

BAXTER, PRINTER, OXFORD